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 I 
Abstract 
 
This thesis analyzes the political discourse on skilled labour migration in Germany 
between 2005 and 2009 and investigates how and why skilled labour migration polices are 
negotiated in the Federal Republic of Germany. In particular the thesis highlights the 
significance of underlying policy maker motives within the policy formation process of 
Germany’s 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration as well as their ultimate 
imprint on the legislation. The critical discourse analysis of parliamentary debate in 
Germany between 2005 and 2009 in conjunction with interviews with relevant national 
policy makers, institutional actors, labour market stakeholder, and independent policy 
advisors reveals that there is a significant discrepancy between policy maker intent in 
regards to skilled labour migration legislation and the stated intent of the 2009 Action 
Programme. While the stated aim of the Action Programme is to facilitate and promote 
skilled labour migration to Germany, the analysis of relevant political debate and the 
stakeholder interviews reveals that German policy makers are primarily motivated to 
protect and promote preferential labour market access for domestic workers while at the 
same time restricting undesired labour migration to Germany. As a result, the policy 
measures of the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration have a strong 
protectionist and restrictionist emphasis. 
 Moreover, the thesis reveals that the complex and multilayered power-negotiations 
over skilled labour migration legislation between the various policy makers, institutional 
actors, and labour market stakeholders are largely shaped and framed by domestic political 
considerations. Notwithstanding the widely acknowledged global competition over skilled 
workers and the need for German labour market to maintain competitive within the global 
economy, immigration policy makers in Germany are primarily motivated by factors that 
are firmly embedded within the national political sphere and that aim to control, limit, and 
restrict territorial access of foreign workers into the national labour market. This in turn 
highlights the need for migration scholars to reposition and re-conceptualize the role of the 
nation-state and as an active agent in shaping international labour migration flows.  
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 1 
Chapter One – Introduction 
 
1.0 – Introduction 
 
 This thesis investigates the policy formation process of the 2009 Action 
Programme on Skilled Labour Migration in Germany and discusses the results within the 
context of relevant migration theory. Utilizing Critical Discourse Analysis of 
parliamentary debate transcripts and conducting expert interviews with policy makers, 
institutional actors, labour market stakeholder, and policy advisors, the thesis identifies a 
series of underlying policy maker motives within the political negotiations and policy 
formation process of the 2009 legislation. These underlying policy maker motives 
provide critical insight on the determinants of state action towards skilled labour 
migration in Germany and thus contribute to a more nuanced scholarly understanding of 
the causal relationship between state action and skilled labour migration legislation 
within migration theory.  
 
1.1 – Theory Context 
 
 Within the scholarship on international labour migration there is a growing 
awareness and recognition that immigration policies in many OECD countries are 
increasingly designed to facilitate the flow of skilled foreign professionals into their 
respective national labour markets (Skeldon, 2008; van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007; 
Freeman, 2006; Iredale, 2005, Hollifield, 2004). Over the past decades many 
economically advanced nation-states have implemented new and adjusted existing 
immigration legislation in order to attract skilled foreign workers and fill gaps within the 
domestic labour market (Ley, 2003; Appleyard, 2001; Iredale, 1999).1 According to 
Portes (2009), national labour markets in many advanced economies have in fact become 
dependent on foreign labour to supplement the domestic skilled labour pool and 
Mahroum (2001) links legislative changes in labour migration policy among 
                                                
1 Within the European Union attempts were even made, albeit with limited success, to create a post-national labour 
migration policy for high skill professionals from outside the European Union (Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009; 
van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007; Hix et al, 2007). 
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economically advanced nation-states to the increased global interconnectivity of 
commercial and financial networks. According to Mahroum there is a growing tendency 
within industrialized democracies in Europe, North America, and Australia to channel 
skilled labour migration flows into formalized legal frameworks because ‘immigration, 
particularly of the highly skilled, is becoming increasingly an inseparable segment of 
national and economic development policies’ (2001, p. 27). Ley (2003) concurs with this 
assessment and states that national policy makers and labour market stakeholders in 
OECD countries increasingly view skilled labour migration as a remedy against growing 
skills shortages and lingering demographic decline.  
 While there is an increased scholarly interest in skilled labour migration and 
associated state legislative frameworks and policies, migration scholars point to the 
frequent discrepancy between labour migration policy goals and the actual policy 
outcomes in many migrant receiving countries (Samers, 2009; Boswell, 2007; Castles, 
2004; Hollifield, 2004; Massey, 1999; Cornelius et al, 1994). There is a scholarly 
consensus that labour migration policy formation processes are poorly understood and 
under-theorized within migration scholarship and as a consequence they often fail to 
achieve their intended objectives and instead result in unintended policy outcomes  
 While migration scholars recognize that national governments and national 
regulatory regimes play an important role in regulating, facilitating, and controlling 
skilled labour migration flows, the theories on labour migration do not adequately 
conceptualize and incorporate the ‘nation-state as an agent influencing the volume and 
composition of international migration’ (Massey, 1999, p. 303). According to Samers 
(2010, p. 181) the main problem with incorporating immigration polices into the theories 
of international migration is linked to the simplistic conceptualization of the nation-state 
and its supposed objectives within migration scholarship. Samers argues that ‘the state is 
not monolithic; that is, the state is not a ‘thing’ with one voice; it is not simply a one-
room chamber of expert sages that churn out policy. Rather states are complex 
apparatuses which contain many levels and different ‘branches’ or ‘wings’, often in 
conflict with each other’ (2009, p. 181). Freeman & Kessler (2008, p. 657) also believe 
that the fundamental role of states in stimulating and organizing migration flows remains 
under theorized and point out that migration scholars have yet to produce a full-scale 
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effort to “apply a theory of the state to migration politics and policy”.  Freeman (2011, p. 
1549) states, “that the determinants of policy are complex, difficult to pin down, and 
certainly not reducible to preferences of individual actors or group-level demands” and 
laments that the motives that underlie state action in regards to immigration polices are 
inadequately conceptualized within migration theory.    
 There is a broad census that in order to properly conceptualize the state and 
associated state action on immigration polices within existing migration theory, 
researchers need to account for complexities as well as the multiple layers and scales of 
the actors, agents, institutions, and stakeholders involved in migration policy formation 
processes as well as account for the social, economic, and political context in which these 
policy formation processes are embedded. Particular attention must be paid to the 
underlying motives embedded within power negotiations over skilled labour migration 
legislation. This thesis will therefore investigate the multiple layers and scales of 
migration policy formation processes and identify relevant actors, agents, institutions, 
and stakeholders through Critical Discourse Analysis. The thesis contribution to 
knowledge will be an improved scholarly understanding of state action towards 
international skilled labour migration in economically advanced nation-states as well as a 
critical conceptualization and incorporation of skilled labour migration policy formation 
processes within the broader framework of immigration theory.   
 
1.2 – Research Aims 
 
 This thesis aims to critically evaluate how and why skilled labour migration 
policies are formulated within economically advanced migrant receiving nation-states. It 
is apparent that the agency and the motives of national immigration policy makers within 
the state’s migration management process constitute a black box that migration scholars 
find difficult to address and adequately conceptualize within existing migration theory. 
Instead of lamenting supposed widespread migration policy failure and perceived short-
sightedness of national policy makers in respect to labour migration, this thesis aims to 
deconstruct and analyze the entire policy formation process of a single piece of skilled 
labour migration legislation under the inclusion of all relevant policy makers, institutional 
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actors, and labour market stakeholders involved in the official and unofficial political 
power negotiations over the policy. In particular, the thesis aims to critically evaluate the 
multi-layered and complex processes of labour migration policy formation in order to 
identify underlying motives that determine state action in regards to migration policy. 
Furthermore the thesis aims demonstrate that specific thematic aspects of skilled labour 
migration legislation are in fact a reflection of specific policy maker or stakeholder 
interest. Instead of conceptualizing labour migration legislation as a singular expression 
of political will, the thesis will deconstruct the policy formation process and the 
corresponding legislation alongside its different thematic components in order to 
highlight the different layers of the political negotiation process. The thesis will illustrate 
that the nation-state is not a monolithic institutional entity and that state action on skilled 
labour migration policy is not the singular political expression of this entity. Instead the 
thesis will highlight that migration policy formation processes are the result of multiple 
layers of political negotiation and an expression of particular as well as multiple policy 
maker motives. The study will thus highlight and stress the significance of underlying 
policy makers’ motives in shaping and determining state action on international skilled 
labour migration, thereby demonstrating that immigration policy formation processes are 
in fact far more complex than migration scholarship credits them. 
 
1.3 – The Case for Germany  
 
 Unlike countries such as Canada and the United States, the Federal Republic of 
Germany does not have a tradition of importing skilled foreign labour and German policy 
makers have only recently recognized the economic and labour market potential of 
skilled foreign professionals. Even though Germany has seen significant amendments and 
far-reaching reforms to its immigration and citizenship laws over the past decade, 
successive governments have neglected to establish an appropriate policy framework for 
skilled labour recruitment (Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009; Bauder 2008). Previous 
immigration reform primarily were aimed at improving the social conditions and legal 
status of Germany’s existing migrant community and were therefore not necessarily 
intended to facilitate further immigration to Germany. However, following the 2005 
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federal election employers, industry representatives, and labour market analysts warned 
the federal government about increased skilled labour shortages within the national 
labour market that were starting to threaten economic growth in Germany and they called 
on government to ease restrictions on skilled foreign workers (BDI, 2009; BDA 2009: 
Bade, 2006). As a response, in 2008 the then grand coalition government introduced a 
policy initiative called “Labour migration’s contribution to securing the skilled workers 
base in Germany” (see appendix A) which made the following seven recommendations:   
 
1. Open the national labour market for university graduates from the new EU 
member states 
2. Extend the derogation of freedom of movement for new EU members from 
eastern Europe 
3. Lower minimum income threshold for skilled foreign professionals 
4. Open national labour market for university graduates from third countries  
5. Preferential admission of graduates from oversees German schools  
6. Improvement of status of foreign students educated in the German 
primary/secondary school system but who do not hold a permanent residence 
permit  
7. Improve basic conditions for prospective migrant workers and those already in the 
country 
 
Both the upper (Bundesrat) and lower house (Bundestag) of the German parliament 
supported the policy initiative and it became federal law on January 1st 2009.  
 Even though the policy’s short, medium, and long-term impacts on the German 
labour market are not evident at this point, the 2009 Action Programme of the Federal 
Government: Labour migration's contribution to securing the skilled labour base in 
Germany represents an unique research opportunity to enhance scholarly understanding 
of skilled labour migration policy formation processes in economically advanced nation-
states. The 2009 Action Programme allows an all-encompassing and thorough analysis of 
the entire policy formation process and associated political power negotiations, thus 
providing critical insight into the complex and multi-layered process of skilled labour 
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migration policy formation in Germany and potentially other migrant receiving countries. 
Germany’s Action Programme represents an excellent research opportunity to enhance 
scholarly understanding of underlying policy maker’s motives that determine state action 
in regards to skilled labour migration legislation. This then enables a more critical and 
nuanced conceptualization of state action and labour migration policies within migration 
theory. 
 Aside from contributing to wider immigration theory, the 2009 Action 
Programme on Skilled Labour Migration also constitutes an opportunity to reposition and 
reassert the significance of skilled labour migration in specific and immigration in 
general within the German socio-political context. The Action Programme represents a 
paradigm shift in national immigration policy as the Germany’s governing elites 
acknowledged for the first time in thirty-five years that the German labour market will 
need to recruit skilled workers from abroad in order to sustain economic growth in the 
future. Previous political debates on immigration and associated polices have for the most 
part revolved around facilitating the integration of existing migrant communities (asylum, 
family reunion, undocumented) and more significant restricting further immigration to 
Germany (Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009; Boswell et al, 2008; Kruse, 2003, 
Joppke, 1999). The Action Programme is the first piece of legislation since 1973 that 
seeks to encourage future migration to a country that for most of its history claimed not to 
be a country of immigration (Joppke, 2000). It is therefore very likely that the 2009 
policy has implications that go beyond the German labour market.  
 Moreover, scholarly research on immigration related topics in Germany has 
traditionally been dominated and significantly influenced by theories of national identity 
and national citizenship due to the ascribed ethno-cultural conception of German 
nationhood and associated citizenship laws (Preuss, 2003; Joppke, 2000; Brubaker, 
1992). However, recent legal changes to Germany’s citizenship laws and the increased 
recognition of Germany as a country of immigration has rendered much of the previous 
migration scholarship and related identity politics on Germany obsolete (Bauder & 
Semmelroggen, 2009; Stalker, 2002). Thus scholarly research on skilled labour migration 
and corresponding policy frameworks in Germany can be undertaken in the context of 
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labour migration and labour market theory without the research being completely 
shrouded by identity politics.   
 The fact that the policy formation process of the 2009 Action Programme is 
located in its entirety within the 2005 to 2009 legislative period and the absence of 
previous skilled labour migration legislation in Germany allows for a comprehensive, all-
encompassing critical analysis of the legislation’s formation process and the associated 
political discourse. The limited and clearly defined temporal scale enables a complete 
analysis of the parliamentary debates that preceded the implementation of the 2009 
Action Programme. Furthermore, the political constellation within the federal German 
government during the Action Programme’s policy formation process constitutes an 
additional advantage for empirical research on immigration policy and associated 
political discourse. The 2009 legislation was formulated and implemented during the 
grand coalition government (2005-2009) between the centre-right Christian Democrats 
and centre-left Social Democrats.2 This, by German standards, unique political 
constellation significantly influenced the political debate surrounding the legislation as 
the two main parties were coalition partners and effectively enjoyed a parliamentary 
majority capable of ignoring the official opposition. This is insofar significant as the topic 
of immigration, particularly legislation encouraging immigration, is ideologically charged 
and is easily instrumentalized by opposition parties as a political opportunity structure to 
mobilize voters with anti-immigration sentiment (Castles & Miller, 2009; Bauder & 
Semmelroggen, 2009; Boswell et al, 2008; Kruse et al, 2003).  
  
1.4 - Research Methodology 
  
 This thesis explores the complex and nuanced ways in which national policy 
makers, institutional actors, and labour market stakeholders in Germany shape and 
determine skilled labour migration policy-formation processes in Germany. Utilizing 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and stakeholder interviews, the thesis identifies and 
discusses underlying policy maker motives within political negotiations over skilled 
labour migration legislation and investigates how and why skilled labour migration 
                                                
2 West-Germany had a Grand coalition government from 1966-1969 
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polices are negotiated and ultimately implemented in the Federal Republic of Germany 
between 2005 and 2009. The Critical Discourse Analysis exposes and identifies the 
particularities of the power negotiations between the various policy makers and policy 
stakeholders within the relevant political forums where skilled labour migration polices 
are debated and ultimately implemented. This research approach provides empirical 
evidence on how underlying policy maker motives shape and determine state action in 
regards to skilled labour migration legislation in Germany. Therefore the thesis provides 
critical insight into the causal relationship between underlying policy maker motives and 
skilled labour migration legislation and contributes to a more coherent and critical 
conceptualization of state action and skilled labour migration policy within overall 
migration theory.  
 In terms of data collection and analysis, the first research component explores and 
critically evaluates the multi-layered and complex processes of skilled labour migration 
policy formation through Critical Discourse Analysis of political debate within relevant 
political forums in Germany where skilled labour migration and associated government 
policy are debated, negotiated and ultimately implemented. The discourse analysis 
enables the identification and subsequent discussion of underlying policy maker motives 
within political negotiations over skilled labour migration legislation. The second 
research component consists of stakeholder interviews that provide additional in-depth 
context on the underlying motives of policy makers, institutional actors, and non-
government stakeholders within skilled labour migration policy formation processes. The 
discussion of the interview data further demonstrates how particular aspects of skilled 
labour migration policy are a reflection of specific policy maker, political party, and 
stakeholder interest and motivations.  
 Ultimately, Germany’s 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration 
represents an excellent research opportunity to advance scholarly understanding of the 
underlying motives that shape and determine state action in regards to skilled labour 
migration legislation in economically advances nation-states. The fact that the Federal 
Republic lacks previous legislation on skilled labour recruitment enables a complete 
analysis of the power negotiations that preceded the implementation of the 2009 policy. 
State action towards skilled labour migration will be empirically accounted for through 
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identifying and contextualizing underlying policy maker motives within political 
discourse. The Critical Discourse Analysis of the policy formation process and associated 
political debate of Germany’s 2009 Action Programme will thus contribute towards an 
improved scholarly understanding and theoretical incorporation skilled labour migration 
polices within economically advanced nation-states. 
 
1.5 - Thesis Structure  
 
The thesis itself is organized into eight chapters. Chapter two presents and 
discusses a number of prominent theories on international labour migration that provide 
the theoretical backdrop to skilled labour migration policy making in Germany and other 
migrant receiving countries. Moreover the chapter discusses the difference between 
skilled and unskilled labour migration as well as a number of theoretical peculiarities 
associated with skilled labour migration in general and skilled migrants in particular. 
Chapter two finishes with a discussion on the how the nation-state and state policies on 
immigration are inadequately conceptualized within immigration theory and discusses the 
research aims of the thesis in the context of the gaps in the literature and migration 
theory. 
Chapter three provides a detailed review of the history as well as social and 
political context of labour migration in the Federal Republic of Germany and presents a 
series of OECD data tables that illustrate migration trends in Germany in comparison to 
other economically advanced nation-states. The chapter also includes a discussion of the 
relevant academic literature on immigration, citizenship, and national identity in 
Germany, which is still featured prominently within scholarly debate on immigration in 
Germany. Furthermore there is a brief introduction into the system of German party 
politics and the chapter concludes with a discussion of the significance and prospective 
contributions of scholarly research on skilled labour migration and associated policy 
frameworks in Germany. 
 Chapter four lays out the methodological framework used in the research for the 
thesis and provides a detailed discussion/outline of the theories of Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA). Moreover, the chapter discusses in detail the data collection, analysis, 
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and interpretation process in respect to the two data sets used in the thesis and also 
presents the research limitation of the thesis. 
Chapter five presents the results of the Critical Discourse Analysis from the 
primary data set,  - the parliamentary debate transcripts from Bundestag and Bundesrat 
between the years 2005 and 2009. The discourse analysis identifies eight individual 
thematic narratives relating to political debate on skilled labour migration and associated 
state policy and discusses them within the context of relevant academic literature and 
immigration theory.   
Chapter six presents and discusses the results from the secondary data set, which 
constitutes - twenty six stakeholder interviews conducted with German immigration 
policy makers, state actors, labour market stakeholders and non-government immigration 
policy advisors. The data derived from the stakeholder interviews provides additional 
context and further critical insight on the thematic narratives identified within the primary 
data set.  
Chapter seven provides an analytical section that discusses and interprets the 
results from the two data sets. Specifically, this chapter identifies five underlying policy 
maker motives that are deemed instrumental in influencing and determining state action 
in regards to skilled labour migration legislation in Germany during the sampling period. 
The chapter discusses the five motives in the context of the relevant academic literature 
and immigration theory 
Chapter eight concludes that state action on skilled labour migration policy in 
Germany is to a large degree determined by underlying policy maker motives that 
demand restrictions on unskilled labour migration and sufficient barriers to skilled labour 
migration in order to ensure preferential labour market access of domestic workers. 
Overall, the thesis concludes that the identified policy maker motives have a strong 
restrictionist emphasis towards foreign workers. Despite acknowledged global economic 
pressures and domestic labour market demand for skilled workers, state action on skilled 
labour migration in Germany between 2005 and 2009 is largely determined by motives 
that demand territorial closure to unskilled foreign workers while ensuring preferential 
labour market access, labour market outcomes, and professional training of domestic 
workers.   
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Chapter Two - Theories on International Labour Migration 
 
2.0 - Introduction 
   
 This chapter provides a review of the theories of international labour migration 
followed by a detailed discussion of the theories specifically associated with skilled 
labour migration and skilled migrant workers. Moreover, the chapter discusses the 
complex and difficult relationship between migration theory and the nation-state as well 
as the subsequent failure of migration scholarship to incorporate national immigration 
policies into the wider theoretical framework of international migration. The aim of this 
chapter is to illustrate that most migration theory models fail to account for the nation-
state in general and national immigration policies in particular and that the applicability 
of the standard theories on labour migration is therefore severely limited in the research 
context of this thesis. At the same time, the failure of most migration theory models to 
properly incorporate the nation-state and its regulatory frameworks provides a strong 
justification and rationale for the thesis. For organizational purposes, the chapter focuses 
on international labour migration and associated state policies and removes itself for the 
most part from other immigration policy areas such as asylum, family reunion or border 
security.  
 Section 2.1 discusses three influential economic theories on international labour 
migration; neo-classical economic theory, human capital theory, and segmented labour 
market theory. Section 2.2 outlines a number of macro-structural or political economy 
models on international migrations that provide the geo-political context for post-1945 
labour migration. Section 2.4 discusses neo-liberalist critique, an influential intellectual 
critique of government policy responses towards international labour migration while 
section 2.3 reviews the dominant theory models associated with skilled labour migration 
and discusses some of the specific issues associated with skilled migrant workers in 
detail. Section 2.4 discusses the links between the theories on international labour 
migration and the theories of skilled labour migration. Section 2.5 discusses how the 
general theories on labour migration can be combined with specific theory models on 
skilled labour migration. Section 2.6 discusses the inadequate conceptualization of the 
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nation-state and national immigration polices within immigration theory and its 
subsequent significance to the research of this thesis while section 2.7 presents the 
concluding remarks of the theory chapter. 
 
2.1 – Theories of International Labour Migration  
 
 According to Castles (2007) and King & Skeldon (2010), a migration theory that 
could encompass all the complexities of international migration would by its nature have 
to be so abstract that it could not possibly provide any meaningful and explanatory 
insight on the subject matter. Pryor (1981: p. 128) concurs that a single overarching 
theory of migration accounting for all types of migration, for all parts of the world and 
for all periods of human history, would simply be unfeasible and any such attempt would 
run risk of  ‘conceptual reductionism and theoretical imperialism’. It is therefore not 
surprising that migration scholarship lacks the one overarching theory that can frame and 
present international migration as a singular social process (Samers, 2009; Hollifield, 
2008).  Contemporary global migration flows embrace every demographic category; male 
and female, old and young, families and singles, skilled and unskilled, temporary and 
permanent, refugees and business executives, rural and urban, First World and Third 
World, which partially explains the difficulty of developing a coherent and standardized 
theoretical framework for migration scholarship (Hawthorne, 2005; Iredale, 2005). Even 
though the scholarship lacks an overarching and generalizing theory on international 
migration, there are nonetheless a number of theoretical models and conceptual 
frameworks that are applicable to empirical research on international labour migration.   
 However, within the context of the thesis, none of the following theory models are 
applicable or linked to legislative frameworks on skilled labour migration and associated 
policy formation processes. The discussion of the different theory models serves to 
illustrate that the emphasis of labour migration theory is for the most part the actual 
process of migration between labour markets as well as determining and measuring 
labour market outcomes of migrant workers. While most theory models acknowledge that 
immigration policies influence and shape migration flows and determine labour market 
outcomes of migrant workers, none of the models adequately conceptualize the 
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underlying purpose and nature of labour migration policies within migrant receiving 
nation-states. The following discussion of the different theory models on labour 
migration primarily serves to illustrate the significance of the conceptual gap between 
immigration theory and the state’s immigration policies as well as the failure to adequate 
account for state action on skilled labour migration and associated policy within overall 
labour migration theory. Thus the discussion of the dominant theory models of 
international labour migration serves to legitimize and support the research rationale of 
the thesis. 
 
2.1.1 - Neo-classical Economic Theory and Human Capital Theory 
 
 Both neo-classical economic theory and human capital theory represent influential 
theory frameworks within the scholarly field of labour migration and labour market 
studies (Samers, 2009; Castles & Miller, 2009, Massey, 1999). Neo-classical economic 
theory conceptualizes migrant workers as rational social actors that seek to maximize 
their economic utility by moving from a labour market with lower capital earning 
potential to a labour market with higher capital earning potential (Velma et. al. 2009; 
Massey, 1999; Johnston et al., 2000). On a global scale, migrant workers move from 
poorer countries to richer ones and according to neo-classical economic thought, labour 
migration will eventually result in wage equalization within and between national labour 
markets by facilitating wage increases in poorer countries and decreasing them in the 
richer ones (Iredale, 2001; Arango, 2000). In the past, economists have utilized neo-
classic economic theory to analyze labour movement within national and regional labour 
markets but it is increasingly utilized as a theoretical framework for international labour 
migration between different national labour markets (Samers, 2010; Zimmermann, 2008) 
 Within orthodox neo-classical economic theory, migrant workers are 
conceptualized as Homo Economicus, economically rational social agents that seek to 
maximize their human capital potential while the labour market is conceptualized as a 
level playing field in which the labour market outcomes of migrants are solely 
determined by their human capital potential (McDowell et al., 2009; Ley, 2003; Massey, 
1999). The main criticism of neo-classical economic theory is that it does not adequately 
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account for government regulatory regimes as well as trade union and employer relations 
within national labour markets (Castles, 2004). McDowell et al. (2009) and Caviedes 
(2010) believe that international labour migration exposes the inherent limitations of neo-
classical economic models as nation-state governments, trade unions, employers, and 
other institutional actors influence on labour market outcomes for migrant workers is 
widely acknowledged within the literature on international labour migration but as yet 
unaccounted for within orthodox neo-classical economic based migration models.  
  According to Iredale (1999), human capital theory, which is closely linked to 
neo-classical economic theory, was one of the first attempts to empirically assess and 
categorize skilled labour migration and subsequent labour market outcomes of migrant 
workers. Human capital theory supposes that workers migrate to find employment that is 
congruent with their education and training and subsequently yields the best possible 
earning potential (Bauder, 2006). Human capital corresponds to levels of education, 
training, skill, and work experience of the individual migrant worker. Thus an increase in 
the human capital investment will ultimately increase the wage potential of the worker in 
the labour market (Iredale, 2001). Economists have developed statistical and 
mathematical models known as the human capital earning equation that aim to calculate 
and predict the relationship between the earnings of workers and their respective level of 
education (Velma et al., 2009; Williams, 2006; Zimmermann & Constant, 2009). Human 
capital theory becomes more complex in the context of international labour migration as 
the same level of human capital investment will often result in varying wage-earning 
potentials between different national labour markets. In the context of human capital 
theory, international labour migration is essentially the result of different earning 
potentials between different labour markets as individuals, including skilled 
professionals, move between national labour markets in order to maximize their 
respective human capital investment. Economists and labour market analysts have 
developed mathematical and analytical frameworks that model and conceptualize skilled 
labour migration primarily as a transfer of human capital from one labour market to 
another (Williams, 2006; Zimmermann & Constant, 2009).  
 One of the criticisms of human capital theory is that is assumes skilled migrant 
workers enter the labour market under conditions of perfect competition and that their 
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human capital translates without any distortion (Girard at al., 2007). Congruent with neo-
classical economic theory, human capital theory assumes that the skilled migrant 
professionals are rational actors, their decision to migrate is solely determined by their 
desire to maximize human capital investment return from their education and training and 
that they have a comprehensive understanding of the labour market conditions in the 
country of immigration. This is however rarely the case. Bauder’s (2003) study on labour 
market outcomes of skilled migrants in Canada has revealed that migrants often felt 
cheated by the national immigration authorities for not disclosing that the national and 
provincial labour market regulators will potentially restrict the access of foreign trained 
and educated workers to the upper segments of the Canadian labour market. Both neo-
classical economic theory and human capital theory do not account for potential 
differences between the actual labour market conditions and the perceived expectations 
migrants may have about the labour market. Both theories assume that all labour migrants 
have a full and realistic understanding of the labour market conditions in the destination 
country and based upon this information they make rational decisions. In reality, migrant 
workers often have limited or even contradictory information on foreign labour markets 
and their decision to migrate may therefore be influenced or determined by information 
they do not fully comprehend or even lack altogether (Weis et al., 2011; Girard at al., 
2007, Bauder, 2003). This in return limits the migrant’s ability to make rational decisions 
regarding their economic utility potential and subsequent human capital investment 
return. 
 Labour markets, especially the high-skill upper segments, rarely offer perfect 
competition for prospective migrant workers. Girard et al.’s (2007) research on foreign 
educated engineers in the Canadian province of Ontario shows that provincial regulatory 
bodies disadvantage foreign trained and educated engineers on the labour market and 
instead favour those educated within the province. Bauder (2003) suggests that national 
and provincial regulatory bodies in Canada actively exclude skilled migrant professionals 
from the upper segments of the national labour markets while the same regulations favour 
skilled professionals who are educated and trained at Canadian post-secondary 
institutions.  
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 Both Bauder (2006) and Girard et al. (2007) claim that is not only institutional 
barriers that devalue skilled migrant labour but also certain cultural processes such as 
language proficiency or country of origin as some employers favour applicants that can 
be easily socially integrated into the work space. Language barriers and religious 
practices (e.g. wearing a turban or veil) can potentially limit labour market outcomes for 
skilled migrants and result in the devaluation of their human capital (Girard at al., 2007). 
By constructing the skilled migrant professional as a Homo Economicus, orthodox human 
capital and neo-classical economic theory neglect the social, cultural, and institutional 
processes in which skilled labour migration flows are embedded (Bauder, 2003; Balch, 
2009). At the same time, human capital theory does not take into account that skilled 
migrant professionals utilize their social and cultural capital in the labour market to adjust 
to the institutional devaluation of their human capital (Velma, 2009; Bauder, 2006).3 
Labour migrants utilize these forms of capital to compensate for the devaluation and non-
recognition of their human capital in the labour market and both migrant social and 
cultural capital influence the decision making process of would-be migrants (Bauder, 
2006; Ley, 2003). By exclusively focusing on the human capital of labour migrants, 
orthodox neo-classical economic theory and human capital theory largely ignore other 
forms of capital labour migrants may possess and that shape their respective labour 
market outcomes. 
 Neo-classical economic theory also does not adequately account for why it is 
rarely the poorest of the poor that engage in international migration but for the most part 
those who come from an intermediate socio-economic background (Portes, 2009; de 
Haas, 2005). According to Chiswick (2000), higher levels of human capital increase 
motivation for mobility of labour migrants due to perceived higher returns in human 
capital investment. Moreover, research has shown that migrant behaviour is not 
exclusively determined by economic consideration but is also influenced by pre-existing 
social relations and social networks as well certain historically evolved migration patterns 
(Castles, 2007, Mahroum, 2001).  
  
                                                
3 Social capital refers to access to social networks and social identities while cultural capital refers to physical, 
behavioral, and organizational attributes of symbolic meaning and value (Bauder, 2006, Castles & Miller, 2009) 
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2.1.2 - Dual or Segmented Labour Market Theory 
 
 The dual or segmented labour market theory represents an influential theoretical 
framework for international labour migration studies. Whereas neo-classical economic 
theory explains and conceptualizes labour migration in the context of economic push and 
pull factors and human capital theory measures the relationship between migrant skill 
level and labour market outcome, the dual or segmented labour market theory concerns 
itself with the role of labour migrants in reproducing labour market segmentation in 
advanced economies. In his book Birds of Passage Michael Piore (1979) determined that 
employer demand for migrant labour in advanced economies has led to the segmentation 
of national labour markets between migrant workers and domestic workers. Piore divided 
national labour markets in developed countries and distinguished between primary and 
secondary labour markets. According to classic Marxist theory, the primary sector 
encompasses capital intensive and technology dependent industries and services that 
require a well educated and skilled workforce whereas the secondary sector consists of 
labour intensive industries and services that require less capital investment and a less 
skilled workforce (Luthra, 2009; Bauder, 2006; Massey, 1999). Labour market 
segmentation theory supposes that during cyclical economic downturns workers in the 
secondary sector can easily be made redundant while the workers in the primary sector 
are retained by employers to maintain production during recession (Castles & Miller, 
2009). The nature of the secondary sector, that is low pay, little job security, and limited 
upward mobility, effectively discourages domestic workers from seeking employment 
there and migrant workers then fill this gap. (Piper, 2009; Samers, 2010).  
  In the nineteenth century when Karl Marx first formulated the segmented labour 
market theory, primary and secondary labour markets were relatively static and upward 
mobility from secondary to primary sector was all but impossible for the proletariat of 
that era. According to Piore, in the twentieth century labour markets in advanced 
economies are not divided between proletariat and bourgeoisie anymore but between 
domestic workers and immigrant workers and the principle of maintaining an expendable 
labour pool that can be utilized according to economic demand retains its significance 
(Wills et al., 2009). Piore (1979) believed that migrant workers had become the main 
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recruits for this disposable and flexible reserve labour pool of the secondary labour 
market in many advanced economies. The numerous guest workers programs in post-war 
Europe are often interpreted as a government and employer strategy to create and utilize a 
disposable labour pool made up of foreign workers (Castles, 2006; Soysal, 1994).  
 Arango (2000) confirms that there is a structural dependency on cheap and 
flexible migrant labour in the secondary labour markets in many developed countries and 
according to Bauder (2006) and Anderson (2010) these migrant workers maintain the 
employment security of the domestic workers in the well-paid and secure primary labour 
market. Both Bauder (2006) and Meyers (2002) interpret labour migration polices and 
labour recruitment schemes of the past and present as primarily aimed at maintaining a 
pool of disposable labour for the secondary labour market within advanced economies as 
well as an attempt to divide the unity of workers. According to Harvey (2011, p. 9) 
“capital uses differences in gender, ethnicity, race, and even religion to great effect to 
divide the unity and rule in the workplace” and Bauder (2001) confirms that labour 
market segmentation is linked to the economic marginalization of women, ethnic 
minorities, and the working classes that are also disproportionally relegated to the 
secondary labour market. This suggests that the segmentation of labour markets is at least 
partially socially constructed, which challenges neo-classical economic models and 
human capital theory as labour market outcomes for migrant and native workers are not 
solely determined by perfect market mechanisms (Bauder, 2001). Even though Piore’s 
segmented labour approach has had a profound impact on labour market studies in 
Western Europe and North America, according to Samers (2010) its influence within on 
migration theory has been somewhat limited because very few migration scholars have 
attempted to utilize segmented labour market approach as a central argument for the 
initiation and continuation of international labour migration flows.  
 Urban sociologist Saskia Sassen (2001) incorporates aspects of the segmented 
labour market theory into her global cities theory, stating that a large pool of migrant 
labourers within the lower segments of the urban labour market is essential to the 
economic development of world cities. Moreover, research on migrant communities 
within the cities of industrialized countries has revealed that immigrant entrepreneurs and 
migrant business owners themselves often rely on migrant workers of the same ethnic 
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origin as employees in their company and/or family businesses, thus creating a 
segmented labour market on a micro-scale within ethnic communities (King & Skeldon, 
2010, Sassen, 2001). On this localized or regional scale, labour migration has created its 
own demand as the structural dependency of migrant entrepreneurs for other migrant 
workers of the same ethnic origin facilitates international labour migration flows 
(Saxenian, 2002).  
 The global cities theory complements Piore’s segmented labour market theory and 
Sassen (2001) highlights this approach in her book The Global City where she claims that 
international migration from the poorer states to the richer ones would not have occurred 
without the existence of so-called global cities. The global cities are sites of consumption 
and production, particularly in relation to advanced producer services such as banking, 
accounting, management, and consulting (Beaverstock, 2002, Sassen 2001). At the same 
time, there is a structural dependency on low-skilled and low-paid disposable labour in 
global cities (Datta et al., 2007; Sassen, 1996). According to Sassen, the advanced 
producer service industry constitutes a primary labour market that provides high-paid and 
secure employment whereas the secondary labour market in global cities is made up of 
low paid service jobs that can be easily restructured during economic up- and downturns 
(Sassen, 2001). The primary sector in these cities with its advanced producer services 
creates demand for labourers in the secondary sector of the city economy, which acts as a 
pull factor for labour migrants, both skilled and unskilled, to these global cities. Like 
Piore, Sassen focuses on the demand side of labour migration by claiming that migrant 
workers shape the structure of the labour market in global cities and reproduce the dual 
nature of the labour market, maintaining the structural demand for low-income migrant 
workers. From a geographical perspective, Sassen’s global cities approach is interesting 
because it does not view the process of international labour migration through the lens of 
the nation-state but transcends the national scale to the localized urban scale within a 
global context, which is partially linked to the macro-structuralist approaches discussed 
in section 2.2.  
 On a final note, within the scholarly field of labour market studies, the emphasis 
has shifted in recent years from labour market segmentation towards flexible labour 
markets and labour market policies that enable employers to access workers more 
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quickly, in a flexible way, and with flexible salaries (Caviedes, 2010, p. 23). McDowell 
et al. (2009) and Luthra (2009) explore the relationship between migrant workers and 
flexible labour markets within London and conclude that particularly the city’s low-skill 
service sectors, such as hospitality and cleaning, depend on a flexible labour force. Since 
domestic workers are unwilling to work in these sectors, employers have turned to 
migrant workers who provide the flexible labour in many sectors of the low-skill service 
industry in the London. Samers (2010, p. 145) links labour market flexibility to neoliberal 
economic policy and distinguishes between qualitative flexibility and quantitative 
flexibility. The former refers to the ability of employers to switch between different kind 
of workers with different kinds of skill sets while the latter refers to the ability of 
employers to hire and dismiss workers when necessary. According to Caviedes (2010, p. 
32) part-time, temporary, and project tied employment are a characteristic norm of 
flexible labour markets and he distinguishes between numerical, temporal, wage, and 
functional flexibility. He defines numerical flexibility as cost-efficient control of staff 
levels while temporal flexibility enables employers to adjust staff numbers according to 
economic and seasonal demand (Caviedes, 2011, p. 33). Wage flexibility refers to 
employers abandoning uniform wage scales in favour of intra-industry negotiated wage 
scales while functional flexibility refers to employers expecting workers to perform a 
variety of different job tasks. According to Terry (2011) flexibilization can encompass 
anything from decreased employment security, increased employment tasks, and flexible 
working ours and he concludes that “flexible work generally involves a move towards 
non-standard employment characterized as work by contract, organized on an individual 
rather than collective basis, without full-time benefits” (p. 661). At the same time labour 
market flexibility does not necessarily exclusively favour employers, for example 
Wilthagen and Tros (2004) explore the concept of flexicurity, which is enhancing labour 
market flexibility while simultaneously enhancing workers’ security. Moreover, 
according to Kahn (2012, p. 94) flexibility in wage settings, labour utilization, and labour 
mobility increases the employment prospects of previously marginalized groups such as 
females, the young, and immigrants. The concept of labour market flexibility, associated 
state policies, and the decline of secure employment inadvertently blurs the boundaries 
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between migrant workers and domestic workers within national labour markets and 
thereby constitutes an important aspect within scholarly research on labour migration.  
 
2.2 - Macro-structuralist Research Approaches  
 
 This section discusses three political economy approaches to international labour 
migration, which Samers (2010) and Massey (1999) identify as macro-structuralist 
research approaches. These research approaches attempt to place international labour 
migration within the geo-political context of their historical era and for the most part have 
their intellectual origins in a Marxist influenced interpretation of history and capitalism 
(Samers, 2010; Skeldon, 2009).  
 
2.2.1 - Dependency Theory        
                                                                                                          
 Dependency theory rose to prominence in the social sciences during the 1970s and 
linked labour migration to the economic inequality between countries in the Global North 
and the Global South (Cornelius et al, 1994). The structural underdevelopment in 
countries of the Global South was perceived to be a result of the legacy of colonial 
domination, continued resource exploitation following decolonization by western based 
capitalists, and unfair trade relationships with developed countries (Castles & Miller, 
2009; Johnston et al., 2000, Massey, 1999). Dependency theory provided the context of 
post-war labour migration from the former colonies in the Global South to the 
industrialized countries in Europe and North America. Within the context of this theory, 
labour migration flows were conceptualized as the empirical evidence of economic 
inequality between nation-states and the culture of underdevelopment in many post-
colonial states (Johnston et al., 2000). The penetration of western capitalists into 
developing countries uprooted existing socio-economic structures in developing 
countries, particularly in agriculture, and led to impoverishment of large segments of the 
domestic population in many post-colonial states (Massey, 1999). This in return 
compelled workers to migrate to the countries with more advanced economies that 
ultimately were responsible for their impoverishment. In that sense Dependency theory 
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complements neo-classical economic theory as it highlights the push factor, that is 
impoverishment and lack of economic opportunity, that compels migrant workers to 
move from places with low income to places with higher income potentials. 
 Dependency theory offers an explanation as to why certain areas in the developing 
world can only offer low income opportunities while those in other places, such as the 
industrial countries of the global North, can offer higher income prospects. Moreover, 
Castles & Miller (2009) point out that labour migration policies in economically 
developed nation-states siphon off the most productive and educated workers in 
developing countries and thus exacerbate and maintain the latter countries’ structural 
underdevelopment. For some scholars this so-called Brain Drain deprives developing 
countries of the skilled labour force necessary to create and maintain economic growth 
and provide social services. The Brain Drain theory assumes that migrating skilled 
workers and their human capital are forever lost to their home economy and instead 
exclusively benefit the economies of the developed countries, thus feeding into a 
hegemonic cycle of dependency (Skeldon, 2009). However, longitudinal studies have 
revealed that in many scenarios the Brain Drain evolves into a Brain Circulation in which 
migrant entrepreneurs and professionals reinvest and set up franchises in their country of 
origin once they have established themselves abroad (Ley, 2003; Hawthorne, 2005; de 
Haas, 2005). Prominent examples of this Brain Circulation are American IT companies 
founded by Indian and Chinese migrant entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley that later set up 
businesses and investments in India and China, providing employment for graduates in 
their home countries (Saxenian, 2002). Daugeliene & Marcinkeviciene (2009) state that 
the international exchange of skilled workers through Brain Circulation is vital to a 
country’s economic development and by default skilled labour migration is a door that 
inevitably will have to swing both ways.  
 The Dependency theory was very influential in decades following decolonization 
but its influence within the scholarship has diminished with the ascendency of 
globalization scholarship in the 1990s and its applicability to contemporary international 
labour migration scholarship may be somewhat limited (Massey, 1999). 
 
2.2.2 - World Systems Theory 
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  The second macro-structuralist approach that provides a more comprehensive 
theoretical framework for international labour migration is the so-called World Systems 
theory, which was developed by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein and has had a 
profound impact within the field of political geography. The World Systems theory 
examined how peripheral regions and countries were incorporated into the global 
economy, the latter being controlled by capitalist countries (Wallerstein, 1974). 
According to Wallerstein (1994) the world had become a unified capitalist system in 
which individual nation-states were either part of the core, the semi-periphery or the 
periphery. The gradual spread of capitalism into the semi-peripheral and peripheral 
regions of world created a structure that facilitated labour migration flows to the core 
regions (Samers, 2010). While the Dependency theory explained labour migration in the 
context of global inequality, the World Systems theorists believed that the way peripheral 
and semi-peripheral nation-states were incorporated into the capitalist world system 
determined the nature of migration flows from the periphery towards the core (Johnston 
et al., 2000).  
 Both Dependency theory and World Systems theory claim that labour migration 
to the advanced economies maintains and reproduces a cycle of economic hegemonic 
domination of the developed/core countries over less-developed/peripheral countries. 
Western capitalism prevents sustainable economic growth in the developing/peripheral 
countries, which in turn leads to labour migration from these places to the developed/core 
countries where Third World labour migrants provide the flexible and disposable 
workforce that supports and maintains the capitalist system in the advanced economies.  
Both theories fail to adequately address the differences between labour migration patterns 
and flows within the core/peripheral model as well as the existence of different migrant 
settlements in the core/developed nation-states. By almost exclusively focusing on the 
macro-scale of global political and economic structures and the agency of capitalism, 
both approaches make little reference to the human agency of individual migrants and 
migrant groups (Castles & Miller, 2009).  
 Closely related to both Dependency theory and World Systems model is the 
Migration-Development nexus, which conceptualizes labour migration as a means of 
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economic development for impoverished states in the southern hemisphere (King & 
Skeldon, 2010; Piper, 2009). Within recent scholarship on development and migration 
there has been the suggestion that international labour migration stimulates economic 
development in poor countries through financial remittances, investments, and the 
transfer of technical and managerial know how through return migration (de Haas, 2005; 
Vertovec, 2002). This then alleviates and reduces emigration pressures in poorer 
countries due to increased employment opportunities in the home country. 
 Adherents to Dependency theory point to the Brain Drain effect caused by 
emigration of the more skilled and educated from developing countries. Had these 
professionals not migrated in first place and instead had invested their skills and capital in 
their country of origin, there would be no need for them to return years or decades later to 
stimulate economic development. In respect to the financial remittances sent by the 
expatriate population, they do in fact alleviate poverty on a localized scale such as clans 
or villages but they do not present a basis of sustained economic development on a 
national scale due to their uneven distribution among the population (Skeldon, 2009; 
Castles & Miller, 2009; Portes, 2009). Return migration on the other hand can indeed act 
as a development stimulus on a local or regional scale and some scholars have made the 
point that return migrants often utilize their acquired skill, expertise, and entrepreneurial 
spirit to act as development agents in their respective communities in the developing 
world (Samers, 2010; de Haas, 2005). Other scholars however point to the potential 
adverse effects of financial remittances and return migration on socio-economic 
development in migrant sending societies (Piper, 2009; Portes, 2009).  
 
2.2.3 - Globalization Approach 
 
  The third macro-structuralist theory within the literature on international labour 
migration is the Globalization approach, which in itself does not present a unified 
theoretical model but rather the recognition of the ongoing process of economic, political, 
cultural, and social integration on global scale through networks and flows of capital, 
goods, services, information, and people (Castells, 2000, Johnston et al., 2000). The 
historic origins of globalization go back to Age of Discovery and colonialism but it was 
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not until the second half of the twentieth century that globalization became a meaningful 
theoretical concept. Globalization theorists claim that recent technological innovations 
and infrastructure developments have created a global interconnectedness unprecedented 
in terms of the speed, reach, and intensity (Sassen, 2001; Castells, 2000; Leitner, 1995). 
Consequently the Globalization approach within migration scholarship is primarily 
concerned with the global flows and networks and the associated transportation and 
telecommunication technologies that facilitate a time-space convergence. The time-space 
convergence associated with globalization enables migrant workers to maintain social 
networks on a scale and intensity unprecedented in history and also influences the 
migration and settlement rational of individual migrants or even groups of migrants. The 
process of globalization itself encompasses a wide array of processes and outcomes on 
multiple scales, which makes it difficult to conceptualize it as a coherent theoretical 
framework (Castles, 2004). On a macro-scale, globalization provides the context for the 
transnational relationships between migrant communities and their social networks 
around the globe (Bauder, 2006; Vertovec, 2002). Critics of neo-liberalist policy argue 
that globalization has led to global restructuring of national labour markets as workers in 
developed countries find their workplaces outsourced to low-income countries and their 
qualifications devalued as entire branches of industry relocate to low-wage labour 
markets (Castles, 2007). 
 Theories of transnationalism are closely linked to globalization. Transnationalism 
refers to the multiple ties and interactions between individuals, communities, and 
institutions across the boundaries of nation-states facilitated by modern communication 
technologies and transportation infrastructure (Vertovec, 2009). Within migration 
literature, migrant transnationalism refers to various practices as well as formal and 
informal institutions that link migrant communities to people and institutions in their 
country of origin (Samers, 2010; Castles & Miller, 2009). Transnational theoretical 
approaches transcend the prism of the nation-state and view migration as a process that 
occurs within a singular social space (Kivisto, 2001). The emphasis of the transnational 
approach is on human agency, that is the behaviour and social actions of individual 
migrants, migrant communities, migrant entrepreneurs as well formal and informal 
migrant institutions. Castles & Millers (2009) distinguish between transnationalism from 
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above and from below; transnationalism from above is initiated by institutional actors 
such as states or multi-national corporations while transnationalism from below 
originates from migrant communities and their counterparts in the country of origin.4  
 According to Glick Schiller (1999) migrants that participate in transnational 
communities and engage in transnational practice should be identified as transmigrants.  
Vertovec (2009) concurs with this assessment and adds that the lives and practices of 
transmigrants cannot be adequately conceptualized and theorized by utilizing the nation-
state as a scale. However, a potential methodological problem of relying solely on 
transnational approaches is that even though transnational migrants and their associated 
practices may follow a transnational logic, their everyday social space is still confined to 
the bounded territorialized space of a nation-state (Leitner, 1995). Moreover, immigration 
laws, labour market regulations, and other state policies that affect migrants’ choices and 
influence their behaviour continue to follow a national logic (Bauder, 2006). 
 For geographers, transnationalism constitutes an ambiguous theoretical concept 
because it emphasizes the importance of migrant networks (social space) over national 
territory, making political boundaries less significant or even obsolete. Yet significant 
aspects of migrant lives are still shaped by forces that originate from and are constrained 
by bounded territorial space. It is partly due to this contradiction that transnational theory 
remains a debated and contested theoretical concept within human geography (Bauder, 
2006; Vertovec, 2004; Mitchell, 1997). 
 
2.3 - Neo-liberalism and Labour Migration 
 
 The scholarly critique of neo-liberal policy constitutes another relevant research 
approach to labour migration. It involves critical evaluation and interpretation of 
government and corporate involvement in labour migration, particularly government 
policies regulating labour market access for migrant workers. This approach does not 
constitute a coherent theoretical model but instead it represents an intellectual critique of 
the economics and politics of neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism emerged as a political 
                                                
4 Transnationalism from above represents a structural manifestation whereas transnationalism from below is a result of 
human agency (Vertovec, 2009). 
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ideology in the 1980s and its proponents promote free markets as the organizing principle 
for economies, politics, and society and subsequently push for a reduced role of national 
and local governments in the social and economic sphere (Mansfield, 2005; Johnston et 
al., 2000). According to Harvey (2006, p. 145);  
“Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices 
which proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization 
of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by 
private property rights, individual liberty, free markets and free trade. The role of 
the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such 
practices.”  
 Critics of neo-liberalist ideology and associated economic policy argue that 
governments and state agencies in Europe and North America have implemented 
immigration policies which emphasize the recruitment of skilled migrant professionals 
and that at the same time exclude unskilled foreigners from the labour market (Harvey, 
2006; Meyers, 2004). The legal exclusion of unskilled workers from the labour market, 
often in conjunction with stricter border controls, ultimately leads to undocumented 
migration since demand for cheap, unskilled labour generally remains unaffected by 
official government policy. According to Bauder (2006) and Cornelius et al. (1994), 
governments in the developed countries, despite their ‘tough on illegal immigration’ 
rhetoric in fact choose to tolerate undocumented migration in some sectors of their 
national economy to ensure a supply of cheap and disposable workers. This is especially 
apparent in the agricultural industry as well as sectors of the low-skill service industry in 
North America and Europe (King & Skeldon, 2010). According to Bauder (2006), the 
neo-liberal influenced policies on immigration have deliberately created undocumented 
and non-policed spaces within national labour markets in capitalist economies that are 
sustained by continued undocumented and unofficially tolerated labour migration. 
Anderson (2010) states that labour migration policies and other forms of immigration 
control systems legalize certain migrant groups (i.e. skilled professionals, investors) in 
very specific ways while specifically illegalizing other groups (e.g. unskilled). According 
to Anderson (2010, p. 312) ‘immigration controls might be usefully conceived as a mould 
constructing certain types of workers through selection of legal entrants, the requiring 
 28 
and enforcing of certain types of employment relations, and the creation of 
institutionalized uncertainty.’ Neo-liberal influenced labour migration policies and 
systems of immigration control maintain the duality of labour markets in advanced 
economies by facilitating the supply of skilled foreign labour to the upper segments of the 
national economy while at the same time tolerating undocumented unskilled foreign 
workers in the precarious low-wage employment sectors (Harvey, 2011). 
 Some aspects of the neo-liberalist critique can be linked to the earlier discussed 
Dependency theory, as developing countries are forced by international but western-
capitalist dominated bodies and agencies such as the IMF or World Bank to implement 
neo-liberal policies that exacerbate existing social and economic inequalities in 
developing countries (Boucher, 2008). This then acts as another push factor for labour 
migration from developing countries to the richer capitalist countries. Mexico-US labour 
migration is a prime example where US corporate capitalism uproots the socio-economic 
structures in rural Mexico, which is ultimately leads to undocumented cross-border 
migration of Mexican labourers to the United States (Castles & Miller, 2009). 
 The neo-liberalist critique allows for critical interpretation of both the determinist 
economic theories on labour migration (neo-classical economic theory and labour market 
segmentation) as well as the macro-structuralist theory frameworks of labour migration 
(globalization). At the same time, it allows for critical interpretation of government 
labour migration policies aimed at recruiting skilled foreign professionals while 
simultaneously restricting unskilled migrant workers as well as corporate involvement in 
international labour migration. 
Since this study is particularly concerned with skilled labour migration policy 
formation processes and policy makers’ motives regarding skilled labour migration, the 
discussion of the theoretical frameworks of international labour migration will now shift 
towards theories and models specifically associated with skilled labour migration. There 
are a number of specific factors and considerations that distinguish skilled labour 
migration from other form of migration and policy makers need to be aware off these. 
The following section discusses the peculiarities of skilled labour migration.  
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2.4 – Theories of Skilled Labour Migration 
 
The literature on international labour migration distinguishes between skilled and 
unskilled labour migration and it is essential for researchers to define the boundaries 
between them (Samers, 2010; Castles & Miller, 2009). The Organization of Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) states that skilled migrant professionals should 
hold a post-secondary degree that formalizes their professional skills and their human 
capital (Iredale, 2001). Without an officially recognized post-secondary degree or other 
formal professional accreditation it is difficult if not impossible for skilled migrant 
professionals to have their skills recognized by the immigration authorities and regulatory 
bodies in migrant receiving countries (Epstein, 2009; Bauder, 2006). This is the point 
where the distinction between skilled and unskilled migrant workers occurs. It is not the 
actual human capital that distinguishes skilled from unskilled migrant workers but rather 
the formal recognition of this human capital by the state authorities, its regulatory 
institutions as well as prospective employers (Bauder, 2005). It should be mentioned that 
some scholars refer to skilled migrants as highly skilled in order to emphasise their status 
as elite workers but post-secondary credentials are nevertheless used as benchmark in 
measuring skill levels (Salt, 1988; White, 1988).  
 The academic scholarship on the migration of skilled professionals has its historic 
roots in the forced migration of intellectuals and professionals from European 
totalitarianism and post-colonial conflict in the developing world during the twentieth 
century (Iredale, 2001). The first attempt to empirically link skilled labour migration to a 
wider theoretical framework occurred during the 1960s when scholars linked skilled 
labour migration to the Brain Drain from the recently decolonized Global South to the 
developed core countries in Europe and North America (Iredale, 1999; Skeldon, 2008). 
The migration of skilled professionals was merely treated as empirical evidence for the 
Brain Drain theory and initially very little scholarly research was conducted on the topic 
of skilled labour migration itself. Scholars perceived the migration of skilled 
professionals as further evidence of the structural inequality within the existing world 
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system. It is only in the last two decades that migration scholars have attempted to treat 
skilled labour migration as a separate subject within the scholarship (Salt, 1988; White, 
1988; Koser & Salt, 1997; Iredale, 1999; Beaverstock, 2002; Bauder, 2006; Samers, 
2010). 
Scholarly research on the international migration of skilled professionals is closely linked 
to the global expansion of commerce and the rise of transnational corporations (TNC’s) 
as well as increased labour shortages within professional services in developed countries 
(Mahroum, 2001; Khoo et al, 2008; Voigt-Graf, McDonald & Hugo, 2007; Iredale, 
1999). According to Salt (1988, p. 388) the international spatial division of labour, in 
which economic processes of production are no longer confined to the territory of 
individual nation-states, provides the explanatory framework for skilled labour migration 
and he stresses that attempts to empirically explain skilled labour migration must account 
for different occupational groups as well as their respective relationships with labour 
market processes and institutions. Findley et al. (1996, p. 59) conclude that the analysis 
of international skilled labour migration needs to be anchored and conceptualized within 
processes of global economic development and the growth of global cities. They also 
stress the complex relationship between international skilled labour migration and the 
organization of trans-national corporations. Beaverstock (2002) confirms that a 
disproportionate number of skilled professionals have migrated and continue to migrate 
to so-called global cities due to the concentration of advanced producer services, 
corporate headquarters, and subsequent demand for high-skill specialist professionals.     
 Within the academic discipline of geography, skilled labour migration has been 
intrinsically linked to the field of economic geography even though in recent years a 
number of human geographers have highlighted some of the social aspects of skilled 
labour migration such as the labour market utility of migrant social and cultural capital 
and the labour market outcomes of female professionals (Bauder, 2005; Ley, 2003; 
Koffman & Raghuram, 2006; Walton-Roberts, 2004; Iredale, 2004; Raghuram, 2008).  
Koser & Salt (1997) present a scale-based model to conceptualize skilled labour 
migration flows based on macro-, meso-, and micro-scale. The macro-level model 
focuses on the global economic conditions that determine the disparities in supply and 
demand for skilled professionals between nation-states. This model stresses the core 
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versus periphery dichotomy and the resulting (economic) inequality between nation-
states and their respective labour markets. The theory models discussed in section 2.1 and 
2.2 would qualify as macro-level. Meso-level models on the other hand focus on the 
management efforts of state governments in relation to skilled labour migration as well as 
the role of transnational corporations in facilitating international migration within their 
corporate structure. Recruitment agencies also play a considerable role within meso-level 
models. Finally, micro-level models focus their attention on individual migrants and 
incorporate factors such as family relations or life style choices of individual migrants 
that affect the frequency, duration, and direction of flows of individual migrant 
professionals (Koser & Salt, 1997). According to Iredale (1999) a comprehensive 
research strategy towards skilled labour migration should incorporate a multi-scalar 
approach in which the international division of labour between states, government 
policies regulating skilled labour migration as well as corporate employment structures 
are taken into consideration.  
Another theoretical model specifically aimed at skilled labour migration is the so-
called Structuration approach that incorporates individual migrants as well as structural 
and institutional factors (Iredale, 2001). This theoretical approach recognizes the role of 
private enterprises and capital as well as state polices in the active recruitment of skilled 
migrant professionals. Iredale (2001) also believes state policies and private enterprise 
have entered a symbiotic relationship in which national immigration policies (e.g. points 
based immigration systems) and multilateral agreements (e.g. Maastricht Treaty, 
NAFTA) are implemented to supply domestic labour markets for the benefit of corporate 
capital.  The Structuration approach closely resembles the multi-scale model advocated 
by Koser & Salt (1997). 
Mahroum (2001) has identified five occupational groups that characterize the 
majority killed migrant professionals. These occupational groups are senior managers & 
executives, engineers & technicians, scientists, entrepreneurs, and students. 5 Within the 
scholarship, attempts were made to distinguish skilled migrants based on their respective 
occupation as research revealed that the labour market experience for skilled migrants 
                                                
5 David Ley’s research on the Canadian Business Immigration program (2003) has revealed that entrepreneurs are in 
fact not so-much skilled professionals but rather migrants with substantial financial assets. Due to their socio-economic 
status, labour migration policies classify these international entrepreneurial migrants as skilled migrant professionals. 
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varies significantly between the professions and employment sectors depending of the 
level of national and professional regulation. For example, medical and engineering 
professions experience high levels of regulation as national regulatory associations and 
institutions maintain strict professional standards for these occupations (Iredale, 2001; 
Girard et al., 2007, Khoo et al. 2008; Hawthorne, 2005). Skilled migrant professionals 
with engineering or medical degrees and work experience may have their credentials 
recognized by the immigration authorities for their residence and work permit but then 
they often experience labour market exclusion due to non-recognition of their credentials 
by the professional associations in the host country (Skeldon, 2009; Girard et al, 2007; 
Iredale, 2001). This non-recognition can potentially result in Brain Waste, i.e. trained 
medical professionals working as petrol station attendants or taxi drivers (Bauder, 2003). 
The failure to translate and accredit foreign work credentials and work experiences often 
prevents skilled migrants from entering the labour market at a level that is congruent with 
their professional expertise and relegates them into the secondary labour market 
(Raghuram, 2007; Coffman & Raghuram, 2006; Bauder, 2003).  
The de-skilling of migrant professionals and non-recognition of migrant 
professional credentials has become a major subject within in the scholarship on skilled 
labour migration. Bauder (2003) claims that the non-recognition of foreign work 
credentials by national regulatory bodies systematically excludes skilled migrant 
professionals from the upper segments of the labour market and forces them into 
unskilled low-pay professions in the secondary labour market. Migration scholars, 
economists, businesses, and government policy makers have become increasingly aware 
that that Brain Waste, aside from causing untold human misery on migrant professionals, 
results in substantial financial loss to national economies as the labour markets fail to 
capitalize from skilled migrant professionals who then may even become dependent on 
the social welfare system (Bauder, 2003).  
 However, not all skilled migrants face accreditation problems because a 
substantial number of skilled migrants attain their educational qualifications in the 
country of immigration (Saxenian, 2002). They may have initially arrived on a student 
visa and after attaining their post-secondary degree applied for a permanent residence. 
According to Saxenian (2002) a large number of migrant IT specialists in California have 
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attained their university degrees from institutions in the United States and after 
graduation were immediately employed in the American IT sector. Many developed 
countries have realized the benefit of granting automatic work and residence permits to 
foreign students after graduation. Canada, for example, has created a Post-Graduation 
Work Permit Program that allows oversees students to stay and work in the country for 
up to three years after graduation (Castles & Miller, 2009). The subject of student 
mobility and internationalization of post-secondary educations has become a major 
research area in the scholarship on skilled labour migration in recent years (Garbanzo, 
2009; Liu-Farer, 2009; Ewers & Lewis, 2009; Skeldon, 2008).  
 An interesting aspect of the IT sector as well as the business and finance sector is 
that migrant professionals in these occupations face few accreditation and recognition 
barriers (Iredale, 2001, Saxenian, 2002). These employment sectors operate according to 
global professional standards; they are largely de-territorialized thus face little to no 
interference from national professional associations and state regulatory bodies 
(Raghuram, 2008; Iredale, 2001). Moreover, post-secondary educational institutions in 
developing countries, particularly in China and India, produce IT graduates who can 
easily compete within the global IT labour market at the same professional level as their 
counterparts graduating from western universities (Saxenian, 2002). As for the financial 
and business sectors, the ascendancy of the MBA with its globally standardized 
curriculum has greatly reduced institutionalized professional barriers for migrant 
professionals working in international finance and business (Morgan, 2001). Migrant 
professionals in both IT and financial management greatly benefit from the regulatory 
laissez-faire nature within their professions and employment sectors. 
 Professional accreditation also differs alongside gender lines as research by 
Bauder (2006), Iredale (2005), and Koffman & Raghuram (2006) reveals. Female 
migrant professionals, especially those originating from developing countries, face higher 
accreditation barriers and experience more labour market exclusion than their male 
counterparts. Skilled female workers are more likely to have their professional skills 
devalued by national regulatory bodies than skilled males because their professional 
expertise is less likely to fit the somewhat masculine standards of managerial elites and 
hi-tech technicians (Koffman & Raghuram, 2006, Iredale, 2005). 
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 Overall, migrant professionals originating from developed, western countries 
experience less de-skilling in the labour market than those originating from developing 
countries (Iredale, 2001; Khoo et al., 2008). This is partially due to bi-lateral treaties that 
force national regulatory bodies to recognize certain foreign credentials, for example EU 
citizens have the right to professional accreditation in some professions if they work in 
another member state while non-EU members do not automatically enjoy such privileges 
(Mahroum, 2001). Another factor that leads to deskilling is the perception by some 
employers that non-western trained professionals have inferior training and expertise 
(Girard at al., 2007; Spoonley, 2006). According to Iredale (2001), the professional 
standards and regulations in migrant receiving countries limit the mobility of non-western 
trained professionals while at same time facilitating the mobility of western trained 
professionals. Iredale (2001) claims that mutual recognition treaties over professional 
credentials between nation-states are largely industry driven in order to have access to a 
larger labour pool.  
 Since the scholarly study of labour migration is strongly influenced by human 
capital and neo-classical economic theory, it is not surprising that the topic of skilled 
labour migration between developed countries remains under theorized within the 
literature. Variations in income may explain some of the labour migration of western 
professionals between advanced economies but income alone is by no means the sole 
agent behind this specific migratory flow. In today’s finance and business industry, 
overseas deployments and international work experience are essential for any long-term 
professional career development. Moreover Beaverstock’s research (2002) on western 
based professionals working in the finance sector to cities like London, New York, and 
Singapore has revealed that the desire to live in a global city and experience the cultural 
and social amenities associated with these places acts as a major lubricant in facilitating 
the flow of skilled professionals between developed economies. At the same time, the 
presence of skilled migrant professionals exacerbates the ‘agglomeration economies, 
wealth creation and global reach’ of these global cities thus further facilitating and 
encouraging skilled labour migration to global cities (Beaverstock, 2002, p. 525) 
 One of the prominent themes within the scholarship on skilled labour migration 
incorporates the temporal aspect of labour migration, which is permanent migration 
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versus temporary mobility. Most countries with advanced economies maintain temporary 
migration programs that are specifically aimed at skilled professionals. According to 
Khoo, Voigt-Graf et al. (2007) most work permits for temporary skilled migrants are 
given to employees of transnational corporations who migrate between countries but 
within the corporate structure for specific short-term assignments and project work. 
Governments of industrialized countries as well as their corporate employers are 
increasingly aware that individual domestic labour markets cannot produce and sustain a 
skilled labour force necessary to fill labour demands of advanced economies (Khoo, 
Voigt-Graf et al., 2007). Temporary migration of skilled professionals is in the interest of 
government policy makers as skilled professionals fill temporary gaps in the labour 
markets while not becoming potential long-term liabilities to the social welfare system. 
From a corporate viewpoint, temporary migration programmes create a greater catchment 
area for skilled labour recruitment and thus provide companies with a greater selection of 
prospective candidates. As for skilled migrants, research from Australia has shown that 
those originating from other developed countries (North America, Europe and Japan) are 
generally inclined to return to their country of origin once their employment contract 
ceases while those skilled migrants originating from developing countries tend to apply 
for permanent residency once their temporary work visa expires (Khoo et al., 2008). This 
suggests that the social and economic conditions in the country of emigration influence 
the temporal aspect of skilled labour migration. However, Khoo et al. (2008) point out 
that there is insufficient theory on the temporal dimension of skilled labour migration and 
temporary labour migration polices, especially the transition from temporary labour 
migrant to permanent resident remains under theorized and possibly under researched.  
  
2.5 – Combining Theory Frameworks and Scales of Analysis  
  
 The review of the theories of labour migration shows that even though there are 
some significant conceptual distinctions between the general theories of immigration 
such as Neo-classical Economic Theory, Dependency Theory, World Systems Theory or 
Globalization and the more specific theory frameworks on skilled labour migration such 
as de-skilling and Brain Waste, they are nevertheless intrinsically connected to each 
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other. Applying Koser and Salts’ (1997) earlier discussed scale based model for skilled 
labour migration, the more general labour migration theories such as Neo-classical 
Economic based models as well as the Macro-Structuralist Approaches constitute the 
macro-scale of global skilled labour migration. This scale represents the actual migratory 
flow of skilled foreign professionals from their countries of origin and the countries of 
destination and according to Koser and Salt (1997, p. 291) ‘macro-models tend to focus 
on the international economic conditions that shape global disparities in supply of and 
demand for highly skilled people’. Other migration flows such as unskilled workers, 
refugees, family unification or even undocumented migrants also occur at the macro-
scale and some skilled professionals may even arrive in the country of destination 
through family reunion or asylum. Therefore the macro-level models are generally 
applicable to a variety of different migration flows and not exclusively to skilled labour 
migration.  
 However, the institutional processes that de-skill migrant professionals and 
ultimately result in Brain Waste are on the other hand confined to the meso-level of 
Koser and Salt’s model. The accreditation agencies that officially recognize professional 
skills and post-secondary credentials of skilled migrant workers also exist at this meso-
scale. It is also apparent that non-recognition of foreign credentials can result in skilled 
migrant professionals being relegated to Piore’s (1977) secondary labour market. Koser 
and Salt (1997) state that the interplay between migrant professionals, employers, and the 
state, especially migration management attempts by the latter, should be the focus of 
analysis at the meso-level. Points based immigration system such as the ones in Canada 
and Australia are good examples of state migration management at the meso-scale.  
 The micro-scale of skilled labour migration flows represents the individual 
migrant and individual migrant agency in conjunction with employers and the 
individual’s family relations (Koser and Salt, 1997, p.292). Since the research aims of 
this study are to critically evaluate and comprehend how skilled labour migration policies 
are negotiated and to identify policy maker motives within policy formation processes, 
individual migrant agency is not a significant concern and therefore the micro-scale is not 
overly applicable to this study.  
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 Instead, this study utilizes the meso-scale approach in order to analyze and 
comprehend the interplay between the different political factions of the state (policy 
makers), skilled labour migration flows, and the national labour market within national 
policy formation processes. The macro-scale and its associated migration theories also 
retain significance for the purpose of this study. The international economic conditions 
that shape and frame skilled labour migration and determine labour market demand for 
skilled workers potentially affect policy formation processes and policy maker motives in 
respect to skilled labour migration.   
 While sections 2.2 to 2.5 presented and discussed the main theory frameworks on 
international labour migration as well as scholarly concepts on skilled labour migration, 
the discussion will now shift towards the nation-state and its role within immigration 
theory. The scale of analysis of this study is the nation-state as national policy makers 
and national immigration policies are the main research focus of this study. The review of 
the relevant academic literature reveals that the nation-state and its policies on 
immigration constitute a problem within migration theory. The following section 
discusses the role and the problem of placing and conceptually incorporating the nation-
state and its legal regulatory regimes within migration scholarship and immigration 
theory.   
 
2.6  - Immigration Theory and the Nation-State 
 
According to Castles (2007), Massey (1999), and Cornelius et al. (1994) the 
scholarly literature on international labour migration does not adequately conceptualize 
and theoretically incorporate the nation-state as an actor that shapes the direction, 
composition, and volume of international migration flows. Migration scholars are in 
agreement that national governments and their immigration and labour market policies 
exert significant influence on international migration flows, whether these be skilled 
professionals, unskilled labourers, asylum seekers or undocumented migrants (Brettel & 
Hollifield, 2008; Meyers, 2004; Massey, 1999; Castles & Miller, 2009). According to 
Caviedes (2004) immigration policies, including labour migration policies, remain the 
monopoly of nation-states and these policies are a reflection of the cultural and legal 
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traditions of individual nation-states. Consequently migration policies vary between 
different nation-states and result in different immigration outcomes, which explains the 
difficulty of incorporating the specificity of nation-states and national immigration 
polices into the broader theory framework of international migration. 
 Massey (1999) cites neo-classical economic and human capital theory influenced 
labour migration models as an example how the state has been inadequately 
conceptualized within international labour migration scholarship. Within these theoretical 
models, the nation-state is conceptualized as a monolithic, static, and irrational actor that 
distorts the level playing field between the migrant workers and the labour market, thus 
preventing perfect competition on the labour market from occurring (Boswell, 2007; Ley, 
2003). This raises serious questions about the theoretical merit and applicability of neo-
classical economics and associated theories within migration scholarship. Neo-classical 
economic based models on international labour migration assume a labour market of 
perfect competition without external interference and distortion. However, as Hollifield 
(2008) and Wimmer et al. (2002) point out, the current world system is organized 
alongside sovereign territorial units, over which individual national governments exercise 
legal, political, and economic authority. The fact that nation-states are the basis for global 
territorial organization effectively makes the labour market of perfect competition a 
hypothetical scenario with a limited applicability for empirical research. This severely 
restricts the ability of neo-classical economic migration models to predict and measure 
labour market outcomes for international migrant workers as national government 
policies in countries of immigration and emigration exert significant influence on 
migration flows and subsequent labour market outcomes of migrant workers (Bauder, 
2006; Massey, 1999).  
While orthodox neo-classical economic theory on international labour migration fails to 
adequately account for the nation-state and its migration and labour market policies, it 
has also become apparent to migration scholars that national immigration policies in the 
industrialized democracies in Europe and North America generally fail to achieve their 
intended outcomes and often lead to unintended results (Samers, 2010; Castles, 2004; 
Massey, 1999; Cornelius et al, 1994). A well cited example of this policy failure are the 
numerous guest workers programs in post-war Europe that were intended to fill short 
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terms gaps in the lower segments of the labour market in Germany, Switzerland, and 
other European countries but ultimately led to unintended permanent settlement of former 
migrant workers throughout Western Europe (Hollifield, 2004; Soysal, 1994).  
 Within the scholarship, migration policy failure is known as the Gap Hypothesis, 
which states that there is a significant structural and persistent gap between official 
immigration policy goals and actual policy outcomes in many migrant receiving countries 
(Castles, 2004; Cornelius et al., 1994). The Gap Hypothesis is linked to the inadequate 
conceptualization of the nation-state and theoretical incorporation of national migration 
policy into the framework of international labour migration theory (Hollifield, 2008; 
Massey, 1999). Meyers (2004) notes that the scholarly literature on migration control 
policy is not linked to any of the earlier discussed theoretical models on international 
labour migration and that overall studies on migration policy are generally empirically 
based and country specific. In fact there is no overarching theoretical framework on the 
migration policy formation processes within nation-states, which links back to the 
inadequate theoretical conceptualization of the nation-state within migration theory.  
Castles (2007) concurs with notion that the inadequate conceptualization of the 
nation-state and its immigration policies within research methodologies and migration 
theory is linked to the inability of nation-state governments and immigration policy 
makers to comprehend the long-term implications of their respective immigration 
policies. According to Castles (2003, p.222) national migration policies are destined for 
failure due to the inability of policy-makers and politicians to view labour migration ‘as a 
dynamic social process linked to broader patterns of social transformation’ Policy-
makers in the past and present were and continue to be under the impression that 
international migration flows can be turned on and off through appropriate policy settings 
and that migration would only impact labour markets and not the host society (de Haas, 
2005; Castles, 2004; Massey, 1999). 
 Immigration policy failure has become most apparent in relation to undocumented 
labour migration. According the Boucher (2008), Bauder (2006), Flynn (2005), and 
Cornelius et al. (1994) increasingly restrictive migration policies and securitization of 
international migration in many industrialized democracies effectively forces prospective 
migrants, particularly unskilled and low-skilled workers, into illegality and 
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undocumented migration channels. Restrictive immigration laws in migrant receiving 
countries in fact do not address the actual causes that sustain international migration 
flows (Cornelius et al., 1994). The labour markets in the migrant receiving national 
economies and their structural demand for cheap labour combined with limited economic 
opportunities in many parts of the developing world serve respectively as economic pull 
and push factor for international labour migration (Bauder, 2006; de Haas, 2005; 
Hollifield, 2004). At the same time transnational personal, family, and clan relations 
between country of emigration and immigration facilitate continued migratory flows 
between nation-states (Samers, 2010). Finally widespread political, ethnic, or religious 
persecution and discrimination in many developing countries and the liberal, pluralistic, 
and democratic character of the industrial democracies serve as further lubricant for 
migration flows (Leitner, 1995). The combination of these different factors essentially 
initiates and sustains international migration flows including labour migration. Restrictive 
immigration policies in migrant receiving countries do not address any of these push and 
pull factors. Restrictive national immigration laws in Europe and North America do not 
alleviate poverty, lack of economic opportunity, and human rights abuse in migrant 
sending countries and therefore do not address the main causes of international migration 
(Boucher, 2008; de Haas, 2008). 
 Since the structural demand for skilled as well as unskilled migrant labour in 
many advanced economies (e.g. segmented labour market theory) sustains international 
migration flows, government policy makers in migrant receiving countries would have to 
suppress economic development and growth in order to halt employers demand for cheap 
foreign labour in the lower segments of their national labour markets (Martin, 1994). 
Policies penalizing employers from hiring undocumented migrant labour have proven 
ineffective in both Europe and North America (Castles, 2004). The transnational social 
links between migrant communities that help sustain migration flows are also beyond the 
legislative reach of immigration policy makers as the liberal democratic character of 
many (not all) migrant receiving countries prohibits legal measures that would infringe 
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on basic human rights such as marriage and family reunion (Samers, 2010; de Haas, 
2005; Joppke, 1999).6 
 The push and pull factors that initiate and sustain international migration flows 
are often beyond the legislative reach of immigration policy makers and as long as policy 
makers in the industrial democracies fail to address, incorporate, and alleviate these push 
and pull factors, immigration policies, particularly those aiming to control and restrict 
labour migration, will not achieve their intended outcomes. Castles (2004) states that 
national labour migration policies are not implemented to address the push and pull 
factors that are at the root of international migratory flows but are designed to cater to 
interest groups within the migrant receiving country, that is the electorate (restrictive 
migration polices) and employers (expansive labour migration polices). Moreover, the 
bureaucratic belief that labour migration flows can be turned on and off through 
appropriate legislation fails to incorporate migrant agency. Migration policies and their 
physical manifestation such as barbed wire fences and border patrols are merely another 
obstacle that migrants have to overcome (Cornelius et al, 1994). According to Castles 
(2004) migrants are not just isolated individuals who react to market stimulus and 
bureaucratic rules, but social beings that seek to achieve better outcomes for themselves, 
their families, and their communities through actively shaping the migratory process. 
 For Castles (2004) the national labour recruitment programs of the post-war era in 
Europe provide significant insight into persistent immigration policy failure in migrant 
receiving countries. First, immigration policy failures involve strong states with efficient 
bureaucracies, thus it is not the weakness of government that results in policy failure. 
Secondly policy failures or unintended policy outcomes often only become apparent after 
a significant time lapse. Finally, Castles (2004) concludes that any migration flow will 
inevitably result in outcomes that were not expected or intended by the migrants and 
policy makers. For Castles (2004) and Massey (1999) the migratory process, especially 
labour migration, is a long-term social process with its own inherent dynamics starting 
from migrants’ departure from his or her home community to settlement and community 
formation in the country of destination and finally the birth of second and third 
                                                
6 The booming economies in the Gulf region and East Asia are an exception to this rule as international human rights 
do not enjoy widespread recognition in these places. Consequently migrant workers in these parts are often without 
basic human right and legal protection (Castles and Miller, 2009). 
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generation migrants in the immigration country. As long as immigration policies are only 
conceptualized by state policy makers as a mere response and attempt to regulate certain 
pressures (economic, migratory etc) and not as a positive and active means of achieving 
long-term social and economic objectives, migration polices will not achieve their 
intended outcomes (Balch, 2009). 
 For Castles (2004) labour migration policy formation and formulation in the 
industrialized democracies has been influenced by two distinct assumptions. The first one 
assumes that international migrant labourers move to maximize their respective utility 
based on a cost-benefit calculation and cease to move once the costs of migration 
outweigh the benefits.7 The second one is embedded in the bureaucratic belief of policy 
makers that migration policy and admission regulations can control individual migrant 
behaviour and determine migrant decisions. Together they have made policy makers in 
the industrialized democracies assume that labour migration can be effectively controlled 
through appropriate policy settings and legal admission requirements. However, the 
failure of this logic became apparent in Western Europe following the end of post-war 
labour recruitment where migrant communities continued to grow despite the end of 
recruitment and a de facto zero immigration policy (Recchi, 2006, Hollifield, 2004, 
Cornelius et al., 1994; Martin, 1994;). 
 Contemporary national immigration policies in the industrialized democracies in 
Europe, North America, Japan, and Australia differ significantly from national 
immigration policies of the post-war decades. According to Piper (2009), van Houtum et 
al.  (2007), and Skeldon (2009) the main purpose of contemporary migration policies 
throughout Europe and other migrant receiving countries is to restrict migration of 
unskilled workers and limit the number of asylum seekers and secondly serve to regulate 
migration of skilled workers. This dualism in immigration policy has become apparent in 
many advanced economies where the emphasis of labour migration policies is to 
specifically encourage and facilitate the movement of skilled foreign professionals 
(Skeldon, 2008; Castles, 2006; Koffman & Raghuram, 2006; Money, 1997). Balch 
(2009) is critical of this policy dualism in relation to labour migration in advanced 
economies because it conceptualizes migration policy as a mere short-term reaction to 
                                                
7 Based on neo-classical economic theory 
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migration pressures (restrictive policies or immigration control) and labour market 
demand (regulatory policies or immigration management). 
 Restrictive immigration policies, also known as immigration control policies, are in 
place to prevent labour market competition between unskilled domestic workers and 
migrant workers over increasingly scarce jobs in lower segments of the manufacturing 
and service sector in many advanced economies (Hix, 2007; Meyers, 1992). Employers 
and industry might lobby the government to open up the labour market for unskilled 
migrant workers, but elected officials are wary of this, as unskilled labour migration, 
particularly from non-western Third World countries, tends to antagonize the electorate 
(van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007; Castles, 2006; Stalker, 2002). Moreover, governments 
have realized that unskilled migrant workers might benefit employers in the short-term 
but in the long-term run the risk of becoming a liability to the national welfare system 
(Boucher, 2008). In response to employer demand, many developed countries (e.g. 
Germany, Canada, Spain) have instead opted for temporary work programs for unskilled 
workers, particularly in the seasonal agricultural or meatpacking sector where low wages 
and a hard work environment discourage domestic unskilled workers from seeking 
employment (Bauder, 2006; de Haas, 2008). Seasonal or temporary migrant worker 
programs have the advantage of fulfilling employer demand for cheap labour while at the 
same time preventing permanent settlement as well as potential social-welfare liabilities 
for the state (Boucher, 2008).8  
 Skilled labour migrants generally do not face the kind of restrictive migration 
polices that characterizes unskilled labour migration. Quite to the contrary, most 
industrialized countries encourage skilled labour migration and as previously mentioned 
have implemented specific programs to facilitate labour market access for skilled foreign 
workers e.g. points system in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK (Skeldon, 
2009, Spoonley, 2006; Iredale, 2005; Scheve et al., 2001). It has been argued that the 
difference in policy between unskilled and skilled migrants is labour market demand for 
the latter as many advanced economies experience shortages in some professions and 
sectors of their national economy (Khoo et al., 2007; Hawthorne, 2005; Iredale, 1999) 
                                                
8 Most significantly, policy makers do not have to fear potential voter backlash over migration, as seasonal work 
migration is a less contentious issue. 
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Yet, the same economies that experience labour shortage for skilled professionals also 
have a structural demand for unskilled labour, so labour market demand is not necessarily 
correlated to labour migration policy (Bauder, 2006). 
 While neo-classical economic based labour migration models add little insight into 
the potential impacts of national migration policy on labour market outcomes for migrant 
workers, a number of scholars have incorporated government migration policies into the 
theories of labour market segmentation. Velma et al. (2009), Luthra (2009), and 
McDowell et al. (2009) analyze specific labour market policies and initiatives 
respectively in China, the United States, and the United Kingdom. These three studies 
have revealed that government policy actively institutionalizes labour market 
segmentation between migrants and domestic workers. Yet none of the three case studies 
critically evaluates or comments on the rationale behind the policies, they only criticize 
the policy outcome. The studies also make no reference to the policy formation process 
and the different stakeholders involved in the process and instead conceptualize state 
immigration policies as the singular expression of the responsible authorities that 
represent the interest of a monolithically conceptualized nation-state government. 
McDowell et al. (2009) for example do not provide information as to why the UK policy 
makers allowed full labour market access for A8 migrants while the policy makers on the 
continent restricted A8 labour migration. The same applies to Luthra (2009) and Velma et 
al. (2009) who present empirical evidence on the impacts of state policies that cause 
labour market segmentation between domestic workers and migrant workers respectively 
in the United States IT sector and urban China but do not pay adequate attention to policy 
makers’ intentions and associated stakeholders’ interest in regards to labour market 
segmentation.  
 Massey (1999) and Castles (2007) point out that there is very little theoretical 
knowledge on how labour migration policies are formulated and how individual 
stakeholders within or with access to state institutions and governing bodies exert 
influence on the policy formation process, as research on labour migration policies is 
primarily concerned with post-policy labour market outcomes (Castles, 2004). Despite 
the continued failure and shortfall of immigration policies in many industrial 
democracies, very little empirical research has been conducted on immigration policy 
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formation processes themselves and the socio-political context in which they are 
embedded.9 A comprehensive critical research approach should go beyond the 
policy/policy-outcome dualism and analyze labour migration policy formation processes 
in order to identify the various policy stakeholders and their respective interests (Massey, 
1999). This then will liberate the nation-state and state action on labour migration policy 
from its monolithic mode of representation and ultimately contribute to a more 
comprehensive understanding of labour migration policy within immigration theory. 
Hollifield (2008) concurs with this notion and argues that the state should be the centre of 
analysis in explaining the policy formation process and subsequent policy outcomes. In 
order to critically assess, contextualize, and understand labour migration policy 
outcomes, researchers must link the policy outcome to the policy formation processes and 
the relevant stakeholders within state government and its institutions. For Mountz (2003) 
‘the state does not exist outside of the people that comprise it, their everyday work, and 
their social embeddedness in local relationships’ (p.640) and she suggests 
conceptualizing the state as ‘a set of social practices and a set of diverse institutional 
actors exercising agency through quotidian bureaucratic arrangements’ (p.629).  This 
can be accomplished by examining the interests of relevant policy stakeholders; i.e. 
institutions, politicians, and labour market stakeholders, and critically assess how their 
respective interests are articulated and how they are finally introduced into the political 
process and associated power negotiations that ultimately form migration policy.  
 According to Boswell (2007, p.79), there needs to be a ‘conceptual distinction 
between the system of party politics, which defines values orientation and political 
programs; and the administration, or the state’s bureaucratic apparatus, which 
determines the detailed content and implementation of collectively binding decisions’. 
Caviedes (2010) demonstrates the applicability of this conceptual approach in his study 
on sectoral labour migration in Europe where he includes the interest of labour market 
stakeholders such as employers, industry lobbyists, and trade unionists in his analysis. 
According to Boucher (2008) national labour migration policies in industrialized 
economies are not exclusively a reflection of economic interest on the part of employers 
                                                
9 Alison Mounts (2003) conducted empirical research on immigration officials in Canada and revealed that there was 
significant human agency in interpreting and enforcing immigration policy within the administrative and institutional 
structure of Canadian Immigration services and the Coast Guard.   
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but are also a reflection of voter and media apprehension about immigration and its real 
and perceived effects on the national labour market especially in relation to wages and 
salaries (Caviedes, 2004; Scheve et al., 2001; Meyers, 2004).10 Castles (2004) suggests 
that national labour migration policy formation and also policy outcomes should be 
understood in the context of the social structure of the policy formation process.  
 To conclude this section, the review of the literature on labour migration and 
associated government policies suggests that within the theoretical framework of 
international labour migration, the nation-state should not be conceptualized as 
monolithic institutional actor that distorts labour migration flows and labour market 
outcomes for migrant workers. Instead, the institutional processes that create labour 
migration policies and subsequently affect labour market outcomes of skilled migrant 
workers should be conceptualized as a reflection of the interests and motives of various 
policy makers and labour market stakeholders. The agency of actors and stakeholders that 
shape institutional processes and state policies that affect or attempt to regulate 
international labour migration flows need to be theoretically incorporated into or at least 
accounted for within scholarly research on labour migration policy outcomes. 
Comprehensive scholarly research on national labour migration policies and labour 
market outcomes for migrant workers should not simply present empirical evidence on 
how labour migration policies are not working as intended but should attempt to 
conceptually link the collective policy maker and stakeholder interests and motives to the 
intended policy goals and ultimately to the policy outcome. This can be accomplished by 
critical analysis and evaluation of formal policy formation processes with the inclusion of 
different policy maker and labour market stakeholders’ motives, which has the potential 
to reveal the origins of unintended or undesired immigration policy outcome. 
 
2.7 – Bridging the Gap between Immigration Theory and Nation-State  
 
 The theories of international labour migration discussed above attempt to explain, 
contextualize or analyze global migratory flows between nation-states and labour markets 
                                                
10 Government policy makers and politicians, wary about potential electoral backlash, comply by passing more 
restrictive immigration policies for unskilled migrants and facilitate the securitization of undocumented migration.  
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while the theories associated with skilled labour migration predominantly focus on labour 
market outcomes of skilled migrant professionals. Both sets of theories fail to incorporate 
and adequately conceptualize the nation-state as an agent shaping labour migration flows 
and affecting labour market outcomes of skilled migrant professionals. The failure to 
incorporate the nation-state into the wider framework of immigration theory is rooted in 
the failure of migration scholars to comprehend and empirically account for state action 
on immigration policy within the legislative structures of nation-states (Freeman, 2011). 
In particular, the policy makers within the state’s migration management process 
constitute a black box that migration scholars find difficult to address and adequately 
conceptualize within existing migration theory.  
 This thesis aims to bridge the gap between immigration theory and immigration 
policy, particularly in respect to skilled labour migration, and to contribute towards a 
more nuanced understanding of the underlying motives that trigger state action on skilled 
labour migration policy. Therefore it critically analyzes the entire policy formation 
process of a specific piece of skilled labour migration legislation and then critically 
discusses and evaluates the legislation within the context of existing immigration theory. 
The thesis will disaggregate the state by investigating and critically evaluating the distinct 
roles played by bureaucrats, political parties, electoral arrangements and executive-
legislative relationships within migration policy formation processes (Freeman, 2011). 
Moreover, the thesis will account for interest and lobby groups input towards and 
influence within political negotiations over skilled labour migration legislation, which 
according to Freeman and Kessler 2008) remains an underresearched topic within 
migration scholarship. The ultimate goal of the thesis is to deconstruct and analyze an 
entire policy formation process of a single piece of skilled labour migration legislation 
which is inclusive of all policy makers, institutional actors, and labour market 
stakeholders involved in the official and unofficial political power negotiations over the 
policy.  
 The thesis uses Critical Discourse Analysis of relevant parliamentary debate in 
order to identify underlying motives that determine state action in regards to skilled 
labour migration policy and discuss these motives within the context of relevant 
migration literature. The thesis will demonstrate that specific thematic aspects of skilled 
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labour migration legislation are a reflection of specific policy maker or stakeholder 
interests, thus providing an empirically grounded account of state action towards skilled 
labour migration and associated legislative frameworks. Instead of conceptualizing 
skilled labour migration legislation as a singular expression of political will, the Critical 
Discourse Analysis will deconstruct the policy formation process and the corresponding 
legislation alongside its different thematic components and illustrate that the nation-state 
is not a monolithic institutional entity and that state action on skilled labour migration 
legislation is determined through multiple layers of political negotiation and an 
expression of particular as well as multiple policy maker motives. The thesis will 
ultimately affirm the significance of underlying policy makers’ motives within state 
action regarding skilled labour migration policy and provide an empirically grounded 
account thereof.  Ultimately the thesis will demonstrate that immigration policy 
formation processes are far more complex than migration scholarship credits them. 
 As indicated during the introduction chapter, the thesis will analyze and critically 
investigate the policy formation process and associated political negotiations of 
Germany’s 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration. The following chapter 
provides a thorough review of the national historical, social, and political context of the 
2009 policy and moreover discusses some of the peculiarities of immigration related 
scholarship in Germany. 
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Chapter Three – Germany, a Reluctant Country of Immigration  
 
 3.0 - Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses past and present labour migration as well as politics of 
immigration in post-war Germany, thereby presenting the socio-political context of the 
thesis. Section 3.1 provides an overview of migration and labour market trends in 
Germany during the policy formation process of the 2009 Action Programme while 
Section 3.2 reviews post-1945 labour migration and associated legislative changes in 
Federal Republic of Germany.11 Section 3.3 discusses some of the prominent scholarly 
debates on German immigration and citizenship laws and their significance towards 
research on immigration related matters in Germany. Section 3.4 introduces the federal 
political parties in Germany and section 3.5 presents the concluding remarks of the 
chapter three. 
 
3.1 – The State of Immigration in Modern Germany 
 
The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is one of the world’s largest migrant 
receiving societies; between 1950 and 1993 the country’s net immigration balance was 
12.6 million people (Joppke, 2000). As of 2009 almost 16 million people in Germany 
have an immigrant background or are migrants themselves, which accounts for nearly 
one fifth of the country’s population (see Table I). While in other countries with a similar 
demographic composition, like the United States or Canada, immigration has become 
part of the national self-identification, successive German governments have for a long 
time even refused to acknowledge that Germany was a country of immigration (Bade, 
2000). According to Joppke (2000, p. 62), ‘the discrepancy between de facto permanent 
                                                
11 The chapter presents a number of tables and graphs that illustrate migration trends and flows to and from Germany 
and other EU and OECD countries. While tables I, II, and VI were taken from the 2010 Annual Labour Migration 
Report of the German Federal Statistical Office, the remaining tables were derived from the OECD's 2010 International 
Migration Outlook Report. The OECD data has the advantage that it allows us to compare and contrast Germany's 
national data with the numbers from other developed countries. The tables primarily aim to provide additional insight 
into the national context of the thesis and further support the research rationale and scholarly relevance of the thesis.   
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immigration and its collective political denial by Germany’s governing elites is the most 
enduring puzzle in German immigration debate’. 
Table I: Share of migrants among the overall population in Germany in 2009 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010) 
 
 
Despite the country’s demographic reality, the ethos of being a non-immigration country 
(kein Einwanderungsland) has shaped virtually every aspect of national political debate 
on immigration issues and associated public policy in Germany for decades (Bade, 2002; 
Joppke, 2000).  
 Since 1998 there has however been a gradual shift within the immigration debate 
among Germany’s political elites, moving from the collective denial that permanent 
migration even existed to the gradual recognition that modern Germany is de facto a 
country of immigration and permanent migrant settlement. As a result the political debate 
on immigration shifted towards developing long-term strategies and comprehensive legal 
policies to socially integrate and legally incorporate Germany’s migrant community into 
the country (Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009). Since the year 2000 successive 
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German governments have passed, reformed, and rewritten public policies and 
legislations ranging from citizenship laws, asylum rules, residence permits, social 
integration initiatives to labour migration policies in order to accommodate the country’s 
existing migrant community as well future migrant generations. The irony of this 
paradigm shift in public and political discourse on immigration and associated state 
policy is that since 2008 Germany has had a negative net-immigration balance as more 
people are emigrating from Germany than immigrating to Germany (Table II).  
 
Table II: Net-migration balance Germany from 1991 to 2008 (Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 2010) 
 
Despite a negative net-immigration balance, Table II shows that the FRG still 
experiences significant in-migration, almost 700.000 people in year 2008. However, 
within the international context, OECD data reveals that Germany is currently one of the 
developed countries with the least relative permanent immigration (see Table III). 
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Table III: Permanent-type immigration in % of overall population, 2008 (OECD, 
2010) 
 
 
While Germany’s political elites as well as ordinary citizens are coming to terms 
with the fact that Germany is a country of immigration and has been so for many 
decades, current migratory trends indicate most other developed countries experience 
significantly more relative permanent migration and that Germany is a de facto 
emigration country again, which exacerbates already existing labour shortages in key 
sectors of the German economy (Caviedes, 2010). Current labour migration trends 
suggest that highly skilled German professionals are leaving Germany while they are 
being replaced by migrants with little or no professional qualifications (Bade, 2006). The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has analyzed this 
trend in its 2010 report on global migration and Table IV below illustrates the primary 
countries of emigration for German nationals in the year 2009. It shows that significant 
numbers of German nationals are migrating and have migrated to countries in relative 
close geographic proximity to Germany due to EU and EEA labour mobility laws, 
particularly to Switzerland, Spain, and Austria. 
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Table IV: Resident Foreigners and German Expatriates (OECD, 2010) 
 
 
The relative marginal impact of immigration onto the German labour market becomes 
apparent in Table V, which shows that between 2004 and 2007 migrants constituted less 
than twenty percent of all new entries into the working age population. 
 
 
 
 
This trend becomes even more significant in light of Germany’s rapidly ageing and 
Table V: Permanent-type Immigration to Germany (OECD, 2010) 
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shrinking working population. While Germany attracts a large number of migrants, in 
proportion to its population there has been a decline in people of working age migrating 
permanently to Germany. Other industrialized countries such as Switzerland, Ireland and, 
Spain seem to be more successful in attracting migrants of working age.12   
 This trend is insofar significant as over the last decade the German labour market 
has been experiencing an ever-increasing shortage of skilled workers. The German 
Association of Industry (BDI) declared in 2009 that in spite of the Global Economic 
Crisis, the German labour market experienced a shortage of 60.000 skilled professionals 
in the fields of maths, IT, natural sciences and technical engineering (BDI, 2009). 
Moreover, due to the demographic transition, the German labour market will need to 
recruit a minimum of 50,000 skilled foreign professionals per year in order to compensate 
for the projected negative balance between upcoming retirees and new university 
graduates (BDI, 2009). The German Association of Employers (BDA) even predicted 
increased labour shortages for intermediate professionals as well as unskilled workers 
(BDA, 2009). Both industry associations call on the German government to implement 
new labour migration policies and advocate a Canadian style points based immigration 
system to facility skilled labour migration to Germany. The Federal Ministry for 
Economy and Technology already predicted in 2007 that future economic growth in 
Germany would depend on the availability of skilled workers and called for a 
comprehensive labour migration strategy (BMWI, 2007). A 2007 research report from 
the German Chamber of Commerce (DIHK) calculated the annual loss due to labour 
shortage for the German economy at around 18.5 billion Euros and the report also 
stressed that in light of a declining national labour force, future economic development 
would depend on the recruitment of skilled professionals from abroad (DIHK, 2007). In 
2010 the DIHK calculated the annual loss of aggregate value added at 25 billion Euros 
and claimed that the German economy lacked 400.000 engineers and other skilled 
technicians (Spiegel, 20th Oct 2010). Even though there is a strong economic rationale for 
a comprehensive institutionalized labour migration regime in Germany, labour migration 
polices have only experienced minimal liberalization over the last decade, notably in 
                                                
12 Ironically, a significant portion of the foreign workforce in Switzerland migrated from Germany.  
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2000 with the introduction of the Green Card for foreign IT specialists (Pethe, 2005; 
Hollifield, 2004). 
 The main cause for the discrepancy between labour market demand and official 
government policy on labour migration in Germany is linked to the perceived socio-
cultural implications of past immigration to Germany. Parallel to the political debate on 
skilled labour migration, immigration debate in Germany is dominated by social issues 
surrounding Muslim and non-European immigration and the perceived failure of these 
groups to integrate themselves in Germany (Bauder & Semmelroggen, 2009). Newspaper 
headlines such as “welfare migration”, “honour killings”, “forced marriages”, “parallel 
society” or “integration refusenik” have become part of everyday vocabulary in Germany 
and are commonly associated with Muslim immigrants in public and media discourse 
(Bauder, 2008). 
During the summer and fall of 2010 the political debate on skilled labour 
migration and the socio-cultural implications of non-western immigration reached new 
levels of intensity and exposed the lingering controversy over immigration within 
German society. On the one hand the German economy desperately needs skilled workers 
while as a country Germany requires immigrants to maintain existing population levels 
(Caviedes, 2010; BDA, 2009; BDI, 2009). On the other hand large segments of 
Germany’s electorate are increasingly apprehensive about large-scale non-European 
immigration, particularly from Islamic countries (Caldwell, 2009, Joppke, 2009).13 It 
remains to be seen as to whether immigration policy makers in Germany will manage to 
balance the demand for skilled migrant labour from industry and employers with electoral 
fears about large-scale immigration of non-western nationals. 
 
3.2 – Labour Migration to Germany after 1945  
 
International labour migration to Germany is historically linked to the economic 
recovery of West Germany after the Second World War (1939-1945).14 During the post-
                                                
13 Within the debate on future skilled labour migration, Bavarian premier Horst Sleepover stated that ‘….it is obvious 
that migrants from different cultures, such as Turkey and the Arabic countries, are difficult to integrate. Therefore we 
don’t need further immigration from these cultures’ (Spiegel, 11 Oct, 2010).  
14 According to Bade, significant migratory movement of workers had already occurred in Germany during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Imperial Germany (1871-1918) had already experienced massive labour 
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war decades, also known as the era of the Wirtschaftswunder or economic miracle, the 
West German economy entered an era of unprecedented economic growth. In the early 
1950s several million displaced Germans from the country’s former eastern territories as 
well as a continuing flow of East German refugees from the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) to West Germany provided a large labour pool for West Germany’s 
expanding economy.15 During the 1950s some sectors of the West German economy, 
particularly agriculture, construction, and mining, experienced first signs of labour 
shortage as these sectors became increasingly unpopular with German workers who 
preferred the higher wages and better working conditions in the country’s expanding 
manufacturing sector (Caviedes, 2010). In response to emerging sectoral labour 
shortages, the West German authorities signed a bi-lateral agreement with the 
government of Italy in 1955 to facilitate the temporary recruitment of Italian workers into 
the West German labour market (Freeman, 2006; Martin, 1994).16 Until 1960 
approximately fifty thousand Italian migrant workers entered the West German labour 
market annually but the continued growth of the West German economy created an 
accelerated demand for foreign labour and in 1960 alone 144.000 Italians migrated to 
Germany for work (Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009). With the construction of the 
Berlin Wall in 1961, the flow of East German workers to West Germany came to a 
standstill, which exacerbated already existing shortages on the West German labour 
market. Under pressure from employers and industry, who threatened to move their 
factories abroad if labour demand was not met, the government of the Federal Republic 
signed further labour recruitment treaties with Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), 
Portugal (1964), and Yugoslavia (1968) (Constant & Massey, 2002).17 Between 1955 and 
1973 over five million foreign workers or Gastarbeiter (guest workers) were recruited by 
                                                                                                                                            
migrations, particularly of Italian and Polish workers to the emerging industrial centres of Ruhr valley at the end of the 
nineteenth century (Bade, 2002). However, pre-1948 migratory movements to Germany are rarely a topic of interest 
within social science research on contemporary migration scholarship in Germany.  
15 Between 1944 and 1950 8.3 million German refugees and displaced persons arrived in West Germany followed by 
several millions fleeing from East Germany between 1949 and 1961, which prompts migration scholar Klaus Bade to 
suggest that immigration is de facto a founding myth of the FRG (Bade, 2002). 
16 The West German government could have also encouraged the inclusion of female workers into the labour market 
but for the ruling socially conservative Christian Democrats (CDU) this would have undermined their traditionalist 
views on family and motherhood. 
17 Treaties were also signed with Morocco (1963) and Tunisia (1965) but these treaties were more based upon foreign 
policy consideration than economic rational, subsequently few workers from these two countries ventured to West-
Germany (Schönwalder, 2004) 
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West German employers and they performed for the most part low-skill jobs in the 
manufacturing, mining, construction, and service sectors of the West German economy 
(Klusmeyer et al., 2009, Bauer et al., 2002). Economists are in agreement that migrant 
labourers constituted a vital component in the German Wirtschaftswunder of the post-war 
decades (Caviedes, 2009; Castles, 2006). 
An often-overlooked aspect of labour migration management in West Germany 
during the 1950s and 60s is the fact that West German employers and state administrators 
actually had substantial experience in managing and utilizing foreign labour (Meyers, 
2004). In both World Wars, but especially during the Second World War, the German 
authorities recruited and forced millions of workers and prisoners of war to work in 
labour camps and factories, some of which were run by private German corporations, as a 
replacement for the domestic workers who had been conscripted into the military 
(Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009). Conservative estimates claim that up to twelve 
million foreign workers were imported to Germany between 1939 and 1945 and that 
foreign labour constituted about forty percent of the domestic workforce in Germany 
during World War II (Meyers, 2004). While most of the foreign labour was drafted from 
concentration and prisoner of war camps, a significant portion of foreign labour in 
wartime-Germany came from allied countries such as Franco-Spain, Vichy-France or 
Fascist Italy with whom the German authorities had signed recruitment agreements. As a 
result industry, factory managers, and government administrators in West Germany 
during in the post-war decades had already extensive experience in managing a foreign 
work force in large-scale industrial production, which explains the relative ease in which 
foreign workers were in integrated into the West German economy. 
Nevertheless, the recruitment of several hundred thousand foreign workers during 
the 1950s and 60s required some sort of legislative framework to regulate their daily lives 
in West Germany. Again, the West German authorities could fall back on previous 
legislation and experience as they revived the 1938 Ausländerpolizeiverordnung 
(Foreigner Policing Law) that was initially implemented during the Third Reich as legal 
framework for conscripted foreign workers. The revised law served as the legal basis for 
regulating the daily lives of foreign workers in West Germany until the implementation 
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of Ausländergesetz (Foreigner Law) in 1965 (Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009; 
Joppke, 1999).18  
As for managing a foreign workforce, German policy makers originally intended 
to only temporarily import labour and avoid permanent settlement of foreign workers at 
all cost (Castles, 2006; Schönwalder, 2004; Hollifield, 2004; Soysal, 1994). Therefore 
labour migration was only to occur within the legal framework of the guest workers 
program, which was intended to control the duration of stay and ensure the repatriation of 
workers after their assignment had ceased. The recruitment of foreign workers was 
initially centrally organized; employers would issue a request for workers to their local 
employment office, which then would pass the request to one of the German embassies in 
Turkey, Italy or other treaty partner country (Joppke, 1999). Recruitment agents in the 
German embassies would then issue work permits to interested locals, who would then 
travel to Germany to work (Meyers, 2004). However, as the word got out even in the 
most rural regions of southern Europe that paid employment was readily available in 
West Germany, migrant workers from the treaty countries would often travel on their 
own account to Germany and utilize already existing family and kinship networks to find 
employment (Martin, 1994). Due to the massive labour shortage in the lower segments of 
the West German economy during the 1960s, local German employment agencies 
discreetly issued work permits to migrant workers who had bypassed the official 
recruitment scheme as visa restrictions did not exist in those days (Klusmeyer & 
Papademetrious, 2009).  
The migratory flow from southern Europe to West Germany, even though 
initiated by state policy, soon developed its own inherent dynamics contrary to the 
original policy intent. First, the migrant workers did not behave as anticipated as many 
did not return to their country of origin after their original work contract expired. Many 
guest workers realized upon arrival that even though they could earn significantly higher 
wages than at home, their cost of living on Germany was also much higher than in rural 
southern Europe (Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009). In order to secure the desired 
monetary savings, many foreign workers stayed on working longer than they had initially 
                                                
18 The lawmakers only changed the name from Fremdarbeiter (Foreign worker) to Gastarbeiter (Guest Worker) in 
order to avoid any discursive association with the Nazi labour scheme 
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planned and as guest worker policy had originally intended. This development 
undermined an important policy provision, the so-called “rotational” principle or 
Rotationsprinzip in which migrant workers were only supposed to stay on the job for two 
years and then return to their country of origin and be replaced by another guest worker 
(Constant & Massey, 2002). The rotational principle was explicitly implemented to 
prevent permanent settlement of non-German migrant workers (Castles, 2006; Hollifield, 
2004). 
 Aside from guest workers wishing to stay longer in West Germany, the West 
German employers also did not want to invest into the training of migrant workers just to 
have them leave after two years and be replaced by new workers who needed to be 
trained all over. As a result, German employers actively encouraged and passively 
ignored the extended work stays of many guest workers (Constant & Massey, 2002; 
Cornelius et al., 1994). For the sake of continued economic growth, the West German 
authorities also chose to ignore the widespread disregard by employers and migrant 
workers for the rotational principle, which undermined the intent of the policy from the 
very beginning. The rotational principle was ultimately abolished altogether in 1964 
(Constant & Massey, 2002). 
The second factor that ran counter to official government policy in regard to the 
guest workers was family unification. Initially it was the intention of German policy 
makers to prevent family unification, but the extended stay of many foreign workers 
ultimately resulted in their wives and children moving to West Germany as well (Castles, 
2006). The independent court system in West Germany prevented any infringement on 
this basic human right by the government authorities and also removed a number of the 
legal obstacles that hindered family unification over the course of the 1960s (Joppke, 
1998). German employers were more than happy to employ migrant women because they 
had to pay them even less than the men and therefore German employers effectively 
contributed to undermine the government policy intent on temporary labour recruitment 
(Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009). 
Policy makers in West Germany had not foreseen these developments as they 
designed the recruitment scheme to solely to satisfy employers and industry demand and 
they did not consider the potential long-term social dimensions of the guest worker 
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program. Despite the explicit aim of West German policy makers to maintain labour 
recruitment as a strictly temporary measure to alleviate temporary labour shortages in the 
German economy, foreign workers in West Germany had always enjoyed full 
incorporation into the German social security system, something West German trade 
unions insisted on in 1955 prior to the recruitment treaty with Italy (Borkert & Bosswock, 
2007; Koopmans & Statham, 1999; Soysal, 1994). As a result migrant workers in West 
Germany enjoyed economic and social privileges that were unheard of in their countries 
of origin, particularly in Turkey and Yugoslavia.  
The German guest worker recruitment scheme ended with the Arab Oil Embargo 
of 1973. After more than two decades of unprecedented economic growth and prosperity, 
Western Europe and the FRG experienced the first major recession following the war 
(Borkert et al., 2007). As a result of the energy crisis and subsequent economic turmoil, 
German industry began a massive restructuring process with the aim of making industrial 
production more efficient and less labour dependent. In previous years the overabundant 
supply of cheap and flexible migrant labour had taken incentives away from West 
German industry to invest in more efficient modes of production but the rising cost of 
energy and labour after 1973 made many industry branches in West Germany streamline 
their assembly lines and dispose of manual labour, particularly unskilled workers 
(Caviedes, 2010, Martin 1994).19 As a result of the oil crisis, recession, and industrial 
restructuring, unemployment numbers began to rise in West Germany and migrant 
workers were not required anymore (Castles, 2006).20  
Aside from economic and industrial restructuring, the West German authorities 
also became increasingly apprehensive about immigration and its social and cultural 
impacts on West German society.21 Initially there had been little public resentment 
                                                
19 Some scholars even suggest that the availability of cheap foreign labour in the post-war decades kept inefficient and 
unprofitable industries such as coal mining and steel production alive in West Germany that would have been phased 
out on their own due to the lack of workers willing to be employed there (Caldwell, 2009). Due to the availability of 
cheap foreign labour these industries were kept alive for several decades and to this day the coal and steel industry in 
Germany continues to be a major biggest recipient of state subsidies. This puts into question the economic long-term 
benefit of the guest worker program. 
20 Many employers believed that the German government used the 1973 Oil Crisis as a convenient excuse the end 
recruitment of foreign workers as an increasingly irritated electorate resented the large scale presence of foreign 
workers and their dependents in the FRG (Martin, 1994) 
21 During the summer of 1973, the FRG experienced a series of wildcat strikes in which foreign workers played a 
prominent role. German policy makers and employers realized that foreign workers were not necessarily a reliable low 
cost source of labour anymore (Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009; Martin, 1994). 
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towards the foreign workers as their presence symbolized West Germany’s economic 
affluence in the first post-war decades (Caviedes, 2010). However, as the FRG’s migrant 
workforce and their dependents became more and more visible outside the workspaces 
during the 1960s, West Germans became increasingly apprehensive about labour 
migration and foreign workers, despite considerable effort by politicians and the media to 
present the benefits of labour migration to the German population (Schönwalder, 2004). 
In light of economic stagnation and rising unemployment, first in 1966 and then again in 
1973, this message became harder to sell to the West German electorate. Moreover, 
social tensions over immigration and the economic costs of low skill labour migration 
started to become apparent with the onset of the 1973 recession (Bauer et al, 2002).22 
Martin (1994) believes that German policy makers seized the 1973 crisis as an 
opportunity to suspend increasingly unpopular foreign labour migration to Germany. 
 In November 1973 the West German government suspended further labour 
recruitment and withdrew from the bi-lateral treaties with its partner countries (Caviedes, 
2010). In the following years labour migration to West Germany occurred only within the 
institutional and legal framework of the European Economic Community (EEC) and was 
relatively small scale in comparison to the previous decades (Constant & Massey, 2002). 
Following the Anwerbestop (end of recruitment) of 1973, labour migration disappeared 
from the government agenda and policymakers assumed (and hoped) that the guest 
workers remaining in West Germany would return eventually to their countries of 
origin.23 Yet, the absolute number of migrants in the FRG continued to increase as 
migration shifted from labour migration to family unification and asylum (Bauer et al., 
2002; Borkert & Bosswock, 2007). In 1973 four million foreigners resided in Germany 
and by 1980 that number had increased to 4.5 million even though the number of foreign 
workers fell from 2.6 million to 2 million in the same time (Martin, 1994). These 
numbers indicate that temporary labour recruitment had in fact lead to semi-permanent 
settlement of foreign workers in the FRG as well as continued immigration of family 
                                                
22  A Spiegel issue from July 1973 exposed the decrepit living conditions of migrant workers, particularly Turkish 
migrants, in some of the major urban areas in West Germany. The fear of emerging North American style ethnic 
ghettos and an ethnic underclass in West Germany prompted German policy makers to halt further migrant recruitment 
(Schönwalder, 2004). 
23 During the short recession of 1966 significant number of migrant workers did in fact leave West Germany to return 
home (Klusmeyer et al, 2009). Therefore it was not unreasonable for West German policy makers to assume that the 
same would occur after the 1973 Anwerbestop. 
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members of the former guest workers. According to Joppke (1998) this process of 
continued migration to and migrant settlement in West Germany was actively facilitated 
by the countries court system that gradually stabilized and regularized the precarious 
legal status of Germany’s former guest workers. While West German politicians 
maintained that Germany was not a country of immigration and refused to develop and 
implement long-term strategies and policies that addressed the needs of the country’s 
foreign-born population, the country’s independent court system at federal and state level 
continued to place certain moral obligations and legal constraints on the West German 
state that effectively created expansionary immigration policies (Stalker, 2002). The 
result was a discrepancy between political rhetoric in Germany (exclusionary) and actual 
immigration policy outcome (inclusionary). Joppke (1998) believes that the existence of 
an independent judiciary system in advanced democratic economies results in a self-
limited sovereignty of nation-states in relation to immigration and associated policy and 
he cites West Germany as a prime example. Samers (2010) and Massey (1999) concur 
with this assessment and point out that self-limited sovereignty distinguishes immigration 
in Germany and other western countries from immigration to non-democratic countries 
such as the Gulf States.  
In terms of government policy, labour migration to West Germany ended with the 
Anwerbestop (end of recruitment) in 1973. Once it became apparent that many former 
guest workers chose to remain in Germany, the federal government implemented a policy 
of voluntary repatriation with financial incentives, which in the short term caused a slight 
decline in numbers of migrants in West Germany (Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009; 
Martin, 1994). However, in retrospect only those migrant workers left Germany that were 
planning to repatriate anyway and as such the policy of repatriation did not yield the 
desired results. On the other hand there is a scholarly consensus that the Anwerbestop 
effectively led to permanent settlement of former migrant workers, particularly those 
from Turkey who did not have the benefit of EEC membership (Borkert & Bosswock, 
2007; Morris, 2000). The Anwerbestop and associated policy of voluntary repatriation 
prompted many former guest workers to stay indefinitely in the Federal Republic as the 
option of re-entry after voluntary repatriation was barred (Borkert & Bosswock, 2007, 
Martin, 1994). Ironically, the repatriation efforts of the West German government 
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following the Anwerbestop resulted in West Germany becoming a country of permanent 
immigration and settlement. 
Table VI shows that most migrants in Germany remain concentrated to this day in 
the old West-German states, particularly the manufacturing centres in the southwest and 
the Ruhr valley.24 
 
 
                                                
24 The geographic distribution and regional concentration of migrants in Germany is a legacy of the guest-workers 
program as well as the political division of Germany until 1990. 
Table VI:  Settlement Patterns of Migrants in Germany 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010) 
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With the exception of legal citizenship, the guest workers and increasingly their 
descendants enjoyed most social and economic privileges in West Germany (Worbs, 
2003; Soysal, 1994). Even after 1973 the relatives of the migrant workers, particularly 
Turks, continued to move to Germany and as a result the migrant population in West 
Germany continued to grow over the next three decades (Hollifield, 2004, Worbs, 2003, 
Bauer et al., 2002; Leitner, 1995).25 During the implementation of the guest worker 
program, West German policy makers had believed that they could turn migration flows 
on and off like a tap but the years following the Anwerbestop showed that the labour 
migration flows from southern Europe, particularly Turkey, had created its own inherent 
dynamics unintended by official government recruitment policy.  
In the 1980s the issue of immigration and associated political debate in West 
Germany shifted from the economic sphere to social policy and human rights, 
particularly asylum. The German constitution of 1949 had enshrined generous and far-
reaching asylum provisions to anyone escaping political persecution.26 Initially aimed at 
those wishing to flee the oppression of Soviet Communism, there were fewer than two 
hundred thousand asylum applicants in West Germany between 1953 and 1978 (Martin, 
1994). After 1978, the number of asylum applicants swelled up to a hundred thousand 
annually with most applicants coming from Turkey (Stalker, 2002). There was 
widespread awareness in Turkey that the easiest way to obtain a work permit in West 
Germany was through claiming political asylum (Martin, 1994). The West German 
authorities, in an attempt to maintain the asylum provision of the Basic Law, reacted by 
requiring Turkish citizens to obtain a visa before travelling to West Germany. At the 
same time, a law was passed that barred asylum seekers in Germany from the labour 
market while their claim was being evaluated, a process that would often take years 
(Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009). These policy adjustments helped to temporarily 
lower the number of asylum seekers in the FRG. However, the collapse of the Soviet 
Block in 1989 followed by the descent of the Balkans into civil war led to an 
unprecedented rise in asylum application in the FRG in the early 1990s. In response, 
                                                
25 In 1971 652,000 Turkish citizens resided in West Germany, by 1975 the number had reached one million and 
increased to two million in 1995. At the same time the number of Turkish citizens working in Germany has varied 
constantly between 400,000 and 600,000 over the past three decades (Worbs, 2003). 
26 Many of the authors of the German Basic Law had taken refuge abroad during the Nazi dictatorship  
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German policy makers amended the asylum provisions of their constitution in 1993 by 
allowing the immediate rejection of any asylum application from foreigners who arrived 
via a safe third country (Meyers, 2004; Bade, 2000; Morris, 2000).27  
Aside from increasing numbers of asylum seekers in the 1990s, the newly unified 
German state experienced a large-scale return migration and repatriation of ethnic 
Germans from eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Cornelius et al, 1994). Between 
1987 and 2001, almost three million ethnic Germans migrated to the now unified FRG 
from eastern Europe (Meyers, 2004). Under paragraph 116 of the Grundgestetz  (Basic 
Law/Constitution) of 1949 these ethnic Germans or Aussiedler are legally entitled to 
German citizenship.28 It created a paradoxical situation in which Soviet-born Aussiedlers 
were given immediate access to German citizenship despite often-substantial language 
deficits and cultural barriers while the fully integrated German born descendants of the 
guest workers generation often lived in the country without legal citizenship (Bade, 
2000). Ultimately the large inflow of ethnic Germans from the collapsing Soviet Union 
compelled German policy makers to set an annual quota (first 220.000 than reduced to 
110.000) in 1992 and implement mandatory language tests (Meyers, 2004). 
The aftermath of German unification in 1989 witnessed internal labour migration 
from the five eastern provinces towards the west of the country. According to Bade 
(2000, p.388) more than five percent of all residents in former East Germany migrated to 
western states in the three years following unification. At the same time, the former East 
Germany’s declining industry and more significantly increasing discrepancy in wages 
between East and West, compelled several hundred thousand workers from the eastern 
states to commute to work in the west of the country (Sassen, 2000, p. 128). Hunt’s 
(2006) analysis of East-West labour migration in the 1990s concludes that is was 
primarily the skilled East Germans that relocated to the west and that in fact East 
Germany experienced a significant Brain Drain during that period. Due to the drastic rise 
in unemployment in Germany following unification, the de-facto de-industrialization of 
                                                
27 Since all Germany’s neighbours are deemed safe third countries, it is de facto impossible to claim asylum in the 
FRG. This constitutional amendment by the German state effectively exported to asylum and refugee issue and 
associated responsibilities to the European countries along the Mediterranean. 
28 Just as the asylum provisions of the federal constitution, the right of return of ethnic Germans from “communist” 
eastern Europe was a political tool during the cold war. West German policy makers wanted to present the Federal 
Republic as the sole legitimate German nation-state, thus any person of German descent could claim national 
citizenship in the FRG. 
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East Germany, and a wave of xenophobic violence throughout Germany there was little 
incentive for German policy makers to embark on a large-scale liberalization of existing 
labour migration policy frameworks (Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009; Bade, 2000).  
However, in light of the new geo-political situation that the unified Germany 
found itself after 1989 led to some low-key policy changes in relation to labour migration 
from eastern Europe. In order to alleviate emigration pressures from Germany’s eastern 
neighbours, the then Christian Democrat led coalition government passed the so-called 
Anwerbestoppausnahmeverordnung or labour recruitment exemption law in 1991 
(Borkert & Bosswock, 2007). Under this policy initiative, bi-lateral treaties were signed 
with a number of eastern European countries to allow a specific quota of seasonal farm 
workers, project tied workers, border commuters, and health care professionals to work in 
Germany (Caviedes, 2010). This demand driven legislation was low key and sparked 
virtually no controversy especially since the workers that fell under this legislation were 
fully integrated into Germany’s social security system and were paid according to 
national tariffs, which prevented large scale wage dumping and opposition from the trade 
unions.29  
By the end of the 1990s the political debate on migration developed a new 
dynamic. After winning the 1998 federal election, the new Social Democrat and Green 
Party coalition embarked to reform Germany’s citizenship law and overhaul the country’s 
immigration policies, particularly those policies affecting Germany’s native born migrant 
population. The new government coalition created an Independent Commission for 
Immigration reform chaired by former Bundestag President Rita Süssmuth (CDU) which 
in 2001 suggested a new policy framework for immigration in the FRG based upon 
specific humanitarian and economic considerations (Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009, 
Kruse et al., 2003). The Süssmuth Commission Report criticized Germany’s restrictive 
labour migration laws and argued that continued economic growth would depend on the 
migration of skilled and less-skilled workers (Castles, 2006).    
As for policy changes after 1998, the most far-reaching reform was the 
amendment of Germany’s century old citizenship law, which excluded German born 
                                                
29 The legislation also affected workers from the EEC member states such as the UK and Portugal, which were before 
utilized by companies to undercut German wages (Bauer et al, 2002). 
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children of immigrant parents from national citizenship. The new legislation added a 
territorial principle of citizenship, which entitled migrant children born in the FRG to 
claim German citizenship as birthright and also allowed dual citizenship for German born 
migrant children (Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009).30 The most significant policy 
development in relation to labour migration was the introduction of the so-called Green-
Card for IT specialists in the year 2000 (Caviedes, 2009, Hollifield, 2004). The German 
IT sector was facing a severe labour shortage and the Green-Card was viewed by 
government and industry as a potential quick fix for this problem. The policy of the 
Green-Card initiative was to enable industry to hire up to 20.000 IT workers annually 
from outside the European Union (Green, 2004; Pethe 2005). Despite widespread 
industry and employer’s support for the policy, the conservative opposition decried the 
initiative as unnecessary and cynical in light of widespread unemployment in Germany at 
the time (Borkert & Bosswock, 2007).31 In the end the Green-Card initiative attracted far 
fewer IT workers to Germany than anticipated (Pethe, 2005). The program was designed 
as a short term-labour recruitment scheme and lacked any kind of long-term career 
perspective for prospective foreign IT workers (Caviedes, 2010). Ultimately a mere 
17,831 foreign IT workers came to Germany over the five-year duration of the Green-
Card program (Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009). In comparison with other IT 
recruiting countries, especially the United States, the German labour market simply 
lacked in competiveness and incentive (Green, 2005). 
After the Green-Card initiative, immigration debate in Germany shifted from 
labour migration back to citizenship laws and social policy. The Social Democrat-Green 
coalition set out to replace the 1965 Foreigner Law with a new and more comprehensive 
Migration Law but a series of provincial electoral defeats between 2000 and 2005 
prevented any sort of far reaching legal reform while the events of Sept 11th 2001 led to 
an increased securitization of any immigration related policy debate (Borkert & Boswell, 
2007; Kruse at al, 2003). When in 2005 the new Migration Law was finally passed, very 
                                                
30 The Christian Democrats were opposed to these policy changes on the basis that Germany was not a country of 
immigration. At a provincial level, they utilized the changes in the citizenship law for their electoral platform in 1998 
and 1999 (Boswell & Hough, 2008). 
31 The CDU utilized the controversy surrounding the Green-Card initiative in the 2000 provincial election in state of 
North Rhine Westphalia with the campaign slogan “Kinder statt Inder” meaning children instead of Indians. The 
message was that Germany should focus on educating its youth instead of importing foreign labour (Green, 2004).   
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little of its original intentions remained.32 33 One of the more far reaching clauses of the 
2005 Migration law was that it institutionalized mandatory social and political integration 
courses on a federal level for newly arriving migrants and their dependents (Klusmeyer & 
Papademetrious, 2009).34 The 2005 Migration Law changed very little in regards to 
labour migration because the most significant aspect of the original legislation, the 
introduction of a skills based points system for migrant workers, was dropped altogether 
during the political negotiations (Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009). However, aside 
from institutionalizing already existing exemptions for nurses, IT specialists (green-card), 
and seasonal agricultural workers, the 2005 Migration Law made additional residency 
allowances for skilled non-EU professionals and managers if their annual salary was 
above !86.400. It also allowed foreign students to remain in Germany for a year after 
completion of their studies if they found employment in their area of academic training 
(Iredale, 2005). Third, foreign investors wishing to invest one million Euros and create 
ten new jobs in Germany were given limited residence permits (Borkert & Bosswock, 
2007). Most significantly the 2005 law limited the previously numerous bureaucratic and 
legal residence titles from past migration schemes to two; limited residence permit and 
unlimited residence permit (Borkert & Bosswock, 2007; Green, 2004). Thus the new 
legislation combined for the first time legal labour market access, residence rights, and 
social integration measures into one integrative piece of legislation.  
Even though the 2005 Migration Law did not turn out to be as revolutionary, 
progressive, and far reaching as its original authors had hoped for, it nonetheless 
represented a significant paradigm shift in relation to immigration in Germany. Since 
1973 virtually all immigration related legislation in Germany had been implemented to 
limit further in-migration; therefore, the 2005 Migration Law signifies a relatively 
significant policy shift.  
                                                
32 Even the name was changed from “Immigration Law” to “Law for Controlling and Limiting Immigration and for 
Regulating the Residency and Integration of EU Nationals and Foreigners.  
33 Kruse et al (2003) believe that major immigration reform in the FRG is difficult due to the federal political system 
with its permanent state of electoral campaigning at provincial level. The contested topic of immigration, even though a 
federal jurisdiction, can easily be utilized by opportunist provincial politicians for sub national electoral gains while at 
the same time constitutional reform requires a majority in both the lower and upper house of the German parliament 
34 Previous attempts to institutionalize such integration measures on a national scale failed because policy makers and 
politicians felt that integration measures for foreigners would undermine the notion of temporary residence for 
migrants.  
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In 2009 the Christian Democrat and Social Democrat coalition government passed 
the Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration, which was implemented in response 
to labour market demand for skilled workers and the declining domestic supply of skilled 
workers in Germany due the demographic transition.35 For the first time since 1973 
German policy makers officially recognized that continued economic growth in the FRG 
would depend on recruiting skilled workers from other countries. At the same time the 
public and political debate on immigration in Germany continues to be torn between the 
economic necessity of skilled labour migration and the social question relating to 
migration of non-Europeans, particularly Muslims (Bade, 2006). The latter is not a 
specific German issue, the question on how to integrate Islam into European culture 
shapes political discourse on migration in many European countries (Joppke 2009; 
Caldwell, 2009).36 It indicates that the social dimensions of immigration should not be 
ignored in the scholarly analysis of international labour migration and associated policies 
in Germany and Europe. 
 
3.3 – Theoretical Debates on Immigration in Germany 
 
Due to the sheer scale and scope of West Germany’s post-war guest worker 
program and its long-term socio-political consequences to the country, the literature on 
international labour migration usually presents Germany as the feature example for state 
organized labour migration programs (Samers, 2010; Castles and Miller, 2009; Caviedes, 
2010; Meyers, 2004).37 Since Germany did not actively encourage or enable labour 
migration for over three decades, empirical studies on post-1973 skilled labour migration 
in Germany are somewhat rare and not policy relevant. On the other hand, Germany is 
prominently featured within the literature on immigration and citizenship issues due to 
the peculiar nature of Germany’s legal citizenship laws and its perceived effect on social 
                                                
35 The Christian Democrats faced mounting criticism for their “Germany is not a country of immigration” attitude from 
employers, industry, churches and other NGO’s, the former being their traditional political supporters (Borkert & 
Bosswock, 2007). 
36 2010 saw the Minaret ban in Switzerland, Burka bans in France, and the rise of anti-Islamic parties in Scandinavia 
and the Low Countries. 
37 Germany is a perfect example to support the Gap Hypothesis of Cornelius et al. (1992) where policy intention 
(temporary labour recruitment) and policy outcome (permanent settlement of migrants) differ significantly. 
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integration and naturalization of migrants in the country (Bauder & Semmelroggen, 2009; 
Halfman, 1997; Brubaker, 1996; Leitner, 1995; Brubaker, 1992) 
 Scholarly debates and academic research on immigration issues in modern 
Germany have for the longest time been shaped by and linked to the country’s conception 
of nationhood and associated citizenship legislation. Prominent social science scholars on 
subject of nationalism and citizenship such as Christian Joppke (1999), Liah Greenfeld 
(1993) and Rogers Brubaker (1992) have argued that Germany’s delayed development 
towards becoming a nation-state in the nineteenth and twentieth century led to an ethno-
cultural understanding of nationhood, which subsequently resulted in legal citizenship 
laws based on descent.38 Brubaker’s (1992) comparative study on the historical 
development of citizenship laws in Germany and France has been particularly influential 
within scholarly research on immigration and citizenship in the FRG (Miller-Idiss, 2006; 
Preuss, 2003; Koopmans & Statham, 1999; Halfmann, 1997; Fahrmeier, 1997). 
According to Brubaker (1992), Germany lacked central state authority during most of the 
nineteenth century, which fostered an ethno-cultural understanding of nationhood and 
ultimately resulted in jus sanguinis citizenship laws where parental lineage determined 
legal citizenship and national belonging (Halfmann, 1997). France and other western 
European countries developed a civic territorial principle of nationhood and associated 
identity by institutionalizing jus soli based citizenship laws in which place of birth 
determined legal citizenship (Brubaker, 1992, Preuss, 2003). In France citizenship 
developed as a political construct linked to territory while in Germany citizenship laws 
institutionalized ethnic belonging. According to Preuss (2003, p.37) ‘German citizenship 
law,’ … is characterized by the separation of citizenship from nationality, the distinction 
between nationality and ethnic belonging and the emphasis on the cultural and social 
dimensions of citizenship rather than its political significance’. Within the literature, jus 
soli citizenship regimes are generally characterized as more inclusive towards migrants 
and their descendants whereas jus sanguinis citizenship legislations are considered 
exclusionary towards second-generation migrants (Castles & Miller, 2009; Samers, 
2010).  
                                                
38 Their assumptions about German nationalism were influenced by the historical theories on nationalism based on the 
works of Hobsbawm (1990) and Gellner (1983). 
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During the 1990s Brubaker’s theories dominated the literature on immigration in 
Germany. Germany had failed to socially and politically integrate large segments of its 
migrant community because of the restrictive nature of it citizenship laws (Borker & 
Bosswick, 2007; Koopmans & Statham, 1999). Table VII below shows the relative low 
naturalization rates for migrants in Germany as compared to other developed countries in 
2009. 
Table VII: Naturalization Rates of Migrants (OECD, 2010) 
 
The traditional immigration countries in North America and those European 
countries with jus soli based citizenship laws appear more successful in socially 
integrating and politically incorporating their migrant communities. Citizenship laws and 
their embodied national identity seemed a plausible explanation as to why certain 
countries failed or succeeded in accommodating migrants and their descendants. 
Brubaker’s work on Germany and France seemed to confirm the theory that the ethos of 
ethno-cultural German nationhood was socially reproduced through Germany’s 
constitution (article 116) and corresponding citizenship laws (Brubaker, 1992).39 The 
country’s ethno-cultural understanding of nationhood and associated legal practice 
effectively barred migrants and their descendants from legal and social membership in 
the German national community. Within the scholarship, Germany’s citizenship laws 
                                                
39 During the 1990s Germany experienced widespread xenophobic violence while France won the FIFA World Cup 
with a national team largely consisting of players with a migratory background.   
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were perceived as the main obstacle to successful migrant integration (Samers, 2010; 
Preuss, 2003, Halfmann, 1997; Brubaker, 1992). 
While there is little doubt that the state’s legal definition of citizenship is linked to 
and shaped by the nation’s history and culture, it is disputable as to whether legal 
citizenship laws exert a significant imprint on popular understandings of nationhood and 
citizenship. Müller-Iddris (2006) believes that popular understandings of citizenship are 
poorly understood and do not necessarily reflect legal citizenship regimes. According to 
Müller-Iddris (2006, p.531)  ‘… the trouble with research on German citizenship is that 
it assigns Germans a static and uniform notion of citizenship that is rooted in a blood-
based conceptions of national belonging…’ and she believes that the meaning of 
citizenship for individuals cannot be entirely understood by examining citizenship and 
naturalization laws but must also must include how these policies are interpreted and 
reacted upon by ordinary citizens. In the German example, the FRG’s citizenship laws 
were based upon the Reichs und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (citizenship law) of 1913, 
which was adopted into the West-German Basic Law after World War II.  Müller-Iddris 
(2006) points out that there is no empirical evidence to support the notion that the popular 
understanding of nationhood among ordinary Germans is still determined by a century 
old law40.  
Another methodological problem in relying on citizenship policies in defining 
national identity and national belonging is that citizenship laws are not static. When 
Brubaker published his research findings on Germany and France in early 1990s, 
Germany’s citizenship laws had been in place since 1913, surviving the collapse of three 
successive German states over the course of the twentieth century (Preuss, 2003). 
However, in 1999 the unified Federal Republic amended its citizenship legislation and 
included a jus soli principle followed up by legal provisions that enabled dual citizenship 
for migrants and streamlined the naturalization process (Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 
2009; Meyers, 2004, Miller-Idriss, 2006). Yet, despite these far-reaching and significant 
legislative changes to its citizenship laws, the literature still describes Germany as the 
quintessential jus sanguinis nation-state and retains the assumption that jus soli 
                                                
40 Legal scholars will confirm that it is far easier to write a new law than to reform an old one, which explains why 
some laws remain in place despite being seriously out of touch with present circumstances.  
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citizenship regimes are naturally more inclusive towards migrants than jus sanguinis 
citizenship regimes (Samers, 2010, Castles &Miller, 2009).  
Aside from Miller-Idriss’s (2006) criticism about the lack of theoretical 
knowledge on popular understandings of nationhood and citizenship, there is also a lack 
of theoretical knowledge about to what extent citizenship legislation affects the social 
integration of migrants into the national community or migrant workers’ labour market 
outcomes. As Green (2004) points out, ethnic German migrants from the former Soviet 
Union have had automatic access to German citizenship but nonetheless experienced 
great difficulties integrating themselves into German society and the German labour 
market despite legal citizenship. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous section, migrant 
workers in the FRG have always enjoyed full social and economic incorporation into 
German labour market notwithstanding their respective citizenship. At the same time, 
some European countries with seemingly inclusive citizenship laws and more civic-
territorial conceptions of nationhood such as France, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom have experienced widespread social and political discontent within their 
migrant community, resulting in urban riots, increased xenophobia or home grown 
Islamic terrorism as well as poor labour market outcomes second generation migrants 
(Geis, 2011; Fleischman et al, 2010; Koopmans, 2010; Joppke, 2009). Despite significant 
variations in citizenship legislation and naturalization procedures throughout Europe, 
almost all European countries are currently experiencing significant problems with the 
social and labour market integration of their resident Muslim citizens (Koopmans, 2010; 
Joppke, 2009; Caldwell, 2009; Koopmans & Stratham, 1999). Returning to Brubaker’s 
(1992) study on the traditions of citizenship in Germany and France, both countries 
experienced widespread social discontent, poor labour market performance, and cultural 
alienation within their Muslim migrant community, especially second and third 
generation migrants, despite having fundamentally different legal traditions of citizenship 
and naturalization procedures (Fleischmann et al, 2010; Geis et al, 2011; Caldwell, 2009). 
This suggests that the impact of citizenship legislation on the social, economic and 
political integration of migrants and their descendants as well as migrant’s labour market 
participation may actually not be that significant. Scholarly research on contemporary 
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skilled labour migration in Germany should therefore not be limited to or constrained by 
the theories of national identity and citizenship policies. 
 
3.4 – System of Party Politics in Germany  
  
 This section provides a brief review of the political parties in the German 
Bundestag. As with most nation-states with parliamentary democracies, political parties 
constitute a vital aspect of political discourse in Germany. Between 2005 and 2009 six 
federal political parties had seats in the German Bundestag; the Christian Democrat 
Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Liberal Party (FDP), the Green Party, and the Links 
Party.  
 The Christian Democrats have historically dominated federal politics since 1949, 
the first three Chancellors of the Federal Republic were Christian Democrats and it was 
the CDU government under former Chancellor Helmut Kohl that oversaw the political 
unification between West Germany and East Germany in 1990. The Christian Democrats 
are a conservative party and regarded as the centre-right in the German political system 
(www.cdu.de). Its sister party, the CSU, only operates in the German state of Bavaria 
while the CDU operates in the remaining fifteen federal states. The CSU has more 
regional political outlook and retains strong links with the German Catholic Church. The 
CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag is commonly referred to as the “Union”. The 
CDU/CSU received the most votes in the 2005 federal election and the party’s candidate, 
Dr. Angela Merkel, subsequently became Federal Chancellor. 
 The Social Democrats are the country’s oldest political party having been founded 
in nineteenth century. The SPD is a traditional labour party and occupies the centre-left in 
German politics (www.spd.de). Prior to 2005, the Social Democrats held the 
chancellorship together with their Green coalition partner. The 2005 federal election 
virtually tied the CDU/CSU and SPD, with the former only winning by a slight margin. 
As result of that election the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats found 
themselves in the position where neither side could form the government with any of the 
smaller parties and were subsequently forced into a grand coalition. The only precedent 
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for this was in 1966 when the CDU and SPD formed a short-lived grand coalition.  
 The Free Liberal Party (FDP) is one of the smaller political parties in the 
Bundestag and it occupies a centrist position within the parliamentary system. The Free 
Liberals promote a free market economy and are strong proponents of civil liberties 
(www.fdp.de). They are the preferred coalition partner of the Christian Democrats. 
 The German Green Party has its origins in environmental and anti-war movement 
of the 1970s and they entered the Bundestag for the first time in 1983. After 1998 the 
Greens joined the Social Democrats to form a new coalition government after sixteen 
years of Christian Democrat and Free Liberal rule. The two following electoral terms 
(1995 -2005) are commonly referred to as the Red-Green years. The Greens are 
considered a leftist party often associated with pacifism, environmental politics, and 
promotion of minority rights (www.gruene.de). 
 The Links Party is newest addition to the parliamentary system in Germany. The 
party was founded in 2007 through the merger between the Party of Democratic 
Socialism (PDS) and the Labour and Social Justice Party (WASG). The Links Party is 
particularly strong in the former East German states and it occupies a far left political 
position within the German political spectrum (www.die-linke.de). Due to its historical 
ties to the former East German regime, the other four federal parties are hesitant to 
cooperate with the Links Party.  
After the 2005 federal election the Christina Democrats and Social Democrats 
formed a grand coalition government while the Free Liberals, Greens, and Links Party 
were in opposition. Coalition governments are actually the norm in the Federal Republic 
(Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009). Table VII below shows the distribution of seats in 
the Bundestag between the different political parties during the Federal Republic’s 
sixteenth legislative period (2005 – 2009). 
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Table VIII: Distribution of Seats in the Bundestag: 2005 – 2009 (www.Bundestag.de) 
 
 
Due to the fact that that Germany’s federal states are in a quasi-permanent state of 
elections, the composition and distribution of the seats in the Bundesrat continuously 
changed between 2005 and 2009.  
 
3.5 – Germany: a Relevant Case Study for Skilled Labour Migration Policy Making 
 
 Germany has a tradition of importing foreign labour and state policies have been 
instrumental in facilitating and shaping labour migration flows during the post-war 
decades. Within the German context, labour migration and state immigration policy are 
intrinsically linked, the latter being instrumental to the former. Germany is also a prime 
example of the discrepancy between immigration policy intent (temporary labour 
migration) and actual immigration policy outcome (permanent settlement of temporary 
migrant workers). In terms of scale, the German guest workers program is possibly the 
single biggest example of long-term immigration policy failure in any modern economy. 
The inability of German policy makers in the post-war decades to comprehend labour 
migration as a long-term social process and their refusal to recognize the existence of 
permanent migrant settlement has for the longest time been discussed largely within the 
theoretical context of German national identity and associated ethno-cultural conception 
of nationhood and citizenship (Joppke, 2000; Koopmans & Statham, 1999; Brubaker, 
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1992). Contemporary political debate on skilled labour migration and associated state 
policy in Germany is however set in a significantly different and changed socio-political 
context because the unification of Germany in the 1990s allowed for a legal 
reconfiguration towards more inclusive citizenship legislation alongside a civic-territorial 
conception of nationhood. At the same time, German policy makers recognize and openly 
acknowledge that the country is home to a large migrant community, which allows labour 
migration policy to be debated in a social and political climate that does not deny the very 
existence of this migrant community. Moreover, the economic rationale for skilled labour 
migration has changed significantly in recent years as the demographic transition in 
Germany and increased labour market demand for skilled workers have made skilled 
labour migration a vital component for continued and future economic growth. Thus state 
action on skilled labour migration and associated legislation is set in a significantly 
different economic, social, and political context compared to previous labour migration 
legislation. 
  Germany’s 2009 Action Programme represents an excellent research opportunity 
to conduct empirical research on skilled labour migration legislation and associated state 
action and thereby improve scholarly understanding and theoretical incorporation of 
skilled labour migration policy formation processes in economically advanced migrant 
receiving nation-states. At the same time, it is also an opportunity to re-position 
migration policy in general and labour migration in particular within a post-jus sanguinis 
German research context that is predominantly shaped and framed by economic and 
demographic considerations (BDA, 2009; BDI; 2009). Since the entire policy formation 
process of the 2009 Action Programme is set within the legislative period between 2005 
and 2009, it is possible to investigate and analyze the multi-layered and complex 
processes of skilled labour migration policy formation under the inclusion of all relevant 
policy makers, institutional actors, labour market stakeholder, and other NGOs. 
Ultimately the German case study will enhance scholarly understanding of skilled labour 
migration policy formation processes and allow these processes to be properly placed and 
critically discussed within scholarly context of migration theory.  
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Chapter Four – Research Methodology 
 
4.0 – Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the research design and the methodological approach used 
in the thesis and provides a detailed discussion of Critical Discourse Analysis as well as a 
review key CDA authors. Moreover, the chapter provides an outline and discussion of the 
data collection processes utilized in the thesis.  
Section 4.1 briefly outlines the general research design while Section 4.2 
discusses the theories of Critical Discourse Analysis. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 present the 
methods of collection and subsequent analysis of primary data set, the parliamentary 
debate transcripts of Bundestag and Bundesrat while sections 4.5 and 4.6 present the 
methods of collection and analysis of the secondary data set, the twenty-six stakeholder 
interviews. Section 4.7 outlines the methodological approach utilized in the analysis and 
discussion of the underlying policy maker motives identified within political discourse. 
Finally, Section 4.8 discusses the research limitations of the thesis.  
 
4.1 - Research Design 
 
 The research of the thesis is based upon a critical analysis of the political 
discourse on skilled labour migration in the Federal Republic of Germany during the 
grand coalition government in the years 2005 to 2009. The overall research objective is to 
develop a comprehensive understanding of skilled labour migration policy formation 
processes and place them within the existing framework of labour migration theory. 
During the Federal republic’s sixteenth legislative period (2005 to 2009) a new skilled 
labour migration law titled Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration 
(Arbeitsmigrationssteuerungsgesetz) was debated, modified, and ultimately implemented 
by Germany’s governing coalition, which represents a significant shift in government 
policy towards opening the German labour market to skilled migrant professionals. The 
research aims to link political discourse on skilled labour migration to the policy 
formation process of the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration 
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(Arbeitsmigrationssteuerungsgesetz), which in turn will contribute to an improved 
scholarly understanding of the complexities of labour migration policy formation 
processes within industrialized democracies. The German case study is particularly 
interesting as is represents the country’s first comprehensive labour migration legislation 
in decades. The policy formation process of the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled 
Labour Migration is located in its entirety within the years  2005 to 2009 (22nd Nov 2005 
– Oct 27th 2009), which limits the data sampling timeframe to a manageable time scale. 
  The project is based on two separate data sets, the first and most important data  
set consists of the relevant parliamentary debates held in the German national parliament 
(Bundestag) during the grand coalition government (2005 – 2009) as well as relevant 
political debates held in the German federal assembly (Bundesrat), which represents the 
individual federal states.41 The official debate transcripts from these two political forums 
provide detailed information on the political debate and associated legislative process 
regarding skilled labour migration policy during the sample period. The debate transcripts 
have been analyzed and critically evaluated utilizing Critical Discourse Analysis, which 
provides detailed insight into the multi-layered and complex processes of skilled labour 
migration policy formation within the relevant political forums in the FRG. The 
parliamentary debate transcripts represent the primary data set of this thesis as they 
contain the thematic narratives discussed in chapter five.  
The secondary data set consists of twenty-six semi-structured interviews with 
German policy makers, institutional representatives, labour market stakeholders, and non-
government policy advisors that were conducted during the summer months of 2009 and 
2010. The interviews provide in-depth context and detailed background information on 
the 2009 Action Programme from the perspective of active policy makers from political 
parties and state institutions as well as relevant labour market stakeholders that exert 
influence on the policy formation process from outside the official political structures of 
the federal German state (trade-unions, non-governmental think tanks, and employers 
                                                
41 Even though the Bundestag has more direct political power and influence within the legislative process in Germany, 
it nevertheless requires consent from the Bundesrat on proposed legislation that imposes responsibilities on the federal 
states or creates fiscal responsibilities for individual state governments. Legislation on immigration and citizenship 
polices generally require the approval from the German Bundesrat and the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour 
Migration is no exception to this.  
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associations). The interviews are insofar important as they provide detailed information 
and background information on political debate and power negotiations that occurred 
outside the official legislative process and are therefore not included in the official debate 
transcripts of Bundestag and Bundesrat. The data derived from the interviews provides 
additional insight and context on the underlying motives of policy makers, institutional 
actors, and non-government stakeholders in respects to skilled labour migration policy in 
Germany during the sampling period. Sections 4.2 to 4.5 respectively discuss how the 
data derived from the parliamentary transcripts and the respondent interviews has been 
analyzed and categorized alongside eight different thematic narratives. 
For organizational purposes the data derived from the parliamentary debate 
transcripts and the respondents’ interviews has been discussed in two separate chapters. 
Discussing the evaluating interview and evaluating both data sets together was deemed 
unwise since the primary data set (Parliamentary debate) presents the actual political 
debate on skilled labour migration whereas the secondary data set (interviews) provides 
additional context and insight on the debate as well as information in the power 
negotiations and debates outside the official political forum. From an organizational 
perspective it seemed more prudent to discuss the actual political debate in Bundestag 
and Bundesrat first followed by a discussion of the interviews with the policy makers, 
institutional actors, labour market stakeholders and policy advisors .   
 
4.2 – Critical Discourse Analysis  
 
 Discourse analysis has its scholarly origins in philosophy, linguistics, and literary 
theory but it also enjoys widespread popularity and applicability within the social 
sciences, including human geography (Bauder, 2008; Wait, 2005; Taylor, 2001; Wood & 
Kroger, 2000). In basic terms discourse analysis is the study of language in use. It does 
not conceptualize language as a mere medium of communication or a descriptive tool but 
rather as social practice, a way of doing things (Taylor, 2001; de Cilla et al, 1999). For 
Kress (1989, p. 7):  
‘Discourses are systematically organized sets of statements which give expression 
to the meanings and values of institutions…A discourse provides a set of possible 
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statements about a given area and organizes and gives structures to the manner 
in which a particular topic, object, process is to be talked about.’  
Discourse analysis itself encompasses an array of different research methods, 
theory approaches, and scales of analysis (Bayley, 2008; Reisgl, 2008; Burns & Carson, 
2005; Wodak, 2001; Taylor, 2001; de Cillia et al, 1999). In relation to human geography, 
discourse analysis can be utilized to identify and analyse patterns in language used within 
specific spaces or forums that relate to specific themes or topics (Waitt, 2005; Taylor, 
2001). According to Taylor (2001), discourse analysis can then be utilized to link patterns 
of language and/or models of argumentation utilized within specific social or institutional 
settings and critically evaluate them within larger contexts, such as society or culture. 
The latter is particularly useful for researchers analyzing the use and patterns of language 
and its importance to larger scale processes of social transformation and/or 
representation. In that respect media and political discourse analysis have become 
particularly popular among researchers in relation to international migration and migrant 
related issues (Karyotis & Patrikios, 2010; Tereskinas, 2009; Gonzalez, 2009; Bauder, 
2008; Baker et al., 2008; Palmer, 2008; Ramoos, 2004; Triandafyllidou, 2000). Bauder 
(2008) for example explores the relationship between discursive processes in the media, 
law, and policy, and their geographic embeddedness within labour market reform in 
Germany. Every & Augoustinos (2007) on the other hand conduct critical analysis on 
asylum debate in the Australian parliament and examine the relationship between 
discourse, racist representation of asylum seekers, and asylum policy. Palmer (2008) 
attempts to expose the underlying framework of values that shape political debate on 
asylum legislation in Australia through stakeholder interviews with policy makers and 
state administrators.  
 The proposed analysis tool for this research project is Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA), which according to Wodak (2001) takes into consideration the context in which 
language (written and spoken) is used and evaluates the relationship between language 
and power. The “critical” in CDA presupposes a distance of the researcher towards the 
collected data and its social embeddedness for the sake of scholarly objectivity (Baker, et 
al 2008; Wodak, 2001). 
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 According to Weiss & Wodak (2003, p.13) the context in which language and 
associated social practice is embedded in is essential to CDA;  
‘Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship 
between a particular discursive events and the situations, institutions and social 
structures which frame it: the discursive event is socially constitutive as well as 
socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and social 
identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is 
constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social 
Status Quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it.’  
De Cillia et al (1999) concur with this assessment and state that discursive acts and 
events play a prominent role in the creation, production, and construction of social 
conditions and as such reproduce and entrench the social Status Quo.  
 Power and power relations play an important role within CDA. Michel Foucault 
for example conceptualized power as social relations between individuals, groups, and 
institutions that are negotiated through discourse (Wait, 2005). These power negotiations 
then set the Status Quo and position individuals, groups or institutions within social 
systems by either empowering them or disempowering them. For CDA research, power is 
conceptualized as relations of difference and the effects of these differences within social 
structures (Weiss & Wodak, 2003). Yet, language itself does not constitute power. 
Instead power lies with the powerful people and institutions that utilize language and 
CDA is concerned how language and text are used by the elites to express and manipulate 
power in order to advance their ideological agenda (Weiss & Wodak, 2003; Wodak 
2001). CDA is equally concerned with the individuals, groups or institutions that have the 
power to utilize language for social and political transformation. For example, CDA 
researchers often single out the mass media as a significant site of discursive power 
struggle (Bauder, 2008; Wodak, 2001).   
According to Weiss & Wodak (2003, p. 15) 
‘…language is entwined in social power in a number of ways: language indexes 
power, expresses power, is involved where there is contention over and a 
challenge to power. Power does not derive from language, but language can be 
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used to challenge power, to subvert it, to alter distributions of power in the short 
and long term.’ 
  Within the scholarship CDA is associated with socially and politically activist 
agendas, positioning itself on behalf of oppressed or minority groups against dominating 
groups and institutions (Bayley, 2008). As such CDA is often utilized for critical research 
on institutional, political, gender as well as media discourses particularly in relation to 
issues of class, racism, and sexism (Wood & Kroger, 2000). CDA has the explicit aim to 
uncover and unmask ideologies and structures of power, political control, and domination 
and make transparent the dialectical relationship between discourse and the prevailing 
political, social, and institutional structures (Wodak, 2001; de Cillia et al, 1999). A 
recurring criticism of CDA scholarship is the perceived political agenda of some CDA 
researchers who believe that political indifference ultimately permeates and entrenches an 
unjust social and political order (de Cillia, 1999).  
 CDA is a powerful research tool for critical analysis on policy and policy 
formation processes within political structures and institutions. Reisigl (2008, p.98) 
suggests utilizing CDA for analyzing and evaluating political debates and policy maker 
intentions within policy formation processes in legislative forums. He states that: 
‘Policy involves the content-related dimension of political action that aims at 
shaping various political areas and is performed primarily by members of the 
government and civil servants of respective political institutions (ministries). 
Their main goals are political justification, political instruction, and winning 
political allies over to one’s side.’ 
 Burns & Carson (2005) also provide a methodological framework for discourse 
analysis within institutional settings and the paradigms (social, political, cultural) they 
embody. According to them, institutional paradigms are communicated through discourse 
and associated social action. Burns & Carson (2005) and Baker et al. (2008) pay 
particular attention to elites within institutional settings that have the power, knowledge, 
and interest to legislate and mobilize institutional transformation and institutional 
paradigm shifts that affect policy formation processes.42 In relation to labour migration, 
                                                
42 Paradigm shift implies fundamental change within the key organizing principles, normative ideas and expectations 
on social relationships; these shifts are often the result of crisis or revolutionary change in the technology and/or the 
social or political sphere (Burns & Carson, 2005, p. 299).  
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Every et al (2007) argue that the elites, that is the policy makers, exert significant 
influence over issues such as immigration as they are responsible to draft and administer 
immigration policies and also are more capable in promoting their viewpoints through 
greater access to national media.  
 Bayley (2008) applies CDA to political discourses in parliamentary settings, even 
accounting for the varieties of constitutional frameworks among different nation states as 
well as different debate cultures within national parliaments. Bayley (2008, p.1-2) points 
out that parliaments are very well suited for CDA as they provide an institutional setting 
that is dedicated to talk; members of parliament question, debate, and challenge 
government policy and proposals while at the same time it is the forum where 
governments and policy makers publically explain and justify their policies and laws. 
Above all, parliamentary debates provide access to the powerful political elites in a forum 
where they can openly convey and express their political positions through discourse 
(Huysmans et al, 2008). Parliamentary discourse results in tangible political and social 
action within the territorial boundaries over which the respective parliament exerts legal 
and political jurisdiction. Significantly for this project, the parliamentary setting often 
does not represent a singular site of political discourse but can potentially encompass 
multiple sites of political discourse such as upper and lower house (e.g. countries with a 
federal constitution) as well as parliamentary subcommittees where policy proposals are 
discussed prior to being debated on the floor.   
However, as Bayley (2008, p.10) points out, significant parliamentary discourse 
also takes place outside the official debate setting and is conducted informally through 
semi-private discourse away from public and especially media scrutiny. Thus, a mere 
analysis of debate records of the various forums within parliamentary setting will not lead 
to a complete discourse analysis of parliamentary debate. A comprehensive analysis of 
parliamentary discourse needs to include the informal aspects of parliamentary discourse 
as well. This can be achieved by conducting stakeholder interviews with the relevant 
policy makers, institutional actors, and labour market stakeholders. Personal interviews 
with relevant individual representatives who directly as well as indirectly exert influence 
on political discourse, allows the researcher to include the informal political debate and 
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power negotiating that occurs outside the official parliamentary setting. The personal 
interviews account for both official and unofficial political debate and thereby allow the 
researcher to conduct a more comprehensive and complete analysis and evaluation of 
political discourse. 
 To conclude, Critical Discourse Analysis enables identification, critical 
contextualization, and empirical reconstruction of the discursive power negotiations 
among the political elites within the institutional structures of the Federal German state 
and subsequently it is possible to identify and critically evaluate underlying motives that 
determine state action in regards to skilled labour migration legislation and associated 
policy formation processes. In the context of this thesis, CDA represents an excellent 
research tool to critically investigate skilled labour policy formation processes within 
institutional settings and parliamentary forums of the federal German state. Furthermore, 
the results derived through CDA of parliamentary debate are complemented with the 
results derived from stakeholder interviews, which represent informal discourse from 
outside the official political forum. This dual research approach is useful as one data set 
can be weighed against the other because statements from parliamentary debates do not 
necessarily reflect actual personal political convictions but could potentially be an 
expression of populist wowing of voters or a mere regurgitation of the respective party 
line. Statements made during interviews, particularly from labour market stakeholders 
and institutional representatives can account for, and provide insight into, the informal 
power negotiations while interview statements from the independent policy advisors 
provide a non-politicised viewpoint on the particularities of the policy formation process.   
  
4.3 - Data Collection: Parliamentary Debate Transcripts 
 
This section discusses the collection, evaluation, and analysis of the primary data 
set, the parliamentary debate transcripts on skilled labour migration policy from the 
German Bundestag and Bundesrat between 2005 and 2009.  
In the Federal Republic of Germany the Bundestag is the most important organ of 
the legislative branch of government. The Bundestag is the forum where members of 
parliament engage themselves in the legislative process and also scrutinize the 
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government and its work. Due to Germany’s federal political system, the federal states 
(Länder) also hold significant political power within the nation-state through the federal 
assembly or Bundesrat. The Bundesrat enables the Länder to participate in legislative 
process of the federal government, as most major legislations require a majority vote in 
both Bundestag and Bundesrat (Klusmeyer et al., 2009). In relation to political discourse 
on skilled labour migration and associated government policy, both forums need to be 
taken into consideration for debate transcript analysis.   
Transcripts of parliamentary debates  in the FRG are available under 
www.Bundestag.de, the official website of the German Bundestag. The website allows 
free and unrestricted access to the Parliamentary Material Information System 
(Dokumentations- und Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge or DIP). DIP 
can be utilized to search for archived parliamentary proceedings (debates, bills, motions, 
questions, reports etc.) as well as for parliamentary activities undertaken by MPs and  
members of government in both Bundestag (lower house of the parliament) and 
Bundesrat (upper house of the parliament and federal assembly). The search results link 
directly to the full text documents and the minutes of plenary sessions.   
 The search function in DIP allows reviewing of the official transcripts of plenary 
minutes and other archival transcripts based upon subject matter such as migration and 
migration policy. However, the DIP search engine does not allow for specialized search 
on skilled labour migration, only on general thematic searches on immigration policy and 
migration policy related issues. It was determined that it was more efficient to manually 
search the individual debate transcripts and not utilize the search function in DIP. During 
the sixteenth federal electoral term (2005 to 2009) two hundred thirty three individual 
plenary sessions were held in the Bundestag and forty-six plenary sessions were held in 
the Bundesrat. All debate transcripts for the sample period were downloaded and stored 
as pdf documents. Every debate transcript has an agenda on its first page that was utilized 
to determine which transcript was relevant to the research project. The agenda of each 
transcript was evaluated on themes and topics specifically about or related to skilled 
labour migration, particularly the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration. 
Many of the agenda items on immigration related issues focused on the social and 
particularly humanitarian aspects of international migration; however a number of 
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immigration related debates linked themselves to skilled labour migration. At the same 
time, a number of debates focused on topics that applied to skilled labour migration as 
well as other forms of migration. For example, one of the debate topics was a government 
social integration policy initiative that also took skilled migrant professionals into 
consideration. Another subject matter was the recognition of foreign work credentials, 
which technically speaking is not related to immigration policy but nevertheless 
constitutes a significant issue for skilled labour migration and associated political 
discourse. The search engine function in DIP would have overlooked these debate 
transcripts that constitute an important aspect of political discourse on skilled labour 
migration.  
After the manual evaluation of the two hundred thirty three Bundestag transcripts 
and the forty-six Bundesrat transcripts respectively, sixteen Bundestag debates and six 
Bundesrat debates were deemed relevant for the purpose of the research project. Some of 
the plenary transcripts were only two or three pages in length while others were twenty to 
thirty pages long, the latter indicating intense parliamentary debate on the subject matter.  
Aside from the plenary transcripts of Bundestag and Bundesrat, the Parliamentary 
Committee of Internal Affairs (Innenausschuss) was also identified as a relevant forum 
for political debate on skilled labour migration. Skilled labour migration, as all 
immigration related matters, falls within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior 
(Bundesministerium des Inneren) and the Committee of Internal Affairs deals with 
policies, laws, and regulations on all migration related matters. The Committee of 
Internal Affairs is one of twenty-two permanent committees that are formed by the 
Bundestag and each committee is made up of members of parliament from the five 
political parties in accordance with their relative strength in the Bundestag. The 
Bundestag forms the committees for the duration of the electoral term (usually four 
years) and the various committees provide a forum in which their respective members 
concentrate on a single, specialized area of policy. In fact the committees conduct a 
significant portion of the parliamentary work; much of what becomes policy is 
deliberated and discussed within the committee before it is presented in the Bundestag. 
Most important, the committees provide a forum where a cross-party consensus can be 
reached on bills prior to their presentation and vote in the Bundestag. The committees 
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often obtain information from NGOs and relevant expert witnesses in order to familiarize 
themselves with the background to the issues and policies they are discussing. 
Unfortunately, the official transcripts from the Committee of Internal Affairs are 
classified and not open to the general public. A request for access to these archived files 
was denied by the DIP administration. However, ten of the twenty-six interview 
respondents regularly attend the Committee of Internal Affairs and as such the interview 
data provides critical insight into the Committee’s work and by default on the informal 
power negotiations the preceded the implementation of the 2009 Action Programme. To 
conclude, the analysis of the parliamentary debate during the sampling period identified 
of sixteen relevant plenary transcripts from the German Bundestag, and six relevant 
plenary transcripts from the German Bundesrat.43  
 
4.4 - Data Analysis: Parliamentary Debate Transcripts 
 
Taylor (2001) identifies four research approaches in regards to discourse analysis. 
The first approach focuses on variation and imperfection of language as a system and the 
analyst determines how this variation relates to different social situations and actors. The 
second approach focuses on the activity of language use in which language is 
conceptualized as a process of interaction between two or more parties and the analyst 
looks for patterns within the interaction. In the third approach the analyst looks for 
patterns in language associated with a specific topic or activity and Taylor (2001) uses 
the example of language use within a specific occupation such as social work. The final 
approach takes discourse analysis to a different scale as the analysis looks for patterns 
within larger contexts such as society or culture and determines how language frames and 
shapes wider processes of social transformation. The final fourth approach has been 
deemed most suited for the analysis of the collected parliamentary debate transcripts 
since the political debate on skilled labour migration policy occurs at the national level 
and involves political transformation on a national scale.  
                                                
43 This might seem like a relatively small data set but national parliaments debate a wide range of subject matters 
ranging from infrastructure management over criminal law to defense spending and labour migration policy only 
accounts for a fraction of issues and themes debated by and dealt with by parliament.  
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 Discourse analysis involves the search for patterns in language used within a 
defined space or setting. The collected parliamentary debate transcripts from the 
Bundestag and Bundesrat were searched for specific themes and topics identified within 
the speeches and statements of policymakers and political party representatives during 
official debates on skilled labour migration. This was accomplished by coding the 
collected debate transcripts with manifest codes, which identify specific models of 
argumentation utilized in parliamentary speeches and statements on skilled labour 
migration and associated policy in Germany (David & Sutton, 2004). All coding was 
done manually without the use of software programs.  A master-coding sheet containing 
eighteen thematic codes was created after an initial review of the debate transcripts and 
under consideration of the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration (see 
appendix D). As part of the coding process the political affiliation of the individual 
making a statement or speech was recorded. The coding scheme enabled exploration of 
the association between models of argumentation and political parties in the Bundestag 
and Bundesrat  and determined to what degree the political parties and their 
representatives were embedded within particular discursive structures (Waitt, 2005). A 
series of tables of all the relevant political debates in Bundestag and Bundesrat showing 
the distribution of manifest codes alongside political party lines was created and included 
in the appendix (see appendix E).  
The discourse analysis following the coding process identified eight individual 
thematic narratives within political debate on skilled labour migration. These eight 
thematic narratives were identified and constructed by categorizing relevant manifest 
codes and their associated models of argumentation together. The purpose of categorizing 
the political debate on skilled labour migration into separate thematic narratives liberates 
the debate and policy formation process from its monolithic form of representation.  
The following eight narratives were identified within political debate on skilled 
labour migration in Germany between 2005 and 2009. 
 
1. Global Competition over Skilled Migrant Professionals & Domestic Skilled 
Shortages (Codes B1, C1, C2, C3) 
2. Controlling, Restricting & Managing Labour Migration (Codes F1, G1, Y1) 
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3. Welcome Culture for Skilled Migrant Workers & Social Integration of Labour 
Migrants (Code X3) 
4. Income Threshold for Highly Skilled Migrant Professionals (Codes X2.1 & X2.2) 
5. Foreign Skills Accreditation (Code X3H1) 
6. Foreign University Graduates (Codes X1.1, X1.2, X1.3, X1.4) 
7. Continued EU-8 +2 Restriction (Codes X4.1 & X4.2) 
8. Points Based Immigration (Codes A1 & A2) 
 
The thematic narratives 1, 2 and 3 provide insight into the political economy of skilled 
labour migration policy formation during the sample period as these three narratives 
encompass themes that represent the discursive framework or undercurrent of skilled 
labour migration debate. This includes labour market demand for skilled workers by 
German employers as well as policy makers’ desire for the state to retain effective control 
over labour migration flows and restrict migrant access to the national social-welfare 
system. Moreover, debates over the socio-economic integration of migrants also represent 
an influential discursive undercurrent of labour migration debate in Germany. 
 Narratives 4, 5, 6, and 7 on other hand represent debates and models of 
argumentation that reference specific policy aspects of 2009 Action Programme on 
Skilled Labour Migration, which includes income thresholds for skilled workers, foreign 
skills accreditation, international post-graduate students as well as extension of 
derogation of freedom of movement for citizens from the new European Union member 
states. The final narrative encompasses debate over points based immigration that is not 
linked to the 2009 Action Programme but nevertheless constitutes an influential and 
recurring topic within  political discourse during the policy formation process of the 2009 
Action Programme. 
 The discussion of each of the eight narratives in the analysis chapters four and five 
follows a similar format. First the particular manifest code(s) that constitute the 
respective narrative were presented and discussed. A number of sub-sections in chapter 
four include bar charts that indicate the quantity and distribution of the respective 
manifest codes alongside party lines within each of the identified narratives. This 
illustrates the political party preferences and dominance on specific manifest codes 
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within the individual thematic narratives. The relative strength of each narrative within 
the overall political debate on skilled labour migration was determined by the amount of 
manifest codes identified within each narrative. 
 Once the manifest codes and their distribution along political party lines were 
established, the discussion of the individual narratives shifted towards the analysis of 
specific statements made by members of German Bundestag (Mdb) or representatives of 
the German Bundesrat during debates and hearings on skilled labour migration 
legislation. These statements, which highlight the respective positions and viewpoints of 
individual politicians as well as their respective parties on the particular issue at stake 
were then presented and discussed within the context of the relevant academic literature 
and immigration theory. While most collected debate statements were made in the 
Bundestag, a number of narrative discussions included statements made during political 
debate that occurred in the Bundesrat, the assembly that represents the federal states in 
Germany. 
The discussion and analysis of the thematic narratives and their embedded power 
negotiations provides critical insight into state action regarding skilled labour migration 
policy and ultimately contributes to a more nuanced understanding of skilled labour 
migration policy formation processes within migration theory.  
 
4.5 - Data Collection: Stakeholder Interviews 
 
This section discusses the collection, evaluation and analysis of the secondary 
data set, the twenty-six interviews with policymakers, institutional actors, labour market 
stakeholders, and policy advisors.  
 The interviews were conducted during July/August/September 2009 and 
July/August/September 2010 in Germany. Most interviews were held in the city of 
Berlin, capital of the Federal Republic and seat of the German government. The first 
segment of interview candidates includes key members of the Bundestag, representatives 
of federal political parties as well as institutional actors representing the relevant federal 
ministries that are involved in the formulation and administration of labour migration 
policies. In order to include the federal states represented in the Bundesrat, interviews 
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were also conducted with representatives from federal state or Länder institutions that are 
involved with migrant workers and administer labour migration policies.  
 The second segment of interview candidates consists of labour market 
stakeholders and non-government policy advisors that advise, lobby, and criticize the 
government and its ministries on matters relating to skilled labour migration policy and 
as such represent influential agents within  political disclosure on skilled labour 
migration. Labour market stakeholders include representatives of the trade unions as well 
as employers and industry associations. Non-government policy advisors include 
representatives from economic research institutes, immigration think-tanks as well as 
prominent migration scholar and government immigration advisor Dr Klaus Bade.   
 Prospective interview candidates were identified utilizing an array of research 
strategies. The members of the Bundestag (MdB’s) interviewed were identified through 
their participation in the parliamentary debate on skilled labour migration or their 
membership in relevant parliamentary committees such as the Parliamentary Committee 
for Interior Politics. The Bundestag website (www.Bundestag.de) as well as the 
respective websites of political parties with seats in the Bundestag were utilized to find 
the contact details of the MdB’s. The interview candidates from the trade unions, industry 
association, and think tanks were identified through contact with the information services 
of their respective institution and interviews were scheduled by phone and email. A 
number of interview candidate were identified after being referred to by other interview 
respondents and in some cases the interviewees acted intermediary by arranging 
interviews with third parties. 
The representatives from the Bundestag were contacted by phone and email in their 
office within their respective home constituency. Approximately twenty-four members of 
the Bundestag were contacted. In the end one representative from each political party 
with seats in the Bundestag during the 2005 to 2009 legislative period agreed to be 
interviewed.  
 
Interviewed Members of Bundestag (MdB): 
•  CDU  –   MdB Reinhard Grindel  
• SPD    –   MdB Michael Bürsch 
 93 
•  Green Party  –   MdB Christian Ströbele 
•  Links Party  -  MdB Sevin Dadgelen 
•  FDP    -   MdB Sibylle Laurischk 
 
Both interviewed representatives from Christian Democrats (CDU) and Social 
Democrats (SPD) were members of the Parliamentary Committee on Interior Affairs 
between 2005 and 2009 and were also their respective party representatives on 
immigration and migration policy. The FDP, Links Party, and Green Party 
representatives on the other hand were not on the Committee on Interior Affairs (The 
Links Party representative joined the committee after 2009). The respective members of 
three opposition parties (FDP, Linke, and Greens) on the Parliamentary Committee on 
Interior Affairs declined to be interviewed on the issue of skilled labour migration.44 The 
substitute interview respondents from the three opposition parties nonetheless proved 
valuable. The interviewee from the Free Liberals (FDP) was the current party 
representative on immigration matters and she was a member of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Family Affairs in the 2005 – 2009 period. The Links Party interview 
respondent was a deputy member of the Committee on Interior Affairs between 2005 to 
2009 and had been the prominent party spokesperson on migration matters, particularly 
on issues relating to racism and Islamophobia. The Green Party representative, who 
agreed to be interviewed at the very last minute, is a founding member of the German 
Green Party and member of the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs.45 Due to time 
constraints and scheduling difficulties on the part of the MdBs, the interview sessions 
were limited to fifteen or twenty minutes, which meant that they could not answer every 
                                                
44 As small federal political parties, FDP, Linke, and Greens only constitute a relatively small number of 
representatives in the various parliamentary committees. SPD and CDU on the other hand generally have a dozen or 
more representatives on the parliamentary committees, particularly the important ones such as the Committee on 
Interior Affairs. It proved very difficult and time-consuming to find willing interview respondents from the Committee 
on Interior Affairs and it was most likely only possible to schedule with CDU and SPD members of the Committee on 
Interior Affairs because there are simply more Christian Democrats and Social Democrats on the committee than from 
the smaller federal parties. 
45 Approximately eight Green Party Bundestag members were contacted but they either declined the interview request 
or never respondent. The Green Party representative remains the only Green Party representative with a direct political 
mandate in Germany, which means he has his own constituency. As a final ditch effort to secure an interview from the 
Green Party, the interviewee was approached in person in his constituent office in Berlin (Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg) 
and he agreed to a short interview. The constituency Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg in Berlin is one of Germany’s most 
ethnically diverse neighbourhoods and as such the MdB Ströbele engages himself frequently on behalf of Germany’s 
migrant community.   
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question included in  the interview guide. As such the interviews with the MdBs did not 
yield the same quantity of data as the interviews with the other respondents where there 
were no time limitations.  
 Another five interviews were conducted with consultants from each of the five 
federal political parties with seats in the Bundestag. Unlike the members of Bundestag, 
the party consultants are legal specialists with in-depth knowledge and expertise on 
immigration policies and the issues surrounding labour migration, advising their 
respective political party and its MdBs on migration policy related matters and as such 
are actively engaged in the process of migration policy formulation. The five interview 
respondents support the work of their respective party members on the Parliamentary 
Committee on Interior Affairs and also attend and participate in the committee’s 
meetings.   
 
Party Consultants Interviewed: 
•  CDU   –   Consultant for Work Group Interior Affairs  
•  SPD   –   Consultant for Committee on Interior Affairs 
•  Green Party  –   Consultant for Migration and Refugee Policy   
•  Links Party  -   Consultant for Migration and Integration 
•  FDP    -    Consultant for Integration  
 
Unlike the interviewed members of the Bundestag, the names and contact details of party 
immigration consultants were not openly accessible. The party consultants were 
identified through consultation with the administration in their respective party 
headquarters, which supplied the e-mail addresses of the interview respondents. Interview   
appointments were then arranged through/via phone and email. 
 Three interview respondents came from key federal ministries and federal 
institutions involved in implementing, administering, as well as formulating skilled 
labour migration policies on behalf of the government.  
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Institutional Stakeholders - Federal 
• Federal Ministry of the Interior 
• Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
• Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration.  
 
These three federal ministries and offices are key institutional actors in formulating, 
implementing, and administering skilled labour migration polices in Germany, 
particularly the Federal Ministry of the Interior, which is the leading ministry on 
immigration and migration policy related matters while the Federal Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs is responsible for implementing policies and regulations for migrant 
workers in Germany. The federal ministers in charge of the federal ministries are also 
members of the Bundestag and as such engage themselves in political debate and policy 
formation processes on skilled labour migration.46 The Federal Government 
Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration does not represent a federal 
ministry but instead is represented by a Minister of State located within the Chancellor’s 
office. All three interview respondents were senior civil servants within their respective 
institution and their names and office locations were released upon request through the 
information services of their respective institution. 
The federal state or Länder institutions that were selected for interviews for the 
research project were the integration representatives of four different federal states. As 
mentioned before, Germany’s federal states (Länder) exert some influence on federal 
political debate through the Bundesrat. Four state institutions were included in this 
research project in order to contextualize the data derived from the Bundesrat debate 
transcripts. The following four federal states (Länder) were chosen for the research 
project and interviews were conducted with senior representatives from each institution. 
                                                
46 The Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology was also identified as a significant contributor to political 
discourse on labour migration and associated policy, particularly after several well-publicized statements by Minister 
Brüderle during June 2010 about prospective labour shortages in Germany’s high technology sector. However 
interview requests were repeatedly denied by representatives from the ministry on the reason that labour migration was 
not part of the ministry’s jurisdiction.  
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Institutional Stakeholders – State (Länder) 
• Office of the Representative for Integration in Lower Saxony 
• Office of the Representative for Integration and Migration in Berlin   
• Office for Integration & Migration in Bremen 
• Welcome Center Hamburg 
 
The interview candidates from the Länder institutions in Bremen and Hamburg 
worked within branches of their respective institution that specifically dealt with skilled 
foreign professionals. In Lower Saxony and Berlin, the interview respondents were the 
actual state commissioners for immigration and integration and therefore had all aspects 
of immigration fell within their jurisdiction. All four interview respondents were 
identified through their institution’s website and contacted by email.  
 Aside from the seventeen interviews with politicians, policy makers, and state 
administrators, another set of interviews was conducted with representatives of non-
government institutions that are involved in the political debate and associated policy 
formation processes on skilled labour migration in Germany. Government and party 
representatives identified these as “social partners” and they acknowledged that the 
government regularly consulted these social partners and that they also actively lobby the 
government, political parties, and ministries on labour migration policy related issues.  
Two interviews were conducted with representatives from Germany’s Trade Unions. 
 
Labour Market Stakeholders – Organized Labour 
• Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB) 
• Industrial Union of Metalworkers (IG metal): Berlin/Brandenburg/Saxony-branch  
 
The Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB) represents an umbrella 
organization of the country’s main trade unions and the DGB’s interview respondent is 
the union’s chief federal advisor on labour migration issues and migrant workers rights. 
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The IG Metal on the other hand is a member of the DGB and represented the metal 
industry, particularly the automobile sector. The interview respondent from the IG Metal 
represents migrant workers in the provinces of Berlin, Brandenburg, and Saxony. Thus 
the trade union interviews represented a federal as well as state position on skilled labour 
migration and corresponding government policy. 
In order to balance the trade union viewpoint on the issue of skilled labour migration, 
three interviews were conducted with representatives of employer and industry friendly 
institutions.   
 
Labour Market Stakeholders – Employers/Industry 
• Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) 
• Confederation of German Employers' Associations (BDA) 
• Association of German Engineers (VDI) 
 
These three industry associations represent industry and employers in Germany and 
they frequently voiced concern in the national media about current and future skilled 
labour shortages in Germany. The DIHK and BDA interview respondents represent their 
respective national head organization in Berlin while the VDI interviewee represents his 
association’s branch for the states Brandenburg and Berlin. Thus again the interviews 
provided a balance between federal and state view on the policy issue at stake. Interviews 
were arranged through the reception services at the three organizations. 
 Further interviews were held with representatives from three German think tanks 
and research institutes that conduct research on labour migration in Germany and more 
significantly advise government policy makers on the issue.    
 
 Non-government policy advisors 
• German Institute for Economic Research  (DIW) 
• Cologne Institute for Economic Research (IW Köln) 
• German Expert Advisory Board on Integration and Migration (SVR) 
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The DIW is a publically funded economic research institute specializing in applied 
economic research and economic policy consulting and the interview respondent, 
Professor Klaus Zimmermann, is also the president of the institute.47  The IW Köln on the 
other hand is a private research institute with close connections to German industry. 
Representatives of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology referred to the IW 
Köln because all ministerial research on the issue of skilled labour migration had been 
outsourced to the institute. The SVR on the other hand represents an independent 
advisory board funded by a number of private and charitable foundations in Germany. 
The SVR conducts and publishes research on immigration and positions itself on issues 
relating to immigration and migrant integration in Germany.  
The final interview respondent was Dr Klaus Bade, Germany’s leading migration 
scholar who is frequently quoted in the national media and regularly advises the German 
government on immigration policies and policy reform. Dr Bade is also a founding 
member of the SVR. 
Arranging and scheduling the interviews proved a difficult and challenging task 
as all participants were senior policy makers and professionals and therefore had 
extremely busy schedules. It took several weeks, sometimes even months, to schedule an 
interview. Upon meeting the interview respondents, each candidate was given a written 
outline of the research project, which included the stated research goals as well as the 
contact information of the project manager. All interviewed candidates were asked to 
sign a consent form stating that they had the right to withdraw from the interview at any 
point and that the interview questions had been approved by the Loughborough 
University Ethical Advisory Committee (see appendix C). All interview respondents 
agreed to the terms outlined in the consent form. The names of the interview respondents 
from the federal political parties, federal ministries as well as the labour market 
stakeholders and non-policy advisors remain anonymous. The interviewed politicians on 
the other hand, due to their public role, agreed to be quoted in the study. This also applies 
to the integration representatives for the federal states and participants from the research 
institutes. Prof Klaus Bade also agreed to be quoted in the study. Since many of the 
                                                
47 Dr Zimmermann is also Director of the Institute at the Study of Labour in Germany and Professor of Economics at 
Bonn University 
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interview respondents belong to Germany’s political and economic elite, the lead 
researcher made sure that his appearance and conduct during the interview was 
professional, which included appropriate clothing (tie and suit) and the use of formal 
German language, factors, which as Harvey (2009) and Valentine (2005) have 
highlighted, are important. Moreover, personalized background profiles were created for 
each interview respondent. These were then reviewed prior to the actual interview and 
helped convey an image of professional preparedness on part of the researcher and 
showed awareness of the respondent’s political views.   
 All interviews were held in the offices of the participants, which provided a quiet 
and professional setting for the interviews, which generally took between forty and sixty 
minutes. All interviews were conducted in German, the native language of all interview 
respondents. The interviews were recorded on a digital voice recorder, digitally stored, 
and transcribed and translated upon the researcher’s return to the UK. The researcher of 
this project speaks English and German with native fluency and has had significant 
experience in German-English translation. The main objective of the translation process 
was to confer the actual meaning of the German interview statements into English and 
preserve the models of argumentation embedded in the interview statements.  
One of the issues that arose during the translation process was the translation of 
the term skilled migrant professional from German into English. The participants in the 
parliamentary debate in Bundestag and Bundesrat and the interview respondents 
frequently refer to highly skilled migrant professionals (Hochqualifizierte Zuwanderer) 
when they refer to migrant workers with post-secondary credentials. The literature on 
labour migration defines migrants with post-secondary degrees as skilled migrants and 
therefore the German term Hochqualifizierte Zuwanderer was been translated into skilled 
migrants instead of highly skilled migrants in order to avoid confusion and be consistent 
with the literature (Iredale, 2001).    
 For confidentiality reasons, the wmv files containing the interviews were deleted 
after the transcription and translation was completed. Each transcript was labelled with a 
unique code that identified the particular interview respondents and the researcher only 
knows these transcript label codes. 
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Each interview session followed an interview guide that consisted of twenty-one 
questions, all of which relate to aspects and issues raised about the 2009 Action 
Programme on Skilled Labour Migration (see appendix B). The interviews were open-
ended and semi-structured and the questions did not necessarily follow the same order in 
every interview (Valentine, 2005). Moreover, in a number of interviews, issues were 
raised that specifically applied to the particular respondent’s professional background and 
a number of follow up questions were improvised during some of the interviews. This 
partially explains why some interviews only lasted forty minutes while others lasted up to 
two hours. As such the semi-structured interview guide provided the flexibility to follow 
up on interested leads and topics that occurred during the interview with some 
participants.  One of the recurring issues in the interview process was respondents’ not 
answering the question they were asked. This is not surprising in elite interviews; Harvey 
(2009, p. 25) states that; ‘Elite members will often advertently or inadvertently not 
answer the questions asked of them’. When such scenario occurred, the question was 
repeated or rephrased, which then always led to a conclusive answer. For further 
information of research ethics please refer to appendix F. 
 
4.7 - Data Analysis: Stakeholder Interviews 
 
The purpose of the interviews was to collect a secondary data set from the 
informal discourse and power brokering that occurs outside the official political debate in 
the German Bundestag and Bundesrat, which nevertheless constitutes an important aspect 
of the 2009 Action Programme’s policy formation process. These unofficial debates and 
power negotiations occurred outside the official plenary sessions or occurred in forums 
such as the Parliamentary Committee of the Interior where debate transcripts are 
classified and unavailable to the public. The data derived from the interviews 
complements and further contextualizes the data derived from the discourse analysis of 
parliamentary debate transcripts discussed in section 4.4 and also provides specific 
insight on the different viewpoints of the various policy makers, institutional 
stakeholders, labour market stakeholder, and non-government policy advisors on the 
individual measures of the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration. 
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The interview transcripts first underwent a preliminary analysis utilizing ‘open 
codes’ in order to maintain a general overview over the collected interview data. The 
purpose of open coding is to enable the researcher to get as close as possible to the 
available data and get a general ‘feel’ for the material (Crang, 2005). During this 
preliminary analysis, a set of ‘theoretical memos’ was created to highlight, organize, and 
clarify recurring themes within the data set that are significant for the main analysis 
(Crang, 2005). The preliminary analysis helped with the setting up the coding structure 
for the final analysis. The purpose of coding is to reduce the data to a manageable scale 
and create a coherent organizational framework in which the research data can be 
adequately discussed and conceptualized (Abel & Myers, 2008; Cope, 2005).     
The main analysis of the interview data was achieved through a combination of 
descriptive and analytic codes that were developed in the aftermath preliminary analysis. 
According to Cope (2005, p. 224) descriptive codes represent more general category 
labels that highlight more obvious patterns and themes within the interview data. 
Analytic codes on the other hand are applied to highlight specific information within the 
data that relates to the research question and also takes the context of the recorded code 
into consideration. As with the parliamentary debate transcripts (Section 4.4), coding was 
utilized to identify specific models of argumentation within the interview transcripts.  
The purpose of the analysis has been to search, identify, and categorize dominant models 
of argumentation within the recorded statements that are specifically linked to the policy 
measures of the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration as well as general 
skilled labour migration policies. As part of the analysis process, the interview statements 
were categorized utilizing the same manifest thematic codes used in the parliamentary 
debate analysis and subsequently organized alongside the same thematic narratives 
identified and utilized in the parliamentary debate analysis. 
The discussion of the thematic narratives from the interview data follows the 
same pattern utilized earlier in parliamentary debate analysis. The respondent’s 
statements are presented and then critically discussed in context of relevant academic 
literature on labour migration and immigration theory.  
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4.7 – Underlying Policy Maker Motives  
 
Chapter seven discusses the underlying policy maker motives identified within the 
thematic narratives presented in chapters five and six. These motives represent recurring 
models of argumentation that constitute influential discursive undercurrents within the 
parliamentary debate and ultimately determine and shape state action regarding on skilled 
labour migration legislation in Germany during the sampling period. Unlike the thematic 
narratives that are for the most part linked specific policy issues such as PBIS or foreign 
skills accreditation, the identified motives expose underlying policy maker intentions in 
regards to skilled labour migration legislation in Germany. The following five policy 
maker motives have been identified and are discussed in detail in chapter seven.  
 
1. Utilizing Domestic Labour Potential 
2. Preventing Migrant Access to Welfare 
3. Preventing Unskilled Labour Migration & Labour Market Competition 
4. Maintaining National Control over Labour Migration  
5. Integrating Migrant Workers 
 
Chapter seven identifies, presents, and discusses these five motives and illustrates 
how they shape political debate on skilled labour migration and assess the extent in which 
the 2009 Action Programme and Skilled Labour Migration is a reflection these policy 
maker motives.  
 
4.8 - Research Limitations  
 
 One of the potential limitations of this research project is that it conceptualizes 
skilled labour migration and associated policy formation processes through the prism of 
the nation-state, thus engaging in ‘methodological nationalism’ which Wimmer & Glick-
Schiller (2002, p. 302) define as the “assumption that the nation/state/society/ is the 
natural social and political form of the modern world”. However, even though Mansfield 
(2005, p. 458) claims that “national governance is being rescaled to the global and 
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regional levels”, the results of this thesis show that the political processes that shape 
political discourse as well as policy formation processes on skilled labour migration in 
Germany are controlled by political actors who are located within national institutional 
and political frameworks. Even though immigration flows, including skilled labour, often 
follow a trans-national logic, the legislative framework that aims to regulate migration is 
still determined by national policy makers and national regulatory institutions (Bauder, 
2006; Castles, 2004).  
Moreover, the analysis of the political debate on skilled labour migration in 
Germany between 2005 and 2009 shows that even though German policy makers 
acknowledged the global competition for skilled workers, the factors shaping and framing 
political discourse on skilled labour migration nevertheless have their origin in the 
particular and peculiar nature of German national politics. Domestic labour market 
demand, domestic skills shortages, and projected demographic transition initiated the 
political debate on skilled labour migration that ultimately culminated in the 2009 Action 
Programme on Skilled Labour Migration. Moreover, the political debate itself was 
primarily shaped and framed by domestic national political, economic, and social 
considerations. Most significantly, the legislative process that followed the political 
debate on skilled labour migration occurred at the national political scale. Therefore, in 
the context of this study ‘methodological nationalism’ was a necessity in order to achieve 
a comprehensive and critical understanding of the policy formation process of the 2009 
Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration.   
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Chapter Five – Political Debate in Bundestag and Bundesrat 
 
5.0 – Introduction 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the data collected from the parliamentary 
debate transcripts from the Bundestag and Bundesrat between 2005 and 2009, which 
constitutes the primary data set of the thesis. As discussed in the previous chapter, sixteen 
Bundestag debate and six Bundesrat debates were identified and deemed relevant for the 
purpose of this study as they include relevant political debate that is thematically linked 
to skilled labour migration and associated state policy.  
As part of the data analysis process, eight individual thematic narratives relating 
to skilled labour migration and the 2009 Action Programme were identified and 
constructed from the parliamentary debate transcripts. Each narrative has been 
constructed alongside unique criteria, relating to the specific manifest codes (see 
appendices D and E) and their associated models of argumentation. The analysis of the 
thematic narratives provides a systematic and all encompassing analysis of the political 
discourse on skilled labour migration in Germany from 2005 - 2009.  
The analysis and discussion of the eight thematic narratives reveals that political 
discourse on skilled labour migration in Germany between 2005 and 2009 was largely 
determined by domestic political and social considerations. Although global economic 
pressures are wide acknowledged, they do not appear to have exerted significant 
influence on political debate and corresponding state legislation. Moreover, Critical 
Discourse Analysis reveals that political debate and associated state action was 
predominately driven by policy makers belonging the Christian Democrat Union, which 
in turn put a strong restrictionist emphasis on the policy negotiations of the 2009 Action 
Programme.  
 
5.1 – Parliamentary Debate Narratives 
 
The following eight thematic narratives were identified based upon the collected manifest 
codes.  
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1. Global Competition over Skilled Workers & Domestic Skills Shortages (Codes 
B1, C1, C2, C3) 
2. Controlling, Restricting & Managing Labour Migration (Codes F1, G1, Y1) 
3. Welcome Culture & Integration of Skilled Migrant Workers (Code X3) 
4. Income Threshold for Highly Skilled Migrant Professionals (Codes X2.1 & X2.2) 
5. Foreign Skills Accreditation (Code X3H1) 
6. Foreign University Graduates (Codes X1.1, X1.2, X.1.3 & X1.4) 
7. Continued EU-8 +2 Restriction (Codes X4.1 & X4.2) 
8. Points Based Immigration (Codes A1 & A2) 
 
The discussion of the eight thematic narratives follows a predetermined sequence. 
Narrative 1 encompasses models of argumentation linked to the underlying rationale for 
skilled labour migration legislation in Germany and therefore constitutes the most 
important thematic narrative within political discourse. Narrative 2 on the other hand 
encompasses models of argumentation that emphasize restrictions on and control over 
skilled labour migration in order to avoid undesired policy consequences. Narratives 3 to 
7 encompass models of argumentation specifically linked to individual policy measures 
of the 2009 Action Programme. Narrative 3 however requires further elaboration. Unlike 
the four narratives that follow, the Welcome Culture narrative is not linked to a clearly 
articulated policy measure but rather encompasses models of argumentation concerning a 
rather a vaguely formulated policy objective based on an abstract notion of Welcome 
Culture (see appendix A). Narrative 4 is only marginally represented within 
parliamentary debate but its significance becomes more apparent during the discussion of 
the stakeholder interviews in chapter six. At the same time, the Welcome Culture 
narrative provides an important link between narrative 2 and narratives 4 to 7.  Finally, 
narrative 8 encompasses models of argumentation relating to points based immigration in 
Germany. Even though points based immigration does not constitute a policy measure of 
the 2009 Action Programme, the intense political debate over such system provides 
significant insight into power negotiations over skilled labour migration legislation in 
Germany and thus constitutes an important thematic narrative within political discourse.       
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5.2 – Global Competition over Skilled Workers & Domestics Skills Shortages  
  
The analysis of the parliamentary debate in Bundestag and Bundesrat between 
2005 and 2009 reveals that labour migration reform in Germany was initiated by an 
increased awareness among national policy makers that there is a global competition for 
skilled workers among industrialized nation-states and that present as well as future 
economic growth in Germany will depend on the availability of skilled workers. 
According to Mahroum (2001, p.28) this is not surprising as ‘there is widespread 
agreement in Europe that economic competitiveness is increasingly linked to the quality 
and quantity of skilled human resources available for any given economy’. Moreover, 
German politicians appear to have realized the potential of labour migration for offsetting 
some of the impacts of Germany’s demographic decline as well as alleviating current 
skills shortages within the German labour market.  
The first narrative encompasses models of argumentation linked to the underlying 
political motives of German policy makers for labour migration reform in respect to 
skilled foreign workers; therefore, this narrative highlights the discursive undercurrent 
within the overall political debate on skilled labour migration. The narrative itself 
encompasses four separate manifest codes, each of which is linked to a specific model of 
argumentation. Manifest code B1 is linked to statements that recognize the global 
competition over skilled professionals, which in the context of political debate over 
skilled labour migration in Germany is frequently labelled “competition over the 
brightest heads”. Manifest code C1 and C2 on the other hand respectively make reference 
to skilled labour migration offsetting the demographic transition in Germany and skilled 
labour migration alleviating existing skills shortages in the German labour market. 
Finally, manifest code C3 encompasses models of argumentation that link skilled labour 
migration policies to the interest of employers and industry. The awareness of the 
necessity for present and future skilled labour migration in Germany thematically links 
these four manifest codes together and as such they constitute a distinct narrative within 
the overall political debate on skilled migration in Germany. 
 Figures 5.1 and 5.2 below illustrate the distribution of the four manifest codes in 
the political debate in both Bundestag and Bundesrat between the political parties during 
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the four-year sampling period. The figures show how often the manifest codes have been 
recorded within the debate transcripts and also record the party affiliation of the speakers. 
It shows that there is a cross-party consensus among the main political parties regarding 
the necessity for skilled labour migration to Germany. 
 
Figure 5.1 –Bundestag: Global Competition & Skilled Labour Shortage 
 
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates that awareness of the global competition over skilled workers (code 
B1) is most prevalent among Christian Democrat (8) and Liberal (8) MdB’s. 
Corresponding to this, the following Figure 5.2 indicates the Christian Democrat 
representatives in the German Bundesrat (6) are also very much aware of the global 
competition over the “brightest heads”. 
Figure 5.2 –Bundesrat: Global Competition & Skilled Labour Shortage 
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The following statements capture the Christian Democrat viewpoint on the issue 
of the international skills competition. 
 
Bundestag: 217. Session, the 23. April 2009 
Thomas Bareiß (CDU/CSU): 
We implemented 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration in Germany in 
order to strengthen Germany within the international competition over the brightest 
heads. 
 
Bundestag: 179. Session the 25. September 2008 
Peter Altmaier, Parl. State Secretary at the Minister of the Interior (CDU/CSU): 
We have to strengthen the position of our country within the global competition over the 
brightest heads. 
 
Bundestag: 119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, Federal Minister of the Interior (CDU/CSU): 
The federal government agrees that in the context of globalization there is a competition 
over the brightest heads. We have to be vigilant in order to maintain 
competitiveness…...With the implementation of the [2005] Immigration Law we have set 
policies in place that in light of the global competition over the brightest heads will 
encourage migration of highly skilled professionals to Germany.   
 
According to these statements the Christian Democrat MdBs seem fully aware of the 
necessity for comprehensive labour migration policies in order to attract highly sought 
skilled foreign processionals to Germany. Moreover, they acknowledge that Germany 
stands in direct competition with other countries over skilled migrant professionals and 
that the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration is a direct policy response 
aiming to maintain the competitiveness of the German labour market within the global 
economy. According to Ley (2003) and Hawthorne (2006), government policies that aim 
to increase immigration are usually implemented to sustain or boost economic growth 
and the 2009 Action Programme appears to follow that pattern.   
Representatives from the Bundesrat are also aware that Germany competes with 
other countries over skilled migrant professionals and acknowledge that some of these 
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countries may even offer better immigration conditions to foreign professionals than 
Germany.  
 
Bundesrat: 835. Session, the 6. July 2007 
Uwe Schünemann (CDU - Lower-Saxony): 
The industry laments that this [labour shortage] slows economic growth in our country, 
which has little natural resources and can only retain its position in global economy 
through ideas and innovation. Therefore we need to position ourselves within the 
competition over the brightest heads and the best ideas.  
 
Bundesrat: 840. Session, the 20. December 2007 
Ralf Stegner (SPD - Schleswig-Holstein): 
Highly skilled migrants often choose careers in the US or Canada as both these countries 
offer better immigration and residence conditions. 
 
 Social Democrat MdB Bürsch is equally aware that some of Germany’s EU 
partners offer better residence and employment conditions to foreign professionals and 
warns that Germany is bound to lose the competition over skilled workers unless the 
government changes existing policy frameworks. These statements clearly show that the 
international skills competition is recognized as a significant factors in regards skilled 
labour recruitment and it clearly affect s labour migration policy formation processes in 
Germany.  
 
Bundestag: 119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Dr. Michael Bürsch (SPD): 
I believe that in the competition over the brightest heads we need to position ourselves 
better. If we don’t change the current conditions, we will lose ground to our rivals in the 
UK, Ireland or countries like the Czech Republic or the Baltic States. Estonia for example 
has made significant advancement in Information Technology….The brightest heads will 
go to the places where they find the best working conditions.  
 
The possibility that other industrialized countries offer a better legal framework for 
immigration, improved residence rights as well as better labour market conditions for 
skilled foreign workers is also not lost on the representatives from the opposition parties 
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in the Bundestag. Unsurprisingly, the opposition Liberals and Greens claim that the 
government is not doing enough to encourage skilled labour migration to Germany.  
 
Bundestag: 163. Session, the 29. May 2008 
Hartfrid Wolff (FDP): 
Germany is prone to lose the competition over the brightest heads…Other countries such 
as the UK, the US, and Canada are miles ahead of us due to their clear and transparent 
rules on immigration. The federal government is sleeping through these dynamic 
developments at the expense of this country’s business and research community. 
 
Bundestag: 179. Session the 25. September 2008 
Brigitte Pothmer (Green Party): 
Your politics cause Germany to trail behind in the international competition over the 
brightest heads and most skilled hands. This is irresponsible.  
  
These statements by members of the opposition highlight the cross party consensus in the 
Bundestag over the global competition over skilled workers and the necessity for 
comprehensive legislation to encourage and facilitate skilled labour migration to 
Germany.  
 However, the Christian Democrat representatives in the Bundestag also believe 
that government policy is not the only factor that can strengthen Germany’s position 
within the global competition over skilled workers and they call on the German 
employers and industry to improve employment conditions in the country by paying 
competitive salaries to all skilled professionals in order make the German labour market 
more attractive. 
 
Bundestag: 187. Session the 13. November 2008 
Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU): 
It is my opinion that only those who offer attractive working conditions and appropriate 
salaries will be able to compete in the global competition over the so-called “High 
Potentials”. 
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Bundestag: 179. Session the 25. September 2008 
Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU): 
We have already talked about the global competition over the brightest heads. We can 
only win in this competition if our business community pays competitive salaries [to its 
employees].  
 
Bundestag: 119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Anette Hübinger (CDU/CSU): 
The competition over the best heads is also a matter of salary.  
 
According to these statements CDU policy makers are convinced that labour migration 
policies can only achieve their intended outcomes if the national salaries are sufficiently 
high, an argument closely aligned alongside neo-classical economic theory in which 
wage disparities between countries determine migratory flows (Arango, 2000; Bach, 
2007). In other words, competitive salaries are just as important as immigration policies. 
Even though Favell et al. (2007, p.17) concur that salaries and wages motivate migrant 
workers to move abroad, they stress that the market forces driving skilled global labour 
migration, including salaries, are mediated through institutional barriers and channelling 
mechanisms and as such immigration policy retains an important gate keeping function 
with regards to skilled labour mobility between nation-states.  
 While the parties of the governing coalition as well as the opposition parties are in 
agreement that the German labour market is in fact competing with other countries over 
skilled workers, the Links Party uses the global competition over skilled workers to 
question the morality behind the government’s approach towards skilled labour 
migration. 
 
Bundestag: 103. Session, the 14. June 2007 
Sevim Dagdelen (DIE LINKE): 
In the past as well as today, policy changes follow racist forms of categorization and 
associated degradation of human beings alongside criteria of economic utility. The 
migration policy of the federal government is only concerned with blocking refugees and 
selecting highly skilled professionals for the global economic competition.  
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Castles (2004) and Skeldon (2008) confirm MdB Dagdelen's claim that the German 
government as well as other European governments increasingly put a stronger emphasis 
on immigration policies favouring skilled migrants while at same time restricting 
unskilled labour migration. Even though the Links Party does not support immigration 
policies that are based on economic utility and labour market demand, their party 
representative nevertheless acknowledges that the global competition over skilled 
professionals does in fact exist and that it constitutes an influential factor in migration 
policy formation processes.  
 Within the context of political debate over skilled labour migration, policy 
makers’ awareness of the global competition over skilled foreign workers explains the 
need for competitive labour migration policies and adequate salaries in Germany, but it 
does not actually provide a comprehensive explanation for labour market demand itself. 
Further data analysis reveals that from a policymaker perspective the demographic 
transition of German society (Manifest code C1) is an important factor driving skilled 
labour demand in Germany. MdBs from the governing coalition are in agreement that the 
demographic transition represents a challenge to future economic growth and prosperity 
in Germany and that skilled labour migration can help offset skills shortages in the 
German economy.  
 
Bundestag: 179. Session, the 25. September 2008 
Rüdiger Veit (SPD): 
More people have left Germany than have moved here. In terms of birth rates we are at 
near the bottom in Europe. We are therefore in agreement that in order to maintain our 
economy and our social welfare system we need to organize and manage migration and 
for example have to make sure that skilled foreigners can stay here and are not deported.    
 
Bundestag: 179. Session, the 25. September 2008 
Peter Altmaier (CDU): Parl. State Secretary of the Minister of the Interior: 
The demand for labour grows and will continue so in the future despite economic 
fluctuations, especially in light of the demographic transition.  
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Bundestag: 119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU): Federal Minister of the Interior: 
Future development on the labour market and the demographic transition suggest that 
we have to expect an increased demand for skilled workers that will make it necessary to 
open our labour market even further. 
 
Castles (2006) confirms that that current demographic trends in Europe will lead to a 
significant decline in the working population across the continent which will significantly 
affect economic growth in EU member states and will likely negatively affect Europe’s 
competitiveness in the global economy.   
While the members of the governing coalition seem to have recognized the 
significance of the demographic transition in Germany in respect to developments on the 
national labour market, representatives of the opposition parties are also in agreement on 
this issue and foresee similar problems for the future of the German economy.  
 
Bundestag 217. Session, the 23. April 2009 
Hartfrid Wolff (FDP): 
In light of the demographic transition, we will not be able to maintain our economic 
standards if we don’t open up to skilled labour migration.  
 
Bundestag 162. Session, the 9. May 2008 
Josef Philip Winkler (Green Party): 
We cannot solve our demographic dilemma through migration alone. However, since we 
have a demographic problem, it would make sense to give preference to migrants with 
young children if they wish to settle in Germany. 
 
There is an inter-party agreement that demographic transition will pose a challenge to 
long-term economic growth and that skilled labour migration in particular and 
immigration in general can help solve some of the problems that arise from a declining 
workforce and aging population. Representatives of the federal states are equally 
concerned about the demographic transition and future shortages of the skilled 
professionals. They also derive at the conclusion that skilled labour migration can offset 
some of the impacts of demographic decline in Germany.  
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Bundesrat: 847. Session, the 19. September 2008 
Staatsminister Volker Bouffier (CDU - Hessia) 
Indeed, the European Union is for demographic and labour market related reasons 
dependent on the in-migration of skilled workers. 
 
Bundesrat: 835. Session, the 6. July 2007 
Prof. Dr. Andreas Pinkwart (FDP - Northrhine-Westphalia) 
Northrhine-Westphalia expects the federal government to do more to facilitate the 
migration of highly skilled foreigners, especially with the backdrop of demographic 
transition in Germany.   
 
Mahroum (2001) states that the projected changes in European demography, which will 
result in aging and declining populations across the continent, will inevitably result in a 
shrinking labour pool, particularly of skilled workers. Policy makers in many European 
countries increasingly perceive the demographic trend as a challenge to future economic 
growth and according to Ley (2003, p.426) ‘immigration has become a major guarantor 
not only of demographic growth but also of population replacement… ‘ and as a result 
‘national economic policy is becoming ever more closely wedded to immigration policy’. 
Sides & Citrin (2007, p. 478) believe that policy makers in Europe will find it 
increasingly difficult to refute immigration as a policy tool to alleviate the impacts of 
economic decline caused by population decline.  
While the debate on the impacts of demographic transition on the labour market is 
for the most part concerned with future labour market developments, policymakers in 
both Bundesrat and Bundestag are at the same time very much concerned with existing 
skills shortages in the German labour market (Manifest code C2) and the repercussions of 
this on the national economy. The Christian Democrats do not deny that shortages of 
skilled professionals currently exist in the German labour market and that the country 
requires comprehensive labour migration policies in order to attract foreign skilled 
professionals. 
 
Bundestag: 103. Session, the 14. June 2007 
Dr. Hans-Peter Uhl (CDU/CSU): 
We do need to manage the flow of migrants into our country and it is important for an 
industrialized knowledge based economy with structural skilled workers shortage to make 
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sure that highly qualified people can find their way to Germany.   
 
Bundestag: 119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Anette Hübinger (CDU/CSU): 
In light of the current skills shortage in several sectors of our labour market, the German 
economy will have to recruit foreign professionals.  
 
Bundestag: 179. Session, the 25. September 2008 
Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU): 
There is no doubt that the German economy is experiencing an increased demand in 
skilled labour and some sectors are already experiencing skilled labour shortage.  
   
Their Social Democrat coalition partners are also aware that there is an existing shortage 
of skilled workers in some sectors of the economy, particularly engineers.  
 
Bundestag: 94. Session, the 26. April 2007 
Dr. Michael Bürsch (SPD): 
There are more and more reports about increased skilled labour shortages. The 
association of German Engineers announced last week that in 2006 over 48.000 
engineering positions could not be filled. We desperately need engineers and technical 
specialists.  
 
Bundestag: 179. Session, the 25. September 2008 
Josip Juratovic (SPD): 
We need more skilled and highly skilled professionals in order to secure future growth 
and employment. 
 
Representatives of the opposition parties concur with coalition government’s position on 
existing skilled worker shortages and point to the prospective benefits that skilled labour 
migration can bring to the German economy. 
 
119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Sibylle Laurischk (FDP): 
The German labour market desperately needs skilled professionals. For example, we are 
short of 50,000 engineers whose employment would create new jobs in downstream 
sectors of the labour market. As such skilled labour migration is not only vital to maintain 
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Germany’s economic competitiveness but also a means to reduce overall unemployment. 
 
119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Kai Gehring (Green Party): 
It is vital to find an answer to these questions, as the shortage of qualified employees is 
becoming an increased liability for technological advancement and sustainable economic 
development.  
 
Despite its opposition to labour migration laws that reflect economic utility, the Links 
Party representatives also recognize that long-term economic development in Germany 
cannot be maintained if employers and industry cannot find suitably qualified personnel.   
 
217. Session, the 23. April 2009 
Kornelia Möller (DIE LINKE): 
The future of our country depends on how we can advance and create the capacities for 
growth. In order to accomplish thus we must solve the issue of skilled labour shortages. 
 
Representatives of the Bundesrat also recognize the gravity of the situation in the 
German labour market and point to the potential synergy that skilled labour migration can 
bring to the lower segments of the German labour market. 
 
Bundesrat: 835. Session, the 6. July 2007 
Uwe Schünemann (CDU - Lower-Saxony): 
The industry laments that the labour shortage has already put the brakes on economic 
growth. 
 
Bundesrat: 835. Session, the 6. July 2007 
Prof. Dr. Andreas Pinkwart (FDP - Northrhine-Westphalia):  
The shortage of highly qualified professionals does not increase employment 
opportunities for the unemployed in our country. If we wish to give the 3.5 million 
unemployed in this country better [employment] prospects, we need to reduce the 
shortage of engineers and academics.  
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835. Session, the 6. July 2007 
Richard Drautz (FDP - Baden-Württemberg): 
Unfortunately our employers are encountering problems when trying to recruit skilled 
workers. The capacity for innovation in our enterprises will decline with the increased 
scarcity of engineers.  
 
While the politicians stress the perceived economic benefits of skilled labour migration, 
the scholarship on the economic impacts of labour migration is divided over this issue. 
According to Castles & Miller (2009) economists remain divided over costs and benefits 
of immigration but confirm that the short-term economic benefits of labour migration 
often persuade national governments to ignore the potential long-term socio-economic 
implications of large-scale labour migration. According to Rhus (2005) economists agree 
that in the short-run immigration can boost economic development in receiving countries 
but that it also leads to a redistribution of national income from the workers to the owners 
of capital. This implies that employers and capitalist owners primarily gain from 
immigration at the expense of the domestic workers (Rhus, 2005; Money, 1997). 
However, these theories are based upon large-scale immigration of unskilled and semi-
skilled workers as it occurred in Europe between 1960 and 1973 and are therefore not 
necessarily applicable to small and medium scale immigration of skilled foreign 
professionals. 
 Saxenian (2002) laments that debates over migrant workers replacing domestic 
workers ignore the entrepreneurial efforts of high skill migrants in starting new 
enterprises and businesses, thus generating wealth and jobs in the receiving society.  
Saxenian (2002) cites the example of Asian IT professionals and entrepreneurs in Silicon 
Valley. Luthra (2009) on the other hand looks at labour market outcomes of skilled 
migrant workers on temporary H-1B visas in the United States and finds that skilled 
foreign workers do not constitute cheap labour, thereby not outcompeting native workers, 
but rather flexible labour, which can be easily restructured in times of economic 
downturn. The short, medium, and long-term economic implications of skilled labour 
migration are not as clear-cut as some of the German policy makers seem to believe and 
therefore the assumption that immigration of skilled foreign workers will be to the benefit 
of everyone in Germany may not necessarily be valid. 
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Regardless, the data reveals that there is political consensus between government 
and opposition as well as between the federal government and federal states over the 
issue of skilled labour shortage. Everybody acknowledges that present and future 
shortages of skilled workers pose a significant challenge to short-, medium-, and long-
term economic growth and prosperity in Germany. At the same time there appears to be a 
realization across the political spectrum and levels of government that skilled labour 
migration can potentially provide a solution to the long-term demographic challenge as 
well as immediate skills shortages.  
 The final thematic code (C3) that ties into the Global Competition & Skilled 
Labour Shortage narrative within the political discourse on skilled labour migration in 
Germany between 2005 and 2009 links labour migration policy to the interests of 
employers and industry. Both the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats claim 
that their government’s policies on skilled labour migration are implemented to serve the 
interest of the German state, its economy as well as industry and employers.   
 
Bundestag 202. Session, the 29. January 2009 
Gesine Multhaupt (SPD): 
We Social Democrats have for a long time supported a modern immigration policy with 
the goal to manage migration flows according to our own interests. At every opportunity 
we have emphasized our support for a coordinated migration, especially of skilled and 
highly skilled people.  
 
Bundestag 179. Session, the 25. September 2008 
Peter Altmaier, CDU – Parliamentary State Secretary at Ministry of the Interior: 
First and foremost this policy serves the needs of the labour market and the economy. 
 
Bundestag 103. Session, the 14. June 2007 
Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, CDU - Minister of the Interior: 
I have said in relation to managed legal migration that we need to recognize our 
responsibility towards the national labour markets. 
 
It appears that German policy makers are following their counterparts in other advanced 
economies such as Canada and Australia who have conceptualized skilled labour 
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migration as a policy tool to alleviate skills shortages and to ensure economic growth 
(Iredale, 1999, Favell et al, 2007).  
Representatives of the Bundesrat also stress the necessity for labour migration 
polices that are aligned with the interests of domestic industry and employers. 
 
Bundesrat: 851. Session, the 28. November 2008 
Minister Margit Conrad (SPD - Rhineland-Pfalz) 
The state of Rheinland-Pfalz believes that it is in the interest of the small- and mid-sized 
enterprises [Mittelstand] to ease the rules on skilled labour migration.  
 
The Christian Democrats are particularly keen to show that their labour migration 
policies are first and foremost implemented for the benefit of the Germany economy and 
the national business community. Since point six (see appendix A) of the 2009 Action 
Programme on Skilled Labour Migration enables migrant professionals without 
permanent residence rights to attain a long-term residence and employment prospects in 
Germany, the Christian Democrats appear keen to dispel any possibility that this policy 
measure could be interpreted as a humanitarian based legalization of temporary and 
undocumented migrants. Following statement illustrates Christian Democrat attempt 
present the 2009 policy as a purely economic and labour market demand driven necessity.  
 
Bundestag: 187. Session, the 13. November 2008 
Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU) 
Some aspects of the new migration and residence rules are linked to humanitarian 
considerations but they were primarily implemented in the interest of those companies 
that have been employing skilled and experienced specialists with temporary residence 
permits and that rely on those specialists. These companies, we have them in Munich, 
Hamburg, and Düsseldorf but also in rural Bavaria, will be given the ability for long-term 
planning as we [the government] grant long-term residence and work permits to affected 
workers. We do realize that in some sectors of the German labour market skills shortages 
exist that cannot be filled with domestic and EU applicants… 
 
And continues with  
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I emphasise again, for us Christian Democrats the purpose of this policy change is to 
alleviate real and pressing skills shortages experienced by companies in Germany. It is 
not an exception rule based on humanitarian considerations.  
 
The statements above suggest that the Christian Democrats do not wish to appear soft on 
immigration and refugees as they are keen to ensure that their support for new labour 
migration polices is solely based upon economic considerations in support of domestic 
employers and industry. The Christian Democrats seem keen to avoid the label of a pro- 
immigration party and therefore brand their support for skilled labour migration 
legislation with the argument that Germany’s knowledge and technology based economy 
requires access to the ‘world’s best and brightest’ (Freeman, 2006, p. 237).    
However, the opposition parties do not attempt to gain political capital from this 
by attacking the governing coalition and their “liberal” immigration agenda. Instead, the 
Liberal Party appears in agreement that labour migration policies of European countries 
should be linked to labour market demand and domestic economic interest. 
 
142. Session, the 14. February 2008 
Florian Toncar (FDP) 
In the end, the European countries should not neglect their own interest and they should 
manage migration flows according to their respective economic demand.  
  
The opposition Links Party laments that the government’s approach towards labour 
migration is largely determined by economic considerations and their representative does 
not believe that economic interests should solely determine national immigration policy.     
 
Bundestag: 187. Session, the 13. November 2008 
Sevim Dagdelen (DIE LINKE): 
The influence of business interest is very much apparent in your [the government’s] 
politics.…. The federal government does anything to serve the interest of the German 
business community to secure cheap, flexible, and obedient migrant workers. In the 
interest of capitalism, the government expands low pay employment sector and 
exacerbates the competition between migrants and domestic workers.   
 
The Links Party opposition to immigration policies that emphasize economic utility is not 
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surprising; earlier studies have already revealed that the Links Party’s predecessor party, 
the PDS, frequently rejected policies that were interpreted as a classicisation scheme to 
divide migrants into ‘useful’ and ‘less useful people’ (Kruse et. al, 2003, p. 136).  
The analysis of this first narrative reveals that the political parties in the German 
Bundestag are without exception aware that there is an ongoing global competition over 
skilled workers between economically advanced nation-states. The existence of this 
global competition over skilled foreign labour or ‘looming war for skills’ (Hawthorne, 
2005, p. 690) has been acknowledged in numerous academic studies (Portes, 2009; van 
Houtum, 2007; Hollifield, 2004; Stalker, 2002; Iredale, 2001). The governing coalition of 
Christian Democrats and Social Democrats argues that comprehensive labour migration 
policies are necessary in order to maintain and increase the competitiveness of the 
German economy and the national labour market. The opposition Liberals, Greens, and 
Links Party do not deny that global competition over skilled workers exists. Liberals and 
Greens call on the government to further improve existing legislation and also implement 
more comprehensive and far reaching skilled labour migration polices while 
representatives of the Links Party, notwithstanding their acknowledgment of the global 
skills competition, attack government policy on labour migration and immigration in 
general as primarily driven by industry demand and economic utility. It appears that with 
the exception of the Links Party all political parties in the Bundestag and Bundesrat 
support skilled labour migration in light of Germany’s demographic transition as well as 
current shortages of skilled professionals in sectors of the German economy. This 
supports Mahroum’s (2001) and Hollifield’s (2004) assessment that demographic change 
and skills shortage in the labour market are the two major socio-economic rationals that 
underly policy debate on labour migration in Europe. Finally, apart from the Links Party, 
government and opposition representatives in both Bundestag and Bundesrat concur that 
skilled labour migration policies should be implemented in accordance to industry and 
employer demand. Yet again, this demand merely follows existing trend in other 
countries such as Australia where migration polices are set in accordance with to what 
Hawthorne (2005, p. 690) labels ‘acceptable human capital’. 
  The most significant aspect of this narrative is that nobody challenges the notion 
for current and future need for skilled foreign workers. In the context of the policy 
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formation process and associated political debate this means that it is not a question as 
the whether or not to implement or change policy on skilled labour migration but rather a 
question of what particular skilled labour migration policy is required and to what extent 
this policy should be implemented. Considering the widespread political consensus 
among Germany’s political elites over the need for skilled migrant professionals, it is not 
surprising that the grand coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats managed 
to successfully implement the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration 
during the 16th Legislative period (2005-2009). 
 
5.3 – Controlling, Restricting & Managing Labour Migration  
 
 This second narrative encompasses models of argumentation identified within the 
political debate that relate to supposed undesired outcomes of skilled labour migration in 
Germany. The narrative encompasses three manifest codes; code F1, code G1, and code 
Y1. Manifest code F1 encompasses models of argumentation identified within the 
parliamentary debate that conceptualize skilled labour migration merely as a component 
supporting a wider government strategy aimed at mobilizing unutilized or underutilized 
domestic labour potential. In other words, manifest code F1 embodies models of 
argumentation that are critical towards the recruitment of foreign professionals at the 
expense of unemployed or underemployed German workers. Manifest code G1 is linked 
to models of argumentation that oppose foreign nationals accessing Germany’s social- 
welfare system. The analysis of the debate transcripts in both Bundesrat and Bundesrat 
reveals that this a recurring issue within parliamentary discourse on skilled labour 
migration. Finally, Manifest code Y1 encompasses models of argumentation that oppose 
the labour market access for unskilled foreign workers.  
 These three manifest codes form a distinct narrative within political discourse on 
skilled labour migration because each model of argumentation is concerned with 
undesirable outcomes of skilled labour migration policy, namely displacement of 
domestic workers (F1), foreigners’ access to the social-welfare system (G1), as well as 
uncontrolled migration of unskilled labourers (Y1). Similar to the narrative discussed in 
section 5.2, this narrative is not linked to a specific policy measure of the 2009 Action 
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Programme but rather represents an influential discursive undercurrent within the 
political debate on skilled labour migration in Germany. 
 Figures 5.3 and 5.4 below indicate that Christian Democrat politicians 
disproportionately resort to the models of argumentations associated with this narrative 
during debate in both Bundestag and Bundesrat, which highlights the discursive links 
between the three manifest codes in the context of the narrative. 
 
Figure 5.3 – Bundestag: Controlling, Restricting & Managing Labour Migration 
 
 
Figure 5.4 – Bundesrat: Controlling, Restricting & Managing Labour Migration 
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The discussion of the data linked to this narrative begins with the models of 
argumentation (manifest code F1) that conceptualize skilled labour migration polices 
merely as a component of a wider labour market initiative aimed at mobilizing, utilizing, 
and upgrading domestic labour resources. Unlike the debates relating to migrant access to 
social-welfare (Manifest code G1) and unskilled labour migration (Manifest code Y1), 
which are almost exclusively led by representatives of the Christian Democrat Party, 
manifest code F1 and its associated models of argumentation indicate a wider consensus 
between the political parties in the Bundestag (see Table 5.3). This political consensus is 
rooted in the common assumption that skilled labour migration should not be facilitated 
at the expense of the domestic unemployed and that training and skills-upgrading for 
domestic workers needs to take precedence over skilled labour migration.  
In the context of this narrative, the Christian Democrat MdB Stephan Mayer 
shows very little enthusiasm for skilled labour migration to Germany, arguing that the 
key to solve skilled labour shortages in the country lies with training and skills-upgrading 
for domestic workers, particularly women and older employees. 
 
Bundestag: 187. Session, the 13. November 2008 
Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU): 
The highest priority for the CDU, regardless of economic developments, is the training 
and qualifying the people in the country. That priority will be retained with the new 
legislation. We have to utilize the skills potential within the country before we call for 
labour migration. I am confident that most of the demand for skilled workers can be 
satisfied through utilizing domestic labour resources.   
 
Bundestag: 179. Session, the 25. September 2008 
Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU): 
For us Christian Democrats education, training, and qualification take precedent over 
immigration.  
 
MdB Mayer is also uncharacteristically critical of the Germany’s business community 
and their call on the government to ease restrictions for foreign professionals. He subtly 
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accuses Germany’s business community of reneging on its social responsibility towards 
domestic workers.  
 
Bundestag: 119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU): 
I place the responsibility with the business community. Despite my personal pro-business 
views, especially in regards to small and medium sized enterprises, I have to stress that 
our business community is not allowed to renege on its responsibility to train and educate 
the young people [in Germany]. Therefore, it is necessary to resist the somewhat hasty 
warnings from the business community about imminent skilled labour shortages that can 
only be countered by enabling labour migration from non-EU countries.    
 
Fellow Christian Democrat MdB Reinhardt Grindel concurs with the assessment that the 
German business community is not doing enough to alleviate unemployment among the 
German workers.  
 
Bundestag: 163. Session, the 29. May 2008 
Reinhard Grindel (CDU/CSU): 
In light of 3.3 million unemployed, among them 150.000 academics, we cannot seriously 
debate if it would be wiser to look whether or not skilled domestic workers could fill 
vacant positions before a foreigner enters the German labour market….We should train 
the people here and not exacerbate existing problems with [migrant] integration by 
increasing uncontrolled migration.  
 
In an earlier statement about labour migration MdB Grindel strategically argues that 
unemployment and lack of qualification also affect the second and third generation 
migrant children born in Germany, decreasing their chances of success in the German 
labour market.   
 
Bundestag: 94. Session, the 26. April 2007 
Reinhard Grindel (CDU/CSU): 
I tell those that cannot wait to open our labour market because we have a [supposed] 
shortage of skilled workers: Maybe we should first make sure that those children born in 
Germany with a migratory background get a chance to become a skilled professional. 
This law [2009 Action Programme] creates a better framework for this. 
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Within the context of the narrative, the Parliamentary State Secretary at the Ministry of 
the Interior appears to be the only Christian Democrat open to the potential of skilled 
labour migration as he at least acknowledges that it can be integrated as part of a wider 
labour market initiative to mobilize domestic labour potentials.   
 
Bundestag: 179. Session, the 25. September 2008 
Peter Altmaier, (CDU) Parl. State Secretary at Minister of the Interior: 
The policy of the government rests on three principles, first to train and qualify the 
domestic workforce to a degree that it can take advantage of the opportunities on the 
labour market. Second, this strategy also applies to those [migrants] who have resided 
here for a long time but due to poor education and training cannot integrate themselves 
into the labour market.  Third, the recruitment of foreign professionals cannot fully 
compensate for our failure to properly train segments of our domestic workforce. It can 
only be considered as an addition to this policy [training and qualifying].    
 
Nevertheless Altmaier reaffirms that the training and skills upgrading of the domestic 
workforce, which includes second and third generation migrants, must take precedence 
over the recruitment of foreign professionals. Interestingly, despite the vocal opposition 
of the Christian Democrat MdBs towards skilled labour migration in light of domestic 
unemployment, their party was ultimately responsible for the implementation of the 2009 
Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration. Their passionate support on behalf of 
unskilled and/or unemployed German workers against the German business community’s 
desire to import foreign professionals could be interpreted as mere political rhetoric to 
show that the CDU supports the collective interest of the lower segments of the domestic 
labour force. 
 Their Social Democrat coalition partners appear equally critical towards calls 
from the German business community for skilled foreign professionals and also argue 
that domestic employers have to commit to more training and skills-upgrading of 
domestic workers before resorting to foreign labour. 
 
 
 
 127 
Bundestag: 163. Session, the 29. May 2008 
Sebastian Edathy (SPD): 
The business community has to shoulder some of the responsibility for these 
developments. They have to compensate for deficits in the domestic labour market; they 
have to do more for training and skills-upgrading.  
 
Bundestag: 119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Katja Mast (SPD): 
Demanding and supporting, that also applies to the skilled labour shortage. Support: 
Everyone in Germany should have the opportunity to be a skilled professional in the 
labour market. Support: We want to reward businesses that train well. Demand: We need 
skilled foreign workers in Germany. Demand: Businesses need to increase their efforts to 
their train and upgrade [domestic workers].     
 
There appears to be subtle difference in argumentative patterns on this issue between the 
two ruling political parties. In light of the supposed “overabundant’ labour surplus among 
the German unemployed who only require proper professional training, the Christian 
Democrats appear almost unconvinced about the need for large–scale recruitment of 
skilled foreign workers whereas the Social Democrats appear to favour a balance between 
skilled labour migration and domestic skills upgrading. Both political parties though hold 
German employers responsible for past and present neglect of the domestic workforce in 
regards to training and skills upgrading and are subsequently suspicious about industry 
calls for increased skilled labour migration.  
 As for the three opposition parties, they more or less echo the sentiment of the 
two governing parties and are equally conscious of the need to balance skilled labour 
migration with skills upgrading and employment of domestic workers. The following 
statement by Green MdB Brigitte Pothmer exemplifies this viewpoint.  
 
Bundestag: 179. Session, the 25. September 2008 
Brigitte Pothmer (Green Party): 
We need skilled professionals from other countries, but we also require better 
qualification and labour market integration of those groups that have been neglected 
before such as women and older people. We cannot call for labour migration and then do 
nothing for these people.  We need them all.  
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Other opposition MdBs are not fully convinced that utilizing the entire domestic labour 
potential will offset existing and future skills shortages in Germany. Subsequently, they 
highlight the need for comprehensive skilled labour migration legislation within a wider 
policy framework for domestic skills and labour mobilization.  
 
Bundestag: 119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Dr. Thea Dückert (Green Party): 
We need all-encompassing concepts. We need better training for our domestic young 
people, especially women. We need to further qualify those that are already here. And we 
need skilled foreign professionals. We need to conceptualize these as one [concept]. 
 
Bundestag: 163. Session, the 29. May 2008 
Hartfrid Wolff (FDP): 
Of course we have to try, through quick and efficient education, training and intra 
company qualification initiatives, to fill [labour market] demand with domestic workers. 
We also need to enhance the career opportunities for women and older employees. That 
is the compromise. However, this will likely not suffice to cover the demand for skilled 
professionals. Ladies and Gentlemen, the labour market…the labour market is already 
global. 
 
 The Links Party and its MdB Sevim Dagdelen maintain a viewpoint close to the 
Christian Democrat’s, namely that domestic workers, particularly women who are 
supposedly underrepresented in the engineering professions, need to be trained to fill 
vacancies in the technology and engineering sectors of the German economy.   
  
 Bundestag: 163. Session, the 29. May 2008 
Sevim Dagdelen (DIE LINKE): 
You will realize that the [current] skilled labour shortage is about young, male engineers. 
We need in increase the employment quotas for women in this sector; it is women who 
are unemployed and are not included to this employment sector.  
 
As for the political debate in the German Bundesrat on this issue, at federal state level the 
Christian Democrats resort to more conciliatory models of argumentation. Parliamentary 
Secretary Peter Altmaier, who in his 2008 Bundestag report primarily talks about training 
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and skills-upgrading for domestic workers and only briefly references skilled labour 
migration, appears much more confident about the potential of skilled labour migration in 
his statements in the Bundesrat. 
 
Bundesrat: 835. Session, the 6. July 2007 
Peter Altmaier, (CDU - Ministry of the Interior) 
Potential easing on migration restrictions and the necessary national qualifying initiatives 
do not negate themselves but complement each other instead.  
 
Bundesrat: 848. Session the 10. October 2008 
State Secretary Altmaier (CDU - Ministry of the Interior)  
Ladies and Gentlemen, the migration of skilled professionals is an important instrument 
for success in the global competition over the brightest heads. But it is not the only one. It 
can only be an additional instrument to the government’s effort to better qualify and utilize 
domestic labour potentials.  
 
Altmaier’s two-pronged approach to labour migration within different political forums is 
typical of immigration policy makers in industrial democracies. Castles (2003, p.214) 
observed that ‘politicians are content to provide anti-immigration rhetoric while actually 
pursuing policies that lead to more immigration, because it meets with important 
economic or labour market objectives’. It seems that some CDU representatives are torn 
between employers demand from skilled workers and the interest of domestic workers. 
Other Christian Democrats in the Bundesrat also see long-term benefits of skilled labour 
migration for the German economy but still stress that domestic unemployed should take 
precedence in the short run.  
 
Bundesrat: 840. Session, the 20. December 2007 
Dr. Markus Söder (CDU/CSU - Bayern): 
In the long run we do support migration of highly skilled professionals but in the 
meantime we need to do more about training in our own country. 
 
Liberal Party MdB Richard Dautz views the issue from an opposite temporal scale and 
advocates skilled labour migration as the short-term solution and education as the long-
term strategy to alleviate skills shortages in the German labour market.   
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Bundesrat: 835. Session, the 6. July 2007 
Richard Drautz (FDP - Baden-Württemberg): 
In the long run we need to increase the number of graduates from specialist 
apprenticeships as well as post-secondary and polytechnic institutions. In the short term 
we need to ease restrictions for foreign professionals.    
 
The analysis of manifest code F1 and its associated patterns of argumentation clearly 
show that any comprehensive skilled labour migration policy can only be passed through 
the Bundestag if it is included or at least conceptualized within in a wider policy 
framework that addresses the needs of the domestic workforce such as retraining and 
skills-upgrading. Any attempt to politically address skilled labour shortages in Germany 
without including the needs of the domestic workforce will likely have very little support 
from any of the political parties in parliament. Within political discourse there appears to 
be a relationship between skilled labour migration debate and the political debate on 
employing and training domestic workers. The models of argumentation utilized in 
conjunction with manifest code F1 suggests that policy makers in Germany recognize 
that despite its acknowledged economic benefits, skilled labour migration is not 
politically justifiable in light of domestic unemployment. According to Freeman (1995) 
migration polices are determined by the content and relative power weighing of 
organized interest in a nation-state and he conceptualizes policy makers as power brokers 
who create legislation that mollifies organized interests (Boswell, 2007, p. 77). 
Freeman’s model assumes that liberal migration polices are an inevitable outcome in 
industrial democracies because employers interest is more pronounced than the interest of 
domestic working classes, who according to Freeman (2005), Castles (2004) and Meyers 
(2002) are more likely to be negatively affected by labour migration. As such policy 
makers usually give into employers’ demand and labour migration legislation will likely 
reflect employers and industry interest. In Germany on other hand, policy makers, even 
the business friendly Liberals and Christian Democrats, appear more concerned about the 
interest and/or electoral wrath of the domestic working population than the economic 
interest of employers. Albeit all political parties recognize the need for skilled workers 
and associated policy frameworks, there is a cross party consensus in the national 
political forums that the interest of domestic workers must take precedent over foreign 
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workers and subsequently employers interest. Freeman’s (1995) assumption, which is 
based upon empirical evidence collected in the United States, may therefore not be 
applicable to Germany. Statham & Geddes (2006) for example highlight the limitations 
of Freeman’s model on UK immigration policy where they found that British political 
elites, particularly the conservative elites, favour restrictive immigration policies in light 
of widespread apprehension within the British public, disregarding the economic interest 
their employer clientele. Leitner (1995, p. 262) concurs with this view and states that 
while the admission of foreigners may be favoured by some (employers) on economic 
grounds, restrictionist immigration policies are often justified on the grounds of 
protecting national interest and help ensure the economic well-being of national citizens. 
As such the influence of employers and their economic interest in labour migration policy 
formation in Germany between 2005 and 2009 may be less pronounced than Freeman’s 
theories on immigration policies in industrialized democracies suggest.  
 The discussion of the Controlling, Restricting & Managing Labour Migration 
narrative will now shift towards manifest codes G1 and Y1 and their associated models of 
argumentation. Figure 5.3 and 5.4 clearly indicate that the Christian Democrat 
representatives in Bundestag and Bundesrat monopolize the political debate associated 
with these two manifest codes. This especially applies to manifest code G1, which 
encompasses models of argumentation that indicate opposition to migrants accessing the 
German social-welfare system, which within political and media discourse in Germany is 
referred to as “migration into the social-welfare system” (Bauder & Semmelroggen, 
2009, p. 14).  
 In a parliamentary debate on immigration policies that also references skilled 
labour migration as policy instrument, Christian Democrat MdB Hans-Werner-Kramer 
claims that a Green party proposal to reduce legal barriers for skilled labour migration is 
a step towards “uncontrolled migration”, which he then equates with migration into the 
German social-welfare system. 
 
Bundestag: 214. Session, the 26. March 2009 
Hans-Werner Kammer (CDU/CSU): 
What you dear colleagues from the Green Party want is uncontrolled migration into our 
[national] labour market and by default into our social-welfare system. 
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Similar viewpoints appear to be prevalent among Christian Democrat representatives in 
the German Bundesrat. 
 
Bundesrat: 833. Session, the 11. May 2007 
Elisabeth Heister-Neumann (CDU - Lower-Saxony) 
We need to do everything to prevent migration into the social-welfare system. 
 
Bundesrat: 847. Session, the 19. September 2008 
State Minister Volker Bouffier (CDU - Hessia) 
In return, this will mean increased migration of the unskilled into our already 
overburdened social-welfare system…. I fear the well-developed social-welfare systems 
across Europe will further increase the desire [to migrate]. 
 
Other CDU representatives in the Bundesrat display a certain degree of support for 
skilled labour migration but yet seem to feel the need to reassure that they oppose 
migration into the social-welfares system at the same time. The following statement 
exemplifies this sentiment. 
 
Bundesrat 835. Session, the 6. July 2007 
Uwe Schünemann (CDU - Lower-Saxony): 
With the new rules we enable migration into the social-welfare system and yet still inhibit 
migration of the highly skilled……..Migration into the social-welfare system is the wrong 
approach. 
 
In the final Bundestag debate before the implementation of the 2009 Action Programme 
on Skilled Labour Migration, Christian Democrat MdB Stephan Mayer adamantly states 
that the CDU support for the policy ensures that that migration into the social-welfare 
system will be discouraged and prevented. 
 
Bundestag: 187. Session, the 13. November 2008 
Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU): 
The criteria we have set for them [skilled migrants] will make sure that there will be no 
migration into the social welfare system. It [2009 Action Programme] only refers to skilled 
professionals, including skilled workers with a suspension of deportation status that have 
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worked in the country for a specific time. These people have been in demand for years by 
German businesses and are still needed. It is obvious that it is in the interest of the 
business community to keep these people employed……  
……We will make sure that these new rules will not encourage anyone to migrate into the 
social welfare system……  
…….Therefore any steps taken towards easing labour market access for foreigners shall 
not result in an influx into the social welfare system…… 
…….. Our Christian Democrat viewpoint maintains that migration into the labour market 
can only be considered when a specific offer of employment exists. Any other policy 
mechanism, no matter how sophisticated, that forfeits this prerequisite, provokes influx 
into the social-welfare system.  
 
Mayer’s fellow CDU MdB Reinhard Grindel is equally determined to show his 
opposition towards migration into the German social-welfare system during his speech 
where he rallies against a Liberal Party proposal for a point based immigration system in 
Germany. 
 
Bundestag: 163. Session, the 29. May 2008 
Reinhard Grindel (CDU/CSU): 
The important thing is that if a foreign worker comes into this country without a pre-
existing specific offer of employment, it becomes uncontrolled migration because you can 
never determine whether or not this foreign worker arrives in the labour market or ends 
up in the social-welfare system…….. 
…….That means uncontrolled migration. These people arrive with their expectations in 
our labour market even though it is not clear in what kind of companies they can find 
employment. Considering my fifteen years of experiences in immigration politics I tell you. 
In the end this will result in migration into the social-welfare system and not a migration 
into the labour market..…… 
……..I conclude, Mrs President, it will help nobody if older workers are not given a 
chance anymore and training and skills upgrading are not implemented anymore and 
instead young people without specific offers of employment are brought in from abroad. 
That will result in an influx into our social-welfare system and will not help our companies.   
 
The repeated and exclusive use of the “migration into the social-welfare system” 
argument by Christian Democrat MdB’s and representatives in the Bundestag and 
Bundesrat debate confirms earlier assessment by Bauder & Semmelroggen (2009) that 
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the CDU has positioned itself as the guardian of the German social-welfare state within 
political debate on skilled labour migration as well as within the overall national 
immigration debate. Within the context of political debate over immigration, including 
skilled labour migration, political parties can easily utilize voter apprehension about cuts 
to the social-welfare system in conjunction with general public anxieties towards 
immigration to gain electoral advantages (Boucher, 2008; Freeman, 2005). However, 
since the Christian Democrat Party ultimately supported the 2009 Action Programme on 
Skilled Labour Migration, it suggests that the “migration into the social-welfare system” 
argument is not utilized to rally public support against skilled labour migration polices 
but instead is utilized by the Christian Democrats to assure their electorate that 
everything had been undertaken in the design of the new policy to prevent unwanted 
migration into the social-welfare system. In the context of skilled labour migration 
debate, manifest code G1 and associated models of argumentation do not embody 
outright opposition to skilled labour migration. Instead the argumentative pattern 
associated with this manifest code aims to calm voter apprehension and justify the new 
immigration rules for skilled foreign professionals by reassuring that any labour 
migration policy carrying the signature of Christian Democrats is only implemented 
under the precondition that migration into the social-welfare system will not occur.  
 The CDU’s apprehension regarding welfare access of foreign nationals is 
however not surprising. According to Freeman (2005, p. 955) ‘The territorial character 
of the nation-state suggests that welfare systems would be closed to non-members. 
Persons who belong to other states are foreigners and, therefore, ineligible in theory to 
enjoy the benefits of the membership. Migrants receiving benefits, therefore, pose a 
threat to the logic of the welfare state.’ Boswell (2007) attributes the general restrictionist 
discourse on immigration in democratic social-welfare states to the fact that ‘the state 
secures legitimacy through protecting its citizen’s privileged access to welfare’ (p.80). 
According to Ruhs (2005, p. 205), migrants’ access to social-welfare systems in migrant 
receiving societies, especially in those where the welfare provisions such as health care 
are increasingly rationalized, may adversely affect citizens’ access to these welfare 
provisions and thus increase tensions within the domestic population over continued 
immigration (Freeman, 2005; Mountz, 2003). As a consequence countries with strong 
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welfare systems attempt to restrict territorial access to foreigners in order to reduce 
migrants’ access to the welfare system (Freeman, 2005; Castles, 2003).  
 The perception by Christian Democrat policy makers that immigrants gravitate 
towards Germany because of its supposed generous social-welfare system is however 
supported by the literature. Geis et al. (2011) describe Germany and other European 
countries with strong welfare states as “welfare magnets” and point out that immigrants 
in Germany are more likely to experience unemployment than migrants in Anglo-Saxon 
economies where welfare provisions are less generous. According to Koopmans (2010, p. 
8) ‘immigrants with lower educational skills and a concomitant weaker labour market 
position will tend to migrate to countries with a relatively equal income distribution, 
which offer disadvantaged groups relatively good protection against economic adversity. 
Immigration countries with relatively inclusive and generous welfare states will thus be 
‘negatively selected’, whereas countries with higher levels of social inequality will be 
more attractive as destination country for skilled immigrants’. As a result, Germany and 
other European countries such as France disproportionately attract unskilled migrants 
with little human capital (Geis et al., 2011). 
The Christian Democrat’s adamant insistence that skilled labour migration 
policies should not enable welfare access to migrants seems to be linked to the fact the 
Germany disproportionately attracts unskilled foreigners who are more likely to rely on 
the national social-welfare system. Since liberal states cannot refuse welfare access to 
migrants within their national territory (Hollifield, 2004; Joppke, 1999), the Christian 
Democrat policy makers, even in the context of skilled labour migration debate, voice 
their opposition towards immigration of unskilled workers who more likely to become a 
liability to the German welfare state. To conclude, the Christian Democrat opposition to 
migrants accessing the German welfare system constitutes an important paradigm in the 
political discourse on skilled labour migration in Germany, even though welfare 
dependency primarily affects unskilled migrant workers. This suggests that within the 
context of skilled labour migration debate in Germany there is insufficient qualitative 
distinction among (Christian Democrat) policymakers between unskilled labour migrants 
and skilled labour migrants.  
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 This then leads to the discussion of the final manifest code (Y1) of the 
Controlling, Restricting & Managing Labour Migration narrative, which includes models 
of argumentation that in the context of skilled labour migration debate imply that 
immigration to Germany is out of control and that migration of unskilled workers into the 
country needs to be restricted and controlled by the government. A number of the 
identified statements feed into the argumentative patters of first two manifest codes of 
this narrative. As per usual with this narrative, representatives of the Christian Democrats 
dominate the debate on perceived uncontrolled immigration of unskilled foreigners while 
with the exception of the Liberals, the other parties do not appear to resort to this 
particular model of argumentation. The representatives of the CDU justify their 
opposition to uncontrolled immigration with a wide array of reasons.  
 
Bundestag: 103 Session, the 14. June 2007 
Hans-Pete Uhl (CDU/CSU): 
It is not only legal migration that is on the rise but also illegal migration. In light of this 
situation, we need not uphold the social peace. What does this mean? We need to 
control migratory flows into our country.   
 
Bundestag: 119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU): 
We also need to consider, when – unfortunately some industry sectors demand this – we 
open the floodgates too quickly and even more [unskilled] foreign workers are allowed 
into Germany. 
 
While MdB Uhl links the need to control legal and undocumented immigration to 
maintaining the social peace in Germany, MdB Mayer considers an overabundance of 
unskilled foreign workers detrimental to Germany even though he does not state the 
reasons for this. Christian Democrat MdB Reinhard Grindel believes that continued 
uncontrolled immigration would undermine the ongoing state efforts to socially integrate 
existing migrant communities in Germany. He then justifies his opposition to 
uncontrolled immigration with what he perceives as negative consequences of supposed 
uncontrolled immigration in some of Germany’s neighbouring countries.    
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Bundestag: 142. Session, the 14. February 2008 
Reinhard Grindel (CDU/CSU): 
We from the [Christian Democrat] Union have stated specifically: Our country is a country 
of integration and not a country of immigration. Integration countries define themselves 
through migration management based on the specific interests of the receiving country. 
We have done that in Germany while the French and Spanish did not do this. As a 
consequence we have witnessed unlimited immigration resulting in massive integration 
problems [in Spain & France]. I can only suggest, let us consequently solve the problems 
associated with lack of [migrant] integration in our country as well as in Europe and don’t 
undermine this ongoing integration process through continued uncontrolled immigration.  
 
Other Christian Democrat representatives are very conscious of the fact that so-called 
“pull factors” or “pull effects” encourage further undesired immigration to Germany and 
insist that German immigration policies should under no circumstance create new pull 
factors. 
 
Bundestag: 179. Session, the 25. September 2008 
Peter Altmaier (CDU – Parliamentary Secretary at Ministry of the Interior) 
We need to avoid anything that in the future could act as pull-factor … 
 
Bundestag: 179. Session the 25. September 2008 
Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU): 
During the [committee] discussion of the policy proposal we will make sure that it will not 
cause a false signal in relation to uncontrolled and undesired migration to Germany. This 
pull effect, that could potential be a result of this policy, needs to be prevented at any 
cost.  
 
Neither Mayer nor Altmaier provide an adequate explanation as to what constitutes a pull 
factor and how these pull factors create and sustain uncontrolled and undesired migration 
flows to Germany. The Christian Democrats insistence that immigration policies in 
Germany should under no circumstance encourage or facilitate “undesired’ immigration 
has without doubt an effect on the political debate on skilled labour migration as 
conservative policy makers want to ensure that legislation on skilled labour migration 
does not create potential loopholes that could enable undesired migration flows. More 
importantly, any legislation aimed to facilitate or accommodate immigration to Germany 
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would have to ensure that the state retains absolute control over immigration flows, 
which by default will lead to restrictionist immigration policies, even those aimed at 
skilled labour migration. Liberal MdB Hartfrid Wolff employs a similar rhetoric when he 
warns the Bundestag of the inherent dangers of uncontrolled immigration.  
 
Bundestag: 214. Session, the 26. March 2009 
Hartfrid Wolff (FDP): 
There should be no incentives that enable further uncontrolled immigration…. 
……We need migration management, not extending incentives and opportunities for 
uncontrolled migration. Only then can we defuse fears among the citizens of our 
country….. 
….Managing [migration] can under certain circumstances mean prevention....if the 
situation demands it.  
 
While Wolff emphasizes the need to prevent uncontrolled migration, he also neglects to 
provide an adequate definition as to what actually constitutes uncontrolled migration. 
Nevertheless, Wolff believes that comprehensive migration management policies will 
reduce apprehension among German voters about immigration and show that the 
government retains control over immigration flows to Germany. The models of 
argumentation associated with uncontrolled migration stress the need for migration 
management in order to control and restrict undesired migratory flows. Since most 
political parties are in agreement that skilled migrant professionals constitute a desired 
migrant group, very few of the debate statements identified within this narrative attempt 
to specify what actually constitutes an undesired migrant. Representatives of the 
Bundesrat on the other hand are quite clear about what migrant category constitutes an 
undesired group whose migration to Germany has to be closely monitored and restricted.  
 
Bundesrat: 847. Session, the 19. September 2008 
State Minister Volker Bouffier (CDU - Hessia) 
What I am missing in the [parliamentary] commission’s report is how large-scale 
migration of unskilled labourers can be prevented. 
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State Minister’s Bouffier statement clearly indicates that in the context of skilled labour 
migration debate in Germany, unskilled workers do not constitute a desired migrant 
group. Geis et al. (2011) and Koopmans’s (2010) indicate that unskilled migrant workers 
in Germany are more likely to be dependent on welfare and considering the CDU’s 
opposition to ‘welfare migration’ it is not surprising that conservative policy makers view 
unskilled foreign workers as an undesired migrant group. However, issues surrounding 
migrants’ access to welfare are not the only factors determining restrictionist policy 
maker emphasis towards unskilled foreigners. Potential labour market competition 
between unskilled domestic workers and unskilled migrant workers also drives 
restrictionist discourse on skilled labour migration (Massey, 1999). The following 
statement by Liberal Bundesrat representative Pinkwart highlights policy maker’s 
apprehensions of about perceived uncontrolled migration of unskilled foreigners into the 
lower segments of the German labour market.  
 
Bundesrat: 835. Session, the 6. July 2007 
Prof. Dr. Andreas Pinkwart (FDP - Northrhine-Westphalia): 
Ladies and Gentleman, an opening into the already highly strained low-skill sector of the 
German labour market is not justifiable from either an economic or integration viewpoint. 
At the same time those sought after highly skilled professionals are subject to much 
harsher restrictions.  
 
Pinkwart believes that labour market access for unskilled migrant workers needs to be 
tightly controlled in order to protect the labour market prospects of domestic unskilled 
workers. Yet at the same time he laments the restrictions placed on skilled foreign 
professionals. Pinkwart’s statement highlights the political dilemma whereby national 
immigration policy makers are caught between the need to promote skilled labour 
migration while at the same time ‘not neglecting the political imperative to emphasise 
restrictionist credentials to the electorate’ in regards to unskilled labour migration 
(Boswell & Hough, 2008, p.343). 
The Christian Democrat as well as opposition Liberal policy makers appear to be 
aware that there is domestic opposition and apprehension towards perceived uncontrolled 
migration of unskilled foreign workers to Germany even though there have not been any 
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legal channels for large-scale unskilled labour migration to Germany from outside the 
European Union since 1973 (Klusmeyer & Papademetrious, 2009).48 Nevertheless, in the 
context of skilled labour migration debate, Christian Democrat and Liberal 
representatives are keen to ensure that the national government maintains control over 
immigration to Germany in order to restrict unskilled labour migration. This leads to the 
conclusion that German policy makers, particularly those from the CDU and lesser extent 
the Liberal Party, feel that they have to publically display their intent to restrict unskilled 
labour migration to Germany in order to support legislation aimed to facilitate skilled 
labour migration. While the literature on labour migration has already noted the 
dialectical relationship between restrictionist policies for unskilled migrants and 
expansionist policies for skilled migrants in economically advanced states, the data from 
the German political debate suggests that for conservative policy makers restrictionist 
immigration policies for undesired migrants are actually a precondition for supporting 
policies aimed at facilitating skilled labour migration. 
            The analysis of the Controlling, Restricting & Managing Labour Migration 
narrative reveals that within political debate on skilled labour migration there is 
significant apprehension, particularly among Christian Democrats, about potential 
negative impacts of large-scale unskilled labour migration on the lower segments of the 
German labour market. While all political parties in Germany feel that employment 
prospects of domestic workers must take precedence over foreign workers, including 
skilled foreign professionals, the Christian Democrats in particular are adamant that any 
legislation facilitating migrants, skilled or unskilled, access to social-welfare is under no 
circumstances acceptable. The narrative is insofar significant within the political 
discourse on skilled labour migration because it shows the inherent limitations of and 
contradictions within skilled labour migration policy debate and subsequent policy 
formulation and implementation.  
Interestingly in the context of this narrative, only manifest code F1 is actually 
applicable to skilled labour migration; the patterns of argumentation associated with 
manifest code G1 and Y1 are primarily concerned with unskilled foreign workers. As 
                                                
48 Notwithstanding, large-scale migration of unskilled workers did occur in Germany after 1973 but these flows went 
through the legal framework of family reunion and the then liberal German asylum laws.  
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such, opposition against unskilled foreign workers represents an influential discursive 
current in the political debate on skilled labour migration debate in Germany. The 
analysis of the debate transcripts suggests that only skilled labour migration policies that 
prevent unskilled labour migration and reduce welfare dependency of migrant workers 
are likely to gain the support of the Christian Democrats and to a lesser degree of the 
Liberals in the German Bundestag and Bundesrat. The successful implementation of the 
2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration is therefore most likely linked to 
the fact that German policy makers, particularly from the CDU, felt that the legislation 
would not encourage unskilled labour migration and foster welfare dependency among 
migrants in Germany. Future skilled labour migration polices in Germany will most 
likely only be successfully implemented if reservations about migrant’s welfare access 
and unskilled migration can be reduced during the policy formation process. For the 
Christian Democrats but also for most of the other political parties this means ensuring 
labour market preference for domestic workers/voters and maintaining the appearance of 
government control over migration flows and subsequent migrant access to the German 
welfare system. 
 
5.4 – Welcome Culture & Integration of Skilled Migrant Workers  
 
The third thematic narrative encompasses models of argumentation that call for 
improved employment conditions for skilled migrant professionals in Germany, 
specifically a more welcoming attitude towards migrants on the part of the German state, 
German employers, and the German population (manifest code X3). The seventh policy 
measure  (see appendix A) of the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration 
alludes to such improvements and references a number of barriers and mechanisms that 
need to be changed or abolished altogether in order to make Germany a more attractive 
place to live and to work for foreign professionals. For example, as part of the 2009 
Action Programme, spouses of skilled workers from outside the EU are not required to 
prove basic German language skills anymore in order to receive a spousal residence 
permit, which was necessary under the previous rules. The Action Programme also calls 
for improvements in the state’s recognition of foreign work credentials, which will be 
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discussed in more detail in section 5.6. There is also mention of new initiatives against 
racism and discrimination at the workspace as well as in public spaces.  
The analysis of the narrative shows that German policy makers attempt to 
promote the idea of a “Welcome Culture” among ordinary Germans in order to show 
prospective migrant professionals that they and their families are welcome in country. 
 
187. Session, the 13. November 2008 
Hartfrid Wolff  (FDP): 
Whom do we want to invite to Germany? Who can promote our society? For these, we 
need a welcome culture that will make it easier for highly qualified and skilled professionals 
to make a decision in favour of Germany. 
 
119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Dr. Michael Bürsch (SPD): 
Psychological reasons are calling for a further opening up [of the labour market], and in my 
opinion we need courage to show cosmopolitanism and to point out that we accept 
immigration and want our country to be a country of open borders. 
 
There appears to be awareness among German policymakers that migration policy and 
labour market outcomes are not the sole determining factor promoting skilled labour 
migration to Germany. German policy makers realize that migrants, particularly skilled 
professionals, want to feel welcome in the host society. According to a number of 
parliamentary representatives, cosmopolitanism, tolerance, and general openness are 
some of the attributes that a society needs to display if it wishes to attract skilled migrant 
professionals to its labour market. Green Party MdB Kai Gehring speaks of so-called 
soft-factors that are instrumental for encouraging skilled labour migration and these are 
not necessarily linked to specific labour market conditions or immigration policy 
frameworks. 
 
119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Kai Gehring (Green Party): 
This shows that the so-called "soft" location factors have become quite firm in the 
meantime. Tolerance is a decisive requirement for talents and technology. Social stability, 
family-friendliness and cultural and social variety are compulsory for creativity and 
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innovation in this country. 
 
These statements suggest that skilled labour migration and associated policies are not 
merely conceptualized by German policy makers alongside economic criteria and notions 
of economic utility. There is a realization that the migrant’s perception of Germany as a 
place to live, work, and potentially raise a family is also a determining factor within the 
global competition over skilled professionals. It shows that German policy makers do not 
solely conceptualize skilled foreign professionals as “Homos Economicus” but also view 
them as social actors that are looking for a stable and welcoming social environment for 
themselves and their families (Ley, 2003). Beaverstock (1994, p. 326) notes that aside 
from higher wages skilled migrant professionals are attracted to global cities such as 
London or New York because they offer certain cultural facilities and amenities to 
international elites. German policy makers appear to have recognized that the same can 
be applied to nation-states. A country that provides a certain quality of life and 
cosmopolitanism in conjunction with adequate employment opportunities will more 
likely be able to attract skilled workers from abroad.     
  Other significant factors determining the German labour markets attractiveness 
towards skilled migrant professionals, at least from the policy maker’s viewpoint, are 
linked to family unification and associated residence rights.  
 
133. Session, the 13. December 2007 
Priska Hinz (Green Party): 
It is also vital that the federal government changes the legislation for foreign residents in a 
way to make it easier for skilled professionals to seek employment in Germany and bring 
their families along. 
 
163. Session, the 29. May 2008 
Dr Michael Bürsch (SPD): 
If we want to be an open society and bring highly qualified and skilled workers to Germany, 
we have to communicate clearly that they and their families are welcome in Germany. 
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This shows that German policy makers do not necessarily conceptualize skilled labour 
migration as a movement of individual workers but rather as a movement of families and 
consequently policy frameworks need to account for this. 
In a Bundestag debate on the German-Indian Academic Exchange, Christian 
Democrat MdB Marcus Weinberg suggests the career planning of skilled migrant 
professionals, particularly scientists, is profoundly shaped by long-term residence 
prospects.  
 
133. Session, the 13. December 2007 
Marcus Weinberg  (CDU/CSU): 
Germany will only then be attractive for Indian scientists when they can obtain the option 
for long-term residence and employment opportunities. 
 
According to this, countries that are unwilling to grant long-term or permanent residence 
rights to migrant professional are less likely to attract skilled foreign professionals. 
However, Boucher (2008, p.1466) states that ‘developed states generally do not want 
more legal permanent migration’. While Boucher’s assessment relates to debates about 
unskilled immigration in Germany, in the context of skilled labour migration German 
policy makers are aware that long-term residence prospects promote skilled labour 
migration to Germany. In fact skilled migrant professionals coming to Germany are given 
indefinite residence right as part of the 2009 Action Programme. 
German policy makers appear to be aware that the refusal to grant long-term 
residence prospects and labour market access for spouses will likely deter prospective 
skilled professionals from taking up employment in Germany. At the same time, a society 
that is unwelcoming to migrants and their families will equally fail to attract skilled 
foreign workers. While the Welcome Culture narrative is not as prominently featured 
within the political discourse on skilled labour migration as some of the other narratives, 
it nevertheless shows that German policy makers appear to have realized that labour 
migration policies based on purely economic and labour market considerations alone are 
not a guarantee for successful skilled labour recruitment. The analysis and discussion of 
the interview data in chapter six reveals that political debate over Welcome Culture in 
Germany is closely intertwined with ongoing political debate on immigrant integration 
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5.5 – Income Threshold for Skilled Migrant Professionals 
  
The debate on income thresholds for skilled migrant workers constitutes a 
prominent narrative within the political discourse on skilled labour migration in Germany 
between 2005 and 2009. One of the key policy measures of the 2009 Action Programme 
is the reduction of the minimum income that skilled migrant professionals need to earn in 
order to qualify for a settlement permit in Germany. The 2009 Action Programme on 
Skilled Labour Migration states that:  
 
In order to strengthen Germany in the international competition over highly 
qualified skilled workers, the minimum income threshold for issuing a settlement 
permit to highly skilled workers, which ensures a permanent right of residence 
right from the start, will be lowered from double the income ceiling for assessing 
contributions to a statutory health insurance fund (currently ! 86.400) to the 
income ceiling for assessing contributions to a general pension fund in the 
western federal states which is currently !63.600. 
 
Prior to 2009 third country nationals had to earn an annual salary of 86.400 Euros 
in order to qualify for a settlement permit in Germany. The 2009 Action Programme 
reduces this amount to !63.600. The income threshold does not constitute an arbitrary 
monetary value nor is it linked average salaries earned by skilled workers in Germany. 
Instead the income threshold is based on the social insurance contribution rates in 
Germany. The previous income threshold of !86.400 was calculated based on double the 
income ceiling for assessing contributions to statutory health insurance fund while the 
new income threshold of !63.600 is calculated based on the income ceiling for assessing 
contributions to a general pension fund for the western federal states.  
 The narrative consists of two manifest codes that embody the two prevailing 
viewpoints and associate models of argumentations in relation to income thresholds for 
skilled migrant workers. Manifest code X.2.1 encompasses models of argumentation that 
call for reduction of the income threshold for skilled workers while the models of 
argumentation linked to manifest code X.2.2 state that the income threshold should not be 
reduced any further and the existing (pre-2009) legislation is sufficient. Figures 5.5 and 
5.6 below show the distribution of identified manifest codes and associated models of 
argumentation among representatives of the political parties in Bundestag and Bundesrat. 
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Figure 5.5 – Bundestag: Skilled Workers Income Threshold   
 
Figure 5.6 – Bundesrat: Skilled Workers Income Threshold 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, both opposition Liberal and Greens in the Bundestag claim that 
existing income thresholds for skilled migrant workers are too high and call for 
reductions. The Social Democrats also overwhelmingly support reductions of existing 
income threshold levels while the Christian Democrats appear to be convinced that 
existing levels are sufficient and do not need to be changed. The political fault line over 
the income threshold for foreign workers does not lie between the government and the 
opposition; instead it lies between the two governing parties. The Links Party is notably 
absent in the political debate over income thresholds for skilled migrant professionals. 
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This absence is possibly linked to the prevailing viewpoint among the party’s 
representatives that immigration policies should not be based on considerations of 
economic utility and therefore they did not participate in the debate over income 
thresholds for skilled foreign professionals. 
 Interestingly, Figure 5.6 shows that in the Bundesrat debate on income thresholds 
for migrant professionals a majority of Christian Democrat representatives from the 
federals states favour a lower income threshold. Yet a number of CDU representatives in 
the Bundesrat consider the existing income threshold levels as sufficient. This suggests 
that there is a lack of political consensus among Christian Democrat representatives in 
the Bundesrat on the issue as well as a difference of opinion over income thresholds 
between the CDU MdB’s in the Bundestag and CDU federal state representatives in the 
Bundesrat.  
 The qualitative analysis of the income threshold narrative reveals that the Social 
Democrats in Bundestag are strong proponents for lowering the income threshold for 
skilled foreign workers and if they could have had their way, the new income threshold 
would be much lower than !63.600. 
 
Bundestag:163. Session, the 29. May 2008 
Dr. Michael Bürsch (SPD): 
There were a number of Social Democrats - some are currently sitting in this room - that 
were of the same opinion and were even trying to lower the minimum income threshold to 
maybe !45.000 and not !60.000. This was, as it sometimes happens in politics, at a 
certain time with a certain player at the table, impossible to negotiate. 
 
With “certain players” MdB Bürsch most certainly refers to his Christian Democrat 
coalition partners and their unwillingness to lower the income threshold. CDU MdB 
Reinhard Grindel’s counterargument is that the Social Democrats and Christian 
Democrats supported the changes regarding income threshold together and that both 
coalition partners agreed on the current level of !63.600. 
 
Bundestag:163. Session, the 29. May 2008 
Reinhard Grindel (CDU/CSU): 
Can you confirm that we - and not in the last but in this current legislative period - the 
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CDU/CSU had been ready to change the immigration law in order to grant young, highly 
qualified entry-level applicants access to the German labour market by lowering the 
minimum income threshold to !60.000 and that not only one but the entire Social 
Democrat faction agreed to this? Where were your suggestions [during the debate] to 
change anything in regards to [migrant’s] access to the labour market? 
 
Social Democrat MdB Rüdiger Veit states the new income threshold may not be perfect 
but most certainly represents an improvement from the previous level. 
 
Bundestag:179. Session, the 25. September 2008 
Rüdiger Veit (SPD): 
... we don't know exactly if !64.000 s the correct number. Already during the hearing of 
the immigration law - I think it took place in May 2007 - we have heard from industry that 
the old threshold of !86.000 was much too high and inefficient in practice. 
 
As for the opposition parties, the Free Liberals are critical of the old income 
threshold levels because they believe that most German employers, particularly small and 
medium sized enterprises, cannot afford to pay such high salaries and therefore will not 
be able to hire suitable skilled foreign workers.  
 
Bundestag: 94. Session, the 26. April 2007 
Hartfrid Wolff (FDP): 
The minimum income threshold for foreign specialists and executive employees with 
professional experience is way too high, especially for small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Self-employed entrepreneurs must also be better enabled to invest in 
Germany. 
 
After the grand coalition government announced that the minimum income threshold 
would be reduced to !63.600, the Liberals continued to maintain that the reduction did 
not go far enough and demanded further reductions.  
 
Bundestag:187. Session, the 13. November 2008 
Hartfrid Wolff (FDP): 
The lowering of the minimum income threshold does not go far enough... This new 
income threshold is still too high and it is harming the German high technology market as 
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well as our small and medium-sized enterprises. 
  
While MdB Wolff characterizes both the previous and the new minimum income 
thresholds for skilled migrant professionals as detrimental to employers and German 
businesses, he does not provide an alternative income threshold level. The Greens also 
neglect to provide an alternative income threshold and only use it to criticize the overall 
government policy in response to skilled labour migration. 
 
Bundestag:187. Session, the 13. November 2008 
Josef Philip Winkler (Green Party): 
And after all, emigration rates in Germany remarkably high, especially among the group 
of highly qualified professionals. The steps taken by the grand coalition against this trend 
are half-hearted. This is especially true in relation to the minimum income threshold for 
highly qualified professionals or the minimum investment sum for self-employed 
entrepreneurs. 
  
Bundestag:119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Dr. Thea Dückert (Green Party): 
We have to lower the income threshold for those wanting to come to Germany. It's a joke 
that Mrs Schavan [minister of education] who had at first done very much to prevent any 
such adjustment, but then, during the summer [of 2008], made a public call in the press 
to lower the income threshold. 
  
The Christian Democrats in the Bundestag are adamant the existing income 
thresholds are adequate and do not represent an insurmountable barrier to prospective 
migrant professionals. Particularly CDU MdB Stephan Mayer is opposed to further 
reductions to the income threshold for skilled migrant professionals. 
 
Bundestag: 187. Session, the 13. November 2008 
Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU) 
I do not believe that this income threshold of !86.400 has been an insurmountable hurdle 
for winning highly qualified professionals from abroad... If a company is unable to find a 
qualified candidate for a position demanding special skills within Germany and thus 
needs a specialist from abroad, it should pay him or her accordingly. 
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MdB Mayer believes higher income threshold levels are required because skilled migrant 
professionals are granted long-term residence rights in Germany, a privilege that should 
not be given out too easily.  
 
Bundestag:163. Session, the 29. May 2008 
Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU): 
It is i.e. possible for a high potential, who earns more than !86.400 p.a. and who comes 
from a non-EU-country, to obtain a job in Germany and even be treated to a premium 
package, meaning a settlement permit and an unlimited residence permit. This means 
that those earning more than !86.400 p.a. there is no individual priority check. 
 
Furthermore, for MdB Mayer the significance of the income threshold in relation to 
labour market access is overrated because there are alternative ways for skilled 
professionals from outside the EU to take up employment and residence in Germany.  
 
Bundestag:179. Session, the 25. September 2008 
Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU): 
The planned lowering of the minimum income threshold has already been mentioned. 
Within the debate, however, this issue receives too much attention because it is already 
possible today to employ someone from outside the EU earning less than !86.400 in 
Germany. This is the case when it has been proven that the German labour market is 
unable to provide an equally well-qualified German or EU national instead. 
 
Considering the apprehensive stance of the CDU on unskilled labour migration and 
perceived migrant welfare dependency, Mayer’s opposition to lowering income 
thresholds for skilled migrant professionals is likely based on fears that long-term 
residence permits to Germany will be given to migrants that in the medium- or long-term 
might become a social liability to the German state. 
 The qualitative analysis of the Income Threshold narrative so far has revealed 
while there is significant difference of opinion between the political parties over 
minimum income thresholds for skilled migrant professionals, there nevertheless appears 
to be consensus over the ‘Status Quo’ that income thresholds are a legitimate policy tool 
to manage the flow of skilled migrant workers. The subtle message is that only those 
migrant workers that earn specific salary levels should be given a settlement permit. The 
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entire debate revolves around the most appropriate income thresholds but there is 
virtually no debate on whether or not income thresholds themselves actually constitute an 
adequate policy tool to manage skilled labour migration. According to Germany’s 
Federal Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU), they are an appropriate and 
viable policy tool to regulate skilled labour migration to Germany. 
 
Bundestag:119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU - Federal Minister of the Interior): 
We have only introduced the income threshold because other qualifying references would 
not have yielded the desired results. Considering that it is also possible to obtain a 
permanent residence permit from the beginning, I think that the income threshold is 
justified.  
 
Schäuble does not explain what these desired results actually are. Income levels do not 
necessarily correspond to skills levels and !86.400 are far above the average entry-level 
salary for skilled university trained professionals in Germany. Since the income threshold 
prevents skilled migrant professionals from obtaining an indefinite residence permit if 
their earnings are below the stated income threshold, the purpose of income threshold is 
logically to prevent migrant workers with lower incomes from obtaining long-term 
residence rights in Germany. In the context of the earlier discussed Controlling, 
Restricting & Managing Labour Migration narrative, Christian Democrats, who are 
overwhelmingly critical of lower income thresholds, likely fear that migrants earning less 
than 86.400 Euros could potentially become a liability to the state if granted a settlement 
permits. As such the primary purpose of the income threshold is not to facilitate skilled 
labour migration but rather to act as a barrier against migrant workers in low-income 
professions and is therefore effectively a barrier against unskilled labour migration. The 
lowering of the income threshold to !63.400 ultimately reaffirms its function as a barrier 
against low-wage foreign workers.  
 The peculiar aspect of this narrative is that despite the strong Christian Democrat 
opposition in the Bundestag, the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration 
does lower the threshold by almost twenty five percent. Considering that the Christian 
Democrats appear to usually get their way in the political debate on skilled labour 
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migration and associated policy, in this particular scenario they seem to compromise with 
their coalition partners and the oppositions parties. 
  However, the analysis of the political debate in the German Bundesrat reveals 
that a number of Christian Democrat representatives from the federal states support a 
reduction of the income threshold for skilled migrant professionals. The qualitative 
analysis of Bundesrat transcripts even reveals that the Christian Democrats in the 
Bundesrat support income thresholds for skilled migrant professionals that are 
significantly below the !63.400 compromise established through the 2009 Action 
Programme on Skilled Labour Migration.  
 
Bundesrat: 851. Session, the 28. November 2008 
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Reinhart (CDU - Baden-Württemberg) 
Principally, we want to lower the income threshold for skilled workers further, that is to 
say to !53.400 p.a. instead of !63.400. This is still a barrier. The amount we are 
suggesting corresponds to an income that is twice the average annual income [in 
Germany]. 
 
Bundesrat: 835. Session, the 6. July 2007 
Uwe Schünemann (CDU - Lower-Saxony): 
The income threshold is currently set at !85.000. Considering the fact that recent 
university graduates earn an average first salary of !40.000 p.a., it is clear that we will 
not be able to improve things unless we lower the current income threshold considerably. 
From my point of view, it would actually make sense to lower it to !40.000. 
 
Some of the Christian Democrat representatives in the Bundesrat are aware that existing 
income thresholds are too high for small and medium sized enterprises.  
 
Bundesrat: 833. Session, the 11. May 2007 
Elisabeth Heister-Neumann (CDU - Lower-Saxony) 
Small and medium sized enterprises are often not able to pay the required !84.000 
annual salary for foreign specialists, which is required by the current law for a residence 
permit.  
 
Moreover, the Free Liberals, despite their opposition role in the Bundestag, are 
represented in coalition governments together with the Christian Democrats in a number 
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of federal states. Their Bundesrat representatives also call for significant reductions for 
income threshold for skilled migrant professionals. 
 
Bundesrat: 835. Session, the 6. July 2007 
Richard Drautz (FDP - Baden-Württemberg): 
Ladies and Gentlemen, I ask the federal government to present as soon as possible a 
new law that facilitates access to the German labour market for foreign professionals. It is 
our opinion that in order to accomplish this, it is necessary to lower the minimum income 
threshold for foreign professionals considerably.  
 
Bundesrat: 851. Session, the 28. November 2008 
Walter Hirche (FDP - Lower-Saxony): 
Ladies and Gentlemen, concerning the immigration of highly skilled professionals, the 
federal government is taking insufficient measures with its plan to lower the minimum 
income threshold from !84.000 to merely !63.000. It has been proposed to lower the 
immigration hurdles considerably und set the income minimum to !56.000, the double of 
the national average income of !28.000 according to the newest statistics.  
 
The Social Democrats representing the federal states in the Bundesrat are equally 
adamant on the issue and support the reduction of income thresholds for skilled foreign 
workers. 
 
Bundesrat: 833. Session, the 11. May 2007 
Dr. Ralf Stegner (SPD - Schleswig-Holstein) 
I am happy that five committees have agreed to lower the income threshold and 
consequently strengthen Germany’s position with the global economy. The state of 
Lower-Saxony suggests that an income that amounts to 150% of the contribution 
assessment ceiling of the social insurance should be sufficient: That amount is equal to 
approximately !5300 [per month]. In a second step, this amount should be further 
reduced further, for example to 100% of the contribution assessment ceiling, equivalent 
to approximately !3500 [per month].  
 
 CDU representatives Jürgen Seidel concurs that from an economic perspective 
the new income thresholds still remain too high but he appears to believe that any 
reduction from the previous level is already an improvement.    
 154 
 
Bundesrat: 853. Session, the 19. December 2008 
Jürgen Seidel (CDU - Mecklenburg-Vorpommern): 
The issue of the minimum income threshold [for skilled migrant professionals] has not 
been settled as the economists would have liked. But one has to consider -- this has also 
been a point in the discussion of the parliamentary council - that the minimum salary of 
86.400 Euros has been reduced to !63.300 Euros, which is equivalent to the contribution 
ceiling of the pension insurance. 
 
The following statement by CDU State Secretary Peter Altmaier confirms that CDU 
resistance to lowering the minimum income threshold for skilled migrant professionals is 
linked to the fact that skilled workers who enter Germany through the income threshold 
are given permanent residence rights.   
 
Bundesrat: 848. Session, the 10. October 2008 
Peter Altmaier, (CDU) Parliamentary State Secretary at the Minister of the Interior 
With this law, we will lower the minimum income threshold for highly skilled professionals 
from !86.400 to !63.000. This amount has been questioned during the public debate; 
some still consider it to be too high. The federal government, however, does not believe 
this…. because our rules are not comparable with those in the other countries of the 
European Union. ……Highly qualified workers coming to Germany obtain a permanent 
residence permit right away. In many other EU-countries, this is not the case. Because of 
this, it is important, that only those will only obtain the permanent residence permit where 
we can predict that they are capable of integrating themselves permanently in the 
German labour market without public assistance. 
 
Altmaier admits that apprehension about skilled migrant workers becoming a long-term 
liability to the German state contributes significantly to the Christian Democrat’s desire 
to maintain relatively high income thresholds for foreign workers. He seems to be under 
the impression that lower income thresholds could potentially result in migration into the 
social-welfare system. The CDU opposition to migrant’s access to social-welfare has 
already been discussed in section 5.3. 
 During the final debate in the Bundesrat before it convened to pass the 2009 
Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration, house speaker Thilo Sarrazin from the 
Social Democrats states that it was the Bundesrat that insisted that the income threshold 
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for skilled migrant professionals should be lowered.  
 
Bundesrat: 853. Session, the 19. December 2008 
Dr. Thilo Sarrazin (SPD - Berlin) 
The law is supposed to facilitate the migration process of skilled foreign professionals, 
which is in the interest of our labour market. There is a mutual consent about this among 
us all. However, the Bundesrat had the opinion that the law is not going far enough 
concerning two points: It had the opinion that the double of the average income should 
set the income threshold at which foreigners with an employment offer in Germany 
should obtain a residence permit. It defined !53.400 as the minimum limit. The Federal 
Minister of Labour was able to prove during the conciliation proceedings that the planned 
limit of !63.600 is exactly equivalent to the double income and that the Bundesrat had, as 
such, made a reference to statistically incorrect numbers. We have therefore decided that 
the limit should be !63.600. 
 
 This statement proves that the Bundesrat’s demand for a lower income threshold has 
been instrumental in overcoming or at least compensating the Christian Democrat 
resistance in the Bundestag. Considering the intense political debate in both Bundestag 
and Bundesrat, the new reduced income threshold level for skilled foreign workers is the 
most significant and controversial policy measure of the 2009 Action Programme. As 
such the income threshold and its supposed purpose warrants some additional discussion. 
 Anderson (2010, p.312) suggests that immigration control policies could be 
conceptualized as a mould aimed at constructing a certain kind of worker ‘through 
selection of legal entrants, the requiring and enforcing of certain types of employment 
relations, and the creation of institutionalized uncertainty’. The income threshold laid out 
in the 2009 Action Programme merely references minimum income levels of migrant 
workers and makes no reference to the individual’s actual professional skills. This 
suggests that German policy makers assume that a foreigner earning more than !63.600 
must be a skilled professional. At the same time this presumes that a foreigner earning 
less than !63.600 is not a skilled worker, at least not skilled enough to deserve permanent 
residence rights in Germany. The analysis of the debate on income thresholds indicates 
through that it is not necessarily about skilled professionals and their expertise or specific 
labour demand of skilled workers but rather about foreigners that are deemed deserving 
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of a settlement permit, thus permanent residence in Germany. Boucher (2008) states that 
many governments in developed countries are apprehensive about permanent settlement 
of foreign workers and instead prefer temporary migration of foreign professionals. The 
2009 Action Programme however explicitly facilitates long-term or permanent settlement 
of foreigners irrespective of their actual professional qualifications and as such the new 
income threshold is actually about providing long-term residence prospects to desirable 
high income earners. In light of the widespread opposition to migration into the social-
welfare system among conservative policy makers, the unspoken assumption is that 
individuals earning over !63,600 will likely not ever become a liability to the German 
welfare-state and therefore constitute a desirable migrant group 
 The qualitative analysis of the Income Threshold for Skilled Migrant Professional 
narrative indicates a broad support base for lowering minimum income thresholds for 
skilled migrant professionals. Yet, the Christian Democrat faction in the Bundestag falls 
into the familiar pattern in opposing this broad consensus but ultimately the support 
among state representatives in the Bundesrat including the Christian Democrats seems to 
have tipped the balance in favour of reducing the minimum income threshold for skilled 
migrant workers from !86.400 to !63.600.  
 
5.6 – Foreign Skills Accreditation 
  
This narrative encompasses models of argumentation relating to the recognition of 
foreign work credentials by state regulatory agencies and employers. The topic of non-
recognition of foreign work credentials has created large body of literature within 
migration scholarship (Girard et al., 2007; Koffman & Raghuram, 2006; Iredale, 2004; 
Bauder, 2003; Peixoto, 2001; Iredale, 1999) and the analysis of the political debate in the 
sampling period reveals that German policy makers acknowledge certain deficits on the 
part of the state and its regulatory bodies in recognizing educational credentials as well as 
work experience of foreign professionals. The 2009 Action Programme on Skilled 
Labour Migration calls for a general improvement in the employment conditions of 
skilled migrant professionals and specifically references the subject of skills recognition, 
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stating that as part of the Action Programme improvements will be made in regards to the 
official accreditation of foreign work credentials.   
The analysis of the Bundestag preceding the 2009 Action Programme indicates 
that skills recognition is a recurring theme in the political debate on skilled labour 
migration in Germany. Figure 5.7 below shows the distribution of Manifest codes linked 
to foreign work credentials (X3H1) between the five political parties represented in the 
Bundestag. It shows that models of argumentation related to statements made by 
representatives of Links Party on skills recognition and accreditations are 
disproportionately represented in this narrative. In fact, among the policy specific 
narratives the Foreign Skills Accreditation narrative is the only narrative with significant 
Links Party participation.  
 
Figure 5.7 – Bundestag: Foreign Work Credentials 
 
 
 The analysis of the models of argumentation identified within the narrative 
reveals that government and opposition parties are in agreement that comprehensive 
foreign skills recognition constitutes a widespread problem in Germany. However, while 
the 2009 Action Programme stresses the need to improve accreditation procedures in 
order to attract skilled migrant professionals to Germany, the political debate references 
for the most part those migrants already living in Germany whose educational 
attainments and technical skills have not been recognized by the official regulatory 
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bodies and who have subsequently experienced poor labour market outcomes. The 
following statements indicate that in respect to foreign skills recognition, German policy 
makers are primarily concerned with migrant workers that already live in Germany.  
 
Bundestag: 202. Session, the 29. January 2009 
Gesine Multhaupt (SPD): 
Well-qualified construction engineers are relegated to become painters, teachers work as 
cleaners and doctors work as domestic assistants or work in other sectors of the low-pay 
sector, even though they are well qualified and skilled……[Labour market] Integration 
requires a comprehensive recognition of qualifications of all migrants living in Germany.   
 
Bundestag: 169. Session, the 19. June 2008 
Sibylle Laurischk (FDP): 
The inadequate recognition of foreign work credentials is ridiculous. These to some 
degree outstanding professional qualifications that migrants bring along are not 
appreciated due to bureaucratic rules. The report estimates that 500,000 migrant 
academics are not having their degrees recognized and are forced to find work far below 
their qualifications. This is a waste of qualified knowledge, it is shameful and it contradicts 
our efforts of a comprehensive [labour market] integration policy. 
 
Bundestag: 161. Session, the 9. May 2008 
Reinhard Grindel (CDU/CSU): 
We have plenty of cab drivers in our cities but not enough doctors in our rural areas. A 
comprehensive skills upgrading program and a more flexible recognition of foreign 
credentials could help to better utilize those hidden and unused talents in our country. 
That is in the interest of everyone.   
 
These statements suggest that the main purpose of improved foreign skills accreditation 
procedures is not to facilitate further skilled labour recruitment but actually an attempt to 
mobilize and utilize existing skills potential within the domestic workforce, in this case 
resident migrant workers with foreign work credentials. This suggests that foreign skills 
recognition is closely aligned to the second narrative in which German policy makers 
show a strong preference for domestic skills mobilization over increased labour 
migration. German policy makers are seemingly aware of some of the restrictions, 
barriers, and limitations faced by skilled migrant professionals already residing in 
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Germany and the resulting Brain Waste. There is recognition among policy makers that 
the Brain Waste caused by skilled migrant professionals working below their professional 
qualifications amounts to a poor utilization of domestic labour resources.  
Some left wing politicians go even so far as to call for a legal right for migrants to 
have their skills assessed and recognized by German regulatory bodies. 
 
Bundestag: 202. Session, the 29. January 2009 
Sevim Dagdelen (DIE LINKE): 
We know of the problem. The attempt to enter the German labour market leads to a dead 
end for many migrants with foreign work credentials…..We need a system with the legal 
right for recognition, categorization, and official accreditation of [foreign] degrees.  
 
Bundestag: 202. Session, the 29. January 2009 
Priska Hinz (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN): 
What we need is a legal right for migrants to have their credentials recognized though an 
accreditation process so they at least have a chance to have their skills recognized and 
be integrated. We need an up-to-date qualification system for those with foreign degrees 
that may need to upgrade their skills. 
 
Within the context of this narrative, the Links Party and its representative Sevim 
Dagdelen are the vanguard of skills accreditation debate and MdB Dagdelen repeatedly 
calls on the government to improve the situation of migrants with foreign work 
credentials because non-recognition culminates in disenfranchisement of migrant 
workers. According to MdB Dagdelen, professional skills recognition and official 
accreditation constitute a basic human right. 
 
Bundestag: 179. Session the 25. September 2008 
Sevim Dagdelen (DIE LINKE): 
You need to recognize the biographical credentials of the over 500.000 people who have 
acquired their academic degrees at a foreign institution and that have not been recognized 
in Germany.  
 
Bundestag: 161. Session, the 9. May 2008 
Sevim Dagdelen (DIE LINKE): 
There are approximately half a million people in Germany that have gained their work 
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qualifications abroad, but whose biographical credentials are not recognized within our 
country. As such I can only support Mrs Böhmer [Federal Migration representative] in her 
statement that there is a hidden treasure buried here and that the Federal Education 
Conference needs to create a framework for easier recognition of foreign work credentials. 
Russian doctors should not have to work as cleaning ladies and Iranian engineers should 
not have to work as caretakers. The biographical credentials of these people have to be 
recognized and should not be ignored anymore  
  
Bundestag: 123. Session, the 8. November 2007 
Sevim Dagdelen (DIE LINKE): 
We demand the immediate recognition of foreign degrees; otherwise we are depriving 
migrants of their biographical credentials.  
 
MdB Dagdelen statements suggest that the Links Party’s adamant support for foreign 
skills recognition has less to do with facilitating future skilled labour migration to 
Germany but rather improving labour market prospects of Germany’s existing migrant 
community who are excluded from the labour market due to the lack of proper skills 
recognition. This is not surprising considering the critical stance of the Links Party 
representatives towards the recruitment of skilled foreigners and immigration policies 
based on economic utility. In the context of skilled labour migration debate, the Links 
Party displays preference towards domestic workers who have been marginalized within 
the national labour market, including foreigners residing in Germany.  
As for the other opposition parties, Liberal MdB Sibylle Laurischk sees a certain 
social component intertwined with foreign credential recognition because it would signal 
migrants already in the country and those wishing to migrate there, that they are welcome 
in Germany and thus help promote skilled labour migration to Germany. MdB Laurischk 
stresses the need for a legal mechanism that enables migrant workers to have their skills 
and expertise recognized by the state. 
 
Bundestag: 202. Session, the 29. January 2009 
Sibylle Laurischk (FDP): 
The failure to recognize foreign work and academic credentials leads to humiliation. We 
do not have a system in place to support people whose educational qualifications have 
not been recognized. Just because their professional and educational credentials do not 
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exactly match our standards, it does not mean they are unskilled…….All migrants need 
to have a legal right to have their educational qualifications assessed and combine this 
with a plan that shows the way to the desired level of qualification. That would be a 
paradigm change and signal towards migrants that their qualifications are welcome here.  
 
Even conservative policy makers are seemingly aware of the barriers that skilled 
migrant professionals face in the German labour market in relation to skills recognition 
but are worried that professional standards could be lowered in order to accommodate 
foreign professionals.  
 
Bundestag: 202. Session, the 29. January 2009 
Marcus Weinberg (CDU/CSU): 
There are still problems. The professional qualifications, educational degrees, and 
professional credentials that were acquired abroad by migrants are not or not easily 
recognized in the Federal Republic…..The standards cannot be lowered. It does not help 
the migrants if, in respect to the standards, they will be worse off than before. 
 
MdB Weinberg’s statement can be interpreted as an attempt to maintain the privileged 
position of domestically trained and educated workers in Germany. Girard et al. (2007) 
states that licensing regulations for engineers in the Canadian province of Ontario are 
implemented at the insistence of the provincial engineering association in order to 
maintain the privileged labour market access of domestically trained engineers. Under the 
guise of maintaining high professional standards, regulatory regimes within skilled 
professions such as engineering systematically deskill foreign professionals and 
deliberately limit their access to high skill professions. Iredale (1999) and Mattoo et al 
(2010) argue that state institutions deliberately maintain barriers within skilled 
professions in the name of professional as well as health and safety standards in order to 
maintain political support of key economic stakeholders such as professional 
associations. Moreover, by ensuring labour market preference of locally trained 
professionals, policy makers minimize the risk of voter alienation.     
   The debate in Bundestag on the issue of skills recognition shows that German 
policy makers across the political spectrum are aware that skills recognition plays a 
prominent role within the policy framework of skilled migration. Peixoto (2001) states 
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that skills recognition is crucial to enabling mobility of skilled workers but the political 
debate in Germany over skills accreditation suggests that in the context of debate over 
foreign skills recognition, Germany policy makers, government, and opposition alike are 
less concerned in promoting labour migration to Germany than with utilizing the existing 
professional work and educational credentials of migrants already living in Germany. 
Recognizing the educational attainments of migrants already residing in Germany would 
therefore reduce the need for further skilled labour migration and would not contradict 
the acknowledged policy maker objective of prompting preferential labour market access 
for unemployed or semi-skilled domestic workers. In fact, recognizing professional skills 
and education attainments of migrants already in Germany would likely be cheaper and 
faster than upgrading skills of unskilled and semi-skilled domestic workers. As such 
foreign skills accreditation would reduce the need to recruit skilled workers from abroad 
and consequently reduce the risk of voter alienation and electoral backlash, particularly 
for the Christian Democrats. This would explain the relative consensus between the 
political parties in the German Bundestag on the issue of foreign skills recognition.  
 
5.7 – Foreign University Graduates 
  
 A significant number of policy measures in the 2009 Action Programme on 
Skilled Labour Migration reference foreign university graduates and aim to ease 
residence restrictions for them. The 2009 policy targets three different types of post-
secondary graduates and removes some restrictions in regards to labour market access. 
The first group (manifest code X1.1) are academics from the EU-8 +2 countries in 
Eastern Europe.49 In relation to the EU-8 +2 graduates the Action Programme states the 
following. 
 
 Open the labour market for university graduates from the new EU Member States 
by waiving the priority check (screening to determine whether other job 
candidates with priority are available to fill the position). The labour market will 
                                                
49 EU-8 countries are the EU countries that joined the EU in 2004 and they are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. The +2 refers to Rumania and Bulgaria, which joined the EU in 
2007. Germany and most of the old EU members states implemented restriction on labour mobility for citizens from 
the EU-8+2 countries.  
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be opened to university graduates (with a degree from a university or a university 
of applied sciences) from the new EU Member States. 
 
As part of the 2009 Action Programme (see section 5.8) the derogation of freedom of 
movement for citizens of the new EU member states is extended for another two years 
but the policy effectively abolishes existing labour market restrictions such as priority 
checks for university graduates from the new EU member states. Essentially university 
graduates from the EU-8+2 countries enjoy the same privileges in the German labour 
market as citizens from the old EU member states.  
The second group of post-secondary graduates referenced in the 2009 policy are 
academics and graduates from third countries and their families (manifest code X1.2). 
They however, unlike the EU-8 +2 academics, will still be subject to priority checks if 
they wish to take up employment in Germany. In relation to graduates from third 
countries, the Action Programme implements the following. 
 
Open the labour market for university graduates from third countries (with 
priority check) and for their family members. In addition, the labour market will 
be opened for all university graduates (with a degree from a university or a 
university of applied sciences) from third countries. However, in order to avoid 
adverse effects on the employment opportunities of domestic workers, the relevant 
authorities will continue to check whether other domestic job seekers who are 
entitled to preference are available to fill the particular position (priority check) 
and whether the particular foreign national will be hired under equally 
favourable terms as comparable German workers. The existing arrangement for 
university graduates from third countries who earned their degree in Germany 
will remain unchanged. 
 
In essence the Action Programme maintains existing labour market restrictions for 
graduates from third countries. Should a third country national wish to take up 
employment in Germany, the local employment agency is required to undertake a priority 
check to determine whether there are suitable German or EU candidates for the position. 
Moreover, the policy stipulation also aims to ensure that third country nationals are 
employed under circumstances congruent to similar qualified German workers. The 
priority check policy can either be interpreted as attempt to prevent the deskilling of 
migrant workers or to prevent wage dumping by employers at the expense of domestic 
workers. Its main purpose however is to maintain the privileged labour market access for 
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German and EU worker.   
The third group of post-secondary graduates that is given preferential access to 
the German labour market are students from German schools abroad (manifest code 
X.1.3) because of their supposed in-depth knowledge of the German language and 
culture. Like the EU-8 +2 academics, this group will also have their priority checks 
waived if they wish to take up employment in Germany within their respective field of 
study and training.  
 The analysis of the debate transcripts of the German Bundestag and Bundesrat 
identified a fourth group of university graduates that is not included on the 2009 Action 
Programme on Skilled Labour Migration but nonetheless represents a prominent subject 
in the political debate in both houses. This group includes foreign nationals residing in 
Germany on student visas that have graduated from German universities (manifest code 
X.1.4).50  
 Figures 5.8 and 5.9 below show that this last group is the subject of significant 
debate in both houses. The other groups that are subject to debate, although on a marginal 
scale, are the academics from the EU-8 +2 countries (Manifest Code X1.1) and 
academics from third countries (X1.2).  
Figure 5.8 – Bundestag: Foreign University Graduates 
 
 
                                                
50 Since October 2007 foreign graduates from German universities are granted a one-year residence permit to find 
employment in their particular field of study and they are exempt from any priority check (Faist, 2008). This explains 
their noted absence in the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration. The cross party consensus on this 
issue in both Bundesrat and Bundestag appears to have fast-tracked that legislation. 
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The easing on labour market restriction for graduates from German Schools abroad 
(manifest code X.1.3) does not appear to be subject to political debate at all. Both figures 
also show that the Green Party and the Links Party do not engage themselves in this 
particular debate 
 
Figure 5.9 – Bundesrat: Foreign University Graduates 
 
 
The qualitative analysis of the Foreign University Graduates narrative reveals that 
the issue of foreign students graduating from German post-secondary institutions 
dominates the political debate on foreign university graduates in both houses. The three 
groups (Manifest Code X.1.1, X1.2, X.1.3) that are specifically referenced in the 2009 
Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration are virtually absent in the debate in both 
houses, which suggests that there is little disagreement between the two governing parties 
as well as between the coalition government and the opposition over post-graduation 
labour market access for these migrant groups. Moreover, the political debate on foreign 
students is exclusively restricted to post-study labour market access of foreign graduates 
and there is virtually no mention of promoting foreigner’s access to post-secondary 
education in Germany. However, since education related matters are the responsibility of 
the individual German Länder (federal states), promoting international students’ access to 
post-secondary education does not fall within the jurisdiction of federal policy makers in 
Germany (Borkert & Bosswick, 2007).  
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Interestingly, while both Social Democrats and Christian Democrats support the 
extension of derogation from freedom of movement for citizens from the new EU 
member states, they also support the exemption of university graduates and academics 
from the EU-8 +2 countries from this rule. 
 
Bundestag: 217. Session, the 23. April 2009 
Josip Juratovic (SPD): 
The new Labour migration law that has been in effect since January 1st 2009 enables 
academics from the new EU member states to access our labour market. Since the 
beginning of this year, the mandatory priority check for these nationals has been lifted, 
which makes the employment of academics from the new EU countries much easier. 
 
Bundestag: 179. Sessionthe25. September 2008 
Peter Altmaier, (CDU - Parl. State Secretary at the Minister of the Interior): 
Finally we will ensure that academics from the new EU member states will be exempt 
from the mandatory priority check if they wish to access the German labour market. 
 
This supports the notion that the extension of derogation from freedom of movement for 
citizens from the new EU member states (as discussed in section 5.8) primarily serves to 
protect the lower segments of German labour market from perceived cheap, unskilled 
migrant labour from eastern Europe (Favell, 2008). The very same MdBs that support the 
extension of derogation from freedom of movement for EU-8 +2 citizens applaud the 
removal of priority checks and effective freedom of movement of academics from the 
very same countries of origin. The Action Programme has effectively created a policy 
framework that distinguishes between EU-8+2 citizens with post-graduate degrees and 
presumably unskilled EU8+2 citizens. The former have unrestricted labour market access 
in Germany while the latter continue to be barred from the German labour market. In that 
respect the 2009 Action Programme embodies the familiar pattern of facilitating skilled 
labour migration and restricting unskilled labour migration but it also represents a 
significant paradigm shift in regards to internal EU migration (Piper, 2009; Delanty, 
2008). While the legal framework guiding internal mobility and labour market access 
between old EU member states does not distinguish between skilled and unskilled labour 
migrants, the 2009 Action Programme can be interpreted as an attempt by German policy 
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makers to distinguish between useful, university educated EU-8+2 citizens and less 
useful, unskilled EU-8+2 citizens.  
 The other group of university-educated migrants that is subject to political debate 
in the context of skilled and highly skilled labour migration are non-EU students that 
attend German universities or hold degrees from German universities. Both the Christian 
Democrats and Social Democrats wish to ease barriers for this specific group and try to 
encourage foreign graduates to remain in Germany after graduation. For Christian 
Democrat MdB Stephan Mayer, the fact the foreign graduates from German universities 
are familiar with German culture and society warrants their exemption from the priority 
check system. 
 
Bundestag: 119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU): 
..students that graduated from a post-secondary institution in Germany have shown an 
interest in Germany, in German society, and the German labour market, will be exempt 
from the mandatory priority check by employment agencies. 
 
 Social Democrat MdB Katja Mast also supports the removal of labour market 
restrictions for foreign graduates in Germany because of their potential contribution to 
regional economic development.  
 
Bundestag: 119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Katja Mast (SPD): 
The goal is clear: More foreign students in Pforzheim mean better economic links and 
ties for the entire region and therefore more employment in the future. The previous 
speakers have already mentioned that the grand coalition improves the policy framework 
for skilled foreign workers as foreigners that completed their studies in Germany will be 
given easier access to the labour market. This creates synergy for further employment 
opportunities. 
 
MdB Mast believes that improved labour market access of foreign students following 
their graduation will create positive synergy for local and regional economies, 
particularly in those cities and regions with universities. This assessment compliments 
Samers view (2010, p. 79) according to which “governments recognize that international 
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students in engineering and the sciences in particular can provide the seed of innovation 
and patent creation, which are central to the perception, reality, or rhetoric of global 
neo-liberal landscape of economic competition”.      
 The opposition Liberals also believe that foreign students should be given the 
opportunity to remain in Germany after graduating from university.  
 
Bundestag:  163. Session, the 29. May 2008 
Hartfrid Wolff (FDP): 
Foreign graduates from third countries should upon graduation be able to easily and un-
bureaucratically start working in Germany.  
 
The Liberals consider it poor economic policy on the part of the state to educate 
foreigners at taxpayers’ expense and then insist that they leave Germany after graduation.  
 
Bundestag:  119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Sibylle Laurischk (FDP): 
We should consider the costs for country when well-educated and publicly subsidized 
trained people leave the country. That is macro-economic nonsense. 
 
The statement implies that foreign graduates from German universities are 
conceptualized as an investment by the German state and should therefore be retained for 
the benefit of the German economy. However, Liberal MdB Hartfried Wolff laments that 
the mandatory priority check for foreign graduates in Germany make it impossible for 
German companies to utilize this home-grown skilled labour potential.  
 
Bundestag: 103. Session, the 14. June 2007 
Hartfrid Wolff (FDP): 
I don’t understand why foreign graduates from our national universities, whom we 
invested into, cannot find employment because of the priority check system. First we 
invest into those bright heads and then our companies are not allowed to employ them. 
 
The debate on domestically educated foreign graduates and their subsequent labour 
market access also occurs in the German Bundesrat. In particular, the Christian 
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Democrats support labour market access and residence rights for foreign students once 
they graduate from a German university. 
 
Bundesrat: 835. Session , the 6. July 2007 
Dr. Michael Freytag (CDU - Hamburg): 
Students from outside the EU that graduate after their three years studies should have 
full labour market access…… 
Hamburg stands at the position that we should not only recruit foreign bright heads to 
study in our country but also make sure that they can remain here after successfully 
completing their studies here…. 
We know that very few of the foreign graduates from our universities return to their 
countries of origin. Most migrate to countries with a more welcoming culture, especially 
into those countries that Germany is direct competition with.   
 
Representative Freytag appears the be aware that unless foreign graduates are given long-
term employment and residence prospects, Germany’s global competitors will likely be 
the ones benefiting from this domestically trained skilled labour potential. By stressing 
that domestically educated foreign graduates are unlikely to go to home to their countries 
of origin anyway and instead prefer to stay in countries that can offer them proper career 
opportunities, Freytag strikes out against those who would criticise Germany for retaining 
foreign graduates from developing countries that are in desperate need of skilled workers 
themselves (Skeldon, 2008). Since the German state cannot force foreign graduates to 
move back to their country of origin and migrant graduates prefer to stay in economically 
advanced countries that can offer them career prospects, the German state may as well 
provide possibilities for them to legally stay in Germany. In light of the global 
competition over the brightest heads, debates over potential Third World Brain Drain are 
not relevant from a policy maker’s perspective. The bottom line, there is a strong 
economic rationale to retain domestically educated migrant graduates for the national 
labour market. Christian Democrat representative Uwe Schüneman echoes this sentiment.  
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Bundesrat: 835. Session , the 6. July 2007 
Uwe Schünemann (CDU - Lower-Saxony): 
Another issue that I cannot understand is the issue of foreign graduates. We need to 
improve the labour market situation of those we invested in with our taxes. Anything else 
would be beyond logic. 
 
The Liberal representative Andreas Pinkwart agrees with the Christian Democrats in the 
Bundesrat that preventing foreign graduates from German universities to access the 
German labour market is a waste of German taxpayers’ money and makes little economic 
sense. 
 
Bundesrat: 835. Session , the 6. July 2007 
Prof. Dr. Andreas Pinkwart (FDP - North Rhine-Westphalia): 
It is ludicrous that foreign students, who have studied here at the expense of German 
taxpayers, are lost to the international labour market, merely because their entry level 
salary has to be twice high as the national average.    
 
Again, there is the assumption that Germany’s international competitors will benefit from 
Germany’s failure to allow full labour market access to domestically educated foreign 
graduates. This suggests that the global competition over skilled workers is a contributing 
factor in persuading German policy makers to improve the labour market prospect and 
residence rights of domestically educated foreigners.  
 To conclude the discussion of the Foreign University Graduates narrative, the 
analysis indicates that the economic rationale over the costs of educating foreign students 
in Germany has effectively created a cross-party census in both Bundestag and Bundesrat 
that it is in the best national interest to retain foreign graduates for the domestic labour 
market. There is a perception that if foreign students are barred from the German labour 
market, they will simply move to another industrialized country and seek employment 
there. By restricting labour market access to migrant graduates, the German state 
effectively pays to train the skilled labour force of their international competitors.    
 It is worth mentioning that there is no evidence of German policymakers 
questioning the rationale of allowing foreigners to study in Germany at the taxpayers’ 
expense. While in countries like the United Kingdom post-secondary student migration is 
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often conceptualized as a wealth creating process in which international students have 
become a lucrative market for UK post-secondary educational institutions (Findley, 
2010), the analysis of the political debate in Germany suggests that national policy 
makers primarily conceptualize international students and foreign graduates as available 
skilled labour potential invested in by national taxpayers (Samers, 2010, p. 79.).   
Moreover, the discussion of the narrative reveals that the political debate on 
foreign university graduates is for the most part exclusively about granting labour market 
access for migrant graduates who have completed their studies in Germany and not 
necessarily about attracting migrants with foreign educational credentials. Policy makers’ 
preference for domestically educated migrants may be linked to the fact that  domestic 
degrees conform to professional standards of German labour market whereas foreign 
degrees are not necessarily comparable to German standards. According to Mattoo et al. 
(2008, p. 268) ‘individuals educated in certain countries are better equipped overcome 
[labour market] barriers, mainly due to greater compatibility of education and 
professionals standards’. On the other hand, political debates on promoting the 
recruitment of foreign post-secondary students are likely not to occur in either Bundestag 
or Bundesrat because education policy including post-secondary education falls into the 
legal jurisdiction of the individual federal states in Germany. The federal government and 
federal policy makers have therefore little say on these matters. 
 Since neither government nor opposition parties in the Bundestag or Bundesrat 
oppose post-study residence rights and labour market access of foreign graduates, it 
suggests that they do not constitute an undesired migrant group. At the same time the 
absence of any significant and insightful debate on the three migrant graduate groups 
(Manifest Code X.1.1, X.1.2, X.1.3) referenced in the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled 
Labour Migration suggests that post-graduation labour market access of foreign students 
educated in Germany does not constitute a significant topic within the political debate on 
skilled labour migration in Germany.  
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5.8 – Continued EU-8 +2 Restriction 
  
The Continued EU-8 +2 Restriction narrative encompasses models of 
argumentation that either support or oppose extending the derogation from freedom of 
movement for citizens of the new EU member states in Eastern Europe. Originally 
citizens from the EU-8 countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia) + 2 (Bulgaria and Romania) were supposed to be granted 
freedom of movement and full labour market access to Germany on May 1st 2009  (EU-8) 
and January 1st 2011 (Rumania & Bulgaria) but as part of the 2009 Action Programme, 
the German government extended this limitation of derogation from freedom of 
movement for another two years. As a result the citizens from the new EU members that 
joined in 2004 (EU-8) will not have full labour market access until May 1st 2011 while 
the countries that joined in 2007 (Romania and Bulgaria) will have to wait until January 
1st 2014.   
 The extension of derogation from freedom of movement for the new EU member 
states represents a peculiar aspect of the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour 
Migration. While the overall policy intent is supposedly to encourage and facilitate 
skilled labour migration to Germany, the extension of derogation from freedom of 
movement for citizens from the new EU member states effectively bares migration from 
the new EU member states to Germany. The extension itself is not that surprising 
considering the widespread and longstanding apprehension among German politicians 
and voters about perceived cheap eastern European workers (Caviedes, 2010; Favell, 
2008; Krieger & Fernandez, 2006) but the fact that the extension is part of a policy 
initiative that aims to attract skilled foreigner to Germany is somewhat startling.  
In light of the fact that the 2009 Action Programme effectively grants full labour 
market access to university graduates from the EU8 +2 member states (see section 5.7), 
the extension of derogation from freedom of movement effectively only applies to 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers from the EU8 +2 member states. Therefore the Action 
Programme’s policy measure on EU-8+2 migration is a prime example of an immigration 
policy that provides labour market access to skilled professionals while at the same time 
limiting labour market access to unskilled foreign workers. Even though mobility 
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restrictions on EU-8+2 citizens will eventually be lifted (as of May 1st 2011 EU-8 
citizens enjoy full labour market access in Germany) the policy measures of the 2009 
Action Programme can be interpreted as an attempt to at least temporarily reconfigure 
internal EU labour migration and distinguish between skilled EU nationals and unskilled 
EU nationals with the former being a desired migrant group while latter represents a 
undesired migrant category.  
The models of argumentation relating to the extension of derogation from 
freedom of movement for the new EU member states are categorized alongside two 
different manifest codes. The models of argumentation supporting the extension are 
coded as X4.1 while those opposing the extension are coded X4.2. Figure 5.10 below 
illustrates the distribution of manifest codes between the political parties represented in 
the Bundestag. There appears to be a clear-cut division between the government and the 
opposition parties over the extension of derogation from freedom of movement for 
workers from the new EU member states. The Christian Democrats and Social Democrats 
support the extension while the three opposition parties are unanimously opposed to 
extend of derogation from freedom of movement. 
 
Figure 5.10 – Bundestag: Continued EU-8 + 2 Restriction  
 
 
This suggests that the two years extension of derogation from freedom of 
movement for EU-8 +2 citizens was included in the 2009 Action Program on Skilled 
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Labour Migration with the support of both governing parties and in defiance of the 
opposition parties.  
The analysis of the individual statements identified within the narrative provides 
some context in regards to policy makers’ motives and their respective support or 
opposition to the two-year extension for derogation from freedom of movement for EU-8 
+2 nationals. It appears that the perceived negative impact of eastern European labour 
migration to the United Kingdom after 2004 may have had a profound impact on the 
Christian Democrat MdBs and their support for the extension of derogation from freedom 
of movement. According to the following debate exerts, the Christian Democrats believe 
that under current circumstances the German labour market cannot absorb and integrate 
large-scale labour migration from eastern Europe. The British experience following 2004 
and the supposed widespread exploitation experienced by EU-8 workers in the UK are 
used to justify further extensions to limit labour market access of EU-8 citizens. 
 
Bundestag: 217. Session, the 23. April 2009 
Thomas Bareiß (CDU/CSU): 
As a proponent of liberal economic policy, I strongly support free labour movement as one 
of the four pillars of the EU common market. However, we cannot approach this topic with 
the ease that the Liberal Party suggests. We have to keep our own responsibilities in mind 
and have to carefully balance the consequences. We need to prepare our labour market for 
the impacts of full labour mobility of the newly joined central and eastern European 
member states……..the experiences from Great Britain were initially positive. However this 
view changed. They [the British authorities] lament the exploitation of [migrant] workers and 
the poor social support for the migrants. 
 
While MdB Weiß acknowledges the economic and political advantages of labour 
mobility within the EU, he stresses the need to adequately prepare the German labour 
market for the prospective migratory flows from the east. Interestingly, his statement 
(April 2009) comes five years after the EU-8 countries joined the European Union. 
Moreover, the ascendancy of these EU-8 countries did not occur over night but was 
preceded by years of political negotiation. In realistic terms, by the year 2009, German 
policy makers would have had over a decade to prepare their labour market for supposed 
mass labour migration from the eastern European member states. It seems highly unlikely 
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that the need to prepare the German labour market for EU-8 migrant workers and prevent 
their subsequent exploitation in the German labour market constitutes the real reason for 
the two-year extension.  
  CDU MdB Michael Hennrich is equally concerned about the impacts of EU-8 
migration on the German labour market and also refers to the situation in the UK in 
respect to EU-8 migrants and the perceived exploitative working conditions of eastern 
European workers.  
 
Bundestag: 179. Session, the 25. September 2008 
Michael Hennrich (CDU/CSU): 
Indeed, the initial experiences were good. However, if you have followed the media in 
recent weeks, than you know that this view has changed in Great Britain. If you read the 
headlines of British newspapers, than you will know about worker exploitation and poor 
social support for migrants. That happens despite a government minimum wage. Even the 
British officials have acknowledged in they have been overwhelmed by this migration [of 
eastern Europeans] 
 
It is obvious that CDU policy makers are acutely aware of the political and media debate 
in the United Kingdom in response to EU-8 migration. However, research by McDowell 
at al. (2009), Wills et al. (2009) and Datta et al. (2007) on the migrant labour market in 
London make little reference to supposed excessive exploitation of EU-8 migrants and 
instead suggest that EU-8 migrant workers experience less precarious employment 
conditions in the UK labour market than non-EU migrants due to their privileged legal 
status as EU citizens. It appears that the Christian Democrat view on EU-8 migration in 
the UK is primarily shaped by the headlines of the British tabloid press and is not 
necessarily based on empirical evidence. Moreover, there seems to be no discussion as to 
whether labour market conditions in Germany and the UK in respect to immigrant 
workers from eastern Europe are actually comparable.  
 Despite the opposition to immediate labour market access of the EU-8 workers, 
the Christian Democrats are aware that freedom of movement for the citizens of the new 
EU member states is inevitable. In response to accusations from the opposition parties 
that the German government’s refusal to grant full labour market access to EU-8 workers 
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has effectively deprived the German labour market of all the best skilled workers from 
the new member states, CDU MdB Reinhard Grindel responds accordingly.  
 
Bundestag: 142. Session, the 14. February 2008 
Reinhard Grindel (CDU/CSU): 
I do not belong to the group that says: “You have missed these developments in Germany; 
all the good workers are now in Great Britain or in the Netherlands.” Due to our relative 
location to Poland and the Czech Republic, skilled professionals will migrate to Germany 
for work from the other EU countries. We just have wait for this process to kick in.  
 
According to MdB Grindel, the extension of derogation from freedom of movement will 
not be detrimental to the German economy in the long run because once the inevitable 
full freedom of movement for EU-8+2 nationals is established, Germany’s relative 
geographic proximity to the new EU member states will compensate for any accrued 
skilled labour losses from earlier years. 
The Social Democrats, as traditional working class party, also support the extension 
of derogation from freedom of movement for EU8 +2 citizens. Social Democrat MdB 
Josip Jurotovic states that a EU-wide opening of the German labour market is politically 
not feasible due to widespread voter apprehension on the issue. Favell (2008) confirms 
that such fears are widespread within the German (and Austrian) population and points 
out that migration scholars in the early 1990s actually warned of a potential flood of 
eastern European labourers to western Europe, thereby exacerbating existing 
apprehensions.  
 
Bundestag: 217. Session, the 23. April 2009 
Josip Juratovic (SPD): 
We need the time until 2011, when full labour mobility will be implemented, to create a 
wider consensus for migration. When I travel in my constituency in Heilbronn, I am very 
much aware of the apprehension of the people. For an EU-wide opening of the labour 
market, we need to convince the population in order to facilitate [EU-8 migrant] integration   
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Bundestag: 179. Sessionthe25. September 2008 
Josip Juratovic (SPD): 
The Liberal Party calls for an opening of apprenticeships for young people from central- 
and eastern Europe. That is a ticking social time bomb. 
 
Instead, the extension of derogation from freedom of movement is presented as an 
opportunity to facilitate levels of acceptance among the German population towards 
eastern European labour migration. Like his Christian Democrat coalition partners, MdB 
Juratovic’s justifies the Social Democrat’s position with need for more preparation time, 
in this case to increase levels of acceptance for EU-8+2 labour migrants among the 
German population. MdB Juratovic also neglects to mention that the EU membership of 
the EU-8 +2 countries has not occurred out of nowhere and that by 2009 more than five 
years had already passed since the EU-8 countries originally joined. Moreover, it was the 
previous Social Democrat and Green government that in 2003 negotiated the initial five-
year derogation from freedom of movement for the EU-8 member states with the 
European Commission.  
 To conclude the discussion on the models of argumentation in favour of extending 
the derogation from freedom of movement for EU-8 +2 citizens, the CDU representatives 
cite the political debate and perceived ambivalent experiences of eastern European labour 
migration in the United Kingdom as an argument justifying another two-year extension. 
The Social Democrats on the other hand believe that the widespread apprehension within 
the German population in regards to potential mass immigration of eastern European 
workers merits an additional two-year extension, time which can be used to adequately 
prepare the population in Germany for the inevitable opening of the German labour 
market. The CDU representatives are also aware of their responsibility towards the 
domestic labour force and the need to consider potential voter apprehension regarding 
potential mass immigration from the new EU countries in the east. Both CDU and SPD 
are keenly aware of voter apprehension regarding EU-8 +2 migration but their 
representatives also acknowledge that freedom of movement and subsequent labour 
market access for citizens from the new EU member states is inevitable. While the CDU 
and SPD respondents claim that they will utilize the additional two-year extension to 
adequately prepare the German labour market and create consensus among the German 
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population, they were more likely convinced by national electoral politics to extend the 
derogation from freedom of movement. 2009 saw a federal election in Germany and both 
Christian Democrats and Social Democrats admitted that the prospect of large-scale 
labour migration from eastern Europe would have not been popular with large segments 
of the German population. Under the spectre of a looming federal election the Social 
Democrat and Christian Democrat support for the two-year extension of derogation from 
freedom of movement for EU-8 +2 into the midterm of the next legislative period should 
therefore be interpreted as an electoral strategy and not as a comprehensive labour market 
policy. Neither CDU nor SPD want to be the target for a potential electoral backlash over 
an unpopular labour migration policy measure in a federal election year.  
On the other hand, the three opposition parties are strongly in favour of opening 
the German labour market for migrant workers from the new EU member states. 
Particularly Green Party and Liberals are adamant that such move would result in 
significant economic benefits for the German economy and unlike the governing Social 
Democrats and Christian Democrats, their representatives do not appear to be concerned 
about potential negative implications of EU-8 migration.  
 
Bundestag: 179. Sessionthe25. September 2008 
Brigitte Pothmer (Green Party): 
We need full labour mobility. The fear the labour market will be flooded is unfounded. Full 
labour mobility has more advantages than it causes problems.  
 
Bundestag: 217. Session, the 23. April 2009 
Hartfrid Wolff (FDP): 
Any further attempt to limit EU labour mobility for workers from the new member states to 
the Federal Republic of Germany is counterproductive. To request yet another extension 
with the EU Commission to defer full labour mobility until 2011 is counterproductive. 
Instead we need to open the German labour market for workers from the new EU 
countries.  
 
 Whereas the Christian Democrats utilize supposedly negative experiences with EU-
8 migration in the United Kingdom to justify extension of derogation from freedom of 
movement, Green Party MdB Josef Philip Winkler argues that the perceived positive 
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experiences of other European countries with labour migration from the new EU member 
states should instead encourage the government to not extend the derogation from 
freedom of movement.  
 
Bundestag: 187. Session, the 13. November 2008 
Josef Philip Winkler (Green Party): 
The Labour Migration Control law remains a patchwork. The Grand coalition – despite the 
good experiences of other western European economies [with EU-8 migration] – 
vehemently opposes the right to full labour mobility for workers from the new member 
states, even though especially those federal states that you claim need to be protected 
[from EU-8 workers] actually call for them [EU-8 workers]. 
 
 Unlike the governing coalition, none of the opposition parties are seemingly 
concerned with voter apprehension about EU-8 +2 migration. Instead, for Green Party 
representative Bothmer the government’s plan to extend derogation from freedom of 
movement amounts to a betrayal of Germany’s commitment to the principles of the 
European Union.  
 
Bundestag: 217. Session, the 23. April 2009 
Brigitte Pothmer (Green Party): 
Regardless, the government decided anyway to extend the limitation of freedom of 
movement in Europe beyond May 1st 2009. That is not only a poor signal towards Europe 
but also a poor signal in terms of labour market policy, which you and your government 
coincidently send off today, May 1st, Labour Day.   
 
The Links Party also opposes the governing coalition’s plan for extension of the 
derogation from freedom of movement for EU-8 +2 citizens. Links Party MdB Kornelia 
Möller believes that withholding the freedom of movement for citizens from the EU-8 +2 
countries amounts to discrimination and would force eastern European workers into 
illegality and exploitative work environments in informal economy. 
 
Bundestag: 217. Session, the 23. April 2009 
Kornelia Möller (DIE LINKE): 
Full labour mobility must be guaranteed. Limited labour mobility essentially means that one 
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of the basic freedoms guaranteed by the EU is being limited……The Links Party believes 
its necessary to establish full labour mobility for all those living within the EU because the 
absence of full labour mobility leads to discrimination. This then will lead to an increase in 
unofficial employment through which people will be marginalized into derogatory work- and 
social environments and lawless illegality.    
 
Within the context of the Continued EU-8+2 Restriction narrative, the Links Party 
appears to have reconciled its opposition to neo-liberal labour migration policies with the 
necessity to provide workers from the EU-8  +2 with a legal framework that protects 
them from discrimination and exploitative work conditions. The research by both Wills et 
al. (2009) and McDowell et al. (2009) has shown that EU-8 workers in London benefit 
from the formal legal status bestowed upon them by their country’s EU membership. 
 The discussion of the Continued EU-8+2 Restriction narrative concludes that the 
inclusion of the extension for derogation from freedom of movement for EU-8+2 citizens 
in the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration is due to the governing 
parties’ desire to prevent full labour market access for EU-8 +2 workers in the year 2009. 
While the Christian Democrat’s support of extension is according to their own account 
linked to supposed negative experiences in other EU labour markets with EU-8 migrants, 
the Social Democrats openly admit that apprehension among the domestic population and 
thus voters in regards to eastern European migration merits another two-year extension. 
The CDU representatives are also aware of this apprehension and their party’s 
responsibility towards the domestic working population. Since the original extension for 
derogation from freedom of movement for EU-8 migrants was supposed to end in May 
2009, a few months before a federal election in Germany, the new extension as part of the 
2009 Action Programme is likely a result of national electoral politics in Germany. Kruse 
et al. (2003) arrived at a similar conclusion in their study on immigration reform in 
Germany prior to the 2002 federal election. .  
 Moreover, since the 2009 Action programme effectively removes all barriers for 
university educated EU-8+2 citizens (see section 5.7), the extension of derogation of 
freedom of movement can only be interpreted as an attempt to prevent unskilled labour 
migration from the EU-8 countries to Germany. As such, the two policy measures 
concerning EU-8 +2 citizens within the 2009 Action Programme confirm the policy 
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dualism between facilitating skilled labour migration and limiting unskilled labour 
migration in economically advanced nation-states (Skeldon, 2008, Castles, 2006; 
Hollifield, 2004). This dualism is not new; both Freeman (2004) and Brandi (2001) 
confirm that policy makers generally do not perceive skilled migrant workers as a 
problem whereas the migration of unskilled and less educated workers often faces strong 
political and popular opposition (Hollifield, 2004, p. 902.). The 2009 Action Programme 
on Skilled Labour Migration temporarily applies the dichotomy between useful skilled 
foreigners and less useful unskilled foreigner within the context of internal EU labour 
mobility. As such, even within the internal EU labour market, national policy makers in 
Germany distinguish between skilled EU citizens and unskilled EU citizens, showing a 
clear preference for the former and trying to limit the mobility of the latter.  
 
5.9– Points Based Immigration  
 
 This narrative incorporates the political debate on points based immigration 
systems (PBIS) and whether or not such a system should be implemented in Germany to 
promote and facilitate skilled labour migration. Both Canada and Australia utilize PBIS 
to determine the eligibility of prospective skilled foreign workers for residence rights 
and labour market access based on the individual’s education, age, skills and credentials 
(Appleyard, 2001). According to Bauder (2006) more than half of all immigrants that 
settled in Canada in 2001 were skilled workers who went though the Canadian points 
based immigration system, which highlights the significance of PBIS in the context of 
immigration in Canada. In 2001 the Süssmuth Commision Report, an intragovernmental 
panel on immigration, recommended the establishment of PBIS in Germany to counter 
the country’s demographic transition as well as to offset future shortages of skilled 
workers in the German labour market (Castles, 2006; Borkert & Bosswick, 2007; Kruse 
et al, 2003). The Süssmuth Commision Report argued that PBIS  would enable 
prospective migrant professionals to attain work and residence visas for Germany based 
on their skills, experience, and professional qualifications and the system would 
therefore promote skilled labour migration to Germany (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 
2009).  Even though the federal government at the time of the Süssmuth Commision 
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Report did not  implement a PBIS, the analysis of parliamentary debate in Bundestag 
and Bundesrat between 2005 and 2009 reveals that the issue of a PBIS is subject to 
intense political debate with clearly drawn fault lines between the political parties and 
even within the governing coalition.  
 The Points Based Immigration narrative is tied to two specific manifest codes; 
code A1 and code A2. Code A1 encompasses statements and models of argumentation 
made during parliamentary debate that indicate positive inclination towards PBIS while 
Code A2 encompasses statements and models of argumentation that are against PBIS in 
Germany. Figure 5.11 below shows the distribution of the two opposing manifest codes 
alongside political party lines with the Social Democrat, Liberal, and Green Party MdBs 
supporting PBIS (A1) whereas Links Party and CDU MdBs oppose PBIS (A2). 
 
Figure 5.11 – Bundestag: Points Based Immigration System (PBIS) 
  
 
Even though it should not come as surprise that MdBs follow their respective party line 
during parliamentary debate, it is somewhat surprising that the two parties of the 
governing coalition seem to have fundamentally different views on the issue of PBIS. 
Christian Democrat (CDU) and Social Democrats (SPD) MdBs clearly stand on opposite 
sides over this issue with the SPD representatives in favour of PBIS, a position that is 
supported by the MdB’s of two of the three opposition parties (FDP & Green Party). The 
conservative CDU representatives on the other hand find themselves in the same boat as 
the socialist Links Party in their opposition to PBIS. In the context of the German 
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political system this somewhat odd constellation of political viewpoints requires further 
examination. The analysis of parliamentary debate on PBIS sheds light on the 
particularities of the schism within the governing coalition as well as within the 
opposition camp.  
 The analysis of the Bundestag debate shows that the Social Democrat Party 
supports PBIS in Germany and their representatives are keen to point out that during the 
previous SPD-Green coalition government (1998-2005) they had already supported PBIS 
while then opposition Christian Democrats had blocked this attempt with their majority in 
the Bundesrat.  
 
Bundestag: 214. Session, the 26. March 2009 
Rüdiger Veit (SPD): 
In the long term we would like to gradually abolish the priority check as basis of German 
immigration policy and instead implement a points system with clearly defined levels for 
the number of labour migrants. This is by no means a new thought, the introduction of a 
points based immigration system was already under negotiation during the previous Red-
Green Coalition as part of our immigration reform. Back then the attempt failed due to the 
resistance of the Christian Democrats in the Bundesrat. The opportunity for legal 
migration could also support our attempts to reduce illegal immigration into Europe. 
 
Bundestag: 179. Session the 25. September 2008 
Rüdiger Veit (SPD): 
We Social Democrats already recognized the necessity of this seven years ago when we, 
and our then Green coalition partner, created the new immigration law and put it up for 
debate on this floor. It included a points based immigration system that would have 
enabled flexible match making between labour market and employers demand on the 
one hand and personal skills and abilities on the other hand. Also, we could have 
controlled the number of migrants by flexibly adjusting the required skills levels. 
Unfortunately it was the CDU here in the Bundestag, as well as at the state level, that did 
not see this and ultimately forced the points system off the bill. We regret that very much.  
 
Veit’s arguments suggest that the Social Democrats have supported PBIS since the days 
when they were in a governing coalition with the Green Party (1998-2005) and if it had 
not been for the CDU’s blockade in the Bundesrat during the previous electoral term, 
Germany would have already implemented PBIS. According to Veit, PBIS has the 
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potential to control immigration in general and skilled labour migration in particular in an 
efficient and flexible manner and he insinuates that the Christian Democrats have 
squandered an opportunity to set up this policy tool that could be utilized to control 
unwanted migration to Germany. Samers, (2010); Favell et al. (2007) and Ruhs (2005) 
concur that PBIS constitute a good policy tool to manage skilled labour migration flows 
but there appears no evidence to support Veit’s claim that PBIS could be utilized to 
prevent unwanted migration. Migrants that do not qualify for skilled workers status 
through PBIS would likely resort to undocumented and irregular migration. It has been 
established that immigration policy and border control can actually do very little to 
counter irregular labour migration and PBIS in Germany would therefore not likely 
contribute to keeping unskilled workers out of the country. 
 Representatives from both Liberal Party (FDP) and Green Party support Veit’s 
position as they also emphasise the utility of a PBIS to control and manage migration 
more effectively. 
 
Bundestag: 161. Session, the 9. May 2008 
Josef Philip Winkler (The Greens): 
In terms of migration management we have come to a total standstill. On the other hand 
there has been much effort to prevent and limit further immigration despite the repeated 
calls from our employers and businesses that we need migration. You [governing 
coalition] oppose a points system that could manage and regulate migration.  
      
Bundestag: 161. Session, the 9. Mai 2008 
Gisela Piltz (FDP): 
We have proposed the points system, which we believe is the proper method to manage 
the migration we need. 
 
Bundestag: 142. Session, the 14. February 2008 
Florian Toncar (FDP): 
Germany and the EU have an interest in opening up new channels for managed 
migration. The Liberal party has therefore proposed points based immigration system for 
Germany that balances the needs of migrants with Germany’s economic interest.  
 
The pattern of argumentation that Rüdiger Veit and the three opposition MdBs use in the 
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parliamentary debate indicates that they are utilizing the debate over PBIS to paint the 
Christian Democrats as unwilling to actively manage and control migration of skilled 
workers to Germany. For the MdBs supporting PBIS, they clearly conceptualize it as an 
economic policy tool to alleviate professional skills shortages in the German labour 
market. According to that argument, PBIS is in the interest of German employers, 
German businesses, and ultimately the German economy, all three of which are also the 
traditional political clientele of the Christian Democratic Party with its pro-economy and 
pro-employers stance (Boswell & Hough, 2008). The Social Democrat, Liberal, and 
Green model of argumentation imply that opposition to PBIS is ultimately detrimental to 
the German economy. 
 Michael Bürsch (SPD) approaches the argument from a similar angle as he 
conceptualizes PBIS as a vital component of the future success of Germany’s globally 
operating export-based economy and its increased dependence on skilled migrant 
professionals. 
 
Bundestag: 163. Session, the 29. Mai 2008 
Michael Bürsch (SPD): 
The purpose of the points system is long-term migration management. In the end it’s about 
the question in what kind of society we want to live. Do we want to live in a society that is a 
fortress, where you close the gate so that nobody can come in and exploit our social 
welfare system? Or do we wish to open the door to a globalized world in which we can 
prosper with our export-based economy? For the latter we need an open society, a 
welcoming society, which requires this often debated and often misrepresented points 
based immigration system.      
 
Bundestag: 119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Michael Bürsch (SPD) 
I have said this already said this five or six times….we need a points based system, but 
not, dear colleagues, for economic reasons but for our society’s benefit. That is the 
globalized world in my view. We need migrants from all parts of the world. The points 
system can be a good tool to achieve this. We need a selection mechanism for foreigners 
that not only incorporates short and midterm labour demand but actually looks to the long 
term. I have personally witnessed the application of this system in countries like Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand.  
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According to Bürsch (SPD), a modern society in today’s globalized economy requires a 
certain degree of openness towards non-nationals and a PBIS would symbolize 
Germany’s newfound openness to global economic development including immigration. 
PBIS would symbolize a paradigm change in Germany in regards to immigration and 
Bürsch strategically links the PBIS to economically prosperous countries such as 
Australia and Canada that have established traditions of skilled labour recruitment 
through PBIS. The opposition Green and Liberal representatives also use the 
Canada/Australia argument when they make their case in favour of a PBIS, highlighting 
the perceived advantages and successes of PBIS systems.  
 
Bundestag: 119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Sibylle Laurischk (FDP): 
Such a system in combination with other economic reforms would bring Germany forward 
again. The business community in Germany supports such a positive signal towards 
migration. Economically successful countries such as Canada have a points system. It 
was probably a missed opportunity in the recent reform of our immigration law that such 
as system was not discussed or included in the legislation. 
 
Bundestag: 163. Session, the 29. May 2008 
Josef Philip Winkler (The Greens): 
In Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK, where they have such system, locals are 
not replaced at the age of fifty by young dynamic and successful foreigners. It would also 
not be like this in Germany if we decided to implement points based system. 
 
 The application of PBIS in economically advanced countries like Canada and 
Australia is utilized by opposition MdB’s to dispel certain negative preconceived notions 
about PBIS; e.g. migrant workers entering the national labour market and causing 
redundancies of older or less skilled German workers. The underlying rationale of these 
two arguments is that if countries like Canada and Australia have PBIS and utilize them 
to satisfy labour market demand, Germany should also have such a system. In fact, the 
governing Social Democrats as well as their opposition counterparts in the Green Party 
and FDP, try to emphasise the prospective economic benefits that a points system would 
bring to the German economy and labour market.  
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 Bundestag: 163. Session, the 29. May 2008 
Sebastian Edathy (SPD): 
What I like about the Liberal Party’s suggestion is that it says: let’s develop a system 
through which we can determine which people are especially capable of integrating [into 
the labour market], who has good qualifications and who can establish him or herself over 
here and live here independently so they contribute to economic prosperity in Germany. 
 
Bundestag: 187. Session, the 13. November 2008 
Hartfrid Wolff (FDP): 
Trade unions and employers are in agreement that the increased migration rates of foreign 
professionals through a points system will lead to a reduction of domestic unemployment 
because the deployment of every professional creates further employment opportunities.  
 
Castles & Miller (2009) and Ley (2003) concur that PBIS and the resulting skilled labour 
flows to Canada have tremendously benefited the national economy but Girard et al. 
(2007) and Bauder (2006) claim that labour market outcomes for many skilled migrants 
who entered Canada through PBIS have been less than stellar because non-recognition of 
professional skills as well language barriers have resulted in skilled migrants ending up in 
unskilled professions.  
 While there is much discussion on the prospective benefits and perceived 
advantages of PBIS for the German economy and the national labour market, the Social 
Democrats and Greens are markedly quiet about the exact structure of a points system 
and the specific criteria that would determine eligibility of prospective skilled migrant 
professionals. Meanwhile MdB Hartfrid Wolff from the Free Liberals (FDP) has some 
concrete suggestion how a future PBIS in Germany would function and what criteria 
would frame eligibility for prospective migrants.  
 
Bundestag: 217. Session, the 23. April 2009 
Hartfrid Wolff (FDP) 
We need a points based system that can regulate migration based upon clearly defined 
criteria and that also clearly states our interests and our expectation from the would-be 
migrants. The criteria should be level of professional qualification, work experience, age 
as well as German language skills. The point is: Whom do we want to invite to Germany? 
Who can contribute to our society?  
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Bundestag: 163. Session, the 29. Mai 2008 
Hartfrid Wolff (FDP): 
We need a points system which managed migration alongside clearly defined criteria and 
which incorporates our interest and expectations from the migrants. A points system is a 
flexible and modern way of regulating migration. This way we can satisfy our demand of 
required labour but also in times of low demand reduce migration. Such a system would 
incorporate training, experience, age and ability to speak German. Their professional 
qualifications and ability to integrate into society are particularly important.  
 
MdB Wollf’s (FDP) suggestions for the criteria of a future PBIS are seemingly 
straightforward; skills, qualifications, age, and language skills are the factors that should 
form the basis of PBIS in Germany, essentially the same criteria that frame PBIS in 
Canada and Australia (Anderson, 2010; Samers, 2010). At the same time, the ability of 
migrants to integrate re-emerges as a criteria in a future PBIS, which suggests that for 
Wolff and the Liberal Party labour migration and associated policy is not merely 
conceptualized as a short or medium term human capital transfer but potentially a long-
term if not permanent settlement of foreign workers. As such, any PBIS should not be 
determined by economic and labour markets based considerations alone but also 
incorporate the ability and/or willingness of prospective migrants to socially integrate 
themselves outside the workspace and adhere to the social norms of German society. 
However, aside from assessing language skills, MdB Wolff does not provide the means 
by which a points system can determine and measure the ability or willingness of 
prospective skilled migrant workers to integrate in German society. Experiences from the 
United Kingdom and France indicate that language alone is not a guarantor for social 
integration (Koopmans & Statham, 1999). 
  While the support for a points based immigration system is strong among 
representatives of the SPD, FDP, and the Greens, representatives from the governing 
Christian Democrats are united and vocal in their opposition. CDU MdB Reinhard 
Grindel argues that the introduction of PBIS would not increase skilled labour migration 
to Germany and would only create unnecessary bureaucracy, claiming that existing 
institutional legal structures and bureaucratic agencies already suffice. 
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Bundestag: 161. Session, the 9. May 2008 
Reinhard Grindel (CDU/CSU) 
We neither need a points system or any new bureaucratic rules in relation labour market 
access for migrants. Instead we need more flexibility from the federal agencies, the 
industry- and trade chambers as well as the immigration agencies. That’s how we can 
attract foreign professionals.  
 
His colleague Stephan Mayer, who also doubts the ability of PBIS to achieve the desired 
outcome, echoes this sentiment. 
 
Bundestag: 163. Session, the 29. May 2008 
Stephan Mayer (Altötting) (CDU/CSU): 
 I am surprised that the Liberal party, which likes to present itself alongside an anti-
bureaucracy agenda, would favour a points system that would accomplish the opposite.  
 
And continues with  
 
….the proposal is totally anachronistic because a points system will not solve the problems 
in Germany. 
 
Whereas the opposition Greens and Liberals attack the CDU’s refusal to support PBIS as 
a missed opportunity to control and manage migration, the Christian Democrats argue 
that PBIS would create new unnecessary and incompetent bureaucratic structures. The 
CDU argument is not without merit, Piper (2009, p. 98) confirms that in most countries 
migration management attempts tend to establish relative bureaucratic systems aimed at 
moving migrants around, controlling and monitoring them. The bureaucracy argument is 
nevertheless an obvious snipe at the Liberal Party (FDP), which identifies itself alongside 
libertarian principles of small government and limited bureaucracy. In light of the vocal 
Liberal support for PBIS, the Christian Democrat attempt to brand PBIS as bureaucratic 
could be interpreted as a political strategy to show prospective voters that the Liberal 
Party is undermining its own principle of small government and limited bureaucracy. 
 Uwe Schürmann, Christian Democrat representative of Lower-Saxony in the 
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Bundesrat shares the view that PBIS would create unnecessary bureaucracy and 
ultimately establish a new system that is somehow more complicated than the system 
currently in place. He also insists that PBIS would deviate from the rule in which 
prospective migrant workers to Germany should only receive a work and residence 
permit if a concrete offer of employment exists. 
 
Bundesrat: 835. Session, the 6. July 2007 
Uwe Schürmann (CDU - Lower Saxony): 
The federal Minister of Labour and our colleague Dr Stegener frequently bring up the 
points based system. We know this system from other countries and we know it’s 
complicated and bureaucratic. It also deviates from the established principle in which you 
need to have an offer of employment before you are rewarded with residence rights. That 
is achieved through the lowered income threshold but is not automatically guaranteed 
through a points system. We could talk about this in the long term but it [points system] 
does not provide a short-term solution.     
 
Schürmann and his Christian Democratic colleagues neglect to mention that under the 
current system work visas for migrant workers can only be granted by the German 
immigration agencies after the local employment agency has undertaken a “Priority 
Check”, which determines whether or not any German or EU national is willing or 
capable of filling the respective vacancy. The fact that these very bureaucratic, time 
consuming, and inefficient priority checks could be abolished once PBIS was 
implemented does not appear to have entered the debate.  
 Regardless, the principal motives for the Christian Democrat opposition to PBIS 
are revealed in the following two debate exerts. 
 
Bundestag: 187. Session, the 13. November 2008 
Stephan Mayer (Altötting) (CDU/CSU) 
The main argument of the Liberals is that a points system can facilitate labour migration 
according to labour market demand. I believe that is a false assumption. From our point of 
view, migration into our labour market should only be possible if a concrete employment 
offer exists. Any system, no matter how sophisticated, that waives this prerequisite, 
encourages migration into our social welfare system.  
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Bundestag: 163. Session, the 29. Mai 2008 
Reinhard Grindel (CDU/CSU): 
From a labour market perspective a points system is unnecessary and potentially 
dangerous in terms of integration. Therefore we cannot support your proposal. 
 
And continues with  
 
The Liberal Party’s proposal for a point system neglects to include a mandatory 
prerequisite of an employment offer. If prospective foreign workers do not have a concrete 
offer of employment when they arrive in our country, then we have uncontrolled migration 
because there is no way to recognize whether foreign workers arrive in the labour market 
or end up in the social welfare system.    
 
These exempts reveal that Christian Democrat MdBs fear labour migration through PBIS 
would ultimately result in a loss of control by the state over the admission of foreigners. 
From Christian Democrat viewpoint, abolishing the current system with its mandatory 
priority checks would result in foreigners not moving into the German labour market but 
instead into the German social-welfare system, which the CDU is always keen to oppose 
in public. In their view, migration into the social-welfare system is preventable if 
immigration policies ensure that resident and work visas for foreign workers are always 
tied to a concrete offer of employment and are thus subject to the earlier mentioned 
priority checks. Since PBIS would grant residence and work visas to migrant workers 
based on skills and qualification alone without reference to a concrete employment offer, 
PBIS would in the Christian Democrat’s mindset potentially exacerbate existing 
pressures on the German social-welfare system if migrant workers fail to find immediate 
employment in Germany. These findings suggest that the Christian Democrats’ 
opposition to PBIS is closely associated with the desire to maintain strict control over the 
flow of migrants into Germany and limit immigration of those who may become a 
liability for the national social-welfare system. However, the Christian Democrats’ claim 
that skilled labour migration through PBIS does not necessarily lead to optimal labour 
market outcomes is not without merit. Castles & Miller (2009, p.121) claim that despite 
the strong emphasis on skill and education of the Canadian points system, there is 
growing concern in Canada about underemployment and unemployment of migrant 
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professionals. PBIS in Canada grants labour market access to skilled professionals but the 
system does not guarantee optimal labour market outcomes for migrant professionals. 
While Canada’s relatively unregulated labour market, particularly its lower segments, 
provides ample employment opportunities for skilled migrants who find themselves 
barred from the upper segments of the Canadian labour market, Germany’s highly 
regulated labour market would likely see skilled migrants without an offer of 
employment barred from the labour market altogether which would increased the risk 
welfare dependency (Geis et al., 2011). Therefore, Christian Democrats’ apprehension 
about PBIS and its applicability in Germany are to a certain degree justified. 
 Significant opposition to the PBIS also arises from the Links Party. For their 
representatives, PBIS represents and conceptualizes migrants in the context of capitalist 
and neo-liberal utility, which the party fundamentally opposes. MdB Sevim Dagdelen, 
the party’s critic on immigration issues, is extremely outspoken about the Links Party’s 
opposition to PBIS in Germany as the following statements clearly show. 
 
Bundestag: 214. Session, the 26. March 2009 
Sevim Dagdelen (DIE LINKE) 
The points system is clearly designed to serve the interest of the nation-state. It results in 
selection based on economic utility criteria. We as the Links Party refuse to appraise 
humans on the basis of points.  
 
Bundestag: 163. Session, the 29. May 2008 
Sevim Dagdelen (DIE LINKE): 
We do not accept that migrants are segregated based upon qualification and labour 
market demand into “useful” and “useless”, into “welcome” and “unwelcome”. The points 
system will entrench and legitimize this social ‘Status Quo’ and by default social injustice; 
Qualifications and training are traded for the right to migrate.  
 
Bundestag: 119. Session, the 12. October 2007 
Sevim Dagdelen (DIE LINKE): 
The Links Party is not opposed to immigration. But, we criticize selection process based 
upon national utility criteria. That is the true purpose of the points system, that is 
supported by you [Liberals] and the Greens. The introduction of a points system serves 
only to determine the economic utility of migration for Germany.     
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The Links Party’s political stance is not surprising considering its party doctrine 
of social justice and equality (Kruse, 2003). The analysis of the Links Party models of 
argumentation in the parliamentary debate on PBIS suggests that the Links Party opposes 
labour market demand driven immigration policies such as PBIS because in their view 
they categorize migrants alongside criteria of economic utility at the expense of migrants 
that lack the desired professional skills. Freeman (2006) concurs that PBIS in both 
Canada and Australia primarily conceptualize skilled migrants as human capital that can 
be utilized to facilitate economic growth. The Links Party view on PBIS is therefore 
fairly accurate. 
The Links Party’s and Christian Democrat’s opposition to PBIS does not arise 
from a common political viewpoint; instead, the CDU’s opposition is based on the desire 
to maintain strict control over all forms of migration to Germany, ultimately to prevent 
the use of the social-welfare system by foreigners. The Links Party on the other hand 
objects to the classification of migrants alongside criteria of economic utility and instead 
argues that the right to migrate is a universal human right available to anyone, skilled or 
unskilled.  
 As for the proponents of a PBIS, despite their vocal support for the system, it 
appears that the Christian Democrats maintain a dominant position in the parliamentary 
debate over PBIS. The 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration does not 
include any reference to PBIS, despite having the support of one of the two political 
parties in the governing coalition that has been responsible for the Action Programme. 
The evaluation of the Points Based Immigration narrative suggests that the absence of 
PBIS in the 2009 Action Programme is for the most part due to the fundamental 
opposition of the CDU towards such system. The CDU fundamental opposition to PBIS 
is grounded in the belief that PBIS would be bureaucratic and subsequently inefficient, 
could potentially result in migrants gaining access to the German social-welfare system, 
and most importantly undermine the ability of the German state to maintain strict control 
over migrant flows into the country. Attempts by the previous government to implement 
such systems were also thwarted by the CDU’s opposition (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 
2009).  
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5.10 – The CDU Dominance in Bundestag and Bundesrat 
 
The analysis of the debate transcripts from Bundestag and Bundesrat reveals that 
the Christian Democrat representatives maintain a dominant position within political 
debate on skilled labour migration. The CDU representatives are predominately 
concerned with negative immigration outcomes and tend to favour restrictive 
immigration policy frameworks. A number of scholarly studies on immigration and 
citizenship policies in Germany have already concluded that the Christian Democrats 
tend to oppose liberal immigration policies and instead favour restrictive policy 
measures, be this asylum, family unification, undocumented migration or labour 
migration (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009; Bauder & Semmelroggen, 2009; Boswell 
& Hugh, 2008; Borkert & Bosswick, 2007; Kruse et al, 2003; Cooper, 2002).  
Even though the 2009 Action Programme was implemented under a Christian 
Democrat led coalition government, the analysis of the relevant political debate reveals 
that Christian Democrat policy makers are not overly enthusiastic about immigration, 
including skilled labour migration. At the same time, the Christian Democrats 
apprehensive stance towards immigration disproportionately shapes the political debate 
in Bundestag and Bundesrat on skilled labour migration during the policy formation 
process of the 2009 Action Programme. 
 For example, the Christian Democrats in the Bundestag were opposed to 
lowering the minimum income threshold for skilled foreign professionals, whereas their 
coalition partner and two of the three opposition parties strongly favoured minimum 
income thresholds that were significantly lower that the 63.600 Euros outlined the 2009 
Action Programme. The only reason the income threshold appears to have been lowered 
at all is due to the insistence of the Christian Democrat representatives at the federal state 
level in the Bundesrat. This again underlines the dominant position of the CDU in the 
political debate on skilled labour migration. Notwithstanding the near unanimous 
political support for lower income thresholds among Social Democrats, Liberals, and 
Green in the Bundestag, in the end the tipping of the balance in favour of a gradual 
reduction in minimum income threshold ultimately had to come from within the Christian 
Democrat Party itself. 
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The other policy relevant aspect where the CDU’s restrictive stance towards 
skilled labour migration prevailed is in the political debate over PBIS where the Christian 
Democrats’ uncompromising stance prevented any meaningful discussion on PBIS. 
Points based immigration has been on the political agenda in Germany for over a decade 
and enjoys significant support amongst Social Democrat, Liberal, and Green Party policy 
makers as well as key labour market stakeholders but the CDU’s adamant opposition 
toward PBIS has successfully prevented its implementation in Germany (Klusmeyer & 
Papademetriou, 2009). 
However, the CDU’s critical approach to labour migration should not be 
interpreted as opposition to immigrants. Quite to the contrary, the analysis of the political 
debates on Bundestag and Bundesrat reveals that Christian Democrat policy makers 
support legislative improvements in regards to foreign skills accreditation procedures as 
well as improved post-study labour market access for foreign graduates because these 
measures do not contradict the party’s preference for utilizing domestic workers. 
Furthermore, most Christian Democrat representatives acknowledged that global 
competition over skilled workers exists and that the success of the German economy 
depends on the availability of skilled professionals, domestic or foreign. Yet, the 
Christian Democrats are more than any other party concerned with the perceived negative 
impacts of labour migration, which manifests itself in the CDU’s insistence on policy 
mechanisms that prevent migrant welfare dependency, unskilled labour migration, and 
labour market competition within the lower segments of the national economy. This leads 
to the conclusion that the Christian Democrats are caught in what Hollifield (2004) calls 
the ‘liberal paradox’ whereby economic liberalism needs to be reconciled with the 
economic wellbeing of the domestic population. Boswell & Hough confirm this 
assessment and according to them ‘CDU immigration and citizenship policy is caught 
between the need to attract more high-skilled labour and manage what is effectively 
cultural pluralism whilst not neglecting the political imperative to emphasize 
restrictionist credentials to the electorate’ (2008, p. 243). They furthermore state that 
CDU’s critical stance on immigration ‘should be understood as a calculated strategy to 
articulate popular anxieties about economic and social impacts of immigration in 
Germany‘ (2008, p. 345).  
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However, while Boswell & Hough interpret CDU opposition to liberal 
immigration policy frameworks as political posturing towards their electorate, the 
analysis of the relevant political debate between 2005 and 2009 clearly shows that the 
CDU’s critical stance on skilled labour migration and its perceived negative impacts 
effectively culminates in a restrictive political discourse that emphasises restrictionist 
policy measures in respect to skilled labour recruitment.  
The dominance of the Christian Democrats and their restrictionist and 
protectionist emphasis within political discourse on skilled labour migration is partially 
due to the unwillingness of Social Democrat policy makers to openly oppose their 
coalition partner in this particular policy field. At the same time, the marginal role of the 
three opposition parties within the Bundestag and by default the legislative process 
during the sampling period further strengthens the Christian Democrats position on 
skilled labour migration within political discourse. Even though the Social Democrat 
interview respondents lament the extension of derogation of freedom of movement for 
EU-8+2 workers, within political debate in the Bundestag, their representatives actually 
show support for restricting labour market access for unskilled and semi-skilled EU-8 
workers for another two years. Furthermore, despite the Social Democrat support for 
lower income thresholds for skilled foreign professionals, ultimately they support the line 
of the Christian Democrats who in the end internally agreed to a marginal reduction of 
existing income thresholds as part of the 2009 Action Programme. The only occasion 
where the Social Democrats openly contradict their coalition partner is in the debate over 
Points Based Immigration, where their representatives align themselves with the 
opposition Greens and Liberals, even though to no avail in the end. Just like the Christian 
Democrats, Social Democrat policy makers are strongly motivated to protect the labour 
market prospects and outcomes of domestic workers, albeit they do not employ the same 
restrictionist models of argumentation that characterize the Christian Democrats within 
political discourse. The SPD willingly supports or at least does not actively oppose the 
Christian Democrats within political negotiations on skilled labour migration policy. 
Even in the political debate over PBIS where Social Democrats and Christian Democrats 
occupy fundamentally different positions, the Social Democrat policy makers resort to a 
more conciliatory rhetoric and models of argumentation than the opposition parties. It is 
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apparent that the Social Democrats are unwilling to ‘rock the boat’ within the grand 
coalition over the issue of skilled labour migration. Thus in the context of political 
discourse over skilled labour migration, the Christian Democrats are the de-facto 
dominant political faction within the grand coalition government and therefore by default 
within the German parliamentary system. 
 
5.11 – Concluding Remarks on the Parliamentary Debate 
 
The analysis and discussion of the political debate conducted in the German   
Bundestag and Bundesrat between 2005 and 2009 ends here. In the following chapter the 
data derived from the stakeholder interviews provides additional insight and further 
context on the political discourse on skilled labour migration during the sampling period. 
While the analysis of the parliamentary debate transcripts in this chapter outlined the 
thematic composition of the political debate, identified particular vested interests, and 
discussed policy maker positions between party lines, the interviews will delve deeper 
into the complexities of these vested interests and expose the particularities of the power 
relations within the policy formation processes. In particular, the interview statements by 
national policy makers, institutional actors, labour market stakeholders, and policy 
advisors will contribute towards identifying and contextualizing underlying policy maker 
motives in respect to skilled labour migration and associated state legislation. 
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Chapter Six –Policy Maker and Stakeholder Interviews  
 
6.0  - Introduction 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the results derived from the twenty-six 
interviews with German policy makers, institutional actors, labour market stakeholders, 
and migration policy advisors that were conducted between 2009 and 2010. The 
stakeholder interviews represent the secondary data set of the thesis and they provide 
additional context and insight to the analysis of parliamentary debate on skilled labour 
migration in chapter five. 
For organizational purposes, the data from the interview transcripts has been 
organized and categorized alongside the same narratives that were utilized in the analysis 
of the parliamentary debate transcripts and discusses them within the context of the 
relevant academic literature on skilled labour migration and immigration theory. The 
analysis of the stakeholder interviews provides additional insight and context into the 
political discourse on skilled labour migration in Germany during the policy formation 
process of the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration. Specifically the 
interviews support the identification of and provide additional context on the underlying 
motives of policy makers, institutional actors, and non-government stakeholders in 
regards to skilled labour migration legislation. The analysis of the stakeholder interviews 
confirms that political discourse on skilled labour migration in Germany between 2005 
and 2009 was largely shaped and framed by underlying policy maker motives that 
emphasise restrictions towards skilled foreign workers while simultaneously insisting on 
preferential labour market access for domestic workers. Moreover, the interviews confirm 
that policy makers belonging to the governing Christian Democrat Union 
disproportionately shaped political discourse on skilled labour migration during the 
sampling period.  
 While the stakeholder interviews largely confirm the results from the Critical 
Discourse Analysis of parliamentary debate, there was one significant deviation within 
the interview data. Within the context of skilled labour migration, a majority of interview 
respondents emphasized the need for migrant workers to integrate themselves into 
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Germany. The topic of migrant integration only constituted a minor narrative within 
parliamentary debate but a major narrative within the stakeholder interviews. Therefore, 
the Welcome Culture & Integration of Skilled Migrant Workers narrative is discussed in 
more detail in chapter six.  
 
6.1 - Interview Narratives 
 
All interview respondents were asked a series of questions relating to specific 
aspects of the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration as well as general 
themes relating to skilled labour migration in Germany. The interview questions followed 
a pre-designed interview guide (see appendix B). In addition to questions relating to 
skilled labour migration in Germany, the interview respondents were asked to outline 
their personal or their institution’s position on the 2009 Action Programme. Thus, prior to 
presenting the results from the stakeholder interviews in relation to the eight thematic 
narratives, this chapter will also include a brief discussion of the respondents’ position on 
the 2009 Action Programme. This provides additional context and insight on the 
discursive framework of labour migration policy formation and associated policy maker 
and stakeholder interest in respect to skilled labour migration policy outcomes. The 
discussion of interview data follows the same sequence utilized in the analysis of the 
parliamentary debate transcripts from Bundestag and Bundesrat in the previous chapter.  
 
6.2 – Respondent’s Position on the 2009 Action Programme 
 
Prior to each interview the respondents were asked to state their views on the 
2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration as well as outline their respective 
institution’s position on the new policy. The Christian Democrat and Social Democrat 
politicians and party consultants who led the government during policy formation process 
more or less admitted that in their view the 2009 Action Programme does not represent a 
major policy shift in regards to skilled labour migration in Germany but rather constitutes 
a gradual and relative small-scale improvement of existing policy measures within 
Germany’s wider immigration policy framework. 
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Party Consultant for Work Group Interior Affairs, CDU 
..further [policy] development also goes into the right direction - more opening, and this 
also shows in our action program -  for the time being Germany still lacks the big [policy] 
move, but we are moving forward in small steps. 
 
The Social Democrats admit that some representatives within their party would 
have preferred a more far-reaching policy change, particularly in respect to the migrant 
workers from the new European Union member states in eastern Europe.  
 
Party Consultant for Committee on Interior Affairs, SPD  
We have initially welcomed the Action Programme [on skilled labour migration]. Aside 
from the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, a Social 
Democrat led ministry, have implemented this [policy]. Our input was made in close 
consultation with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Within our parliamentary group 
there were many that would have liked to go even further, especially the European 
politicians, which lobbied for immediate full labour market access for the new members 
states. Regardless, these smaller steps still go into the right direction. We have to start 
with small steps; the grand solution can still come later.    
 
The interviews with the CDU and SPD representatives reveal that both governing parties 
are in agreement that the liberalization and opening of the German labour market for 
foreign professionals is necessary but, at the same time, concur that the corresponding 
legislative changes cannot be implemented immediately and the Christian Democrats in 
particular stress that the opening of the national labour market will only occur over time 
through gradual steps.  
The interview respondent from Germany’s Confederation of Trade Unions 
concurs with the SPD respondent’s assessment because he also believes that the 2009 
policy should have been more forthcoming to labour migrants from the new EU member 
states in eastern Europe.  
 
Integration Commissioner, Confederation of German Trade Unions  
We wished the Federal Government had used the Action Programme to discuss [policy] 
measures to secure possibilities for labour migration from central and eastern European 
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countries and create corresponding support measures and programs for the 
establishment of freedom of movement 
 
Despite some misgivings about certain aspects of the 2009 Action Programme, the trade 
union’s interview respondent confirms that the Confederation of German Trade Unions 
supports the 2009 policy because it still represents a step in the right direction. 
Interestingly, the Confederation of German Employers' Associations shares this view and 
their respondent confirms that the government consulted with them during the 
parliamentary discussion prior to the implementation of the policy. Yet, just like the 
Confederation of Trade Unions, the Employer’s Association criticises the perceived 
limitations of the new policy and the respondent states that his organization had hoped for 
more fundamental change in policy in regards to international skilled labour recruitment. 
The Employers’ Association had particularly hoped that the government would introduce 
PBIS that would enable German companies to recruit skilled professionals from  the 
international labour markets.  
 
Representative, Confederation of German Employers' Associations  
Of course we were involved, after all the social partners were expected to present their 
viewpoints on the issue during the policy formation process, which includes public 
hearings in which we participated as experts - we actually prepared a statement about 
this. We did welcome the new rules in principle and said that this paradigm change that 
had been initiated a few years ago must continue. These are all very promising changes 
but still not even close to what back in 2008 was demanded by the conference of the 
ministers of the economy as well as the committee of the Bundesrat – the introduction of 
a points based immigration system and this [lack thereof] we lament very much. 
 
In the end both trade union and employer representatives support the 2009 policy in 
principal but at the same time lament that that Action Programme falls short of their 
respective expectations. It appears that employers and trade union interests have some 
common ground in regards to skilled labour migration and labour market access for 
foreign professionals. They call for less restrictive labour migration policies in order to 
facilitate increased skilled labour migration to Germany.   
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 The respondents from the three opposition parties do not oppose the opening of 
the German labour market for skilled migrant professionals and their critique focuses 
exclusively on the supposed limited scale and scope of the 2009 Action Programme.  
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Refugee Policy, Green Party 
In our opinion the new law is too narrow. It lacks large-scale improvement [for skilled 
labour migration].  
 
Party Consultant for Integration, FDP  
In the end we rejected in the final result, because even though many people said that it is 
a step into the right direction, we still viewed it as a small or even the smallest step that 
could have been made, and thus the whole policy was no longer meaningful. 
 
Even though the opposition parties voted against the 2009 Action Program on Skilled 
Labour Migration, they are in fact not opposed to the idea of opening the German labour 
market to skilled foreign workers. The Green Party and Liberal Party opposition to the 
legislation stems from the belief that the 2009 Action Program on Skilled Labour 
Migration will not liberalize the German labour market for foreign migrant professionals 
to the extent that they would have liked. The Links Party is also not opposed to labour 
market access for skilled foreign workers, even though the party also voted against the 
legislation in the Bundestag. 
 
 Party Consultant for Migration and Integration, Links Party   
I think most of the measures that have been agreed upon in this policy go in the right 
direction. Even the details we can support much of it. However, much of it did not go far 
enough for us and the policy is limited to very specific sections [of the labour market], 
which is why we ultimately opposed the policy... 
 
Whereas the Greens and Liberals oppose the 2009 legislation because of its 
perceived limited impact on labour market liberalization, the Links Party opposes the 
2009 policy because in their view it caters exclusively to economic and industry interests 
at the expense of humanitarian immigration.  
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MdB Sevin Dadgelen, Links Party  
The previous immigration law was implemented to accommodate economic interests, we 
need Russian mathematicians, Indian IT specialists, Arab millionaires…they may come but 
everyone else should stay away. In my opinion the immigration laws are repressive and 
restrictive.  
 
The Liberal interview respondent is very critical of attempts to blend political 
debate over economic migration and associated policy measures with humanitarian forms 
of migration.  
 
Party Consultant for Integration, FDP  
In my view there is a lack of differentiation between humanitarian migration and labour 
migration. That in my opinion is due to the [political] debate, where one does not 
differentiate at all. I mean, one would have to separate these two debates from each 
other, because the one does not have to do anything with the other. 
 
Despite the refusal of the opposition parties to support the 2009 Action 
Programme on Skilled Labour Migration in the Bundestag, there is a cross-party 
consensus that labour market access for skilled foreign professionals is desirable and 
necessary and the 2009 Action Programme is a step, albeit a small one, in the right 
direction. The disagreement between the governing parties and the opposition parties is 
for the most part over the extent and speed of labour market liberalization with the 
Greens, Liberals and to some degree the coalition Social Democrats favouring more 
liberal labour migration legislation. Only the Christian Democrats appear to be content 
with gradual and small scale reform of existing policy frameworks and it appears that the 
more conservative Christian Democrat viewpoint has prevailed in the political debate that 
preceded the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration.  
 For German immigration scholar Dr Klaus Bade the favouring of gradual small-
scale reform of immigration policy is typical for Germany where in his view policy 
makers and institutional stakeholders favour small-scale and gradual adjustments to 
existing policy frameworks over fundamental policy change.    
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Dr Klaus Bade, Immigration Scholar & Government Advisor 
The intent is to create a system that is supposed to replace the popular idea of a points 
system. That is a very German approach, very German because they have said; ”let’s not 
create the grand new solution here, let’s just keep on fiddling with our small set screws 
until we get a similar result  - so we don’t have the giant fountain blowing up but rather 
two dozen small ones – that is also an accomplishment.“   
 
Even though Dr Bade supports the 2009 policy as a step in the right direction, he 
nevertheless criticises the Action Programme for falling short in regard to the recruitment 
of skilled professionals from outside the EU and more importantly that the government 
shies away from openly engaging with the electorate about the purpose and long–term 
goals and benefits of skilled labour migration to Germany.  
 
Dr Klaus Bade, Immigration Scholar & Government Advisor 
First, they haven’t managed to include and consider third country nationals from outside 
the EU. Second, they still haven’t managed to merge this array of seemingly chaotic 
single [immigration] measures into a comprehensive system that can actually convey a 
clear message about the ultimate goal [of labour migration] and why we are doing this 
[immigration policy].    
 
 The interview respondents from Germany’s Expert Advisory Board on Integration 
and Migration, a non-government advisory panel, concurs with Bade’s view and also 
mentions the perceived inability of German policy makers to implement fundamental and 
far reaching reform and improvement of existing legislation on immigration related 
matters. He nevertheless concurs that the 2009 policy is a step in the right direction.  
 
Representative, German Expert Advisory Board on Integration and Migration  
The political structures in Germany do not allow laws to turn 180 degrees. Changes in 
legislation always come step by step, is always works slowly but there is a continuous 
improvement. As such the new labour migration policy is a move forward because it 
speeds up existing policies and it also came through [parliament] relative quickly. The 
Action Programme is small step and Germany actually looked at other countries in order 
to become more attractive in the [global] competition over highly skilled professionals.  
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Most interview respondents indicate a positive inclination towards the 2009 
Action Programme and more significantly none of the policy makers and labour market 
stakeholder interviewed opposes skilled labour migration to Germany on principle. In 
fact there is an almost universal consensus that skilled labour migration to Germany 
should be properly managed, that labour market liberalization for foreign workers is 
necessary, and that government policy should accommodate and facilitate this 
development. With the notable exception of the Christian Democrat interview 
respondents who appear to be satisfied with the 2009 policy, virtually all respondents, 
particularly the market stakeholders such as trade union and employers associations, 
lament the perceived limitation of new legislation. A number of the interviewed 
politicians and immigration consultants link the perceived limited scale and scope of the 
2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration to the fact that immigration polices 
Germany have traditionally been implemented through gradual policy adjustments as 
opposed to radical policy change. Migration scholar Professor Bade on the other hand 
contributes the inability of German policy makers to implement more far-reaching 
immigration legislation to the lack of a long-term strategic planning on the part of 
politicians as well as the failure of Germany’s political elites to properly convey the 
advantages of immigration, particularly high skill professionals, to the German electorate. 
As a result of this, for Bade, immigration reform in Germany usually culminates in small-
scale and gradual adjustments of existing policy frameworks. Castles (2003, p. 207) 
supports Bade’s assessment that migratory processes are long-term processes and thus 
require policy makers to conceptualize migration policy as a long-term policy tool. 
Castles also concurs that policy makers in economically advanced countries are reluctant 
to engage openly and honestly with the electorate on migration matters because they fear 
a potential electoral backlash.  
 
6.3 - Global Competition over Skilled Workers & Domestic Skills Shortages 
 
The interview respondents were asked to what extent labour migration policies 
should conform to industry demands and economic considerations and the respondents 
were given the opportunity to present their views on the potential contribution of skilled 
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foreign professionals to the German economy. The interview respondent from the 
Christian Democrats states that skilled migrant professionals are welcome in Germany 
and that migration polices should facilitate their integration into the national labour 
market because skilled workers are in demand and ultimately contribute to the country’s 
economy. 
 
Party Consultant for Work Group Interior Affairs, CDU  
… there exists also a certain need and a national interest that we get these people into 
the country and this starts with highly skilled professionals such as university graduates, 
high-level personnel, elite managers etc.. There is no disagreement among us that it is 
vital to get these people into the country. 
 
The Liberal Party respondents are keen to stress that labour migration policies 
need to incorporate economic factors and that skilled migrant workers ultimately benefit 
the German economy. In their view skilled workers are particularly desirable because 
they create synergy effects in the lower segments of the labour market for domestic 
workers.  
 
MdB Sibylle Laurischk, FDP  
Immigration policies should be implemented to conform to economic considerations.  
 
Party Consultant for Integration, FDP  
The people that come here for work should benefit our economy. One of the effects of 
skilled labour migration is that is creates further jobs in our labour market. If a high skilled 
professional arrives, this will automatically result in jobs in the lower segments of our 
labour market.  
 
The assumption that skilled labour migration creates employment opportunities for 
domestic workers is supported by a number of authors (Khoo et al., 2007; Saxenian, 
2005) but nevertheless remains a controversial subject among economists and labour 
market analysts (Rhus, 2005; Meyers, 2004). The statements made by the Liberal Party 
respondents are therefore not necessarily supported by empirical evidence.       
The respondent from the Cologne Institute for Economic Research, a non-
government think tank that advises the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs on labour 
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migration, also believes that skilled migrant workers will contribute to the economy if 
migration polices can guarantee their smooth integration into the national labour market.  
 
Representative, Cologne Institute for Economic Research  
We can make sure that quick integration into the labour market guarantees their long-
term employment and therefore their contribution to the economy that benefits the entire 
country. 
 
However, according to Geis et al. (2011) Germany is actually not very successful in 
attracting skilled migrant professionals and also not successful in integrating its migrant 
population into the national labour market as unemployment for migrants with post-
secondary education is disproportionately high.  
The respondent from the Green Party keenly acknowledges the positive contribution 
of migrant workers to the German economy. MdB Ströbele particularly singles out the 
past contribution of migrant workers to Germany’s economic prosperity even though past 
immigrants to Germany have for the most part been unskilled workers (Klusmeyer & 
Papademetriou, 2009).  
 
MdB Christian Ströbele, Green Party  
They [migrant workers] are absolutely necessary for our economic survival; the German 
economy would not be where they are today…the economy and German society would not 
be where they are today.  
 
 The Links Party respondent on the other hand believes that the overemphasis on 
economic utility and skilled labour demand has a derogatory effect on social and political 
integration of Germany’s existing migrant communities.   
 
MdB Sevin Dadgelen, Links Party  
The level of recognized asylum claims is the lowest in twenty years, we have the lowest 
level of naturalizations in years. I have the impression that principle of economic utility still 
dominates [immigration policy], like it always did throughout German history…..there has 
always been a strong economic component, which was favoured by the industry. People 
were brought in as workers, not as people.   
 
 208 
Kruse et al. (2003) already established that the Links Party opposes labour migration 
polices that emphasise economic utility. At the same time there is no evidence to support 
the Links Party assumption that humanitarian based immigration policies will lead to 
improved socio-economic integration of foreigners in Germany. According to Joppke 
(2004), Koopmans (2010), and Weis et al. (2011) humanitarian immigration, improved 
migrant access to social-welfare, and state policies promoting multiculturalism have not 
led to improved labour market outcomes of migrants in many European countries and in 
fact have undermined state efforts to socially integrate migrants into the receiving 
societies. However, van Houtum and Pijpers (2007) support MdB’s Dadgelen claim that 
across Europe immigration polices increasingly aim to select immigrants based on their 
economic value while European governments are increasingly hesitant to grant political 
asylum to refugees. According to van Houtum and Pijpers (2007, p. 295) ‘migration 
motives of those wanting to enter the EU are merely being categorized as productive/ 
unproductive, friendly/fiendish and good/bad, with the direct dichotomous consequence 
of being allowed entrance or not’.  
The interview respondent from the Germany Confederation of Trade Unions also 
voices some apprehension about labour migration polices that are solely aligned 
alongside economic criteria. The respondent is particularly concerned that migration 
polices might enable employers to exploit migrant workers and he therefore advocates 
labour migration polices that ensure long-term residence rights for migrant workers and 
guarantee the right to change employers without losing their residence privileges. 
 
Integration Commissioner, Confederation of German Trade Unions  
We want economic immigration organized in a manner where the people are fully capable 
to pursue their own interests. That means, we are opposed to migration with temporary 
residence rights limited to certain industries and certain kinds of employment without the 
option to change employers and without the option of long-term residence rights.   
 
German Trade Unions have a history of supporting labour migration as long as migrant 
workers receive the same salaries and social benefits as the domestic working population 
(Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009). The Trade Unions believe that this strategy will 
prevent migrant workers from being utilized by employers to undercut the wages of the 
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domestic workers. On the other hand, Caviedes (2010, p. 67) believes that Trade Union 
support for skilled labour migration in Germany stems from a growing realization that 
certain employment sectors in Germany require skilled workers who cannot be supplied 
from the domestic labour pool. Caviedes found that Trade Union resistance to labour 
migration in the IT sector (high skill sector) was least pronounced while Trade Unions in 
both hospitality (low skill) and construction (low skill) sectors showed significant 
resistance towards foreign workers. 
The interview respondents were also asked to state their views on the current 
situation of the German labour market in regards to emerging skills shortages in sectors 
of the German economy as well as Germany’s position within the global economy. For 
many of the interviewees there is a direct link between the future competiveness of 
Germany’s economy and the ability to recruit skilled migrant professionals.   
 
Party Consultant for Integration, FDP  
One must pay attention to the future competitiveness of our economy....we are a global 
player. We have to participate in the global competition over the brightest heads…as 
soon possible.  
 
This statement links to Mahroum’s (2001) claim that European policy makers 
increasingly envision skilled labour migration as a policy tool to maintain present and 
future competiveness in the global economy. Professor Bade concurs with this 
assessment that Germany needs to actively recruit skilled migrant professionals in order 
to maintain its economic and technological edge in the global economy. He points out 
that while the government and the population seem to grasp that the German economy 
needs to remain competitive in light of the increased international competition, the 
government fails to comprehend and fails to convey the message that skilled labour 
migration represents a vital component for any long-term strategy aimed at maintaining 
Germany’s future economic competitiveness.  
 
Dr Klaus Bade, Immigration Scholar & Government Advisor 
Everybody talks about how the process of globalization made the economy a 
transcontinental connection and that we need to face these new challenges. They [the 
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government] have so far been unable to convey the message that migration is part of the 
globalization process and that there are certain things that you just simply need to adapt 
to and that it is possible to call up certain people [skilled migrants] and manage their 
migration appropriately.  
 
Industry representatives go even further and fully admit that without the 
recruitment of migrant professionals, Germany’s industry will unlikely be able to 
maintain its current position as a high-technology export nation. 
 
Representative, Association of German Engineers  
We are quite open-minded when it comes to high skilled labour migration because we are 
fully aware that nothing will go without [future] immigration. 
 
Some of the respondents criticize the prevailing attitude and assumption of the 
government, the political establishment, and employers as well as the general population 
that skilled workers are queuing up for a chance to move to Germany and take up 
employment in the German labour market. For the respondent from the Cologne Institute 
for Economic Research, Germany’s labour migration policies, including the 2009 Action 
Programme reflect this lack of comprehension regarding the global competition over 
skilled migrant workers.   
 
Representative, Cologne Institute for Economic Research  
Some people in Germany are still under the impression that everyone is queuing up to 
get into the German labour market. A well-educated third country national can nowadays 
work anywhere in the world and does not depend on the German labour market. We 
have to compete for these guys with other countries.  
 
Geis et al. (2011) concur with this assessment and state that the German labour market 
fails to attract skilled foreign professionals and instead has become a ‘welfare magnet’ 
for low skill foreign workers with limited economic potential. According to the 
Integration Commissioner of Lower Saxony, employers and industry are partially to 
blame for their failure to comprehend that future economic growth will depend on their 
ability recruit foreign professionals. 
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Integration Commissioner, Lower Saxony 
The trade chambers and federations have no clue. The prevalent mindset is that the 
[labour] market will take care of itself. Well, now we have a skilled labour shortage and 
the market did not solve itself. The whole idea that the market will take care of itself is an 
illusion; otherwise we would not have this problem.  
 
Some of the interview respondents point out that in order for the German 
economy to be able to compete for international skills and talent, the government needs 
to devise immigration policies that can compete with the immigration frameworks of 
other countries. Otherwise prospective migrant professionals will choose to go elsewhere. 
 
Party Consultant for Integration, FDP  
The labour market becomes more global anyway. We always pretend that foreigners like 
to come here for work. However, instead many have the desire to move to the US, 
Canada or the UK and we should not loose sight of that fact. We have to create attractive 
labour market conditions so that people will come in the future and we can alleviate 
skilled labour shortages. 
 
The Integration Commissioner for Lower Saxony concurs with this notion and 
states that the global labour market for skilled professionals is a buyers market where the 
skilled workers will simply choose the best offer and go there.  
 
Integration Commissioner, Lower Saxony 
The highly skilled can in all reality chose wherever they want to work, and they will move 
there were they can earn the best salaries and where they get the best [skills] recognition 
and the best advancement opportunities.  
 
A number of interview respondents refer to skills shortages in certain sectors of 
the German economy; i.e. employers are unable to recruit workers with appropriate skills 
levels and as a result positions in the job market remain vacant. The interview 
respondents representing industry and employer interest are particularly vocal about the 
need for comprehensive labour migration polices in order to remedy these supposed skills 
shortages. 
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Representative, Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce  
We see that employers in certain sectors of the economy and the labour market 
encounter difficulties finding suitable personnel – this already starts with the filling open 
apprenticeships – that is why we think immigration is important, aside from utilizing 
existing [skills] potentials among the domestic workforce. For some time we have lobbied 
for more lenient regulations in regards to labour migration, for example we lobbied for a 
lowering of the income threshold for highly skilled professionals and providing reasonable 
support [to migrant professionals] wherever necessary.  
 
Interview respondents from the Trade Union and the Social Democrat Party 
support this assessment and also warn of increased labour shortages within high skill 
professions unless foreign professionals can be recruited to fill those vacancies. 
 
Integration Commissioner, Industrial Union of Metalworkers Berlin/Brandenburg  
On the other hand there is a shortage of skilled labour, especially in the high skills sector 
but nowadays also among the less qualified.  
 
Party Consultant for Committee on Interior Affairs, SPD  
Yes indeed, in Germany there are [skills] shortages in a number of academic fields, 
especially in the natural sciences, most important among engineers.   
 
However, not everybody is fully convinced that Germany’s employers face an 
immediate skills shortage that has the potential to cripple economic development and 
technological innovation in Germany. The Christian Democrat respondent appears 
especially apprehensive about employer and industry demands for an all-out opening of 
the German labour market to foreign professionals. Instead the CDU respondent proposes 
to wait and determine whether existing demand for skilled workers constitutes a mere 
short-term trend or if it represents a long-term structural labour demand by German 
industry. 
 
Party Consultant for Work Group Interior Affairs, CDU  
But the [labour market] demand changes too. One year a branch of industry says: they 
need trained specialists and in the next year they have too many. Labour market 
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conditions are ever changing. In that respect I would support a temporary work permit for 
short-term assignments but not with unlimited residence titles. I do not see a need for 
that. And therefore unlimited residence permits should be granted on a limited scale.  
 
Hix & Noury (2007) claim that conservative politicians often hesitate to support 
liberal labour migration policies even though they would benefit some of their supporters 
(employers, industry). According to them apprehensions of an electoral backlash from 
working class voters who oppose labour migration often forces conservative policy 
makers to balance the economic interest of their capitalist and industry supporters with 
the apprehension of their domestic constituents. Consequently, even if there is going to 
be a long-term structural demand for skilled migrant workers in Germany, the Christian 
Democrat respondent urges caution and proposes a system of temporary work and 
residence permits. The CDU representative also seems concerned that short-term labour 
demand will result in a long-term liability to the German state when employer demand 
eventually dries up, similar to what happened after the end of Guest Workers recruitment 
in Germany during the early 1970s (Meyers, 2004). This may explain why the respondent 
proposes the use of temporary work visas for foreign professionals that would not be 
extended once labour demand dries up thus providing ‘short term’ flexible labour without 
creating potential long-term liabilities for the state (Luthra, 2009). According to Castles 
(2006) Germany already makes extensive use of temporary work programs primarily in 
the hospitality and agricultural sector that operate alongside seasonal demand. It is 
therefore not surprising that conservative policy makers would also consider utilizing 
temporary work visas for skilled migrant professionals. However, the respondent from 
the Cologne Institute for Economic Research has already pointed out that skilled workers 
are not necessarily lining up to move to Germany and temporary work programs for 
skilled workers will not likely help to improve the attractiveness of the German labour 
market for foreign professionals.  
Interestingly, yet again there are parallels between the CDU position on skills 
shortage and the position of the Links Party as both parties are critical of employer and 
industry claims about imminent skilled labour shortages in Germany. The Links Party 
suspects that German employers merely desire to utilize cheaper immigrant labour 
instead of utilizing the skilled labour potential in the domestic labour market.   
 214 
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Integration, Links Party   
At the same time the supposed skilled labour shortage is disputed. The Ministry of 
Labour itself has published a study that states that the only question is how fast vacant 
positions can be filled and many employers do not have any problems but there are 
certain segments of the economy where there are problems [with labour shortage]. Well, 
it is more convenient to utilize a global labour pool as opposed to being limited to the 
domestic labour market.   
 
The CDU’s and Links Party’s caution regarding employers’ calls to open the 
German labour market to foreign professionals is shared by the respondent from the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior who draws upon past experiences with supposedly 
widespread employer demand for foreign IT professionals a decade ago.  
 
Representative, Federal Ministry of the Interior 
We already had that problem with the introduction of the Green Card, back in 1999/2000. 
Industry claimed 80.000, 100.000 or even 150.000 vacancies in the IT-sector. In 
response we took a close look as to how many of these supposed vacancies were 
actually advertised. We were surprised to find that only 16.000 to 17.000 vacancies were 
advertised. It was somewhat strange because if only ten percent of the vacancies are 
actually advertised, then labour demand can actually not be that severe. OK, not every 
vacancy is registered with the agencies, but this discrepancy did not add up. Therefore 
we told them [industry] that we were initially limiting them to a contingent of 20.000 [green 
cards] and we would wait and monitor how things would develop. Then just when the 
policy measure was implemented, the Dotcom crash occurred. Regardless, 
approximately 17.000 [foreign professionals] did eventually arrive and without the crash 
there may have been three to five thousand additional IT-workers, but it was nowhere 
near the numbers demanded by the industry.  
 
It seems that industry calls for skilled migrant workers in the past have created a 
certain suspicion within the responsible federal ministries about supposed employers 
demand and widespread skills shortages. The ministry respondent’s suspicion of 
employers and industry claims may very well contribute to the ministry’s unwillingness 
to implement immediate labour market liberalization for foreign professionals. Instead 
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their strategy seems to be to wait and see whether labour market demand for skilled 
migrant professional will actually continue to persist.  
However, aside from the supposed shortage of skilled workers there is also the 
recurring issue of demographic transition in Germany that feeds into the political debate 
on skilled labour migration. A number of interview respondents refer to immigration as a 
key component to counter Germany’s demographic decline and are convinced that 
national policymakers need to implement long-term policy frameworks that will ensure a 
steady supply of skilled migrant professionals who will alleviate the projected decline of 
the domestic workforce in the decades to come.  
 
Representative, Confederation of German Employers' Associations  
Skilled labour shortages do exist, one could argue how desperately they are wanted but 
we will actually need migration for demographic reasons alone. Recent studies that 
project the decline of the workforce to be about ten million by the year 2050 only project 
an annual average in-migration at around of two hundred thousand. So when we set 
immigration to zero, this discrepancy would even be more significant 
 
Section 5.1 in the previous chapter already established that demographic transition will 
affect domestic skilled labour supplies across Europe and will likely pose a challenge to 
the competiveness of businesses and industry across the continent (Castles, 2006; 
Hollifield, 2004).   
Yet, other respondents are not convinced that skilled labour migration alone will 
solve Germany’s demographic dilemma but nevertheless concur that it will alleviate 
some of the impacts of the demographic transition. 
 
President, German Institute for Economic Research   
The belief that the demographic decline can be undone with immigration is flawed. It can 
slow the demographic decline but not fully compensate for it. The migrants also age and 
their demographic habits adjust to the rest of the population.   
 
 While a majority of respondents support skilled labour migration and associated 
policy in light of the increased shortage of skilled professionals in the German labour 
market and the looming prospect of demographic transition in Germany, a number of 
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respondents are unconvinced of the severity of skilled labour shortage in Germany and 
effectiveness of labour migration as a remedy against demographic transition. 
Nevertheless, the latter respondents do not oppose skilled labour migration to Germany, 
instead their doubts regarding the severity of skills shortages and the prospect of 
demographic transition culminates in a more cautionary approach towards liberalizing 
skilled labour migration policy. Instead of calling for a fundamental policy adjustment 
regarding labour market access for skilled migrant professional, the sceptics among the 
interview respondents favour gradual policy adjustments over time. The 2009 Action 
Programme on Skilled Labour Migration appears to be a result of this scepticism.  But 
regardless of the doubts and apprehension expressed by some respondents, the majority 
of respondents believe that the German government will have to implement policy 
strategies with regards to skilled labour migration that consider current skilled labour-
demand as well as long-term demographic change in Germany. As such skills shortages 
and demographic transition constitute an influential discursive undercurrent within the 
skilled labour migration debate in Germany.  
 
6.4 - Controlling, Restricting & Managing Labour Migration  
 
 A number of interview respondents comment on the difficulty in reconciling skilled 
labour migration legislation with the need to improve the employment prospects of 
domestic workers and upgrade their professional qualifications so they can fill open 
vacancies in the German labour market. The elected officials are particularly keen to 
stress that they do not support the recruitment of skilled foreign workers unless 
employers and industry commit to improve the employment prospects and professional   
training of domestic workers. The Christian Democrat respondent makes it clear that 
Germany’s domestic unemployed take precedent over foreign workers.  
 
Party Consultant for Work Group Interior Affairs, CDU  
Yes, but the first order of business has to be that domestic employees do not have to suffer 
from the fact that we allow foreign professionals into the country. We will not benefit if our 
own number of unemployed continues to rise.  
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The respondent from the Cologne Institute for Economic Research confirms that the 
Christian Democrats’ opposition to large-scale labour market liberalization for skilled 
foreign workers is a result of perceived widespread apprehension among German workers 
about foreigners entering the German labour market and them competing over vacancies 
with the domestic workforce. According to the respondent the CDU fears voter backlash 
from its conservative constituents. Boswell & Hough (2008) confirm that voter 
apprehension within the conservative electorate has traditionally influenced immigration 
politics of the Christian Democrat Party in Germany.  
 
Representative, Cologne Institute for Economic Research  
The CDU is opposed to this [large scale labour migration]. They fear a quantitative 
migration, that simply more people will come than our country can handle and potentially 
push domestic workers out of the labour market.  
 
 According to the Social Democrat respondent, the fact that there is significant 
domestic unemployment, particularly among semi-skilled and unskilled German workers, 
makes it difficult to politically justify skilled labour migration to Germany, despite the 
fact that skilled workers are in demand and adequately qualified domestic workers are 
often unavailable. The respondent also implies that conservative policy makers insist on 
restrictive labour migration policies in light of domestic unemployment, despite the fact 
there are mismatches in terms of skills-level and qualification between the domestic 
unemployed and the professional skills and expertise required for the vacant positions in 
the high-skill employment sector of the German economy.    
 
Party Consultant for Committee on Interior Affairs, SPD 
What becomes more prevalent is the pointing towards the millions of unemployed in 
Germany, especially from conservative commentators, and the reminder that as long as 
there are x unemployed in Germany we cannot bring in foreign workers…. I have always 
said that in relation to the “mismatch” that [domestic] skills upgrading is a good in theory 
but it does have its limits.  
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Even the Liberal Party representatives who are normally keen to heed industry 
calls for skilled migrant workers are quite clear that large-scale domestic unemployment 
justifies strict immigration rules, particularly for unskilled foreign workers.  
 
MdB Sibylle Laurischk, FDP  
I can say that it is the conviction of the FDP that in light of high domestic unemployment 
in this country, we have to be very strict with labour migration. Strict in the sense of 
professional qualifications. Under current rules only highly skilled migrants are allowed 
into the German labour market.  
 
The second Liberal respondent believes that Germany’s employers have neglected to 
fully utilize the domestic labour potential and demands that German employers should 
train and upgrade the qualifications of older employees, female workers, and unemployed 
young people so they can to fill the vacant positions.  
 
Party Consultant for Integration, FDP  
First we need to consider that older employees are properly integrated [into the labour 
market]. …Also the compatibility between family and work is important because the 
labour market potential of women is often wasted as they have good or better educational 
credentials and professional skills than men.  
 
The Links Party respondent is equally adamant that the state’s first responsibility is to 
improve the employment prospects of the domestic population, including Germans with a 
migratory background.  
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Integration, Links Party   
Our position, which many of the SPD share, is that we need to utilize our domestic labour 
market potential first, there is a lot of unutilized potential, also among the migrants 
already living in the country. We also want to utilize this labour force – this does not mean 
we should shut the borders – don’t understand it that way. However, this must be 
mentioned and we cannot lose sight of that.  
 
The trade union respondent also insists that employers should utilize and upgrade 
existing skills potential in Germany and he claims that in the past Germany’s employers 
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have neglected their social responsibility towards the domestic working population. He 
believes it is not acceptable that employers call upon the government to promote the 
recruitment of foreign professionals.  
 
Integration Commissioner, Industrial Union of Metalworkers Berlin/Brandenburg  
They [employers] can only blame themselves for the skilled labour shortage because in 
the past they did invest in training and neglected to upgrade existing skills.  
 
Another trade union respondent confirms that the German trade unions support the 2009 
Action Programme precisely because the government put pressure on employers to fully 
utilize the domestic labour potential Germany. He hints that otherwise the trade unions 
would have opposed the 2009 policy. 
 
Integration Commissioner, Confederation of German Trade Unions  
We did support the Action Programme because the domestic [labour] potential that has 
been excluded from the labour market will be improved.  
 
Meyers (2002) notes that trade unions generally favour restrictionist labour migration 
polices, particularly in times of high unemployment. Caviedes (2010), on the  other hand, 
links trade union resistance to immigration in Germany to specific employment sectors 
and claims that sectors with an unskilled or semi-skilled workforce are more likely to 
oppose immigration than employment sectors with a skilled labour force. 
The interview respondent from the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
insists that the German employers have a moral responsibility to utilize domestic labour 
potential before lobbying the government on skilled labour migration. He believes that 
industry prefers migrant workers because it is cheaper to employ foreign workers than it 
is to train older German employees. The ministry respondent stresses that the German 
state has a vested interest in employers hiring unemployed and under-skilled domestic 
workers and therefore policy makers hesitate to immediately give into employers’ 
demand for foreign workers.  
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Representative, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
In terms of high skilled workers – industry always proclaims that they need more 
engineers and industry of course wants people that can immediately be deployed. We 
from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs deplore that they [industry] can train 
people. If an engineer has been unemployed for two years and then cannot cope right 
away with some IT program, an upgrading or adjustment training would just suffice. 
 
The Director of the Welcome Center in Hamburg also finds it increasingly 
difficult to politically justify skilled labour migration to segments of the public in light of 
widespread domestic unemployment within the city of Hamburg. The respondent states 
that there is significant political pressure on the City Senate to utilize domestic 
unemployed and limit employers’ access to foreign labour.   
 
Director, Welcome Center Hamburg 
We in Hamburg has to reconcile many different political interests; among them the labour 
market and there is strong political pressure that we need supply it from within our own 
[domestic] ranks. 
 
Other respondents are critical of attempts to place skilled migrant professionals 
and domestic unemployed into the same equation. For the respondent representing the 
Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration this amounts to mere 
populism and he contributes this trend to the lack macro-economical understanding 
within large segments of the population. He laments that the political establishment 
cannot convey to the electorate that skilled labour migration ultimately leads to the 
creation of new employment opportunities for unemployed Germans.  
 
Representative, Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration  
The public debate lacks proper macro-economic perspectives and understanding. For 
example, the Greencard, there are empirical studies that the twenty thousand [IT 
professionals] that came with this initial contingent created another hundred thousand 
jobs down the line due to the employment trickle down effect. This viewpoint is very 
complex and far-reaching, too complex for the immigration debate and its associated 
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economic thinking. The point is that this basic economic understanding is virtually absent 
within the population 
 
The President of German Institute for Economic Research concurs with this 
assessment and states that skilled foreign professionals in Germany’s technology based 
industry secure the jobs of workers on the assembly lines. 
 
President, German Institute for Economic Research   
Skilled [migrant] professionals secure the jobs of the low skilled [workers in Germany]. 
  
Interestingly, the respondents from the employers’ associations admit that in the 
past German employers have neglected to upgrade the skills of domestic workers and 
promise that the neglect of domestic workers will be remedied in the future. They 
nonetheless stress that skilled labour migration is still required to counter increasing skills 
shortages in Germany.   
 
Representative, Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce  
There are debates about playing one off against the other, such as giving preference to 
the mobilization of the unemployed over immigration. This is the wrong approach, we 
need to keep both opportunities beside each other, that you retrain people, that you 
include older people into the process and that you conceptualize migration as a substitute 
option. We will not be able to fully solve skilled labour shortages [with migration], but it is 
nevertheless an opportunity to counter it.   
  
While many of the respondents agree that preference should be given to 
unemployed domestic workers and when appropriate upgrade their qualifications, none of 
the respondents appear to believe that skilled foreign professionals actually take jobs 
away from skilled German workers. Instead, it appears that labour market competition 
between foreign and domestic workers is primarily associated with employment sectors 
that do not require a skilled labour force. A number of respondents actually reference 
unskilled labour migration, which suggests that it is a factor in the debate on skilled 
labour migration. For example, within the context of skilled labour migration, German 
policy makers are keen to stress that the government maintains strict control over 
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unskilled labour migration to Germany. According to the respondent from the German 
Expert Advisory Board on Integration and Migration this is part of a Europe wide trend 
where states that aim to promote skilled labour migration become increasingly 
apprehensive about and restrictive towards unskilled immigration. The literature on 
immigration policy supports this assessment (Castles, 2006; van Houtum & Pijpers, 
2007). 
 
Representative, German Expert advisory board on Integration and Migration  
Many European countries are becoming much more selective towards low-skill workers 
while at the same time they are rolling out the red carpet for the highly skilled.  
 
This suggests that in order for European governments to promote the recruitment 
of desirable skilled foreign professionals, they have to show to their respective electorate 
that they are restricting unskilled labour migration. The respondent believes that 
overabundance of unskilled workers, migrant and domestic, has effectively resulted in the 
former becoming an undesirable migrant group.  
 
Representative, German Expert advisory board on Integration and Migration  
It is just a matter of fact that the group that is scarce on the labour market is the group of 
highly skilled professionals that’s why we need to pay special attention towards them. 
Those [migrants] without skills are just less scarce. 
 
Dr. Bade confirms that the fear of unregulated unskilled labour migration lingers above 
the political debate on skilled labour migration in Germany. 
 
Dr Klaus Bade, Immigration Scholar & Government Advisor 
The predominately and to some degree exclusive concentration on the asylum and 
refugee sectors and the resulting defensive attitude [among the population] has clouded 
everything and all initiatives in the area of economic based long-term migration planning 
were taken aback. That has been a real problem. 
 
One of the Christian Democrat respondent’s states that past immigration of 
unskilled workers to Germany resulted in poor labour market outcomes and therefore did 
not benefit the German economy.  
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Party Consultant for Work Group Interior Affairs, CDU  
After 1973 we were not an immigration country abut in reality many people came into the 
country through family reunion and humanitarian immigrations [asylum applications] who 
did not possess adequate qualifications - thus people, who were not so useful to the 
country and did not participate actively in the economic life. 
 
The statement clearly conceptualizes unskilled foreigners as an undesired migrant group 
due to their perceived inability to economically contribute to the German economy. This 
then suggests that some German policy makers measure the relative benefits of 
immigration in terms of immigrant contribution to the German economy. As such the 
perceived inability of unskilled migrants to contribute to the German economy justifies 
restrictions on unskilled labour migration (Skeldon, 2008). The respondent from the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior confirms that his ministry explicitly aims to restrict 
unskilled labour migration to Germany.  
 
Representative, Federal Ministry of the Interior 
We still retain significant barriers towards low-skilled and unskilled migrants and here we 
only allow labour migration within specific sectors [of the economy] 
 
Yet, the respondent admits that most unskilled migration to Germany occurs through 
different channels that cannot be controlled by restrictive immigration policies.  
 
Representative, Federal Ministry of the Interior 
The bulk of immigration happens in different channels. At the moment family unification 
accounts for most [migration]. This is the biggest part of migration and unfortunately the 
one we can manage the least.  
 
Joppke (1998) confirms that in liberal nation-states independent courts protect the 
residence and family rights of immigrants, which effectively prevents legal restrictions on 
potentially undesired family reunion of unskilled migrant workers.    
The respondent from the Commissioner for Integration and Migration in Berlin 
believes that labour market restrictions aimed at keeping unskilled workers out of 
Germany in fact discourage foreign professionals from taking up employment in 
Germany while unskilled migrants continue to arrive through different channels anyway.  
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Representative, Commissioner for Integration and Migration Berlin 
Our politicians cling to the belief that all of them want to go to Germany but that is an 
illusion. Sure, the lower qualified [migrants] will want to come to Germany. 
 
Aside from supposedly putting strain on the lower segments of the German labour 
market and causing discontent among the domestic workforce, the respondent from the 
Cologne Institute for Economic Research links unskilled labour migration to increased 
unemployment and welfare dependency in Germany’s migrant community. 
 
Representative, Cologne Institute for Economic Research  
It depends on the qualifications, high levels of qualification mean better integration into 
the labour market because there is an increased demand for the highly skilled, much 
higher than among the lower-skilled workers; the lower-skilled [migrant] workers have an 
unemployment rate at around twenty percent, that makes [labour market] integration 
much more difficult.  
 
In relation to this, Leitner (1995) has noted that poor and unskilled migrants are 
increasingly perceived as a burden to the national welfare state and subsequently 
economically advanced states try to restrict unskilled labour migration. 
The interview respondent from Federal Ministry of the Interior is more direct as 
he equates unskilled labour migration with migration into Germany’s social welfare 
system. Yet, he admits that most unskilled migrants arrive in Germany through family 
reunion and not through legal channels created by skilled labour migration legislation.   
 
Representative, Federal Ministry of the Interior 
In some ways family unification is a liability for our system, especially if only unskilled 
arrive, than this is long-term immigration into our social-welfare system.   
 
Section 5.3 already established the discursive link between unskilled labour migration 
and perceived migrant welfare dependency. 
 The employers’ representatives interviewed understand the position of Ministry 
of the Interior and claim that promoting welfare dependency of migrant workers is also 
not in their interest. 
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Representative, Confederation of German Employers' Associations  
We understand that the Ministry of the Interior has to consider the security aspects; after 
all we do not want immigration into the social-welfare system.  
 
MdB Grindel insists that all immigration to Germany must lead into the labour market 
and not into the social-welfare system. He nevertheless supports skilled labour migration, 
which implies that he does not perceive skilled foreigners as potential welfare liability.  
 
MdB Reinhard Grindel, CDU   
We don’t want further immigration into the social-welfare system. The share of foreigners 
among the unemployed is twice as high as their share of the overall population. The 
share of foreigners among those claiming social-welfare payments is three times as high 
as their share among the overall population. We want less immigration into the social- 
welfare system and more immigration of skilled migrants that actually have chance of 
participating in the labour market.  
 
The Christian Democrats are keen to stress that their party insists on migrant workers 
being able to financially sustain themselves and not becoming a liability to the German 
state. Therefore long-term residence rights for migrant workers are reserved only for 
those who can prove that are able to support themselves and their families.  
 
Party Consultant for Work Group Interior Affairs, CDU  
And with this discussion it was important for our parliamentary group that we include a 
safety device, which one says:  “condition is that in the last year you did not receive any 
social security benefits (e.g. Unemployment benefits) to supplement your cost of living. 
For us the highest requirement is not to confront the state with any additional financial 
liabilities.  
 
The Liberal Party respondent is highly critical of the CDU’s perceived obsession 
with supposed structural welfare dependency of immigrants in Germany and believes that 
this attitude severely undermines all constructive attempts to develop a comprehensive 
skilled labour migration policy framework for Germany. Yet, in the same statement the 
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respondent assures that skilled labour migration policies should encourage immigration 
of people that are less likely to become a financial liability to the state.  
 
Party Consultant for Integration, FDP  
We are still trapped in old models of argumentation, it always seems to be about 
migration into the social welfare system, that is stereotypical argument. That is too short 
sighted. This effectively undermines any attempt to manage migration properly. It is a 
fortress mentality that goes like a red line through the politics of immigration. However, 
we should not ignore the rationale behind this mentality. In my opinion, a skills based 
immigration system should be aligned towards people that do not wish to take advantage 
of the social welfare system but to those who wish to contribute.     
 
The statement also implies that skilled labour migration policies such as PBIS could 
effectively be utilized to filter unskilled migrants and subsequently reduce welfare 
dependency of migrants. As such the Liberal respondent confirms that she perceives 
unskilled immigration as detrimental to Germany. 
The statements of the interview respondents indicate that skilled labour migration 
policy formation processes in Germany are influenced by two distinct factors. The first 
factor concerns the domestic unemployed whereby German policy makers across the 
political spectrum agree that the interest of domestic workers takes precedence over 
employer demand for skilled foreign workers, even if the former do not possess the 
proper professional qualifications. Even the respondents representing industry and 
employers’ interest acknowledge that they cannot ask the government to ease 
immigration restrictions for skilled migrant professionals while employers are not even 
attempting to train unemployed domestic workers. This suggests that within the context 
of political debate over skilled labour migration, the interest of domestic German 
workers/voters is more pronounced than the economic interest of employers, which 
somewhat contradicts the existing literature on labour migration that emphasises the 
agency of employer interest in policy formation processes (Castles, 2004; Money, 1997; 
Leitner, 1995).   
The second factor concerns welfare access for immigrants. A number of 
respondents insist that skilled labour migration polices in Germany should not encourage 
or facilitate welfare dependency of migrants. While most respondents concur that skilled 
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migrant professionals will be unlikely to move to Germany in order to access the national 
social-welfare system, many respondents acknowledge that this is a problem with 
unskilled and semi-skilled migrants. Koopmans (2010) and Weis et al. (2011) confirm 
this assessment. As a consequence, policy makers are wary of implementing immigration 
policies, including skilled labour migration policies, which could facilitate or could be 
perceived as facilitating unskilled immigration and enabling migrant access to welfare. 
The interview statements suggest that in the context of skilled labour migration debate, 
German policy makers are equally if not more concerned with ensuring that undesired 
migrants are kept out than with promoting immigration of skilled foreign workers. 
The interview statements expose the inherent limitations of skilled labour 
migration policy formation in Germany. The analysis of the interview data shows that 
labour market outcomes of unskilled and semi-skilled domestic workers as well as the 
perceived negative implications of unskilled labour migration on the lower segments of 
the German labour market and the German welfare state disproportionately shape 
political discourse on skilled labour migration. According to the respondents, skilled 
labour migration policies need to ensure preferential labour market access for unskilled 
and semi-skilled domestic workers while restricting labour access of unskilled foreigners. 
This suggests that two of the policy goals of the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled 
Labour Migration are to promote employment of domestic workers and prevent labour 
market competition through maintaining barriers towards unskilled labour migration.  
 
6.5 - Welcome Culture & Integration of Skilled Migrant Workers 
 
 The topic of Welcome Culture and improvements of basic condition for newcomers 
to Germany constitutes a key policy measure of the 2009 Action Programme. Yet, the 
analysis of political debate in Bundestag and Bundesrat reveals that it does not constitute 
a prominent subject of political debate during the political negotiations of the legislation. 
This is a not surprising, after all legislating a new income threshold or improving skills 
recognition procedures is far easier for policy makers than legislating a Welcome 
Culture, something that requires decades and involves significant effort and adjustment 
on part of the entire society. While debate analysis from the previous chapter merely 
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shows that the topic of Welcome Culture is not prominently featured within political 
discourse, the interview data provides significant insight on the topic. In fact, without the 
interview data it would not have been possible to construct this thematic narrative and 
thus in the context of the Welcome Culture narrative, the interview data effectively 
constitutes the primary data set. The interviews also reveal that debate over the 
integration of skilled foreign professionals in Germany constitutes a prominent theme 
within political discourse.  
 A number of interview respondents comment that forthcoming and accommodating 
skilled labour migration policies and immigration laws are not the only factor that 
facilitate and sustain skilled labour migration flows to Germany. The interview 
respondent representing the Commissioner for Integration and Migration in Berlin talks 
about a  “Welcome Culture” and suggests that German society needs to develop a more 
positive attitude towards international migrants.  
 
Representative, Commissioner for Integration and Migration Berlin 
We have to create totally new motivations, I am not talking of pay and work conditions, 
but instead a wide social acceptance among the domestic population. A so-called 
welcome culture.  
 
 The trade union respondent from the IG Metal believes that the lack of a welcoming 
culture in Germany has contributed to the failure of previous attempts to recruit skilled 
professionals from abroad. In his view the government’s “Green Card” scheme from the 
year 2000 ultimately failed because foreign IT professionals felt they would not be 
welcome in Germany.  
 
Integration Commissioner, Industrial Union of Metalworkers Berlin/Brandenburg  
During the Green Card debate we witnessed that the skilled workers neither came from 
the high skill sector or the professional sector because this group felt that they were in 
fact not welcome over here.  
 
Boswell  & Hough (2008) contribute the Green Card’s limited success to its restrictive 
bureaucratic rules, which could have been interpreted by prospective immigrant IT 
professionals as sign that foreigners were actually not welcome in Germany.    
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  Aside from creating a welcoming culture for prospective migrant professionals, 
some of the respondents mention so-called soft-factors that often lie beyond the reach of 
labour migration policy and are not necessarily related to the labour market at all. For the 
respondent from the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration 
these factors are located within the social sphere and relate to matters of personal 
convenience and lifestyle choices of prospective migrant professionals.  
 
Representative, Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration  
It also is about the opportunity to bring along spouses, it is also about the ability to enrol 
children in kindergarten. In that light residence permits are not that important anymore, 
because if you get a good, well paying job and your wife too, it will not be about any legal 
mumbo-jumbo that you solve sooner or later. What really is important is the reputation of 
the country, how much foreigners enjoy living here.  
 
The respondent from the Association of German Engineers also references these 
factors and he also points to another issue. According to the respondent, skilled 
professionals tend to earn high salaries and he believes that Germany’s high levels of 
taxation and social security contributions for high-income earners discourage elite 
migration to Germany. 
 
Representative, Association of German Engineers  
Here the attractiveness of the [work] location plays a prominent role. Questions about tax 
burdens, social insurance, family unification and welcome culture become very important.  
 
Another respondent mentions that the highly regulated nature of the German 
labour market is a deterrent for foreign professionals and he contributes the success of 
skilled labour recruitment in the Anglo-Saxon economies to their relatively unregulated 
labour markets that allow easy access for outsiders.  
 
Representative, German Expert Advisory Board on Integration and Migration  
You are right, the recruitment methods of the Anglo-Saxon countries are more successful 
but you also have to look at the framework of their labour markets. A labour market that is 
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relatively unregulated provides more opportunity for people coming from the outside. A 
labour market that is highly regulated does provide far less opportunities for outsiders.  
 
Weis et al. (2011) confirm that the deregulated labour markets of the Anglo-
Saxon economies in conjunction with their relative weak welfare systems are more 
attractive to skilled migrant professionals than the highly regulated labour market in 
Germany with its relatively strong welfare system. 
In the context of the welcome culture debate, a number of respondents 
specifically reference the need for foreigners, including skilled professionals, to integrate 
themselves into Germany. That means Germany welcomes immigrants to the country but 
in return migrants are expected to adjust to the socio-cultural norms in Germany. The 
term integration carries a different meaning in different contexts and the recurring 
mentioning of the term  “integration” or the phrase “need to integrate” by different 
interview respondents warrants further investigation into the meaning of integration 
within the political discourse on skilled labour migration (King & Skeldon, 2010).  
Heckmann (2005, p. 15) defines social integration as ‘a long-lasting process of inclusion 
and acceptance of migrants in the core institutions, relations and statuses of the receiving 
society. For the migrants integration refers to a process of learning a new culture, an 
acquisition of rights, access to positions and statuses, a building of personal relations to 
members of the receiving society and a formation of feelings of belonging and 
identification towards the immigration society. Integration is an interactive process 
between migrants and the receiving society, in which, however, the receiving society has 
much more power and prestige.’  
According to King & Skeldon, (2010) integration is commonly divided into a 
number of different spheres - economic, social, political, and spatial and Heckmann 
(2005) organizes social integration as follows.  
1. Structural integration that refers to the acquisition of legal rights and status within 
the core institutions of the host society such as employment, housing, education, 
health services, political and citizenship rights. 
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2. Cultural integration that refers to the cognitive, behavioural and attitudinal change 
of immigrants and their descendants in order to conform to the norms of the host 
society; 
3. Interactive integration that refers to social intercourse, friendship, marriage and 
membership of various organizations. 
4. Identificational integration refers to feelings of belonging, expressed in terms of 
allegiance to ethnic, regional, local and national identity. 
 
Heckman’s notions of immigrant integration primarily conceptualize integration as effort 
on part of the migrants as they have to conform to social, political, linguistic and cultural 
norms prevalent in the host society. However, many economically advanced migrant 
receiving countries have adopted state policies promoting multiculturalism, that is the 
recognition and accommodation of ethno-cultural heterogeneity of state institutions and 
policies (Koopmans, 2010). It seems natural that immigrant integration and state 
multiculturalism should a complement each other but as King & Skeldon (2010) point 
out, multicultural societies are characterized by diversity in culture, religion, class, 
language and social attitudes that make it near impossible to promote a specific mode of 
integration. Koopmans (2010), Joppke (2004) and Delanty (2008) argue therefore that 
state multiculturalism promotes easy access to social rights such as welfare and 
permeates cultural difference within receiving society. This in turn has negative 
consequences on the socio-economic integration of immigrants, particular in relationship 
to labour market participation, in many European countries. According to Sides & Citrin 
(2007) many European countries have started to move away from state multiculturalism 
and integrationist immigration policies in favour of assimilation, demanding that 
migrants adopt the linguistic and cultural norms of the host society. Koopmans (2010), 
Joppke, (2004), and Bade (2000) claim that German policy makers have historically 
preferred assimilatory immigration policies over integrationist policies, meaning that 
state policy aims to encourage migrants to adopt the majority culture, which according to 
Vermeulen (2010) is perceived by immigration policy makers as well some migration 
scholars as a precondition to upward social mobility of migrants.  
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The interview data reveals that it is mostly the Christian Democrat respondents 
that feel that the issue of social integration is important within political debate on skilled 
labour migration. According to the following Christian Democrat respondent, one of the 
factors that characterize internal labour migration within the EU is the fact that social 
integration of EU migrants in Germany is not considered a significant policy issue. The 
respondent claims that integration problems are mainly located within the Turkish 
migrant community in Germany and that the perceived failure of Germany’s large 
Turkish community to socially integrate itself into German society has an effect on 
contemporary skilled labour migration debate in Germany. 
 
Party Consultant for Work Group Interior Affairs, CDU  
I believe, in Germany, our [negative] experiences are made, - not with the European 
Union citizens, everything there falls under freedom of movement and there are also no 
significant problems with the social integration of the people - mainly with the Turkish 
immigrants. This is where the entire problem of the social integration is located. This 
[group] also determines the entire debate about integration. 
 
When challenged about the fact that labour migrants from a number of non-EU 
countries such as Canada, Japan or the United States enjoy special privileges over other 
third country nationals wishing to work in Germany, the Christian Democrat respondent 
justifies this with the fact that migrants from industrialized western countries have fewer 
difficulties integrating into Germany, which entitles them to certain legal privileges such 
as the waiving of visa requirements.  
 
Party Consultant for Work Group Interior Affairs, CDU  
Those are the countries that are already privileged through another policy and therefore 
need no visa. These countries are very important for our international trade and it was not 
deemed necessary to make here rules that obstruct this exchange. And with them there 
are also no problems with integration. 
 
This indicates that conservative policy makers in Germany prefer labour migrants that are 
perceived to be more willing to or more capable of socially integrating themselves into 
German society. By default this preference will most likely extend towards migrants from 
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other European countries or other economically advanced states. Christian Democrat 
MdB Grindel is also critical of what he perceives as failed social integration of certain 
migrant groups in Germany, albeit he does not single out Turkish migrants. MdB Grindel 
however mentions that his party is more concerned about integrating Germany’s existing 
migrant communities rather than encouraging or enabling further migration to Germany. 
Kruse et al. (2003) confirm that the Christian Democrats in Germany put a stronger 
emphasis on promoting integration of existing migrant communities than on promoting 
further immigration to Germany.  
 
MdB Reinhard Grindel, CDU   
I believe that we [the CDU] always and in particular concerned ourselves with the 
question of the integration of the persons living here more strongly than with the 
organization of further immigration [to Germany]. 
 
For Mdb Grindel integration is not conceptualized as a two-way street whereby both 
immigrant community and host society require adaptation. Instead integration means that 
migrants have to adapt to the norms of the host society or the majority culture. For 
German policy makers, particularly on the conservative political spectrum, integration 
equals labour market participation and subsequently migrants on welfare are not 
considered integrated. As such, MdB Grindel’s statement really means that he thinks that 
Germany already has enough unemployed unskilled migrants that need to be integrated 
into the labour market and therefore further migration of unskilled foreigners, who are 
likely going to exacerbate existing integration problems within the labour market, is not 
desirable. Both Bade (2002) and Joppke (2000) confirm that in Germany the labour 
market has traditionally facilitated the integration of immigrants and as such it not 
surprising that Germany’s political elites conceptually link immigrant integration and 
migrant labour market participation together. This also explains the significance migrant 
integration within the context of political debate on skilled labour migration. In Germany 
migrant integration and the labour market are conceptually linked and subsequently 
migrant integration is a factor in skilled labour migration debate. This may explain the 
CDU’s opposition towards large-scale fundamental labour migration reform. There 
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appears to be a fear that continued immigration, even of skilled professionals, might 
exacerbate perceived or real integration problems within Germany’s migrant community.     
The Integration Commissioner of the IG metal on the other hand is convinced that 
the Christian Democrats instrumentalize the issue of migrant integration to prevent or 
slow down skilled labour migration reform.   
 
Integration Commissioner, Industrial Union of Metalworkers Berlin/Brandenburg  
It is unbelievable how the political class in this country makes life difficult for those willing 
to integrate. This is an example of clientele politics, for which I blame the conservative 
camp.  
 
Boswell & Hogh (2008) confirm that CDU has a tradition of utilizing controversies 
surrounding immigration as political opportunity structure. The respondent from the 
Association of German Engineers also laments that the political debate on skilled labour 
migration is disproportionally influenced by factors that in his view are not remotely 
relevant to skilled labour migration, including the perceived failed social integration of 
certain segments of Germany’s migrant community.  
 
Representative, Association of German Engineers  
We also have a blending of terms in the overall migration debate, such as asylum 
seekers, terrorists, and labour migrants. This just cannot work because the basic 
foundations are just too different.  
 
Yet, even the Green Party respondent admits that social integration is a prominent 
factor even within skilled labour migration debate and subsequent labour market outcome 
of skilled migrant professionals. 
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Refugee Policy, Green Party 
It is obvious that those migrants with less cultural differences, that are less different to the 
prevalent German culture, are better positioned and exposed to less discrimination.   
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Kruse et al. (2003, p.138) note that in Germany all political parties agree on the necessity 
of migrant integration and acknowledge the interdependence between migrant integration 
and migration control.  
The Director of the Welcome Center Hamburg confirms that migrant 
professionals from western countries have an easier time socially integrating themselves, 
which in her experience almost always culminates in improved labour market 
performance for the individual migrant.  
 
Director, Welcome Center Hamburg 
Anyway this notion of integration, that we carry forward and that we pass on to the 
people, is supposed to make people feel welcome and help them find employment 
congruent to their training.  
 
This feeds into what Vermeulen (2010) has labelled the classical pattern of assimilation 
whereby upward social mobility is primarily available to those migrants arriving with 
sufficient human capital (skilled) and whom the government and the general population 
perceive positively.  
A number of respondents mention that the nature of immigration debate in 
Germany has an impact on defining and shaping the welcome culture in Germany. Many 
of the interviewees stress that the political debate on immigration including labour 
migration has improved in recent years and that this has helped to convey a better image 
of Germany and its labour market among prospective migrant professionals. The 
representative of the Confederation of German Trade Unions believes that the political 
debate on migration under the current grand coalition government has improved 
significantly compared to previous governments. 
 
Integration Commissioner, Confederation of German Trade Unions  
The great advantage of this legislative period was the debates were conducted in a much 
calmer manner on the one hand and that on the other hand the politics of integration are  
not considered a form of forced assimilation anymore.  
 
Dr. Bade believes that Germany, despite its long denial of even being a country of 
immigration, has in fact been more successful in incorporating its migrant communities 
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than other European countries. Koopmans (2010), Joppke (2009) and Koopmans & 
Statham (1999) support Bade’s view that despite Germany’s assimilationist integration 
policies, restrictionist immigration and residence legislation in conjunction with a noted 
absence of official state policies promoting multiculturalism, Germany’s migrant 
community has higher rates of labour market participation, improved language skills and 
experiences lower levels of cultural alienation than migrants in other parts of Europe. It 
should be noted though that the majority of migrants and migrant descendants in 
Germany originated from other European countries and that the vast majority of German 
Muslims arrived from moderate Islamic countries such as Turkey or the Balkans 
(Schönwalder, 2004). As such the immigrant population in Germany is markedly 
different from the migrant communities in France, the Netherlands or Great Britain. 
At the same time Dr. Bade believes that some of the difficulties in regards to 
social integration of certain migrant groups are linked to Germany’s lack of historical 
experience with non-European immigrants. 
 
Dr Klaus Bade, Immigration Scholar & Government Advisor 
I have always said that we Germans do not need to hide behind the “accomplishments” 
of our European neighbours – especially compared the England where integration has 
always been a “Bloody Affair”, compared to the Netherlands, which is still shocked about 
the murder of Theo van Gogh, compared to France, the hot fall of 2005; all this never 
really happened in Germany. Germany is by no means an exemplarily model but it is a 
relatively successful model with many reductions, accidents, unnecessary delays and the 
collective denials about immigration in the 1980s. That said, Germans are far less 
experienced in dealing with third country nationals.  
 
 Joppke (2009) supports Bade’s assessment and states that Muslims in the United 
Kingdom experience significantly higher levels of alienation and discontent than 
Muslims in Germany despite the British state actively engaging with its Muslim 
community far more extensively than any other European state in order to accommodate 
the collective claims of its Muslim citizens. Germany’s longstanding aversion towards a 
legal framework promoting and upholding multiculturalism and religious diversity appear 
not to have been as detrimental to the social integration of foreigners in Germany as 
generally presumed (Koopmans, 2010). 
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 Overall there appears to be a consensus among the policy makers, institutional actors, 
labour market stakeholders, and migration policy advisors interviewed that the successful 
management of skilled labour migration in Germany goes beyond immediate immigration 
policies and that there is an important social component of which policy makers need to 
be aware. Skilled migrant professionals do not merely migrate into the labour market but 
into German society. Consequently skilled migrant professionals are not exclusively 
motivated by immediate labour market outcomes and economic considerations but are 
equally motivated by the prospect of social inclusion and acceptance of them and their 
families in the receiving society. Many of the respondents refer to this social acceptance 
and inclusion of migrants as “Welcome Culture” and stress that the attractiveness of the 
German labour market is partially dependent on this “Welcome Culture”. 
 At the same time conservative German policy makers expect that migrants in 
Germany, including skilled professionals, socially integrate themselves into German 
society and conform to German customs and social norms. From a policy maker view, 
migrant social integration and active labour market participation are a precondition for 
successful immigration policy outcome. Many of the interview statements also suggest 
that German policy makers conceptualize labour market participation as a precondition 
for social integration and a number of respondent use the terms social integration and 
labour market integration interchangeably. Therefore the inclusion of the Welcome 
Culture policy stipulation in the 2009 Action Programme is not surprising. This also 
shows that German policy makers do not conceptualize skilled labour migration as mere 
movement of people between nation-states but also consider migrant’s labour market as 
well as social integration as an important policy objective.  
 
6.6 - Income Threshold for Skilled Migrant Professionals 
 
The following three sections will discuss specific policy measures of the 2009 
Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration and contextualize these with the 
interview data collected. As already discussed in the previous chapter, one of more 
significant changes of the 2009 Action Programme has been the reduction of the income 
threshold for highly skilled migrant professionals.  
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The analysis of the political debates in both Bundestag and Bundesrat in the 
previous chapter reveals that there has been significant discussion over the issue of 
income thresholds for skilled migrant professionals during the sample period. The 
analysis has also revealed that there is significant discontent over the new income 
threshold, with the opposition parties but also representatives from the governing Social 
Democrats supporting a lower income threshold. The statements collected from the 
interview respondents indicate a similar argumentative pattern. The Social Democrat 
respondent who participated in negotiations over the new income threshold for skilled 
workers states that the new income threshold is still too high and that this will continue to 
prevent prospective migrant professionals from taking up employment in Germany. 
 
Party Consultant for Committee on Interior Affairs, SPD  
It was important to have a new regulation here, that enables the highly skilled 
professionals – the old regulation of !84.000 failed to achieve the intended outcome –  
with a salary of  !63.000, which is still too high, better access to the German labour 
market.  
 
He then states that the Christian Democrat representatives were unwilling to support a 
lower income threshold during the policy negotiations and claims that Social Democrats 
only accepted the  !63.600 because a small step in the right direction is better than no 
step at all.  
The opposition Liberals and Greens also support the reduction of the income 
threshold for skilled labour migrants, the Liberal respondent states that her party had 
hoped for a significantly larger reduction. 
 
Party Consultant for Integration, FDP  
The income threshold reduction is insufficient….The salary levels were ultimately only 
reduced due to the request of the Bundesrat, which includes states with FDP Coalitions 
governments.   
 
The Liberal respondent also points out that the mandatory priority check required for 
skilled migrant professionals with salaries below the income threshold effectively bars 
migrants from the German labour market. According to the respondent the system of 
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priority checks is the actual issue that should have been improved instead of lowering 
income thresholds for elite migrants.  
 
Party Consultant for Integration, FDP  
One of the things is that the priority check system is still too bureaucratic and as a result 
that nobody can make it into the labour market. 
 
She then points out that in the previous year only 212 skilled migrants qualified for 
settlement permits under the old income threshold and she does not believe that the 
numbers will improve significantly with the new reduced income threshold.   
The Christian Democrat respondent confirms that her party opposes lower income 
thresholds for skilled migrant professionals. The respondent insists that the prospects of 
indefinite residence rights given to elite migrants warrants a sufficiently high barrier in 
order to prevent abuse of the system and the income threshold provides an adequate 
barrier. 
 
Party Consultant for Work Group Interior Affairs, CDU  
We had were against a further reduction of the minimum income threshold because we 
are of the opinion that this policy should only apply only to elite migrants, those with really 
high earnings and that we should expect from others that they initially only receive a 
limited residence permit, which may be extended at one point.  
 
For the CDU, the 2009 policy is supposed to accommodate the high-income elites among 
the skilled migrant professionals such as elite-managers and researchers. The Christian 
Democrats appear hesitant to grant long-term residence rights to “ordinary” skilled 
migrants and instead wish to reserve the right to permanent settlement in Germany to 
affluent elite migrants. In light of the CDU’s general apprehension regarding welfare 
dependency of immigrants, there is an understanding that those migrants earning over  
!63.600 are not ever likely become a financial liability to the German state. The Christian 
Democrat respondent insists that the migration channel set out by the Action Programme 
and its income threshold should exclusively facilitate the immigration procedure for 
migrant elites while “average” or “ordinary” skilled migrant professionals earning less 
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than !63,600 are provided with alternative migration channels.51 The respondent admits 
though that there has been pressure to set the income threshold at a lower level from the 
Christian Democrat dominated Bundesrat and thus unbeknownst the respondent 
acknowledges the difference of opinion between federal Christian Democrats in the 
government and the Christian Democrats representatives from the individual federal 
states over the issue of salary boundaries for highly skilled migrant professionals (see 
Table 5.6).  
 
Party Consultant for Work Group Interior Affairs, CDU  
Yes, there was also the suggestion from the Upper House of Parliament to lower the 
income threshold to !54.000, but they could not push it through. There were arguments 
against it, because this income threshold concerns only a special paragraph, which 
makes it possible to certain highly qualified migrant professionals to receive an indefinite 
residence and work permit without priority examination; that is the so-called settlement 
principle. In addition, migrant professionals with salaries below the income threshold can 
also receive  a work permit, however only limited, depending upon qualification. If they 
come from the European Union, without priority examination and if they come from third 
countries, with priority examination. 
 
Even though the respondent admits that the system of priority examinations for labour 
market access of skilled migrant from third countries is bureaucratic and slow, she insists 
that migrant professionals earning less than !63.600 should not automatically be entitled 
to indefinite residence rights in Germany. This shows that conservative policy makers are 
less inclined to promote long-term or permanent settlement of skilled migrant workers 
with lower annual incomes. 
The respondent from the Federal Ministry of the Interior supports the CDU’s 
insistence on sufficiently high-income thresholds for foreign professionals. According to 
the respondent, the current legislation bestows very generous residence rights to skilled 
migrant professionals that should be reserved only for elite migrants with sufficient 
income levels.  
 
                                                
51 The respondent refers to the priority check system, whereby employers have to prove to the employment agency that 
no Germany or EU national was willing to take the job if they want to employ a third country national. 
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Representative, Federal Ministry of the Interior 
Well, you need to understand that this is a measure that is totally unique within Europe. 
There are many policies and programs on skilled labour migration but in all other 
countries highly skilled migrants only get temporary residence permits, which according 
to EU guidelines will lead to permanent residence after five years. In our case these 
people get an immediate indefinite residence permit and that justifies a higher income 
threshold as for example required in the Netherlands where the threshold is !30.000 or 
!35.000. We still think this is justifiable and a further reduction, we have already 
discussed this with Ministry of Labour, will not happen. 
 
The respondent also believes that the prospect of long-term residence rights requires 
sufficient barriers in order to prevent abuses of the immigration system, thus echoing the 
Christian Democrat position on income thresholds.  
However, the respondents from the other federal ministries admit that they had 
been open to discussing significantly lower income thresholds for migrant professionals 
but the CDU and the Federal Ministry of the Interior were not willing to compromise on 
this. The respondent from the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs mentions 
that Annette Schavan, Federal Minister of the Education (CDU) supported lower income 
thresholds during the initial federal cabinet debate on the 2009 policy but was overruled 
by Wolfgang Schäuble, Minister of the Interior (CDU). Immigration has traditionally 
been the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and henceforth the Minster of 
the Interior usually gets his way in the immigration debate (Bade, 2002). The respondent 
from the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs tries to not be overly critical of 
the dominance of the Ministry of the Interior within political debate on labour market 
policy, even though he considers it the jurisdiction of his ministry.  
 
Representative, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
All I can say is that Mr Schäuble thinks of himself as a labour market expert and so does 
Mrs Schavan. 
 
The respondents representing Germany’s employers and industry criticise the new 
income threshold as too high and out of touch with the salary ranges common in the 
German labour market. They admit that they had actively lobbied the government to 
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implement lower income thresholds for skilled workers and are disappointed that the 
government, particularly the CDU, refuses to implement lower thresholds.  
 
Representative, Confederation of German Employers' Associations  
Unfortunately the federal government did not heed our calls and we still criticise that the 
income threshold is still too high. …The boundary is set at the old age pension insurance 
obligation threshold, which is !63.600. This is still, a lot of money – the Bundesrat also 
asked for a lower income threshold.  
 
For the representative of the Association of German Engineers the new income 
threshold represents an insurmountable barrier to the recruitment of entry-level engineers 
from outside the EU. He even goes so far as to suggest that the income threshold will 
likely attract the wrong kind of skilled migrant, namely older migrants with families that 
are less flexible. He points out that industry is actually looking for young, mobile, and 
flexible entry-level engineers. 
 
Representative, Association of German Engineers  
A critical point is the minimum income threshold of !66.300. This number is too high. The 
proper threshold should be more around !40.000. For that you can actually get entry-
level positions filled. !66.300 means a) no entry levels b) age (likely older) c) family – a 
change of location is always problematic [with family]. These problems do not exist at an 
income threshold of !40.000. 
 
A number of respondents mention that the optimal income threshold would be 
around !40.000. According to Dr Bade the income threshold, past and present, is the 
main barrier preventing sufficient numbers of skilled migrant professionals from entering 
the German labour market. 
 
Dr Klaus Bade, Immigration Scholar & Government Advisor 
A few months ago I already warned the Federal Ministry of Education that we have a 
dramatic emigration of high skilled professionals and at the same time lack immigration of 
high skilled professionals because the minimum income threshold is too high – back then 
it was !85.000,--,  later they lowered it to !65.000,-- , which is still way too high – they 
need to lower this to !45.000,-- , which the government even refuses to discuss. 
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When Dr. Bade talks about the government not even willing to discuss lower income 
threshold than the current levels, he refers to the Christian Democrats because the Social 
Democrat respondent clearly supports lower income thresholds as well as the Liberal and 
Green respondents. The current income threshold of !63.600 has been implemented on 
the insistence of the Christian Democrats and the CDU run Federal Ministry of the 
Interior. Virtually every other interview respondent supports lower income threshold 
levels for skilled migrant professionals from third countries.    
 Interestingly, while there is much support for lower income thresholds for skilled 
migrant professionals, virtually no respondent actually challenges the utility and purpose 
of income threshold levels as a means to determine the applicant’s skills, qualifications, 
and professional expertise. The stipulation behind the income threshold basically assumes 
that if a migrant earns above !63.600 he or she must be a skilled worker.52 The 
representative from the Green Party is the only interview respondent who is critical of 
this assumption because the sole reliance of income levels does not factor in the actual 
skills and expertise that migrant professionals may possess.  
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Refugee Policy, Green Party  
The new policy has major flaw and that is the minimum income threshold. The [income] 
level is not relevant, what does it matter to me how much someone makes. I should only 
be of interest if this person has the proper qualifications, something that is in demand. 
Then you can say the high-skill regulation has its purpose and it makes sense to have 
higher requirements towards highly skilled migrant professionals because this group of 
people can relatively easy and quick get settlement permission. In an ideal scenario this 
would mean immediately. 
 
The respondent insists that any policy framework for skilled labour recruitment should be 
based on the person’s skills, qualifications, and expertise and also incorporate labour 
                                                
52 It was rather embarrassing for the German government when it was revealed in early 2011 that Saif al-Arab Gaddafi, 
son of former Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi, was given an indefinite residence permit in Germany under the 
2009 policy for high skilled professionals earning over !63.600. The company, which is owned by a Syrian business 
man, hired Saif al-Arab Gaddafi as “specialist’ consultant but there is now evidence that he never actively worked in 
the company.  
(http://www.focus.de/panorama/reportage/report-der-hochqualifizierte-gaddafi-jr-_aid_605739.html - accessed on June 
1st 2011) 
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market demand for certain professions. For the Green party respondent the income 
threshold does not incorporate any of these factors.  
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Refugee Policy, Green Party  
From a labour market and immigration viewpoint income levels are not relevant and also 
represent an adverse conditionality for migration. Professional qualification and the 
depletion effect on the German labour market - those are the criteria that are important 
for migration and migration management.    
 
The respondent nevertheless concurs that if income thresholds are used to determine 
eligibility for indefinite residence rights, than the barriers should be sufficiently low to 
allow labour market access for migrant professionals that are not necessarily part of the 
managerial and academic elite. 
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Refugee Policy, Green Party  
As I said before, lower the barriers under consideration of the priority check, which should 
include skilled manual workers [trades].  
 
The analysis of the respondent statements regarding income thresholds for skilled 
migrant professionals indicates that a majority of policy makers and labour market 
stakeholders prefer lower income thresholds than the current level set by the 2009 Action 
Programme on Skilled Labour Migration. However, the Christian Democrats oppose any 
calls to further income threshold reductions. Despite their coalition partners’ as well as 
the opposition parties’ support for a lower income threshold, the Christian Democrats 
remain steadfast on the issue. However, some respondents acknowledged that the CDU 
federal state representatives in the German Bundesrat were actually open to negotiating 
lower income thresholds but the federal Christian Democrats in the government opposed 
this. The analysis of the parliamentary debate transcripts in the previous chapter confirms 
this. 
The Christian Democrat as well as the opposition from within the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior towards lower income thresholds for skilled migrant professionals 
and in conjunction with the Christian Democrat’s domineering position within the 
political discourse on this issue suggests that conservative policy makers and responsible 
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institutional stakeholders primarily conceptualize income thresholds for skilled foreigners 
as a barrier preventing long-term or permanent settlement of migrant professionals with 
low and medium incomes. The income threshold does not correspond to specific labour 
market demand in Germany and the respondents representing employers and industry 
confirm that they primarily seek skilled workers within intermediate salary ranges and as 
such the income threshold is de facto a barrier to skilled labour migration in Germany.    
Anderson (2010) states that immigration policy should be conceived as a mould 
constructing a certain type of worker by institutionalizing specific legal parameters 
warranting their entrance into national labour markets. The income threshold as outlined 
in the 2009 Action Programme ensures that long-term residence rights are only given to 
high-income earners, irrespective of professional qualifications or labour market demand. 
In terms of facilitating skilled labour migration to Germany, the income threshold does in 
fact not aim to facilitate labour market access of skilled migrants but instead aims to 
prevent long-term settlement of migrants with incomes below the set threshold. In light of 
the Christian Democrat’s apprehension towards perceived welfare dependency of migrant 
workers and their uncompromising stance against lower income thresholds for skilled 
workers, the income threshold should actually be interpreted as an attempt to limit the 
risk of migrant workers, even skilled professionals, becoming a long-term financial 
liability to the German state. The income threshold clearly does not serve employers’ 
interests and is not linked to labour market demand in Germany; instead it serves the 
political interest of Germany’s conservative political elites and their desire to limit the 
risk of migrant workers accessing the German social-welfare system. As such the income 
threshold should not be conceptualized as a means to facilitate skilled labour migration 
but rather as a policy tool aimed at restricting access to long-term residence rights for 
migrant professionals that could potentially at one point become dependent on the 
German social-welfare system.  
 
6.7 - Foreign Skills Accreditation 
 
One of the policy measures of the 2009 Action Programme calls for improved 
recognition of professional skills and post-secondary degrees of skilled migrants by 
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Germany’s professional regulatory bodies. This policy measure is in an attempt to 
improve labour market access for foreign professionals and enable them take up 
employment that is congruent with their professional qualification. The academic 
literature on skilled labour migration frequently highlights the issue of skills recognition 
and degree accreditation (Girard et al, 2007; Bauder, 2006; Iredale, 2004) and the 
interview data reveals that German policy makers and non-government stakeholders have 
realized that recognizing foreign professional credentials constitutes an important 
component for successful skilled labour recruitment and immigration policy. The 2009 
Action Program on Skilled Labour Migration states that: 
 
Not only the form and content of immigration regulations but also the attractiveness 
of the general conditions for foreigners in Germany will play a decisive role in the 
further opening of the labour market for foreign university graduates. In this 
connection, Germany must compensate for disadvantages in the global competition 
over the best minds which it particularly has vis-à-vis Anglo-Saxon immigration 
countries. This would include, for instance, making better use of immigrants' 
potential and training (particularly through good profiling and targeted updating 
courses) as laid out in the Federal Government's qualification initiative and the 
National Integration Plan. In addition to the issue of granting access to the labour 
market to family members, the following areas for action will be tackled: The easing 
of requirements for the formal recognition of foreign degrees and certificates. 
 
The authors of the Action Programme argue that improved accreditation procedures for 
foreign degrees can counteract the perceived language disadvantage Germany has against 
other migrant receiving countries, particularly English speaking countries. Germany’s 
politicians appear to have grasped the significance of foreign skills recognition in 
conjunction to skilled labour recruitment. The analysis of the parliamentary debates in the 
previous chapter highlights that skills and degree recognition of skilled foreign 
professionals represent a prominent theme within the political discourse on skilled labour 
migration in Germany. It is therefore not surprising that a number of interview 
respondents comment on the issue of foreign skills recognition and how policy 
deficiencies should be remedied. 
   The Green Party respondent states that there is a consensus between the German 
political parties that skills accreditation procedure need to be improved and admits that 
 247 
the government is actually attempting to find and implement a working policy 
framework. He even credits the Christian Democrats engagement on the issue.  
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Refugee Policy, Green Party  
There has been a lot of movement in this regard [foreign skills recognition] and I am 
confident that in the next legislation period we will see further improvement, especially as 
the conservatives seem to have recognized the necessity for this.  
 
The respondent hints that the Christian Democrats are the gatekeepers within the political 
debate on skilled labour migration and improvement and changes to existing policy 
frameworks are likely only to succeed if they are supported by the Christian Democrats.   
 The interview respondent representing the Office of the Commissioner for Integration 
and Migration in Berlin also confirms that significant improvements in regards to foreign 
skills recognition have been undertaken, which is due to an increased awareness among 
German policy makers across the political spectrum regarding the issue of recognizing 
foreign professional qualifications. 
 
Representative, Commissioner for Integration and Migration Berlin 
The other question is whether the acquired degrees are properly recognized in Germany. 
That is not always guaranteed and I see significant barriers here. But it is here where a 
change of mind has occurred in favour of a legal adjustment to ease and speed up the 
recognition procedures.  
 
 When asked what aspect of skilled labour migration needs to be improved the most, a 
number of the policy makers interviewed reference skills recognition and degree 
accreditation. For the representative of the Liberal Party, the speed of accreditation 
procedures is something that needs to be improved and she laments that the current 
system is too time consuming. 
 
Party Consultant for Integration, FDP  
The second thing, which we would have to do immediately, is the recognition of 
educational credentials of the migrants.....Limiting the bureaucracy of the recognition 
procedure is also an issue, because it [the recognition of educational credentials] takes 
far too long.  
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 The respondent from the Links Party also complains that it takes too much time 
for skilled migrant professionals to have their skills and qualifications recognized in 
Germany and points to other countries that supposedly have more efficient accreditation 
procedures in place. He also mentions that there is already a working system in place, 
albeit limited to ethnic Germans, who have a legal right to have their skills recognized 
within a specific timeframe. The respondent suggests extending this legal right to all 
migrants in Germany.   
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Integration, Links Party   
There are countries such as Denmark or Sweden where they have excellent accreditation 
systems in place and here there is one specific group, the repatriated ethnic Germans 
who have a legal right to have their credentials recognized within six months. Thus, this 
[recognition] is possible because these systems are already in place, although only for 
one specific group.  
 
The representative from the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and 
Integration supports the Links Party position and also mentions the policy stipulation for 
ethnic Germans but points out that there also is a policy stipulation at the European level 
regarding recognition of foreign credentials. He also confirms that the government and 
the responsible federal ministries are working hard on implementing a national system for 
foreign skills recognition and that there is a strong political consensus over the issue 
between the political parties.  
 
Representative, Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration  
There is something missing in the German legal code – we are missing something like 
we have for the ethnic Germans, in their case there is an accreditation procedure for their 
degrees. There is also something like that on the EU level but only for highly regulated 
professions. Most jobs are not that regulated. The Biologist has a degree, the mechanic 
has a master apprenticeship but especially for those coming from the Balkans we had 
significant difficulties in recognizing their degrees because their training was not 
considered up to our standards. They failed to access the labour market in their particular 
field. This is an example of “Brain Waste” but we are on it and from a political standpoint 
it’s not that big of a challenge [to change things].  
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The respondent statement shows that German policy makers are aware of deskilling 
process experienced by migrant professional in the German labour market and the 
resulting Brain Waste.   
 The Social Democrat respondent states that the debate within the coalition 
government does not revolve around whether or not to recognize foreign professional 
credentials but rather to what extent professional qualifications should be recognized and 
what policy strategies will likely yield the best outcome.  
 
Party Consultant for Committee on Interior Affairs, SPD 
Then there was an argument over the formulation over what constitutes a recognized 
foreign degree. The CDU said they wanted to recognize the legal and factual university 
degree – we said ‘the degree that is comparable with German degrees will be 
recognized” and we [Social Democrats] prevailed in this debate.    
 
While the government policy makers appear relative confidant that foreign skills 
recognition procedures and associated policy has been and will continue to be improved, 
the interview respondent from trade unions does not share their enthusiasm. For him 
Germany lags behind other countries in respect to accreditation and criticises the fact that 
skilled professionals willing to locate to Germany are in his view deliberately kept 
unaware that their professional qualifications are likely to be devalued.  
 
Integration Commissioner, Confederation of German Trade Unions  
One point is the official recognition of degrees, be this university degrees or occupational 
credentials, where Germany lags behind the other OECD countries and improvements 
will be very difficult even if you take the German bureaucracy out of the equation. The 
second point is counselling. Many highly skilled professionals, even when got their 
degrees over here, do not know about the [labour market] conditions in Germany. 
 
Bauder (2003) confirms that skilled migrant professionals are often left unaware that the 
regulatory bodies in the receiving society will not recognize their educational 
attainments. According Bauder, migrants arriving through Canada’s points based 
immigration system often fail realize that even though the immigration authorities have 
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granted residence rights based on the applicant’s professional qualifications, the 
employers and professional associations in the different Canadian provinces may not 
necessarily recognize their professional qualifications (Bauder, 2006). While policies on 
labour migration are generally implemented on a national scale, the institutional 
processes that deskill migrant labourers often occur on the sub-national scale, particularly 
in countries with a federal constitution.  
 There appears to be widespread awareness among the respondents that the non-
recognition of a migrant’s professional and academic credentials effectively bars them 
from the upper segments of the German labour market and forces them into professions 
that are below their professional and educational qualification.   
 
Representative, Confederation of German Employers' Associations  
Currently there is an important debate about recognition of foreign degrees. What is with 
the degrees and skills acquired abroad? It is well known that relative many people 
immigrate with good degrees and are then employed below their level of expertise and 
skills – for whatever reasons. 
 
Germany however does not have a monopoly on the deskilling of migrant labour. Brandi 
(2001) confirms that in Italy, particularly in Rome, skilled migrant professionals are 
disproportionately represented in low-skill professions in the secondary labour market 
partially because foreigners are effectively excluded from public service sector in Rome. 
The Director of the Welcome Center in Hamburg states in her view the failure to properly 
accredit the credentials of migrant workers continues to discourage skilled migrant 
professionals from moving to Germany. She claims that Germany has already developed 
a bad reputation among elite migrants in that regard.  
 
Director, Welcome Center Hamburg 
The non-recognition of foreign work credentials of highly skilled migrant professionals is a 
major problem. Off course we want that a doctor who can work here as a doctor and not 
as a taxi driver. The situation is still pretty bleak. Due to this problem we have seen a 
decrease in highly skilled migrants coming here.  
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Deskilling of migrant professionals and non-recognition foreign skills is nevertheless by 
no means a problem confined to the German labour market. Mattoo et al. (2008) and 
Thomas (2010) research shows inadequate recognition of foreign professional skills and 
educational attainments is just as much a problem in supposedly liberal immigration 
countries such as the United States and Ireland. 
For the respondent at the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs the non-
recognition of foreign professional qualifications goes beyond Brain Waste because aside 
from marginalizing migrants in the labour market it also leads to social exclusion and 
alienation, particularly of skilled migrant professionals that have come to Germany 
through other routes than the high-skill channel such as spousal reunion or asylum. 
 
Representative, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
Professional accreditation is great problem, because we negate and do not recognize the 
available qualifications – instead they do menial labour such driving taxis…… As I said, 
accreditation is the issue here, it actually is an urgent problem. I have been saying this for 
years. It also relates back self-esteem, it improves [social] integration and for me 
integration is always linked to the question of labour market access. 
 
This then leads to another peculiar aspect related to foreign skills accreditation. The non-
recognition of foreign work credentials and academic degrees does not merely affect 
migrant professionals that are new to the German labour market but also, as earlier 
mentioned, those migrants that have already been in Germany, sometimes for many 
years, without having their credentials officially recognized. The representative from the 
Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration points out that the 
measures in the 2009 Action Programme will benefit long-term migrant residents in 
Germany that have been marginalized in or even excluded from the labour market until 
now because their skills have not been recognized by the authorities and employers.  
 
Representative, Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration  
We look at the [labour] potential that we already have here. How can we activate these 
people to educate and train themselves accordingly? Those people whose credentials 
are not recognized here, possibly due to degrees we do not even know about exist, most 
of them work in the lower pay scales even though they may be qualified to do better.  
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Interview respondents representing industry also admit that employers have failed 
to utilize the skills potential of migrant workers already in Germany due to the non-
recognition of their credentials and they welcome the policy improvements in that regard. 
They also mention that they are attempting to improve the situation from their respective 
end.  
 
Representative, Confederation of German Employers' Associations  
The accreditation debate shifts more towards utilizing the potentials of migrants that are 
already are Germany.  
 
Representative, Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce  
Of course this presents an important [labour] potential, also those who have already 
immigrated and whose degrees are not recognized. There are some things being done 
now so that existing degrees are properly recognized.  
 
Iredale (2001) confirms that much of the on-the-job training and accreditation of 
professional qualifications is driven by private employers who have established their own 
internal training systems. However, a number of respondents from the individual state 
agencies actually point out that according to their daily experience trade unions, 
craftsmen associations, and also industry associations such as chambers of commerce 
often resist government attempts to regulate and facilitate skills recognition of migrant 
workers. 
 
Representative, Commissioner for Integration and Migration Berlin  
During the accreditation process of degrees one could implement a two-year probation 
period for companies willing to employ these people – at a lower salary – and then after 
the probation period and their improved German skills recognize their degrees and then 
fully legalize their residence. The problem here is that the government’s social partners 
such as the trade unions will not cooperate.  
 
One of the main points of contention with the craftsmen association and trade unions is 
their fear that recognition of foreign skills will result in lower qualification standards 
within their respective trades. In other words, skilled workers associations, particularly in 
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the manufacturing and construction business, fear that their professional and by default 
scarce skills will be devalued in the labour market if migrant workers, perceived to be 
less qualified, receive the same professional credentials through the accreditation 
procedure.  
 
Representative, Commissioner for Integration and Migration Berlin 
There are initiatives that ease the accreditation process for foreign degrees. However, 
the central association of tradesmen for example says if we are too generous with our 
recognition procedure, the high quality standard of our [domestic] degrees are 
devaluated. 
 
Bauder (2003) and Girard et al (2006) confirm that professional licensing associations 
prefer domestically trained professionals and try to uphold licensing barriers that 
effectively deskill foreign professionals, particularly in the engineering professions. 
Moreover, according to Iredale (1999) policy makers are apprehensive about alienating 
key labour market stakeholders such as professional associations and their members by 
forcing them to recognize foreign degree qualifications. 
The interview respondent from the German Expert Advisory Board on Integration 
and Migration welcomes initiatives to properly recognize foreign credentials but is also 
somewhat apprehensive about maintaining professional standards within the German 
labour market. 
 
Representative, German Expert Advisory Board on Integration and Migration  
This is a critical point and at the moment there is a lot of development in regards to 
recognition of foreign credentials, the so called accreditation.  Lots is happening here and 
this is a point where a lot a positive changes can come from. Yet, I am a little bit hesitant. 
If a doctor was educated in Siberia, it should not be possible for him to practice medicine 
without further consideration.  
 
Mattoo et al. (2010) confirm that apprehensions about the quality of foreign educational 
attainments and professional training are legitimate, particularly with degrees from 
developing countries. However, their research also reveals that the regulatory regimes 
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imposed on foreigners are just as often a “reflection of protectionist capture of regulatory 
processes by domestic vested interest” (Mattoo et al., 2010, p. 268) 
In order to overcome the resistance of these important stakeholder groups, the 
Integration Commissioner of Lower Saxony suggests incorporating the professional 
associations and trade unions into the accreditation procedure alongside the government 
agencies and ministries on both federal and state level.  
 
Integration Commissioner, Lower Saxony 
We have lots of academics from Eastern Europe who are highly qualified but whose 
degrees are not recognized over here. This will become the greatest challenge for labour 
market management, to locate the jurisdictions within the different scales of government 
but also among trade unions and chambers of commerce.  
 
Other respondents have different suggestions for improving existing professional 
accreditation procedures for migrant workers. The representative from the Office for 
Integration & Migration in Bremen points out that the responsible government agencies 
lack proper IT resources to record, assess, and access the skill levels and professional 
qualifications of migrant workers. This in turn makes it very difficult for the responsible 
government agencies to even designate appropriate skills upgrading initiatives for 
migrant professionals in order to bring their skills and qualification levels up to the 
expected labour market standards in Germany. 
 
Representative, Office for Integration & Migration Bremen 
The recognition of foreign work credentials or qualifications and being able to utilize these 
skills to prevent unemployment and also further upgrade their skills is very important. We 
need to improve the overall framework for the migration of highly skilled professionals 
because what we have in place today will not lead towards sustainable skilled labour 
migration. Furthermore we need to motivate foreign graduates to stay in Germany and 
improve their [legal] status. The collection and processing of data at the Federal 
Employment Agency, where the migrants work credentials are recorded, needs to be 
improved. The current IT system is totally inadequate. 
 
The respondent from Lower Saxony points out that the recognition of migrant 
credentials and associated labour market potential should not just encompass tangible 
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skills and official degrees but should also include a recognition of non-tangible 
qualifications on the part of German employers such as cultural diversity and 
international mobility.  
 
Integration Commissioner, Lower Saxony 
The recognition of foreign degrees does not merely encompass university degrees but 
also professional skills as well as skills-upgrading. There also needs to be a change of 
attitude in the corporate culture, they need to recognize that diversity equals profit.  
 
The analysis of the interview data reveals that skills recognition and degree 
accreditation of migrant professionals encompasses many different aspects of migration 
and labour market policy and that there is a strong political consensus among the policy 
makers interviewed over the necessity of appropriate skills recognition procedures for 
skilled migrant professionals. German policy makers and labour market stakeholders are 
aware that skilled migrant professionals frequently face difficulties in taking up 
employment that is congruent with their professional expertise and education. The 
respondents overwhelmingly acknowledge that Brain Waste is detrimental to everyone 
involved, the migrant worker, the employers, and the German state. The interview 
analysis shows that the most respondents perceive non-recognition as a barrier to skilled 
labour migration. They also acknowledge that non-recognition marginalizes migrant 
professionals who already live in Germany within the labour market. While many 
interview respondents agree that accreditation procedures have improved in recent years, 
the underlying sentiment is that there is still long way to go. The speed of the 
accreditation procedures for new arrivals and appropriate skills upgrading programs for 
migrants that already live in Germany are just two of the suggestions that were brought 
forward by the respondents. Most importantly, the respondents concur that greater 
cooperation between federal and state government as well employers, industrial and 
professional associations, and trade unions on the issue of skills recognition is necessary 
to facilitate a smooth transition of skilled migrant professionals into the German labour 
market and allow them to pursue careers that are congruent with their levels of 
professional expertise and education.   
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Considering the widespread consensus among the interview respondents on the 
topic of skills recognition, it is not surprising that the issue has been included in the 2009 
Acton Programme. Moreover, the recognition of professional skills of migrant workers 
already in Germany does not contradict policy makers’ stated preference for domestic 
workers. In fact it complements existing policy efforts to better utilize domestic skilled 
labour potential.   
 
6.8 - Foreign University Graduates  
 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour 
Migration includes a series of measures that aim to improve labour market access for 
international university graduates. Specifically these policy measures reference three 
distinct groups of post-secondary graduates. First university graduates from the EU-8 +2 
member states (no priority check), second graduates from third countries (subject to 
priority check) and third graduates from German language school abroad (no priority 
check).   
 The respondents were asked to state views on foreign students who graduate from 
German universities and their labour market potential. A number of respondents welcome 
the waiving of the priority check and subsequent full labour market access for university 
graduates from the EU-8 +2 countries. The respondent representing the Federal 
Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration sees the waiving of the priority 
checks for EU-8 +2 academics as a positive policy development but believes that the 
Action Programme could have gone further. He suggests that labour market barriers for 
skilled tradesmen from the new member states should also have been removed.  
 
Representative, Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration  
You cannot say too much about the scale and scope of the Action Programme. It covers 
a wide range, not just one aspect. There have been some changes in regards to the new 
[EU] member states, that their academics have the same freedom of movement as 
citizens of the old EU member states, that is an essential step. However, one could 
question why this freedom of movement was limited to academics and does not apply to 
other employees such as master trades men. 
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The Integration Commissioner for Lower Saxony on the other hand believes that 
full labour market access of  EU-8 +2 academics comes too late because in her view the 
bulk of the post-secondary graduates from Poland and other eastern European countries 
who are willing to migrate are by now long gone to the UK or Ireland.  
 
Integration Commissioner, Lower Saxony 
Well, I do not think that eastern European academics necessarily will come to Germany, 
they already got employment in those other countries [UK & Ireland].  
 
A number of respondents agree with this and also believe that the brightest and 
best skilled professionals from the new EU member states, including academics, are long 
gone and that Germany’s attempt to remove labour market barriers for this group of 
university trained specialists comes too late. 
 
Dr Klaus Bade, Immigration Scholar & Government Advisor 
The elite of mobile workers is already on the road and we have simply come too late.  
 
Representative, German Expert advisory board on Integration and Migration  
Those that migrate are usually the ones that are highly skilled and unlike the unskilled 
they are equipped with human capital and social capital. They are gone now; they got 
their networks now in Sweden, Ireland and the UK..…..Yes, Germany did the crucial 
mistake that they opted out of the EU [free labour mobility] legislation…….Now Germany  
has the problem that all the high skill professionals are already gone.  
 
At this point during the interview, the debate usually shifts towards the impacts of 
the extension of derogation of freedom of movement for EU-8 +2 workers, which 
constitutes a separate policy measure within the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled 
Labour Migration. The discussion of the respondents’ statements on this policy measure 
are discussed in more detail in the following section (Section 6.9) 
The 2009 Action Programme aims to open the labour market for university 
graduates from third countries but in fact it merely confirms existing stipulations because 
graduates from third countries wishing to take up employment in the German labour 
market are still subject to the priority check system. However, the Action Programme 
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implements a number of improvements in relation to labour market access of third 
country nationals. One of these improvements relates to the earlier discussed skills 
recognition and degree accreditation procedures for skilled migrant professionals that 
without doubt will benefit migrant professionals from third countries in the future. Other 
improvements include the exemption of German language requirements for spouses of 
university graduates from third countries or the EU. Moreover, the spouses are also given 
full labour market access by exempting them from the priority check system. 
Surprisingly, the interview respondents have very little to say about these policy 
measures concerning third country nationals.  
The President of the German Institute for Economic Research criticizes the 2009 
Action Programme because it maintains the mandatory priority checks for third country 
nationals that make it very difficult for German employers to hire professionals from 
outside the EU and he suggests that the German government should stop insisting on 
priority checks for third country nationals altogether. 
 
President, German Institute for Economic Research   
The opening of the German labour market for [foreign] graduates is in my view a step in 
the right direction, no matter where they come from. From within the EU all that is needed 
is a vacant position while those coming from outside the EU are subject to a priority 
check. We have to wait and see how this works in practice. Theoretically this can be quite 
simple but in a practical scenario it could be quite complicated. I am in charge of an 
institute and have therefore personal experience in employing foreign professionals  - we 
have a constant demand for them – we had some issue with the responsible 
[government] agencies but now we have a certain routine.  
 
It is however unlikely that the priority check system will be abolished considering the 
widespread consensus among Germany’s politicians (Section 5.3) that the labour market 
prospects of domestic workers must take precedence over foreign workers. The priority 
check system essentially guarantees preferred labour market access for domestic workers.  
However, just like the political representatives in Bundestag and Bundesrat, most 
interview respondents do not appear overly concerned with the labour market prospects 
and skilled labour potential of third country nationals and EU-8 +2 university graduates. 
Instead, significant attention seems to be focused on foreign students attending post-
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secondary education in Germany and their labour market prospects following 
graduation.53 Among the policy makers interviewed there is an almost unanimous 
consensus that foreign nationals studying at German universities should be given the right 
to stay and work in Germany after graduation. Respondents from the opposition parties 
even demand that existing residence and work provisions for migrant graduates should be 
extended.  
 
Party Consultant for Integration, FDP  
We must create an attractive framework for them [foreign graduates], so they remain 
here and not take their degree and leave because their visa runs out. Their time here is 
limited. German society invested into their training and it would be preferably if they can 
return this investment and enrich our society again. We demand that these people 
receive a two-year residence permit after they successfully complete their studies, so 
they can look around the German labour market. 
 
The Green Party representative concurs but insists that measures should be 
implemented to prevent migrant graduates from taking up employment below their 
academic qualification just so that they can remain in Germany, which indicates that he is 
aware that foreign workers can potentially experience deskilling even if they possess 
degrees from domestic post-secondary institutions. The respondent’s apprehension may 
very well be justified as both Bauder (2003) and Girard et al. (2007) suggest that 
deskilling of migrant labour is not exclusively linked to failed accreditation of 
educational credentials but also due to certain cultural processes such as employers’ 
reluctance to hire workers with a foreign background and foreign accent.   
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Refugee Policy, Green Party  
From a legislative point of view we should see if we could extend that period. What we do 
not want is people working below their educational and professional qualifications and 
making an existence as taxi drivers. It nevertheless remains in our interest that people 
educated here should in end be allowed to stay here. By now this idea has created a 
cross-party consensus.  
  
                                                
53 The 2009 Action Programme does not implement any changes to existing legislation it just merely states that it will 
maintain the existing legal provisions for migrants on study visa in Germany 
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Even the Links Party representative agrees and supports the extended residence 
rights and labour market access for foreign graduates. He acknowledges that the Christian 
Democrats were instrumental in extending residence rights and labour market prospects 
of domestically trained foreign graduates. 
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Integration, Links Party   
Well, the latest amendments to the labour migration policy framework have gone in the 
right direction – allowing the people to stay for a year [after graduation]. They [Christian 
Democrats] have become a bit more open minded in this respect. In the past their 
[foreign graduates] ability to utilize the skills acquired over here and remain here 
indefinite were rather limited. This has now been liberalized and we support that.    
 
However, the interview respondent from the Federal Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs is keen to state that migrant graduates are expected to find employment 
within a year after graduation otherwise their residence permit will be relinquished. 
 
Representative, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
They are doing more now than before. Now [migrant] university graduates get a year to 
choose a career. If they cannot find employment within this time, they will have to leave 
the country.  
 
The one-year residence limit following graduation is likely to ensure that foreign 
graduates do not become a long-term liability to the German welfare state. 
The respondent from the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and 
Integration does not dispute that the extended residence rights for migrant graduates are 
an improvement from previous legislation but he believes that the exemption from the 
priority examination for graduates removes an even more significant barrier in respect to  
labour market access in Germany. This then again stresses the significance of the priority 
check system in enabling skilled foreign workers to take up employment in Germany. 
 
Representative, Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration  
For third country nationals who study here the new skilled labour migration law has some 
vital advantages. The priority check has been shelved for them. Once graduated, third 
country national students are entitled to find adequate employment and then they are not 
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subject to the priority check anymore and receive a [post study] residence permit. The 
examination as to whether any German citizen wants that particular job is thus void. It is 
often forgotten that before the new immigration law [2005], third country national students 
had to leave the country upon graduation but now they have the opportunity to stay.  
 
 There are a number of reasons as to why the German government has eased 
labour market access for migrants who have graduated from German universities. Most 
respondents agree that it is not in the interest of the German state and German taxpayers 
to fund the post-secondary education of foreign students and then insist that they leave 
the country after graduating. The following statements highlight this sentiment. 
 
Representative, Association of German Engineers  
They study here, which does cost a lot of money and then they [have to] leave Germany.  
 
Director, Welcome Center Hamburg 
It is a fairly new development that someone who studies here can get a one-year 
residence permit to find employment. The entire thought that someone might study here 
[at taxpayers’ expense] and then has to leave is totally absurd.  
 
The interview respondent from the Federal Ministry of the Interior reveals that 
cost/benefit considerations are not the only factor that lies behind recent policy shifts in 
regards to foreign graduates. The respondent points out that originally the idea behind 
foreigners studying at Germany’s universities was linked to the notion of Third World 
development. In theory immigrants from developing countries were supposed to come to 
Germany in order to acquire skills and expertise at domestic universities and then after 
graduation go back to their country of origin and apply their newly learned skills to 
improve conditions in the home country (Foist, 2008). Because of this foreign students in 
Germany are not required to pay tuition fees as it is common in the Anglo-American 
post-secondary systems (Findley, 2010). Moreover, originally the legal practice of not 
granting residence and work permits to foreign graduates was very much influenced by 
the desire not to exacerbate the Brain Drain from developing countries by recruiting their 
most gifted and skilled (Skeldon, 2008; Faist, 2008; De Haas, 2005). According to the 
respondent this idea of utilizing migrant graduates as development agents in Third World 
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economies has proven an illusion. In fact, the policy of forcing migrant graduates to leave 
Germany after graduation did not compel them to return to the relative poverty of their 
home countries but instead many moved straight away to other industrialized countries 
where they could apply their professional skills that they acquired at the expense of the 
German taxpayer. The respondent claims that the German state until recently paid to 
educate and train the professional labour force of its competitors in other industrialized 
countries. This did not help to alleviate perceived Brain Drain from developing countries 
and thus convinced German policy makers to retain the migrant graduates for the benefit 
of the domestic economy.   
 
Representative, Federal Ministry of the Interior 
The great turnaround came with the previous immigration law [2005] when the realization 
set in that those who were well educated migrated to other industrial countries because 
we did not want them in Germany. Yet, we have a demand for these kinds of skilled 
workers.  Initially the idea was that we only allow them to study here so they can go home 
and utilize their acquired knowledge for the benefit of their home country, like 
development aid. That was the prevailing viewpoint in the early days but then we realized 
that many only enrolled in [German] universities as springboard to work in let’s say in the 
United States or Canada. That’s why we changed the system and said: well, let’s try to 
keep them here. We also realized that not every graduate will be able to find a job right 
away so we implemented a one year probation period. However, they [migrant graduates] 
can only stay if they find adequate employment. We do not want academics who drive 
taxis for years. That does not help us.  
 
Aside from the immediate cost/benefit considerations, the respondent from the 
German Expert Advisory Board on Integration and Migration points out that providing 
improved labour market access to migrant graduates is in fact the quickest way to recruit 
skilled migrant professionals because of their immediate availability, their language 
skills, and their familiarity with German culture.  
 
Representative, German Expert Advisory Board on Integration and Migration  
This is anyway the smartest form of migration of the highly skilled and also the one with 
the least bureaucracy, when you recruit students. First they are already qualified and 
second they already speak the language. A lot of things have already changed in 
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Germany in relation to foreign students – the one-year residence allowance after 
graduation as well as the labour agency granting a right of return to seek employment. 
We have to see how these things will develop over time. This is a real improvement 
considering that prior to 2005, Germany forced its [foreign] graduates to leave the 
country. 
 
Migrant graduates are perceived as the perfect skilled migrant worker. The 
interview respondents representing German industry and employers are equally 
enthusiastic about the skills potential of migrant graduates and they fully support of the 
government on this issue.  
 
Representative, Cologne Institute for Economic Research  
They don’t need to leave the country right after completing their studies anymore. After 
successfully finding employment they get an additional year on their residence permit and 
than get option for long-term residence rights.  
 
Representative, Confederation of German Employers' Associations  
We say, that good graduates, that completed a university degree in Germany, need long-
term residence prospects. Those with good and desirable degrees should be retained 
here – Please stay, we would like you to stay.  
 
Representative, Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce  
They can stay for a year and when they learn the language, thus being in a good 
condition to [socially] integrate themselves. They should however be given more time to 
find an appropriate job. If they extend this waiting period for another year, it would be a 
step in the right direction.    
 
However, other interview respondents are unconvinced that improved residence 
rights and labour market access will actually motivate migrant graduates to stay in 
Germany. The Integration Commissioner at Confederation of German Trade Unions 
believes that today’s elite graduates are more concerned with career prospects than with 
local immigration and residence laws. 
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Integration Commissioner, Confederation of German Trade Unions  
Whether these young people will stay or go somewhere else for their careers has these 
days less to do with the residence laws than it did a few years ago.  
 
Interestingly, while most of the national policy makers as well as national labour 
market stakeholders regard the extended labour market access for migrant graduates a 
significant improvement to existing policy and a flexible tool to secure skilled labour 
supplies, the policy stakeholders representing some of Germany’s federal states believe 
that improving the situation of migrant graduates has to go beyond extended residence 
rights and labour market access. The respondent representing the Commissioner for 
Integration and Migration in Berlin states that the government and its agencies need to do 
more to actively engage with foreigners studying at German post-secondary educational 
institutions and provide motivations for them to stay in Germany after graduation.   
 
Representative, Commissioner for Integration and Migration Berlin 
Too little is being done in this field. The prevalent mindset is still that as long as Germany 
remains attractive, the highly skilled will come in large numbers. This new measure could 
be extended for twice as long. From a macro-economic perspective their employment 
here would make sense, after all their education costs us a lot of money and it should be 
considered normal that these people are given the opportunity to repay some of this 
investment. The federal agencies could do much more to support these highly skilled 
foreigners in their search for employment. 
 
 The respondent from the Office for Integration & Migration in Bremen agrees and 
warns that government policy makers appear to assume that foreign graduates from 
German Universities automatically want to stay in Germany for career purposes. He 
points out that the German labour market is just not attractive enough to actually motivate 
these people to stay. In his view the German educated migrant professionals are very 
much aware that they can work anywhere in the world with their degree and they are first 
and foremost interested in their career prospects and immigration rules are not the main 
factor in their career planning.  
 
 
 265 
Representative, Office for Integration & Migration Bremen 
Until 2005 not only Bremen but the entire Federal Republic entitled itself to the luxury of 
sending these academics that were trained here out of the country. That has changed 
now, but the steps that have been taken so far are not enough to actually retain these 
skilled people. It is actually not that attractive over here especially when one considers 
the tight situation on the labour market. They just do not do enough and especially in 
Bremen were not focusing on retaining this skilled labour potential.  
 
The Integration Commissioner of Lower Saxony believes that government 
agencies need to engage with migrant graduates immediately after their enrolment at 
German universities through social integration initiatives such language training and 
actively supporting their transition and integration into the German labour market during 
their studies and after their studies. Moreover, she suggests that German employers need 
to actively recruit migrant graduates and start appreciating a culturally diverse work 
force. This will ensure that the German labour market can fully utilize the skills potential 
of migrant graduates. Even though the respondent believes that extended labour market 
access and residence rights for migrant graduates are an improvement, they are not the 
sole agent motivating migrant graduates to stay in Germany and pursue careers in the 
domestic labour market.   
  
Integration Commissioner, Lower Saxony 
We are making three distinct mistakes. First the students are left to their own devices 
when they arrive here. When they arrive in a new country and do not find networks that 
pick them up, they tend to move into expatriate communities or religious groups. This is 
not always good for [social] integration. Second there are no language support programs 
and unfortunately their language skills are often inadequate for successful university 
studies. That’s why the dropout rate is so high. Third, there are too few study-
accompanying programs; the transition from university to the labour market is not 
organized. Recruitment efforts by industry for students with a migratory background are 
virtually non-existent.   
 
The analysis of the interview data on the recruitment of migrant graduates from 
German universities reveals a strong consensus among policy makers and labour market 
stakeholders in favour of easing labour market access and extending residence rights to 
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domestically educated foreign professionals. The main justification is of a financial 
nature as the German state effectively funds migrants (as well as domestic students) post-
secondary education. As such the respondents concur that it is in the interest of the 
German taxpayer to retain these graduates in order to alleviate domestic skills shortages, 
especially in light of the perceived trend that migrant graduates tend to move to other 
industrialized countries instead of their respective country of origin. The assumption that 
migrant graduates are already sufficiently socially integrated further justifies the removal 
of restrictions in regards to labour market access and residency in Germany.  
The fact that virtually all respondents focus on foreign graduates from domestic 
post-secondary institutions and conversely have very little to say about foreigners with 
post-secondary qualifications that were attained abroad, with the notable exception of 
EU8+2 graduates, confirms that German policy makers are seemingly more concerned 
with utilizing domestic skills potential. In the context of skilled labour migration debate, 
German policy makers do not appear to conceptualize foreign graduates with educational 
attainments from Germany as migrant workers. The perception that foreign graduates 
from domestic post-secondary institutions already reside in Germany anyway, have 
sufficient language skills, are supposedly familiar with life in Germany, and are trained 
congruent to the professional standards of the German labour market, makes them in the 
eyes of German policy makers a very desirable migrant group.  
 
6.9 - Continued EU-8 +2 Restriction  
 
 One of the more peculiar policy aspects of the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled 
Labour Migration is the two-year extension of the derogation from freedom of movement 
for citizens from the EU-8 member states as well as Romania and Bulgaria. This is 
peculiar because restricting labour market access for migrant workers of a specific 
nationality as part of a policy that aims to encourage skilled labour migration appears 
somewhat counterproductive. Germany, like most EU member states at the time, reserved 
the option to restrict labour market access for citizens from the eastern European states 
that joined the European Union in year 2004 (Favell, 2008). This option to limit the 
freedom of movement for citizens from new EU member states is not without precedent 
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in Germany, similar restrictions had been placed on Spain, Portugal, and Greece after 
they joined the EU during the 1980s (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009). In relation to 
EU8 +2 citizens and their respective labour market access in Germany, the 2009 Action 
Program on Skilled Labour Migration states the following. 
 
Extend the derogation from freedom of movement for the new acceding countries (EU-8 
and for Bulgaria and Romania). The transitional provisions for the EU-8 (3rd phase: 1 May 
2009 - 30 April 2011) and Bulgaria and Romania (2nd phase: 1 January 2009 - 31 
December 2011) which contain a derogation from the principle of free movement for the 
new acceding countries will be extended.  
 
 Thus the 2009 Action Programme reveals an interesting paradox in relation to 
internal EU labour migration. While the policy effectively grants full labour market 
access to university graduates from the EU-8 +2 countries, it extends labour market 
restrictions for other EU-8 +2 citizens without a university degree. The paradigm here is 
blatantly obvious; highly skilled professionals are welcome and subsequently given full 
labour market access while unskilled or less skilled labour migrants from the new EU 
member states are not welcome and subsequently labour market restrictions for this group 
are extended for another two years. The previous chapter already discussed the policy 
dualism between desired skilled labour migration and undesired unskilled labour 
migration in economically advanced nation-states (Skeldon, 2008, Castles, 2006; 
Hollifield, 2004; Brandi, 2001). 
  The analysis of the interview data reveals that there are differences of opinion 
among policy makers and labour market stakeholders over the issue of derogation from 
freedom of movement for citizens from the EU-8 member states with one side defending 
the measure as necessary to prevent mass-migration of unskilled eastern Europeans into 
the lower segments of the German labour market while others lament the extension as a 
populist policy that is out of touch with actual conditions on the German labour market.  
  The interview respondents from Germany’s opposition parties are very critical of 
the government’s attempt to restrict labour market access for eastern European workers 
for another two years. The Liberal Party respondent points to the positive synergy that 
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EU-8 migration has created in those EU economies that did not implement any labour 
market restrictions in 2004. 
 
Party Consultant for Integration, FDP  
The third point is that the eastern European citizens are still subject to the temporary 
provision, meaning they will not have full labour market access until 2011. We have 
always opposed this because there is no reason at all to refuse labour market access to 
these people. We forwarded a motion regarding this and demanded that the restrictions 
should be waived immediately because it can brings many advantages, as one could see 
with other European countries, which did not have these restrictions. On the whole the 
rationale behind this is not acceptable for us. 
 
Even the governing Social Democrats who ultimately supported the 2009 Action 
Programme believe that it is a bad idea to close the labour market off for another two 
years. However, the respondent neglects to mention that the initial restrictions on labour 
market access for EU-8 citizens had been implemented at the request of the previous 
Social Democrat and Green coalition government in 2003/2004. As such the current 
grand coalition government merely continues the policy of the previous Social Democrat 
led government.  
 
Party Consultant for Committee on Interior Affairs, SPD  
Yes, I think the freedom of movement [for EU-8] should be implemented immediately – 
that is part of the foundation of the EU and I don’t know why they did not implement this 
right away. Those [EU-8 citizens] that are mobile have already migrated to the UK and 
Scandinavia and are not available for our domestic labour market anymore.  
 
This sentiment is shared by Dr. Bade who attributes the unwillingness to fully 
open the German labour market to the citizens of the new EU member states to the 
inability of German politicians to envision the potential of these new labour markets. 
Bade also strongly believes that the previous German government committed a grave 
error in 2004 when it initially restricted labour market access to the EU-8 states and now 
continues this line of failure by extending this limitation into 2011. 
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Dr Klaus Bade, Immigration Scholar & Government Advisor 
This is a prime example of the failure of our political class in dealing with the new EU 
member states in the east, because we used the 2 + 3 + 2 policy option from the EU in 
order to close our labour market as long as possible. Today, this, everyone knows, was a 
mistake.  
 
The interview respondents representing industry and employer interest are also 
very critical of the two-year extension on derogation on freedom of movement for 
citizens the new EU member states. However, the respondents’ criticism is not so much 
about the two-year extension as part of the 2009 Action Programme but rather the 
previous government’s initial insistence in 2004 to keep the German labour market closed 
to EU-8 migrants.  
 
Representative, Confederation of German Employers' Associations  
Off course everybody speaks of the freedom of movement and companies do utilize this.  
In relation to the freedom of movement for the EU-8, we have lobbied against the 
derogation of freedom of movement and asked that the principle of freedom of movement 
should be implemented with the exception of certain employment sectors or even regions 
where barriers could remain in place, for example the construction sector.  
 
The respondent makes an interesting point when he refers to specific regions and 
employment sectors within Germany where EU-8+2 migration restrictions should be 
applied. He is referring to Germany’s border regions to Poland and the Czech Republic as 
well as the construction sector where apprehension about labour market competition and 
wage dumping runs strong (Caviedes, 2010). The situation in 2008/2009 has however 
changed significantly as many of these border regions are experiencing growing labour 
demand, even within semi-skilled professions such as construction. According to the 
Green Party respondent, whose party also opposes the extension, today these border 
regions lobby the federal government to open the labour market now and not wait for 
another two years. 
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Party Consultant for Migration and Refugee Policy, Green Party  
We still think it was a mistake. Interestingly the former East-German states with a CDU 
state government are nowadays very vocal about not extending the derogation of 
freedom of movement and instead support full freedom of movement [for EU-8 nationals] 
now.  
 
The respondent from the Association of German Chambers of Industry and  
Commerce also supports immediate labour market access for EU-8 citizens and is very 
concerned about the message that yet another extension will send to potential migrant 
professionals in the new EU member states.  
 
Representative, Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce  
In light of the employment potential it was a mistake, they should have opened the 
[labour] market  - it was a poor political signal when they said: “let’s keep the labour 
market closed as long as possible – we don’t want these workers to come here”. Other 
countries did not do that. Now the question arises, whether the high skilled professionals 
are actually available to work in Germany, because they have already migrated to other 
countries.  
 
The common consensus among the employers and industry representatives is that 
because Germany chose not to open its labour market for EU-8 workers in 2004, the best 
and brightest professionals from these countries have now moved to other EU labour 
markets. Other respondents concur with this assessment. 
 
Representative, Cologne Institute for Economic Research  
Nobody expected that some countries such as the UK and Sweden would implement a 
full opening of their labour markets right away so that all the capable high skill migrants 
from eastern Europe would already be gone [by the time Germany would open its labour 
market]. They all sit in England now and the less skilled have to some extent already 
gone back home. Those that we are actually interested in are long gone and we will not 
be able to utilize their potential.   
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Representative, German Expert advisory board on Integration and Migration  
Basically you could say that Germany wasted an enormous labour potential by keeping 
the labour market closed for migrants from eastern Europe, who now established their 
networks in England.  
 
While the representatives from the two think tanks believe that the initial labour 
market restrictions for EU-8 migrants in Germany have negated any future attempts to 
recruit skilled professionals from the new member states, the President of the German 
Institute for Economic Research believes that the government’s insistence on extending 
labour market restrictions for yet another two years sends a wrong signal to the citizens 
of the new EU member states by confirming that the German labour market does not 
want them.  
 
President, German Institute for Economic Research   
We need a better image. We have the global reputation of a fortress. Insofar the 
extension of derogation of freedom of movement for the new EU member states was the 
wrong signal. 
  
The respondent also believes that by implementing another two-year extension, the 
German government wastes an opportunity to recruit skilled professionals who may have 
become unemployed in the 2008/2009 financial crises. He also has the suspicion that 
Germany may have already missed the opportunity altogether by insisting on restricting 
labour market access for EU-8 migrants back in 2004. 
 
President, German Institute for Economic Research   
The financial crisis represents an opportunity; some of the Polish workers may have 
become unemployed [in the UK] and are thinking about where to go next. But I think in 
terms of skilled professionals from Eastern Europe, we have already missed the train.  
 
However, a number of respondents defend the government’s plan to extend the 
derogation of freedom of movement for EU-8 +2 migrants and also justify the German 
government’s insistence on initially closing the national labour market for workers from 
the new EU member states in 2004. The interview respondent from the CDU makes no 
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secret that her party prefers continued restriction back in 2004 as well as now. The 
respondent believes the German labour market was and still is not prepared for large-
scale labour migration from the east.  
 
Party Consultant for Work Group Interior Affairs, CDU  
Yes, I am not so sure about this. Therefore we implemented this in certain stages, I mean 
the 2, 3 & 2 year intervals, and we examined after the first 2 years whether it makes 
sense now to open [the labour market] , or not. And after this examination  we decided to 
extend derogation of freedom of movement [for EU-8] for another 2 years. 
 
Interestingly, yet again the Links Party finds itself supporting the position as the 
Christian Democrats. The Links Party respondent also believes that the German labour 
market is not ready for mass labour migration from eastern Europe and justifies his 
party’s position with the apprehension among trade unions and German workers about 
labour market competition.  
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Integration, Links Party   
It was a mistake to close the borders, but we have a conditional yes [for derogation of 
freedom of movement] because we see a need to protect the [domestic] labour market. 
The German Association of Trade Unions argues in similar manner, first and foremost we 
need to protect our standards and then we can support a full opening of the labour 
market [for EU-8 migrants].  
 
 Social Democrat MdB Michael Borsch confirms that his party is concerned about 
the implications that a potentially large-scale labour migration of eastern European 
workers will have on the German labour market. He then implies that the initial labour 
market restriction implemented in 2004 as well as the extension of derogation of freedom 
of movement in 2009 aim to calm domestic fears about labour market competition and 
also allowed the politicians to fully prepare the German electorate for the eventual 
opening of the German labour market in May 2011.  
 
MdB Michael Bürsch, SPD  
There are certain fears in Germany, now that Poland and the Czech Republic have 
joined, that competition will increase in the German labour market. Therefore the federal 
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government has implemented a seven-year wait until they [EU-8] can enter the German 
labour market.  
 
Support for the extension of derogation of freedom of movement appears to be 
strong among the respondents that represent the federal ministries. The respondent from 
the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs views the extension as well as the 
initial restriction as a necessary precautionary measure so that Germany’s political 
institutions have time to prepare for the eventual influx of the EU-8 +2 migrants. He 
nevertheless points out that there have been and continue to be exemption rules for labour 
migrants from eastern Europe that in fact precede their ascension to the European Union 
and have their origin in years following the fall of the Iron Curtain. These exemption 
rules apply to agricultural labourers and meat packers (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 
2009). 
 
Representative, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
No, it was not a mistake. I don’t know who many had already been here before and how 
many came after the [EU] entry. We also always enabled exemption rules, if there was a 
labour market shortage [meat packing, agriculture]. By 2011 we already have some idea 
what will happen and the freedom of movement will not come as such as shock.  
 
Furthermore, the respondent implies that in secret the governments of the new EU 
member states are grateful for continued labour market restrictions in Germany because it 
prevents their skilled workers from leaving. 
 
Representative, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
In the past we were always asked when we will abolish the extension rule – this question 
does not arise anymore. I was in Prague for a meeting and the Polish ambassador told 
me: “the longer the derogation of freedom of movement, the better for Poland”  
 
This statement suggests that eastern European politicians perceive the westerly migration 
of their citizens as a form of Brain Drain even though Daugeliene et al. (2009) suggest 
that it is too early to determine whether or not the westerly migration of skilled 
professionals from eastern Europe actually constitutes permanent Brain Drain. 
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The interview respondent representing the Cologne Institute for Economic 
Research confirms that the initial refusal of the German government to grant full labour 
market access to the citizens of the EU-8 countries in 2004 was at the time influenced by  
poor labour market conditions in Germany and widespread unemployment among 
domestic unskilled and semi-skilled workers. The respondent believes that from a purely 
economic standpoint the German labour market could have absorbed large flows of 
migrant workers from eastern Europe in 2004. However, he is also certain that in the 
economic climate of 2004 this would have inevitably led to social tensions between 
domestic workers and migrants in Germany. 
 
Representative, Cologne Institute for Economic Research  
Back than the conditions were different. At that time, in 2004, the unemployment rate in 
Germany was quite high, we had five million unemployed and talk was about conditions 
like in Weimar and the unemployment among the unskilled was especially high. The 
employment problems of the 1990s had already been solved in the UK, they had low 
unemployment rates at the time. The British labour market was able to handle the 
eastern European migrants quite well and even prospered from them. In the German 
labour market there would have been a struggle [over jobs]. From a purely economic 
standpoint it would have probably been better if there had been a full liberalization of the 
[German] labour market, it would have resulted in growth but there would have been 
conflict over jobs. I don’t know if Germany would have gotten through this rough phase 
unscathed. Our labour market did not stabilize until 2006/2007.  
 
The initial restrictions for EU-8 labour migrants were not so much a question of 
economics but more a socio-political necessity. The respondent from the Association of 
German Engineers concurs and even though he believes that the continued closing of the 
German labour market for EU-8+2 migrant workers only delays the inevitable, he agrees 
that domestic political opinion should be factored into immigration policy formation 
processes. 
 
Representative, Association of German Engineers  
In principal this was a mistake. You cannot delay or stop such developments. That 
behaviour reflects the rivalries of the petty kingdoms of the middle ages. I do understand 
that there had to be certain delays [for freedom of movement of EU-8 citizens] – you do 
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have to bring the [domestic] population along. If you don’t do this there will be social 
conflicts. 
 
For Germany’s trade unions the extension of derogation of freedom of movement 
for EU-8 +2 migrants puts them in an awkward position. Traditionally Germany’s trade 
unions protect the rights of foreign workers, including their right to migrate as EU 
citizens. However, the trade union respondent confirms that in 2004 his union was 
opposed to granting full labour market access to citizens of the new member states, 
partially because of domestic unemployment but more so due to widespread fears of 
wage dumping in certain sectors of the economy, particularly the construction sector.  
 
Integration Commissioner, Confederation of German Trade Unions  
The derogation [of freedom of movement] was an economic necessity. The limitation was 
politically justified because large segments of the population would have had some 
difficulties with an immediate full labour market access of [EU-8] workers. It was also 
economically justified, not just because of unemployment, but also because of the 
lingering question relating to central and eastern European enterprises located in the 
Federal Republic such as the construction industry.  
 
 The respondent is particularly critical of certain practices of German employers in 
regards to eastern European workers where social insurance contributions are paid 
according to a fixed level set in Germany and not according to the levels set in their 
respective country of origin. According to the trade union respondent, in 2004 German 
employers had successfully lobbied the national government to continue that practice, 
which the trade unions considered unacceptable and thus they opposed freedom of 
movement for EU-8 citizens.  
 
Integration Commissioner, Confederation of German Trade Unions  
Employers planned to continue to practice of maintaining lower salaries [for Polish 
workers] even after Poland joined the EU. It is not acceptable for us that employers only 
pay 25% social insurance contribution for their Polish workers while in Poland the social 
insurance contribution sits at 47%. As long as the employers do not accept this we have 
to assume that they [employers] will also not accept equal [labour] right.  
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As for the extension of derogation of freedom of movement within the 2009 
Action Programme, the trade union respondent believes that extension for another two 
years is linked to timing and electoral opportunism. 2009 was the year of a crucial federal 
election in Germany and according to the respondent, Germany’s politicians were very 
much aware that a federal election campaign and labour market liberalization for 
foreigners do not make good bedfellows and therefore the members of the grand coalition 
government agreed to postpone EU-8 labour market access until April 2011, which is the 
midterm of the following legislative period.  
 
Integration Commissioner, Confederation of German Trade Unions  
I personally believe that it would have been catastrophic if the Federal Republic had  
opened up [the labour market] on 01.05.2009. The government should have listened to 
its Minister of Labour who would have liked to open the labour market earlier, on 
01.05.2008 or even immediately after their initial membership. Politically this would have 
been more responsible because if they open [the labour market] now, the German media 
will list all the supposed negative implications of migration and we would not be able to 
engage in a calm and balanced debate on this due to the [2009] election. In my mind this 
[EU-8 labour migration] is not just an economical debate but also a political one. We do 
need some adjustment time in order to deal with potential abuses of the system and 
determine prospective legal grey zones. 
 
As for the skilled labour potential of the new EU member states, some 
respondents believe that it is not so much a question about labour market access but in 
fact that it is more about the attractiveness of the German labour market for skilled 
professionals from the new EU member states. The respondent from the Federal Ministry 
of the Interior believes that increased salary levels and corresponding salary expectations 
in eastern Europe will discourage large-scale skilled labour migration to Germany in the 
years to come.  
 
Representative, Federal Ministry of the Interior 
The question should be, to what extent is Germany even interesting for labour migrants 
[from the EU-8]. Right now there is still a certain difference in income but in a few years 
this advantage will dissipate. The incomes in the new member states will drastically 
increase and there will be an adjustment in average cost of living in these countries. The 
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flexibility of the [EU-8} workers will not likely be the same anymore because the main 
motivation of the worker to move abroad is that he can make more money over there. 
When this opportunity disappears, then most of the labour tourism will come to an end 
anyway. 
 
This implies that the respondent conceptualizes labour migration from eastern 
Europe to Germany primarily as a result of income differentials between labour markets. 
Moreover, the Ministry of the Interior does not appear to be view eastern Europe as a 
long-term source of skilled workers for Germany. 
A number of respondents reject the notion that an opening of the German labour 
market for EU-8 migrants in 2009 would have immediately resulted in a large influx of 
eastern European workers into Germany. In fact the respondent representing the 
Commissioner for Integration and Migration in Berlin believes that the refusal of most 
old EU member states in 2004 to grant full labour market access to citizens from the new 
EU member states caused a disproportionate migratory flow to the UK and Ireland.  
 
Representative, Commissioner for Integration and Migration Berlin  
The supposed immigration wave caused by the end of the derogation of freedom of 
movement will not occur. This has been determined by empirical research. The partial 
freedom of movement has caused a large influx into three EU countries, but this was 
caused by the bulk heading of the remaining EU countries.  
 
According to the respondent, if all EU member states had opened their labour market, the 
migratory flow from eastern Europe would have been dispersed equally across the old 
EU member states. Even though Meyers (2002, p.127) confirms this assessment and 
claims that “restrictions on immigration in one country have produced migratory 
pressures in other countries”, there is currently no reliable data as to whether EU-8 
migration flows would have dispersed evenly across the EU member states.    
Dr. Bade even suggests that all the fear mongering about eastern European 
immigration is unfounded because the long-term benefits derived from internal EU 
labour migration outweigh the perceived costs. He claims that the overall positive EU-8 
immigration experience in Britain should have convinced German policy makers to 
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refrain from further extensions and instead opens the labour market to citizens from the 
new member states.  
 
Dr. Klaus Bade, Immigration Scholar & Government Advisor 
These people just wanted to have a look around, work a bit and then go back home 
again. That is how the migratory paths have come into existence, for example Poles 
going to England or Scandinavia – this did not hurt the English at all, in fact the English 
benefited substantially from this.  
 
There appears to be a trend among the respondents interviewed to utilize their respective 
interpretation of the UK experience with EU-8 migration to support their argument 
favouring or opposing derogation from freedom of movement for citizens from the EU-8 
+2 member states. While Caviedes (2010, p.144) concurs that EU-8 migration has put 
significant stress on existing British infrastructure (housing, health care) he nevertheless 
concludes that EU-8 migration has been a tremendous benefit to British employers and 
the British economy as a whole. However Caviedes admits that his assessment on EU-8 
migration in the UK has been made prior to onset of the 2008 global recession and 
therefore the mid to long-term economic implications of EU-8 migration in the UK are 
still to be determined.  
 To conclude this section, it is somewhat telling that none of the interview respondents 
comment on fact that as part of the 2009 Action Programme university educated EU-8 +2 
citizens have de facto been given full labour market access in Germany. The fact that the 
two-year extension effectively only applies to unskilled and semi-skilled workers from 
the new EU-8 +2 countries seems to have been lost on the respondents. The governing 
Christian Democrats and Social Democrats have essentially pursued a twofold strategy 
with the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration. On the one hand, the  
grand coalition government responded to popular fears about supposed cheaper labour 
market competition by postponing unskilled labour migration from the EU-8+2 countries 
for another two years while at the same time they effectively opened the German labour 
market for post-secondary graduates from the EU-8 +2 countries. As such the policy 
measures in 2009 Action Programme referencing eastern European immigration represent 
a balance between short-term electoral strategy and immediate labour market demand for 
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high-skill professionals. The policy effectively bars unskilled and semi-skilled labour 
migration from the new EU member states while at the same time it enables labour 
market access for skilled EU-8+2 citizens with a university degree. It is rather surprising 
that none of the industry respondents, who lament the two-year extension as well as the 
initial labour market restriction in 2004, comment on the fact the grand coalition 
government has de-facto opened the national labour market for all post-secondary 
graduates from the new EU member states. As such the criticism voiced by the employer 
and industry respondents regarding the two-year extension seems unfounded unless their 
real objective is full labour market access for unskilled and semi-skilled EU-8 +2 
citizens.   
  As for those respondents who argue that the German labour market and the state 
institutions require additional two years in order to prepare for the supposed wave of 
eastern European workers from the new member states, their arguments ring somewhat 
hollow in light of the many years they already had to prepare for this. The real motivation 
for extension as part of the 2009 Action Programme is without doubt the 2009 federal 
election in Germany. The extension of derogation of freedom of movement for EU-8 +2 
citizens implemented by the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration 
effectively defers a politically inconvenient and unpopular labour market opening for 
unskilled EU-8 workers into the safety of the midterm of the following legislative period.  
 
6.10  - Points Based Immigration  
 
 The interview respondents were asked to state their views on points based 
immigration systems (PBIS) and as to whether such a system would be applicable in 
Germany. As it turns out, there is significant support for PBIS among the respondents 
representing the opposition parties as well as among labour market stakeholders such as 
employers’ representatives as well as trade unions. On the other hand there is very strong 
opposition to PBIS among the Christian Democrat respondents and the representatives of 
the federal ministries.  
 When asked about their party’s position on PBIS, both opposition Liberal and Green 
respondents present themselves as keen supporters of PBIS. Particularly the Liberals 
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present themselves as the vanguard of PBIS in German politics.  
 
Party Consultant for Integration, FDP  
The FDP parliamentary group was the first parliamentary group that supported a points-
based immigration system. We already adopted a position paper in October 2007 for 
modern immigration control. We requested to have this included in the 2009 policy on 
skilled labour migration, which certain parliamentary groups and parties rejected outright. 
 
 The Green Party respondent supports the Liberal position on PBIS and also confirms 
his party’s support for PBIS. He also confirms that members of Social Democrats also 
favour such a system and also confirms that opposition to PBIS comes primarily from the 
Christian Democrats. 
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Refugee Policy, Green Party  
The Liberal Party is actually the vanguard of this debate and we Greens support this, 
even though we are not as vocal as they are. The Social Democrats will support it too but 
there is nobody that can put pressure of the CDU. That is the problem.    
 
 The Green Party respondent however qualifies his statement in relation to the CDU 
and distinguishes between the Christian Democrats sitting in the Bundestag and the 
Christian Democrats representing the federal states in the Bundesrat. He claims that there 
is significant support for PBIS among the Christian Democrats in the Bundesrat. The 
analysis of the political debate in the Bundesrat however does not confirm this 
assessment (section 5.9).   
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Refugee Policy, Green Party  
The interesting thing is that the Bundesrat, under a conservative majority, has brought 
forward this motion… that is a real sensation. I already thought that this is a possible new 
beginning. But when you hear the members of the Bundestag you don’t feel this 
anymore-  there is a total mental blockade.  
 
 Other respondents also believe that there is  wide cross-party support for PBIS in the 
Bundestag, even among representatives of the CDU. 
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Representative, German Expert advisory board on Integration and Migration  
There has been talk about the points system and a points system would actually have 
enough support in the Bundestag. The SPD, Green, Links Party and FDP and also a 
number of representatives of the CDU are positively inclined towards such a system. 
 
 Dr. Bade also confirms that there is significant support among individual Christian 
Democrats for PBIS but suggests that the political debate over PBIS has become so 
ideologically entrenched that the term “points based immigration system” would need to 
be dropped and labelled differently in order for the Christian Democrats to support such 
policy framework. 
 
Dr Klaus Bade, Immigration Scholar & Government Advisor 
The CDU has opposed the bottleneck diagnosis on every occasion. Of course there is 
party discipline and everyone votes the same and there will always be those that oppose 
the points system. But when you listen to some of them, there is a significant support 
among CDU members of the Bundestag. They say: “well, let’s just not call it points 
system, but we do need something like this”. They know that this [skilled labour] demand 
exists, they call it ‘competition over the brightest heads’.  
 
When asked about her party’s opposition to PBIS, especially since the CDU 
acknowledges increased skilled labour shortages in sectors of the German economy, the 
CDU interview respondent states that any labour migration to Germany needs to be tied 
to a concrete offer of employment. For the CDU this position is not up for negotiation, 
the party is fundamentally opposed to any immigration system that grants labour market 
access to non-EU workers and then just lets them seek for employment after their arrival. 
 
Party Consultant for Work Group Interior Affairs, CDU  
Back then this point system was prevented by the CDU parliamentary group and by the 
Bundesrat, by the majority of the CDU of governed states. We argued that immigration 
into the labour market for the purpose of the occupation should at least be bound to a 
concrete offer of employment. 
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The interview respondent from the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
links the CDU’s opposition to PBIS to the party’s fundamental opposition to immigrants 
living off the social-welfare system. The earlier discussions of welfare migration (section 
6.4) confirm this assessment.  
 
Representative, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
There should have been a legal framework by now but the Christian Democrats blocked 
it. A points system would after all mean that they [migrants] could come and live off the 
social-welfare system.  
 
Other ministry respondents share the assessment that potential migrant welfare 
dependence drives the Christian Democrats opposition to PBIS. The interview respondent 
from the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration, which is 
managed by a Christian Democrat cabinet minister, believes that the advantages offered 
by PBIS in regards to successful skilled labour migration management are not enough to 
convince conservative policy makers to abandon their opposition to such a system in 
Germany. 
 
Representative, Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration  
Within the debate the points system was very controversial, because there was a fear 
that immigration without a concrete offer of employment would go into sectors of the 
economy where there is in fact no demand. The conservative viewpoint prevailed, to 
protect the German labour market. I am not so sure if they would make the same 
decision again today. However, when you need workers, not for a specific job opening 
but for overall immigration, then such a system would be more suitable because it allows 
a flexible adjustment to the economic requirements of the industry. 
 
The statement suggests that CDU opposition to PBIS is also influenced by the fear that 
skilled migrant professionals could end up working in the lower segments of the German 
labour market and therefore compete with German workers over scarce jobs in the low-
skilled and semi-skilled professions. The CDU determination to protect the preferential 
status of domestic workers in the German labour market has already been illustrated in 
section 6.3. However the CDU’s fear is not without merit as studies from Canada have 
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shown that deskilling of migrant credentials has in fact resulted in skilled migrants 
moving into the lower segments of the Canadian labour market (Bauder, 2006). 
The respondent from the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs believes 
that the root of conservative opposition to PBIS is linked to control. While there is no 
dispute that PBIS can be utilized to successfully manage the initial labour migration flow, 
the fear is that once skilled migrants make into Germany, the state effectively loses 
control over them. This lack of control can then potentially result in either welfare 
dependence of skilled migrants or them taking up employment in the lower segments of 
the German labour and outcompeting domestic workers with their higher skills and lower 
salary demands. Both prospects are unacceptable for Christian Democrat policy makers.    
 
Representative, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
The Minister [of the Interior] was openly opposed this – even though not official, there 
was in fact a draft for such a points based immigration system and it was denied.  For 
them [the CDU] employers are relieved by the state and do not hold any responsibilities 
for the selection process. A one-sided increase of the domestic labour market potential in 
the interest of industry without proper guarantee of corresponding [labour market] 
demand can result in lower wage levels [for the domestic workforce]. Moreover, once 
these people are in the country, there is no more room for management; they can work in 
all employment sectors, also in the low wage sector. Example; the Egyptologist who 
drives a taxi.  
 
The respondent from the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and 
Integration confirms that conservative opposition to PBIS is linked to the limitations on 
post-migration management. According to the respondent, the real challenge is to 
promote PBIS to the conservative electorate, which Christian Democrat politicians find 
increasingly difficult, especially in light of structural unemployment among low-skilled 
and older domestic workers.   
 
Representative, Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration  
There is the possibility that someone might enter [Germany] under a points based system 
and then after six weeks show up at the agency apply for benefits. I do not see many 
politicians that can defend that possibility and justify it [to the electorate]. It [points based 
system] has potential but you need to be able to justify this in public to the public. In light 
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of increased unemployment at this time, the implementation of a points based system is 
not opportune.  
 
Castles & Miller (2009) state that one of the factors that makes PBIS in Canada unique in 
comparison to other countries is the far reaching consensus within the Canadian political 
system and between government and the electorate over the utility and benefits of PBIS. 
It appears that Germany is still far away from reaching such consensus.  
It is worth mentioning that the Christian Democrats are not the only party that is 
opposed to PBIS. The Links Party respondent states that his party cannot support PBIS 
because it objectifies immigrants alongside capitalist notion of economic utility and also 
lacks adequate incorporation of humanitarian considerations. However, if the government 
chose to include humanitarian provisions in a future PBIS, then his party would support 
such a system.   
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Integration, Links Party   
Our position on this issue is likely different from the other parliamentary groups. We are 
opposed to immigration that only serves the notion of national and economic utility. We 
do want the points based system, which has recently been debated again but we will not 
support it as long as it is based upon the criteria of national self-interest. You could of 
course add a humanitarian criteria into the points system and design it alongside 
humanitarian needs, at least partially. However, as far I can tell, nobody has the intention 
of doing so.  
 
The Links Party respondent is keen to point out that his party’s opposition to 
PBIS is different from the CDU’s opposition as the latter’s opposition is purely an 
expression of welfare chauvinism among conservative policy makers and an attempt to 
mobilize certain sectors of the electorate through fear mongering. In fact, the respondent 
claims that from an ideological standpoint the CDU should actually be supportive of a 
PBIS because it caters to the economic interests of employers and industry, usually a 
Christian Democrat clientele.  
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Party Consultant for Migration and Integration, Links Party   
The Social Democrats supported a gradual opening [of the labour market]. We all know 
what the Christian Democrats think and that’s why this compromise was the end result. 
One of the problems of this debate is that it is not conducted in a rational manner but 
alongside ideological lines. There is no other explanation for the CDU’s opposition to a 
points based immigration system because it is after all in the interest of the economy. It is 
the typical fear that is being mobilized here, that these people try to take something away 
from us. The cliché of “Immigration into the social welfare system”, it is a primordial fear 
that is being fed into and I do not even know if their [CDU] representatives even believe 
in this themselves. It’s politics of publicity, nothing else.  
 
One the other hand, the Green Party respondent is very critical of the Links 
Party’s position on PBIS and attributes their opposition to ideological anti-capitalist 
dogma.  
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Refugee Policy, Green Party  
That is really fatal – I do not have anything against the Links Party – but their party 
manifest in relation to immigration is rather pathetic. They only say that points based 
immigration is just bad, an expression a capitalist profiteering. That is really lame, they 
have not advanced a bit.   
 
The Green Party respondent implies that the Links Party’s left wing dogmatism prevents 
them from constructively engaging themselves in labour migration policy formation 
processes. Kruse et al. (2003) have already noted the Links Party opposition to 
immigration policies that place economic utility above humanitarian considerations. 
 While Germany’s politicians argue over the advantages and disadvantages of 
PBIS, the respondents representing the interest of German employers and industry 
indicate a strong support for PBIS. The respondent from the Confederation of German 
Employers' Associations claims that his institution has for a long time lobbied for the 
introduction of PBIS in Germany in order to manage skilled labour migration more 
efficiently. He is very confident about the applicability of PBIS in the German labour 
market.  
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Representative, Confederation of German Employers' Associations  
The Association of German Employers has for a long time already, just as the 
Confederation of German Trade Unions, supported the idea of managing migration 
through a points system that is linked the labour market demand. This points system 
would determine eligibility based upon professional qualifications as well as language 
skills and other forms of qualification. These factors create a good framework for 
successful [labour market] integration. 
 
However, when asked why certain political parties are fundamentally opposed to PBIS, 
the respondent claims that the political debate is in fact not about whether PBIS is 
applicable to Germany or not; in reality, it is about party politics. 
 
Representative, Confederation of German Employers' Associations  
That’s why we say, we need to organize the migration of skilled professionals through a 
points system – but in the end this is a political question. 
   
Other industry representatives are also certain that PBIS presents the best possible 
strategy for skilled labour recruitment. 
 
Representative, Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce  
In the intermediate run we need to come up with better management strategies for 
immigration, in this case a points based system would work far more efficient.  
 
Interestingly, one of the trade union respondents supports the employers’ 
representatives’ position on PBIS and he also argues that PBIS could help alleviate 
skilled labour shortages in Germany albeit the respondent stresses that labour market 
conditions alone should not frame such system but also factors relating to social 
integration. The respondent is critical of the Christian Democrat approach whereby 
residency and labour market access have to be linked to concrete offers of employment 
and instead he refers to the successful use of PBIS in Canada. 
 
Integration Commissioner, Confederation of German Trade Unions  
We already had one back in 2001 and brought it in to the commission on migration with a 
critical link to the Canadian model and that the indicators relating to [social] integration 
should be considered more important than the availability of employment offers. Our 
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points system should aim to provide young families with the opportunity of remaining here 
on a long-term basis. That was actually our target audience.  
 
The Trade Union respondent does not exclusively conceptualize PBIS in terms of skilled 
labour recruitment but also in terms of what he calls ‘social integration’, which he 
equates with demographic immigration and the permanent settlement of young migrants 
with families.   
The Social Democrat respondent also mentions that any future PBIS needs to go 
beyond mere labour market considerations and also incorporate certain soft factors that 
relate to social integration and not necessarily specific labour market requirements.  
 
Party Consultant for Committee on Interior Affairs, SPD  
The Social Democrats have favoured the points based immigration system because it 
allows some flexibility. Up front: normal qualifications, job training, and university 
degrees. Followed by work experience, language skills, and special professional skills. 
Moreover certain integration factors such as language skills fall under this category. Also,  
will there be family migration, what is the social environment, are there already relatives 
here? There may be a crossover between these factors that I mentioned.  
 
Similar to the trade union respondent, the SPD respondent also envisions a PBIS that 
combines skills requirements with demographic immigration.  
The respondent representing the Association of German Engineers, while 
supporting PBIS in principle, believes that employers and industry representatives need 
to be included in any future PBIS in Germany in order to ensure that the system 
incorporates specific professional and skills requirements demanded in German labour 
market. The respondent is not convinced that government policy makers and bureaucrats 
are capable of determining what skills and professional qualifications are needed in the 
high-tech industrial sector of the German labour market. 
 
Representative, Association of German Engineers  
In my opinion this issue needs to be solved by the business community because the 
government does not set the requirements for the jobs, this is still done by the employers. 
They are the ones doing the hiring.  
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Bauder (2006) highlights the mismatch between foreign skills recognition by the 
immigration authorities and professional skills recognition by employers and industry in 
Canada. As such employers’ involvement in any future PBIS in Germany would possibly 
improve labour market outcomes of skilled migrant professionals. 
A number of respondents argue that PBIS would actually simplify immigration 
procedures and allow the state to be more selective in regards to skilled foreign workers. 
The respondent from the Cologne Institute for Economic Research points out that under 
the current policy framework skilled labour migration to Germany is barely existent and 
he is confident that PBIS has the potential to remedy this. 
 
Representative, Cologne Institute for Economic Research  
I am convinced that this would work and I think it’s a good idea. In the immigration law 
[2005] we have six or seven paragraphs that deal with labour migration. The number of 
migrants that have come through these legal channels is a joke. There are so few skilled 
labour migrants that pass through this track that it is actually not worth it to even write a 
policy. That shows that the existing regulations for high skill labour migration are totally 
unappealing. Therefore I think the points based system would create far more 
transparency for those willing to migrate [here]. 
 
Ruhs (2005, p. 216) confirms that PBIS actually ‘helped to give immigration policy a 
semblance of certainty and measurability’ in countries such as Australia and Canada. 
This in turn has made skilled labour migration through PBIS much more acceptable and 
mach less controversial in eyes of the domestic population in both Canada and Australia. 
As such PBIS may contribute to transform political debates and associated discourses on 
skilled labour migration in Germany.  
The respondent representing the Commissioner for Integration and Migration in 
Berlin even suggests that in the long run PBIS could potentially motivate graduates in 
other, presumably developing countries, to pursue post-secondary studies in academic or 
professionals fields that are in demand in Germany. Yet he warns that PBIS alone is not 
the solution to solving skills shortages in Germany and points out that other countries 
have clear competitive advantages, such as no language barriers, when it comes to 
international skilled labour recruitment.  
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Representative, Commissioner for Integration and Migration Berlin  
I am confident that a points based immigration system would create a certain level of 
transparency and create a basis for whom we want to let into the country and under what 
considerations. That would encourage prospective migrant to pursue specific degrees in 
order to come to Germany. However, the points based system is not the solution to all 
our problems. Germany is not that competitive due to the language barrier. Many are not 
willing to learn German if they can just go with their native English to the United States.      
 
The respondent is under the impression that the English speaking countries offer better 
labour market prospects for skilled foreign professionals. Even though Geis et al (2011) 
and Fleischmann & Dronkers (2010) support this assessment to some degree, research by 
Khoo et al. (2007), Girard et al (2007), Koffman & Raghuram (2006), Hawthorne (2005), 
Bauder (2003), Hiebert, (2002) shows the labour market outcomes of skilled migrant 
professionals in the traditional English speaking immigration countries are far from 
perfect.  
Other respondents, despite their support for PBIS, also warn that that such system 
alone will not act a pull factor for skilled migrant professionals and point out that the 
German labour markets as whole has to become more attractive to foreign professionals. 
Transparent entry requirements laid out in PBIS are step in the right direction but will not 
suffice on their own. Yet again, reference is made to the Anglo-economies and their more 
pronounced appeal towards skilled foreign professionals  
 
Integration Commissioner, Lower Saxony 
I like that idea [points system like in Canada] because it would force German politicians 
to really think about what we actually need here and how we encourage people to move 
here. However, I don’t think it will happen because the culture here is different and the 
people wanting to come here are also different. We cannot overlook the fact that 
countries like the US, Australia, the UK are more attractive; language wise, labour market 
wise, tax wise, quality of life wise… people want to move there. Sure we can set up 
criteria but realistically I think Germany is not that attractive for most people. You can see 
this in the ‘brains’ that study here and then leave. As a location we are simply not that 
attractive.  
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While PBIS enjoys significant support among respondents representing 
employers, trade unions, and other labour market stakeholders, a number of respondents 
representing state institutions as well as migration policy advisors express doubt about 
the utility and applicability of PBIS in Germany. Their apprehension has less to do with 
the fact that points based immigration systems enable migrants to access the labour 
market without a prior employment offer. Instead, these critics believe that PBIS is 
simply overrated and such system applied in Germany will not deliver the desired results 
in regards to skilled labour migration. For example, the interview responded from the 
Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration points out that PBIS 
brings skilled migrants into the country but cannot ensure that these professionals then 
find employment congruent to their level of education and expertise. He then points out 
that Brain Waste is a common experience of migrant professionals in countries like 
Canada where PBIS has been in use for decades.  
 
Representative, Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration  
Off course our colleagues from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs travel to Canada 
and view on site how things go over there. Then they report back that things over there 
are not that rosy either. There are plenty of people that enter Canada through the points 
system and then end up driving taxi.  
 
Bauder, (2006), Girard et al. (2007), and Castles & Miller (2010) confirm this assessment 
on the less than stellar labour market outcomes of some migrant professionals in Canada.  
The respondent from the German Expert Advisory Board on Integration and 
Migration is also convinced that some of the points based systems utilized in other 
countries are not necessarily as good as some people believe and may not actually be that 
applicable to the recruitment of skilled migrant workers in Germany. 
 
Representative, German Expert advisory board on Integration and Migration  
Points based immigration systems actually have a better reputation than what they are 
actually worth. By now even the Canadians and Australians are not that convinced 
anymore. They are actually asking themselves, why does our points system not work as 
well with high skilled professionals?  Why does our points system not help the high skilled 
professionals to integrate themselves and help them find adequate employment?...Even 
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though points systems get a lot of praise, its practical applicability is actually not that 
good. 
 
 The respondent from the Federal Ministry of the Interior is also keenly aware of 
the shortfall of PBIS in some of the countries that apply and instead he proposes that 
policy makers need to develop a system that is applicable to the German labour market 
and avoids shortcomings of the immigration systems in other countries. 
 
Representative, Federal Ministry of the Interior 
The disadvantage of the Canadian point system is that maybe ten thousand are 
approved but then there is no offer of employment, so they cannot enter. Every system 
has its strengths and weaknesses and not every points system is applicable to Germany. 
We have to come up with our own points system.  
 
The President of the German Institute for Economic Research concurs with this 
assessment and points out that PBIS will not likely alleviate immediate skilled labour 
demand in Germany but he nevertheless concedes that in the long-term PBIS can 
potentially contribute to secure a skilled labour base in Germany. This suggests that he 
conceptualizes PBIS primarily as a policy tool to facilitate demographic migration to 
Germany and promote permanent settlement of foreign professionals.  
 
President, German Institute for Economic Research   
In principle the points system is the best for long-term labour market liberalization. 
However, it will not work as a short-term solution.  
 
Dr. Bade believes PBIS is applicable in Germany if certain adjustment are 
introduced to the policy framework and he proposes to incorporate sectoral labour 
demand within specific high skill professions in order to forecast  “bottlenecks” within 
the German labour market. These bottlenecks will then determine the annual quota of 
specific professions within PBIS in Germany.   
 
Dr Klaus Bade, Immigration Scholar & Government Advisor 
It can work, under the condition of a [labour] bottleneck diagnosis. They should have a 
bottleneck diagnosis in consultation with industry, the employers, and the Federal Agency 
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of Labour Affairs. If these employers’ say and can prove that this or that sector lacks 
available domestic workers and EU workers, they should be allowed to acquire third 
country nationals.   
 
The respondent from the German Expert Advisory Board on Integration and 
Migration supports this idea and also stresses that the successful applicability of PBIS in 
regards to alleviating skilled labour shortages in Germany ultimately needs to be tied to 
specific sectoral labour demand. 
 
Representative, German Expert advisory board on Integration and Migration  
There were suggestions back in 2004 for the implementation of a labour market 
orientated bottleneck diagnosis that can identify specific sectors in the labour market that 
experience demand [for skilled workers] and then enable fine-tuned migration to these 
specific sectors. This will enable a direct link between migrant skills and qualification and 
demand of the labour market 
 
As such the “bottleneck” proposal represents a potentially acceptable compromise for 
Christian Democrats, even though labour market access is not tied to a concrete offer of 
employment, it is at least tied to specific labour market demand.  
Yet, other stakeholders oppose PBIS because they do not believe that it 
constitutes an improvement from existing policy framework, including the 2009 Action 
Program on Skilled Labour Migration. For the respondent from the Federal Ministry of 
the Interior PBIS only represents unnecessary bureaucracy and he is also unconvinced 
that it will actually be flexible and quick enough for German employers that wish to 
employ foreign professionals. The respondent is convinced that PBIS would create a 
backlog of applicants that would take forever to process.  
 
Representative, Federal Ministry of the Interior 
A point system would become a bureaucratic monster because it consumes too much 
time.  If an employer wants to fill a vacant position with a foreigner, this employee has to 
be there now and not in three or four weeks. The current system allows for immediate 
labour market access.  In a points system the foreigner has to apply and that applications 
needs to be evaluated and this would consume immense time and resources because we 
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first need to add up the points and then decide if entry will be granted. That takes much 
more time than the current system 
 
However, in light of the fact that under the current policy framework skilled labour 
migration to Germany is barely existent, it seems somewhat premature to worry about the 
potential bureaucratic backlog of immigration applications. 
Christian Democrat MdB Reinhard Grindel also believes that the current system 
for skilled labour recruitment suffices and does not require any points based system. He 
states that elite migrants (those earning above the !63.600income threshold) coming to 
Germany are in fact more privileged than those in other migrant receiving economies.  
  
MdB Reinhard Grindel, CDU   
One could perhaps say that we even more intensively than the USA or Canada offer 
concessions in terms of residence rights and fast residence solidification to those classified 
as the brightest heads. That includes highly-qualified employees in the economy, in 
research, or culture. That is a privilege, because our labour market is effectively closed and 
in principle foreigners do not enjoy access to the German labour market. This privilege [for 
skilled foreign professionals] includes an immediate right of settlement. This also includes 
improved labour market access for their relatives. As far as I am concerned this goes 
beyond  what is offered in the USA & Canada. 
 
Grindel’s assessment is insofar right as those elite migrants with a salary above the 
income threshold laid out in the 2009 Action Programme are entitled to a settlement 
permit, which does in fact grant long term if not permanent residence rights, which does 
go beyond what offered in many other countries with advanced economies. However, 
MdB Grindel seems to neglect to mention that those non-EU foreign professionals 
earning below the income threshold are subject to the priority check system, which 
effectively bares them from the German labour market. Moreover, their residence rights 
are nowhere near as generous as the ones associated with the settlement permit given to 
elite migrants whose salary is above the minimum income threshold. 
 A number of respondents state their support for PBIS, but not in the context of 
skilled labour migration but rather in the context of demographic migration. Earlier 
discussion of the interview data reveals that a number of policy makers are aware that the 
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demographic transition will inevitably lead to a declining population base and that 
migration, skilled and unskilled, can potentially offset some of the impacts. The Green 
Party respondent believes that PBIS will eventually become necessary in order to 
promote demographic migration and aside from professional skills, the criteria for this 
form of migration will be age, language skills, and other soft factors that are linked to 
social integration prospects in Germany 
 
Party Consultant for Migration and Refugee Policy, Green Party  
I equate point-based immigration with demographic immigration. There are two forms of 
labour migration. The first one emphasizes the particular interest of the business 
community - there is an open position and the employer gets someone from a third country 
– it’s linked to regulation § 18 of the Immigration law. That contrasts with demographic 
immigration, where there is overall public interest that has to be satisfied and where large-
scale labour market demand has to be met. People that are capable of taking up full 
employment that is subject to compulsory insurance. For this I think a points-based 
immigration system is useful  
 
The respondent from the German Expert Advisory Board on Integration and 
Migration agrees with the Green Party respondent and also calls for a points based system 
for demographic migration that includes certain skills provisions.  
 
Representative, German Expert Advisory Board on Integration and Migration  
What we need is a human capital based points system that has a demographic and skills 
based component, which will be complimented by measures that incorporate [labour 
market] demand.  
 
 Interestingly, the respondent representing the Federal Ministry of the Interior, who 
is very critical of PBIS in the context of facilitating skilled labour migration to Germany, 
acknowledges that his ministry is actually planning to implement a points based 
immigration system in the future to facilitate demographic migration to Germany. 
However, the respondent is adamant that this demographic system will not replace the 
current policy framework for skilled labour migration in Germany and is designed as 
mere substitute.   
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Representative, Federal Ministry of the Interior 
We only envisioned this points based system as a substitute for regular labour migration 
[back in 2005]. We also planned to implement a points system at a later time. We never 
intended to utilize this points based immigration system right after the implementation of 
the new immigration law [2005]. Originally we intended to utilize the points system with 
limited numbers [of migrants] in 2008 and 2009 to test it – what is the best way to 
implement this system, is there room for improvement. Only when the demographic 
transition becomes a real issue, then we would have implemented it to the full extent. 
Anyhow, from the beginning on it was more a substitute for the current system.  
  
The analysis of the respondent’s views on the potential of points based 
immigration systems in Germany reveals that there is considerable support for such a 
policy framework. Many of the respondents supporting PBIS refer to the perceived 
successful application of PBIS in Canada and Australia, which supports Favell et al.’s 
(2007) assessment that the skills-based immigration approaches of these two countries 
are a model for other countries seeking to attract skilled foreign professionals to their 
national labour markets. The interview statements show that Social Democrats, Liberals, 
and Greens strongly support PBIS as are German employers and trade union respondents. 
Policy advisors such as Dr. Bade are also positively inclined towards PBIS but urge that 
any such system would need a number of adjustments such as the so-called bottleneck 
analysis that has been mentioned by a number of respondents.  
Other respondents believe that PBIS will not provide a short-term solution to 
skilled labour shortages in Germany and instead envision PBIS more as a long-term 
policy strategy to secure a skilled worker base in Germany. One of the peculiar aspects of 
the PBIS debate is that the institutional stakeholders at the state level are much more 
positively inclined towards PBIS whereas the institutional stakeholder on the federal 
level are very critical about the prospects of points based immigration in Germany. The 
institutional stakeholders at the federal level justify their opposition to PBIS with the 
desire to maintain control over migration flows as well as to reduce unnecessary 
bureaucracy.  
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At the same time many of respondents supporting PBIS claim that the Christian 
Democrats are the driving opposition force against PBIS and the CDU respondents 
interviewed confirm this charge. According to the Christian Democrat respondents, 
current policy provisions for skilled labour migration in Germany are sufficient and the 
CDU will only accept labour market access for skilled migrant professionals if it is linked 
to a concrete offer of employment. For the Christian Democrats an offer of employment 
appears to provide sufficient guarantee that migrant workers will not become a liability to 
the German welfare state. The unspoken assumption in respect to the offer of 
employment is that the current priority check system ensures that there will not be too 
many offers of employment for foreign professionals from outside the EU. The Christian 
Democrats seem content to maintain this Status Quo, which explains their opposition to 
PBIS. The critics of the CDU viewpoint argue that there is actually support for a PBIS-
like system among Christian Democrats and the party’s opposition has more than 
anything to do with electoral politics and catering to voters that are apprehensive about 
immigration.  
The strong support for PBIS among the interview respondents, particularly the 
labour market stakeholders, and its absence in the 2009 Action Programme provides 
important insight into the political debate on skilled labour migration in Germany. In 
light of widely acknowledged skilled labour shortages in Germany and the widespread 
support for PBIS among three of the five political parties as well as the labour market 
stakeholders and NGO policy advisors, PBIS should have been an obvious policy choice 
to be included in the 2009 Action Programme. Its non-inclusion therefore highlights the 
political power of the Christian Democrats and the Christina Democrat federal ministries 
within the political negotiations over skilled labour migration policy in Germany. The 
absence of PBIS can only be interpreted as Christian Democrat policy maker motives 
being significantly more pronounced and influential within policy formation processes on 
skilled labour migration. It is evident that Christian Democrat policy maker motives 
result in tangible political action, which is suppressing a widely popular policy measure 
that would go against their party’s political interest.          
However, the pure volume of interview data relating to PBIS between 2005 and 
2009 suggests that the political debate on PBIS in Germany will likely continue into the 
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future. A number of respondents suggest that PBIS or something that resembles it but 
with a different label, is inevitable. It is therefore possibly only matter of time until a 
PBIS-like system is established in Germany in order to promote skilled labour 
immigration as well as demographic immigration.  
 
6.11 – Concluding Remarks on the Interviews  
 
 The stakeholder interviews largely confirm the results from the parliamentary debate 
analysis in the previous chapter and provide additional depth and context to the eight 
thematic narratives identified within political discourse. For one, many respondents, 
including those representing employers’ interests, confirmed that the Christian Democrat 
policy makers are the most influential political faction within parliamentary debate over 
skilled labour migration. They also confirmed that CDU policy makers as well as the 
Christian Democrat led Ministry of the Interior tend to favour restrictionist immigration 
policies, even those concerning the recruitment of skilled professionals. At the same time, 
the interview data also shows that support for PBIS goes far beyond the political parties 
(Social Democrats, Liberals, Greens) and that there is strong support for such system 
among employers, trade unions as well the policy advising NGO’s. The failure to include 
provisions for PBIS as part of the 2009 Action Programme therefore confirms two 
important things. First, the Christian Democrats are in fact the most influential political 
faction in the policy formation process because they effectively vetoed the inclusion of 
PBIS while second, the political influence of German employers and owners of industry 
within policy formation processes does not appear to be that strong. Moreover the 
interviews highlighted the significance of migrant integration within political debate on 
skilled labur migration. Integration was only marginally discussed within parliamentary 
debate while most interview respondents stressed its importance. 
  However, most significant in relation to the research objectives of the thesis, the 
respondent interviews provided additional insight and context on the underlying policy 
maker motives that determine state action on skilled labour migration. The following 
chapter will present and discuss these underlying policy maker motives based on the 
results derived from the parliamentary debate analysis and the respondents’ interviews. 
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Chapter Seven – Motives, Policy and Political Discourse  
 
7.0 – Introduction 
 
The analysis and discussion of the thematic narratives in the previous two 
chapters identified a number of underlying policy maker motives within political 
discourse on skilled labour migration in Germany between 2005 and 2009. These 
underling motives provide significant insight into the actual intentions of German policy 
makers in relation to skilled labour migration and associated legislative framework. Even  
more significant the identified motives enable a more nuanced understanding of the 
determinants of state action in regards to skilled labour migration policy. Although 
national policy makers as well as the institutional actors, labour market stakeholders, and 
policy advisors interviewed overwhelmingly acknowledge and insist that increased 
skilled labour shortages and global competition for skilled workers have made the 
recruitment of skilled foreign professionals an economic and demographic necessity, the 
discourse analysis reveals that the political debate on skilled labour migration policy is 
largely shaped by domestic political considerations that are actually not directly linked to 
labour market demand and skilled labour shortages in Germany.  
 
7.1 – Discussion of Policy Maker Motives 
 
The analysis of the political debate in Bundestag and Bundesrat as well as the 
data collected from the interviews has identified five underlying motives within the 
political discourse on skilled labour migration in Germany between 2005 and 2009. The 
motives are ranked according to their significance within political discourse and they are 
as follows. 
 
1. Utilizing Domestic Labour Potential  
2. Preventing Migrant Access to Welfare 
3. Preventing Unskilled Labour Migration & Labour Market Competition 
4. Maintaining National Control over Labour Migration  
 299 
5. Integrating Migrant Workers 
 
The following sections present and discuss the five underlying policy maker motives and 
contextualize them with the relevant academic literature. 
  
7.2 – Motive One: Utilizing Domestic Labour Potential 
 
The analysis of the political debate and the stakeholder interviews show that 
German policy makers are strongly concerned about potential negative effects of skilled 
labour migration on the employment prospects and labour market outcomes of the 
domestic working population. German policy makers overwhelmingly insist that their 
priority is to maintain and promote preferential labour market access and employment 
prospects for domestic workers and that skilled labour migration is merely 
complementing existing efforts to mobilize and upgrade the skills potential within the 
domestic workforce.  
Within the context of political debate in Bundestag and Bundesrat, the 
representatives from both governing parties agree that the professional training and skills 
upgrading of domestic workers must take precedence over the recruitment of foreign 
professionals. The opposition parties support the government’s position and they also 
insist that skilled labour recruitment can only be conducted in conjunction with policy 
measures aimed at utilizing unused or underused domestic labour potential.  
The dialectical relationship between utilizing domestic labour potential and labour 
recruitment from abroad has already been established in the literature on labour 
migration. According to Hollifield (2004), countries with advanced economies are caught 
in a ‘liberal paradox’ whereby national policy makers need to reconcile openness of their 
national economy to trade, investment, and people with the need to maintain economic 
prosperity and security of the citizens. The analysis of the political debate on skilled 
labour migration in Germany reveals that national policy makers are caught in a dilemma 
whereby they need to compromise between perceived increased labour market demand 
for skilled professionals and the need to maintain the privileged labour market access for 
the domestic working population. German policy makers collectively attempt to 
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circumvent the ‘liberal paradox’ by insisting that employers have to utilize all available 
domestic labour resources first and upgrade the skills of domestic workers if necessary 
before recruiting from abroad. Ruhs (2005) states that it is prudent for national 
immigration policy makers in migrant receiving countries to include the interests of the 
domestic population in their decision making process in order to facilitate popular 
consensus on immigration with the electorate. For Iredale (1999, p. 95) policy makers 
preference for domestic workers serves a dual purpose: firstly not to alienate key labour 
market stakeholders such as trade unions and secondly to shore up political support 
among voters.  
The analysis of the political debate shows that German policy makers are primarily 
concerned with the labour market outcomes and labour market prospects of domestic 
workers. While Hollifield (2004, p. 900) argues that nation-states need to find an 
appropriate equilibrium between openness and closure towards foreign workers, the 
analysis of the political debate in Germany concludes that in the context of skilled labour 
migration, German policy makers clearly prioritize the collective interest of the domestic 
working population over employers’ interests and supposed macro-economic necessity 
for skilled labour migration. As such the labour market prospects of domestic workers 
and not labour market demand regulate policy formation processes on skilled labour 
migration in Germany. The interest of domestic workers, who also constitute the national 
electorate, is more pronounced in the policy formation process than labour market and 
employers demand for skilled workers. 
Yet, policy makers’ insistence on improving labour market outcomes for domestic 
workers should not necessarily be interpreted as an attempt to exclusively privilege 
workers of German nationality. Instead, the emphasis in this policy maker motive is on 
available domestic labour resources, which includes domestic workers with a migratory 
background. The analysis of the research data suggests that German policy makers 
conceptualize foreign graduates from German universities as an available domestic 
labour resource that can be utilized to alleviate skilled labour shortages. At the same time, 
improving labour market access and residency rights for foreign graduates does not 
contradict existing policy efforts to fully utilize available domestic skilled labour 
potential. It also appears that German policy makers also conceptualize foreign skills 
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recognition and foreign degree accreditation as a means of utilizing available domestic 
skilled labour potential. The analysis of political debate and stakeholder interviews shows 
that accreditation of foreign work credentials is not so much about recruiting new skilled 
workers from abroad but rather an attempt to fully utilize skilled labour potential within 
Germany’s migrant community.  
Thus the improvements to official foreign skills accreditation procedures and 
labour market access for foreign graduates from German universities can be interpreted 
as a policy maker strategy to circumvent the ‘liberal paradox’. Since technically neither 
of these policy measures actively promotes further large-scale labour migration to 
Germany, they do not contradict policy makers’ objective to improve labour market 
outcomes and employment prospects of unemployed or underemployed domestic workers 
first. Instead these policy measures emphasise the expansion of the available skills pool 
within the domestic labour market rather than increase the flow of skilled foreign workers 
into the domestic labour market. The strong emphasis on domestic worker’s labour 
market prospects within political discourse shows how policy maker motives actually 
contradict the official policy intent of the 2009 Action Programme. From a policy maker 
perspective, a desired policy outcome would not necessarily mean increased skilled 
labour migration to Germany, which is the stated aim of the Action Programme, but 
rather national employers fully utilizing available domestic skilled labour potential, 
German or foreign, before recruiting from abroad.  
 
7.3 –Motive Two: Preventing Migrant’s Access to Welfare 
 
 The second policy maker motive identified within the political discourse on 
skilled labour migration concerns opposition to migrant workers accessing the social-
welfare system in Germany. It is primarily the Christian Democrat policy makers who 
insist that immigration policies, including policies on skilled labour recruitment, should 
under no circumstances encourage or facilitate migrant access to national social-welfare. 
Since the German state is legally obliged to provide welfare provisions to all residents 
within its territory, irrespective of the claimant’s nationality or legal status, the only way 
to limit migrants’ access to welfare is to limit their access to the territory of the German 
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state (Freeman, 2004; Joppke, 1998). Therefore calls to limit migration into the social-
welfare system actually translate into restricting territorial access and residency to 
foreigners who may potentially become at some point reliant on the national social-
welfare system. Consequently, the Christian Democrats insist on skilled labour migration 
policies that ensure only those migrant professionals who are not likely to become a 
financial liability to the German state are given labour market access and legal residency.  
According to Castles (2004, p. 856) ‘The emergence of the welfare state 
reinforced the distinction between citizens and foreigners’. National social-welfare 
systems occupy an ambiguous role within migration scholarship because countries with 
strong welfare systems tend to close themselves to immigrants in order restrict access to 
non-nationals while at the same time the national social-welfare system in many migrant 
receiving countries acts as a driving force in facilitating the incorporation of migrants 
into the host society (Castles, 2003, p. 216). According to Boswell (2007, p. 80) ‘the state 
secures legitimacy through protecting its citizens’ privileged access to welfare, or socio-
cultural stability; this explains restrictionist discourse on migration in many democratic 
welfare states. Freeman (2004, p. 955) concurs and states that ‘backlash fuelled by 
perceptions of migrant welfare abuse threatens to erode both consensus over welfare 
provisions and tolerance of continued mass immigration’. As such, national policy 
makers are generally keen to counter perceptions that immigrants can easily use and 
abuse the national social-welfare system once they are in the country (Hanson, 2010). 
Joppke (1999) already established that the ability of liberal states to restrict migrant 
access to national welfare provisions is severely limited once they are in the territory of 
the state due to notions of universal human rights and personhood as well as independent 
judiciary systems. Thus national immigration policy makers strive to limit the territorial 
access of migrants that are perceived as potential welfare liability, such as unskilled 
workers and refugees from developing countries, albeit usually with limited success 
(Joppke, 1998).  
 The significance of migrant access to national social-welfare becomes apparent in 
the political debate over PBIS where the Christian Democrats oppose such system on the 
grounds that it would facilitate migration into the national social-welfare system. 
According to them, if skilled migrant workers who entered Germany under PBIS could 
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not find employment, they would then automatically become a financial liability to the 
German state. Even the Liberal policy makers, who strongly support PBIS, seem to have 
recognized that such a system can only be successfully implemented if prevalent fears 
about immigration into the social-welfare system can be dispelled. According to their 
respondents, PBIS needs to include provisions that ensure only migrants willing and 
capable of supporting themselves are given labour market access in Germany through 
PBIS. Respondents representing industry and employer interest concur with the Liberal 
view that such system can only be successfully implemented if it contains provisions that 
limit the risk of migrants accessing social-welfare in Germany, which by default means 
limiting territorial access to migrant workers who constitute a high-risk group in respect 
to welfare dependency (Boswell, 2007).  
The analysis of the debate over minimum income thresholds for skilled  migrant 
professionals discussed in the previous two chapters suggests that the Christian 
Democrats conceptualize income barriers for skilled migrant professionals as an adequate 
policy mechanism against migration into the social-welfare system. Any professional 
earning over ! 63.600 is unlikely to ever become a liability to the German state because 
any professional in that salary range will likely not want stay in Germany and be 
dependent on the national welfare allowance. Moreover, the legislation on income 
thresholds also ensures that only skilled migrant professionals with a concrete offer of 
employment are provided with settlement permit, which guarantees that migrant 
professionals move into the labour market and not the social-welfare system.  
In the context of the political debate over skilled labour migration and migrant 
access to national social-welfare, the Christian Democrats undoubtedly recognize that 
they cannot restrict access to national social-welfare to anyone legally residing within the 
territory of the German state. The only way to limit welfare access to non-nationals is 
therefore to keep them out of the country altogether and only grant labour market access 
and residency to those who already have a concrete offer of employment and thus will 
not likely become a financial liability to the German state. The CDU’s top priority is to 
maintain control over labour migration to prevent migrant workers from accessing the 
national welfare system while economic and labour market considerations appear to be 
secondary objective. More significant, the CDU strong if not to say obsessive insistence 
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on limiting and preventing migrant’s access to the national social-welfare system is 
largely uncontested by the Social Democrats, which suggests that they do not wish to be 
presented as party that promotes “migration into the social welfare system”. Critique of 
the CDU hard-line is for the most part limited to the opposition Greens and the 
representatives of the Links Party.  
The analysis of the political debate in the German Bundestag and Bundesrat 
reveals that apprehensions about supposed migrant welfare dependency are exclusively 
prevalent among representatives of the CDU. The Christian Democrat representatives 
aim to present themselves in front of the domestic electorate as the guardian of the 
national social-welfare system that guarantees citizens’ privileged and exclusive access to 
the welfare state. As such it is not the nation-state as a political entity or the national 
government as a whole that vocally opposes migrants’ access to the national social-
welfare system but rather only the representatives from one political party in parliament. 
In light of the fact that welfare chauvinism is prevalent in many European countries, the 
CDU’s attempt to mobilize voters who may perceive migrants’ access to national social-
welfare as illegitimate is actually not surprising (Freeman, 2004). It is however 
noteworthy that popular concerns over migrants’ access to national welfare are 
instrumentalized by German conservative policy makers within political debate on elite 
migration. This suggests that in order to legitimize skilled labour migration policies, 
Christian Democrat policy makers feel it is necessary to ensure their conservative 
electorate that popular opposition to migrants accessing the social-welfare system is 
taken seriously and constitutes a vital part of the policy formation process on skilled 
labour migration (Samers, 2009, p. 206; Leitner, 1995). It also shows the national 
electorate that the CDU is in control on immigration.   
 
7.4 – Motive Three: Preventing Unskilled Labour Migration & Labour Market 
Competition 
 
 The third policy maker motive identified within political discourse on skilled 
labour migration concerns widespread apprehension about unskilled labour migration to 
Germany because of its perceived negative impacts on the employment prospects of 
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domestic unskilled workers. At the same time, German policy makers are also concerned 
about skilled foreign workers moving into the lower segments of the national labour 
market and competing with the domestic unskilled labour force. The discourse analysis 
shows that considerations over unskilled labour migration as well as the impacts of 
skilled labour migration on German workers in unskilled and semi-skilled professions 
have had a profound impact on political debate on skilled labour migration during the 
sampling period. 
Castles (2006, p. 760) observes a trend in labour migration policy throughout 
Europe in which national policy makers emphasise the ‘import of human capital’ while at 
the same time they increasingly restrict mobility and labour market access of less-skilled 
workers. Ruhs (2005) and Piper (2009) confirm that restrictions on international labour 
mobility primarily affect unskilled workers. Freeman (2006, p. 241) states that skilled 
labour recruitment schemes in advanced and affluent democracies are rarely contested 
and face little domestic opposition whereas unskilled and semi-skilled labour migration 
often faces significant domestic opposition. White (1988) also believes that low-skilled 
migrants are regarded by policy makers as a potential threat to social cohesion and 
national identity while skilled migrants are perceived far less of threat in this regard. 
While Favell et al. (2007, p. 18) state that ‘both highly skilled and unskilled 
migration are shaped by distinctive policy processes and political structures’, Skeldon 
(2008, p. 4) claims that immigration policy in developed countries has developed a 
dualism in which the promotion of skilled labour migration is accompanied by 
restrictions on unskilled labour migration. Iredale (1999) interprets policy preference for 
skilled migrants and restrictions towards unskilled migrants as an attempt by national 
policy makers to harvest the economic benefits of labour migration without any of the 
social and economic costs. Freeman (2004) argues that the economic benefits of readily 
available cheap migrant labour, presumably unskilled workers, are disproportionately 
concentrated among employers and industry while the social and financial costs of low-
skill immigration are diffused within society and the national social-welfare system 
(Boswell, 2007, p. 77). According to Freeman (2004), the fact that the economic benefits 
of labour migration are concentrated among the owners of capital who utilize foreign 
labour effectively makes employers’ and industry interest more pronounced in the policy 
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formation process. Conversely, the in-flow of foreign workers into the domestic labour 
market and the resulting pressure on wages, particularly in the low-skill professions, will 
inevitably stir discontent among domestic workers who have to compete with them in the 
national labour market (Castles, 2004; Money, 1997).  According to Hix et al. (2007, p. 
185) policy makers have to balance the economic interests of lower-skilled domestic 
workers and the domestic unemployed with the economic interest of the owners of capital 
who benefit from higher levels of labour migration. 
The analysis of the relevant parliamentary debate in Germany in conjunction with 
the stakeholder interviews reveals that German policy makers are keen to present 
themselves as defending the economic interest of domestic workers, low-skilled and 
unemployed, and thus insist on policy measures that ensure unskilled and low-skill labour 
migration to Germany is severely restricted. As a result, opposition to unskilled labour 
migration constitutes an influential policy maker motive within political discourse in 
skilled labour migration. This however does not explain why apprehensions over 
unskilled labour migration matter within political debates over skilled labour migration.     
 According to Stalker (2002, p. 163) governments try to dissuade migrant groups 
that are perceived to ‘bring in’ or ‘create’ social and political problems and ultimately 
aim to reduce the flow of unskilled workers and refugees because they are seen as a 
liability to the national social-welfare system. However, Castles (2006) and Hollifield 
(2004) point out that there is a structural demand for cheap unskilled labour in many 
economically advanced countries just as there is demand for skilled professionals. 
Therefore lack of demand for unskilled workers does not necessarily explain the 
restrictionist emphasis towards unskilled labour migration within political debate on 
skilled labour migration in Germany. However, the data discussed in the previous two 
chapters revealed that German policy makers, particularly the representatives from the 
governing coalition as well as the representatives from organized labour, are concerned 
that unskilled labour migration as well as non-recognition of foreign professional 
credentials could exacerbate labour market competition in the lower segments of the 
German labour market. Thus policy makers’ attempt to restrict unskilled labour migration 
can be interpreted as an attempt to avoid political backlash from their domestic 
constituents. The restrictive emphasis towards unskilled labour migration within political 
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debate on skilled labour migration is most likely a political strategy to legitimize support 
for skilled labour migration policy frameworks in the eyes of the electorate (Boswell, 
2007). By publically pursuing a restrictionist emphasis on unskilled immigration within 
political debate on skilled labour migration, German policy makers aim to reconcile 
widespread domestic apprehension about perceived negative impacts of large-scale 
unskilled immigration with need to for improved skilled labour migration policy 
framework. As such German policy makers utilize restrictionist emphasis on unskilled 
labour migration to facilitate more expansionary labour migration policies for skilled 
foreign professionals.    
 One of the more peculiar aspects of the 2009 Action Programme is the extension 
of derogation of freedom of movement for EU-8 +2 nationals. The data discussed in the 
previous two chapters shows that policy maker fears over labour market competition 
between domestic workers and citizens from the new EU member states constitutes the 
main argument in favour of extending the derogation of freedom of movement for 
citizens of the new EU member states. However, apprehensions over eastern European 
labour migration primarily concern unskilled and semi-skilled workers. While the 
representatives from the governing coalition have justified their party’s support for the 
extension of mobility restrictions for EU-8+2 nationals with the need to prepare the 
domestic labour market for labour migration from the new EU member states, they at the 
same time welcome the opening of the German labour market for EU-8+2 university 
graduates. This suggests that the extension of derogation of freedom of movement for 
EU-8+2 citizens is actually about maintaining restrictions on unskilled and semi–skilled 
labour migration from eastern Europe and subsequently about preventing labour market 
competition between unskilled and semi-skilled domestic workers and EU-8+2 workers 
in the lower segments of the German labour market. The dualism between expansionary 
skilled labour migration policy and restrictionist unskilled labour migration policy has 
already been discussed earlier (Skeldon, 2008; Castles, 2006).  
 German policy makers’ desire to prevent labour market competition between 
unskilled domestic workers and migrant workers also becomes apparent in the political 
debate over foreign skills recognition and degree accreditation. It is clear that German 
policy makers are aware that non-recognition of foreign work credentials and academic 
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degrees often results in skilled migrants taking up employment below their professional 
qualifications. While policy makers officially lament the economic costs as a result of 
non-recognition, they also acknowledge that Brain Waste effectively forces migrant 
professionals into the lower segments of German labour market where they then compete 
with domestic unskilled workers over increasingly scarce jobs that require little or no 
professional qualifications. In light of the fact that German policy makers are keen to 
prevent labour market competition between unskilled and semi-skilled domestic workers 
and immigrant workers, the desire to improve official accreditation procedures for 
foreign professional credentials can also be interpreted as an attempt to prevent skilled 
migrant workers from being relegated to the lower segments of the German labour 
market.  
 There are strong indicators that controversy over unskilled labour migration and 
perceived negative impacts of labour migration, skilled and unskilled, on the lower 
segments of the German labour market do have a significant impact on political debate on 
skilled labour migration and associated policy. This suggests that German policy makers 
do not merely conceptualize skilled labour migration policy in the context of skilled 
labour demand in the upper segments of the German labour market, but also consider the 
potential impacts of labour migration on sectors of the national economy where there is 
no imminent demand for skilled workers. 
 Even though Freeman (2004), Castles (2004), and Money (1997) have pointed out 
that policies promoting labour migration will inevitably reflect employers and industry 
interest, the analysis of the political debate in Germany suggests that national policy 
makers are in fact primarily concerned with implementing skilled labour migration 
policies that reflect the interest of the domestic workforce, particularly domestic unskilled 
workers and domestic unemployed, which then by default adds a restrictionist emphasis 
to political debate over skilled labour migration policy.  
 
7.5 –Motive Four: Maintaining National Control over Labour Migration 
 
The desire to maintain strict state control over labour migration flows constitutes 
a strong policy maker motive within political discourse on skilled labour migration in 
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Germany. The Christian Democrat representatives as well as the respondents from the 
federal ministries are particularly adamant about the need to maintain policy mechanisms 
that enable strict state control over labour migration flows. While it is primarily 
representatives from the CDU that insist on strict control over labour migration flows 
through domestic institutional frameworks, an overwhelming majority of German policy 
makers as well institutional actors are strongly opposed to any common policy 
framework on skilled labour migration implemented at the European Union level. 
Immigration policy, including skilled labour migration, is viewed as an essential 
component of national sovereignty and a common EU policy on skilled labour 
recruitment for third country nationals would undermine the national sovereignty of the 
Federal Republic. Respondents from the federal ministries are equally adamant about 
maintaining national sovereignty over immigration policy in order to guarantee that the 
right migrant worker move into the right employment sectors of the German labour 
market. In light of the fact that German policy makers are keen to maintain preferential 
labour market access for domestic workers, limiting migrant’s access the national social-
welfare system, and preventing labour market competition between domestic workers and 
foreign workers, it is not surprising that they oppose transferring sovereign control over 
skilled labour migration to the European Union 
According to Massey (1999, p. 307) every nation-state seeks to control and 
regulate the numbers and composition of migrant flows into its territory through the 
establishment of policy frameworks and immigration control mechanisms. Favell et al. 
(2007, p. 17) confirm that ‘State policies regarding entry and exit, the granting or 
withholding of visas and work permits, and the establishment of numerical quotas on 
certain categories of migrants, set the permissions and constraints under which various 
regimes of immigration are established by receiving nation-states’. Since control over 
immigration is the natural prerogative of sovereign nation-states, it is not surprising that 
national policy makers are keen to maintain strict direct control over who can and cannot 
enter the territory of the nation-state. As Boucher (2008), Boswell (2007), and Favell et 
al. (2007) point out, modern states maintain their legitimacy by protecting their citizens’ 
privileged access to the state’s resources and the national labour market as well as 
through maintaining socio-cultural stability within society. Consequently, immigration 
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policy makers and the political elites in economically advanced nation-states are aware 
that their legitimacy depends on their ability to maintain a certain degree of territorial 
closure towards non-nationals. According to Joppke (1998, p. 267) economic and 
political globalization have together undermined the ability of nation-states with regards 
to immigration policymaking but Hollifield (2008, p.189) claims that ‘the state does 
matter and has the capacity, if not always the will, to regulate migration flows and stock’. 
The political debate over PBIS represents a good example where particularly 
Christian Democrat representatives are hesitant to relinquish control over labour 
migration flows to an autonomous institutional framework. Christian Democrat but also 
federal institutional opposition towards PBIS is grounded in the assumption that such 
system once in place would severely restrict the ability to control immigration into 
Germany and forfeit the state’s ability to prevent migrant workers from moving into 
sectors of the economy where there actually is labour market demand. Thus policy maker 
motivation to control skilled labour migration to Germany goes beyond controlling the 
territorial access of foreign workers. German policy makers, especially the governing 
Christian Democrats also desire to control the parameters of migrant employment within 
the German labour market as policy makers are keenly aware that skilled labour 
migration flows do not necessarily go into the sectors of the economy where they are 
intended to go. The policy maker insistence to maintain strict control over skilled labour 
migration flows is closely related to earlier discuss three motives.  
The strong motivation by conservative German policy makers to maintain 
sovereign and direct control over skilled migration flows is less about controlling 
territorial access but rather about ensuring skilled migrant workers moving into specific 
pre-determined employment sectors within the German labour market. Points based 
immigration systems are useful for setting and determining the parameters for territorial 
and subsequent labour market access of skilled foreign workers but once in the labour 
market, PBIS generally does not have any control as to where skilled migrant workers 
take up employment or if they take up employment at all. Considering that German 
policy makers and institutional actors are extremely wary of migrants accessing the 
national welfare system due to unemployment or moving into sectors of the economy 
where they then compete with domestic German workers, the CDU opposition to PBIS is 
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actually a logical consequence. The priority check system on the other hand, despite its 
time consuming bureaucracy, ensures that skilled foreign professionals only move into 
sectors of the economy where there is demand and by default they do not compete with 
domestic German workers. The motivation to control skilled labour migration into the 
German labour market explains the Christian Democrat opposition to PBIS and their 
continued insistence on the priority check system for skilled workers from third 
countries.  
The analysis of the political debate and respondents’ interviews in the previous 
two chapters of confirms that even in the context of skilled labour migration debate, 
German policy makers are adamant about maintaining strict national sovereign control 
over labour migration flows. Conservative policy makers are particularly opposed to any 
policy framework that would compromise the ability of the national government and its 
corresponding institutions to control immigration flows. This suggests that policy 
makers’ opposition to PBIS as well as a common EU labour migration policy framework 
may have less to do with maintaining national sovereignty than with maintaining strict 
control over skilled labour migration flows in order to avoid and prevent negative 
outcomes within the German labour market. To conclude this section, the insistence of 
German policy makers’ to maintain direct national legislative control over skilled labour 
migration flows is linked to fears that the surrender of legislative power will deprive the 
state and by default the elected policy makers of the ability to control and restrict 
undesired immigration. It is in the collective interest of particularly conservative 
immigration policy makers in Germany to retain direct control over a politically sensitive 
policy field such as skilled labour migration.   
 
7.6 –Motive Five: Integrating Migrant Workers 
 
Migrant integration has been identified as the final underlying policy maker 
motive within political discourse on skilled labour migration. As already discussed in the 
previous chapter, integration is a heavily contested and debated concept within human 
geography and the social sciences (Koopmans, 2010; Heckmann, 2006; Joppke, 2004). 
The analysis of the political debate on skilled labour migration in Germany however 
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shows that German policy makers as well institutional actors, labour market stakeholders, 
and policy advisors hold very particular views on what constitutes successful migrant 
integration.  
According to Joppke (2009, p. 470) ‘successful integration is eventually the result 
of multiple adjustments in multiple spheres of a differentiated society, including markets, 
culture and everyday life, all of which follow their own rationalities – which can only 
minimally and indirectly be influenced and mended by the liberal state’. Heckman (2006) 
concurs with Joppke’s assessment as he differentiates between cultural, structural, 
interactive, and identificational integration while exploring the complexities and 
multiple-scales of migrant integration in receiving societies. 
 The analysis of the political debate on skilled labour migration in Germany 
reveals that German policy makers, particularly those on the conservative political 
spectrum, insist that migrant workers should be capable of integrating themselves. 
However, the notion of integration in the context of skilled labour debate is closely 
aligned alongside notions of economic utility whereby integration is conceptualized as 
labour market participation and non-reliance on the national social-welfare system. 
Consequently migrants who do not participate in the labour market and rely on state 
support are perceived as an integration failure. 
According to Freeman (2004, p. 951) skilled migrant professionals are perceived 
as better positioned than unskilled migrants to ‘control the terms of their integration’. 
Thus skilled migrants are either more capable or willing to integrate themselves than 
unskilled migrants, which in the context of skilled labour migration debate means that 
skilled migrants are more likely to participate in the labour market and less likely to rely 
on state support. The analysis of the political debate in Bundestag and Bundesrat as well 
as the stakeholder interviews shows that the term integration is frequently applied to 
distinguish between skilled and unskilled labour migration, between participation in the 
labour market and unemployment and reliance on the social-welfare system, between 
desired migrants and undesired migrants.   
German policy makers overwhelmingly conceptualize migrant integration as 
active participation in the national labour market through paid employment while 
unemployment and welfare dependency of migrant workers constitutes integration 
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failure. A number of Christian Democrat representatives argued that there are enough 
migrant workers in Germany that are not integrated, that is they do no participate in the 
labour market and are likely to be reliant on state support, and that further labour 
migration would merely exacerbate existing integration problems, meaning increased 
unemployment and welfare dependency in Germany’s migrant community. At the same 
time, interview respondents representing employers and industry interest stressed that 
skilled migrant professionals are less prone to integration deficits because they are more 
likely to participate in the labour market whereas migrant workers with little or no 
professional qualifications experience significant problems with integration because their 
lack of professional skills prevents them from taking up paid employment in the German 
labour market. It is more than apparent that in the context of political debate over skilled 
labour migration, successful migrant integration equals migrant labour market 
participation.  
 The issue of migrant integration also shapes discussions over PBIS. Those in 
support of PBIS (Social Democrats, Liberals, Greens, Employers) claim that such system 
would actually facilitate and promote labour market integration of skilled migrant 
professionals while the Christian Democrats were convinced that points based 
immigration would undermine government efforts to integrate migrants into the labour 
market because the state could not control if and where migrant professionals take up 
employment. Consequently the Christian Democrats oppose PBIS and instead insist on a 
concrete offer of employment as a prerequisite for labour market access and residency for 
migrant professionals in order to ensure their labour market participation and by default 
integration. Any state labour migration policy that does not make labour market 
participation a priority will like be perceived and labelled as undermining migrant 
integration as the Christian Democrat opposition to PBIS clearly shows. 
 However, not all policy makers conceptualize migrant workers’ integration 
exclusively in terms of migrants’ labour market participation and non-reliance on social-
welfare. While some of the respondents stressed the link between migrants’ professional 
qualifications and their ability to participate in the labour market, others were keen to 
point out that professional skills alone are not the only factor determining migrants’ 
integration and their labour market participation. The Green Party interview respondent 
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claimed that the ability of migrant professionals to participate in the upper segments of 
the German labour market is partially determined by their cultural background. He even 
went so far as to suggest that the cultural background of foreign professionals affects 
their employment prospects in Germany notwithstanding their skills and expertise. The 
CDU party consultant on the other hand believed that non-European workers are more 
difficult to integrate, which has a negative impact on their labour market participation. 
According to that respondent, the migrant group perceived as most problematic in regards 
to integration in Germany are unskilled migrants from Turkey, which according to her is 
self evident in the poor labour market participation of this migrant group.  
 When asked about existing policy measures that grant preferential labour market 
access to citizens from other industrialized countries from outside the EU such as the 
United States, Canada, and Japan, the CDU respondent argued that citizens from other 
economically advanced nation-states are more capable of integrating themselves in 
Germany and participate in the labour market than presumably unskilled migrants from 
developing countries. The Christian Democrat respondent used the terms social 
integration and labour market participation interchangeably, which implies that they are 
both perceived as intrinsically connected in sense that social integration leads to labour 
market integration, which in turn ensures labour market participation.  
To conclude, within the context of political debate over skilled labour migration, 
migrant integration is almost exclusively conceptualized in terms of migrant economic 
utility through active labour market participation while social, cultural, and political 
aspects of migrant integration as outlined by Koopmans (2010), Joppke (2009), and 
Heckmann (2006) are not overly relevant. Migrant workers that participate in the labour 
market and contribute to the national economy are deemed integrated and there is an 
assumption that skilled migrant professionals can integrate themselves better than 
unskilled migrant workers. In the context of skilled labour migration debate, migrant 
integration translates into their integration into the labour market. The insistence of 
German policy makers, particularly from the conservative political spectrum, that labour 
migration policies need to facilitate migrant integration actually mean that policy needs to 
ensure that migrant workers participate in the labour market and do not become a liability 
to the German state. Interestingly, the analysis of the political debate also shows that 
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German policy makers are more concerned with entry restrictions for migrants that are 
perceived as less able to integrate themselves than they with promoting and facilitating 
migrants’ ability to integrate themselves. At the same time, conservative German policy 
makers instrumentalize perceived integration deficits within the migrant community to 
justify protectionist and restrictionist labour migration policies.   
 
7.7 – Interpretation of Policy Maker Motives  
 
The discussion of the five policy maker motives concludes that political discourse 
on skilled labour migration and associated policy formation processes in Germany 
between 2005 and 2009 were disproportionately shaped and framed by motives firmly 
embedded within domestic national politics and at the same time lacked any underlying 
economic rationale. Although German policy makers acknowledge global economic 
pressures such as international skills competition as well as domestic economic 
considerations such as labour market demand, these do not appear to be prominent 
determinants of state action on skilled labour migration during the sampling period. Quite 
to the contrary, national policy makers are strongly motivated to restrict migrants’ access 
to national welfare, prevent undesired unskilled labour migration, and protect privileged 
labour market access and outcomes for domestic workers. These motives are strongly tied 
to domestic politics and fail to include economic considerations. Within the context of 
political debate on skilled labour migration there is also a strong desire among policy 
makers to maintain and enforce strict state control over all immigration flows into 
Germany, including skilled labour migration, thus re-emphasising the significance of 
national territorial sovereignty within labour migration theory. Finally, German policy 
makers are keen to stress that migrants, including skilled foreign professionals, need to 
integrate themselves in Germany. It appears that within political discourse on skilled 
labour migration, the social question enjoys prominence if not priority over the supposed 
economic and labour market objectives  
The analysis and discussion of the identified policy maker motives concludes that 
political discourse on skilled labour migration in Germany during the sampling period 
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has had a strong protectionist and restrictionist emphasis, which in turn resulted in skilled 
labour migration legislation that emphasized restriction over labour market liberalization. 
While German policy makers acknowledge the economic necessity for skilled labour 
migration to Germany, the determinants of state action on skilled labour migration and 
associates legislation lack an overarching economic rational as underlying policy maker 
motives are predominately linked to non-economic national political considerations. 
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Chapter Eight – Thesis Conclusion 
 
8.0 - Introduction 
 
The final chapter presents and discusses the research results of the thesis. Based 
on the Critical Discourse Analysis of parliamentary debate transcripts and the review of 
the twenty-six stakeholder interviews, section 8.1 provides an interpretation of the key 
policy measures within the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration and 
discusses their relationship to underlying policy maker motives identified within political 
discourse. Section 8.2 discusses how the 2009 policy distinguishes between skilled 
workers from within the EU and those from third countries. Section 8.3 stresses the need 
to reposition the role of labour market stakeholders within migration theory while section 
8.4 presents the theoretical contributions of the thesis towards the Gap Hypothesis. 
Section 8.5 discusses the significance of the Liberal Paradox theory in relation to skilled 
labour migration legislation in Germany. Section 8.5 sums up the theoretical 
contributions of thesis to migration scholarship while section 8.6 discusses the 
significance of geographic scale and the nation-state within scholarly research on skilled 
labour migration and associated policy. Finally, section 8.7 presents the potential future 
developments in regards to skilled labour migration policy in Germany.  
 
8.1 - Interpretation of the Policy Measures in 2009 Action Programme 
 
The thesis has reached the following conclusions on the individual policy 
measures of the 2009 Action Programme. First, it is apparent that labour market demand 
for skilled workers and existing as well as emerging skills shortages within the domestic 
labour market have initiated political debate on skilled labour migration in Germany and 
labour market demand for skilled professionals is widely acknowledged among German 
policy makers as well institutional actors, labour market stakeholders and policy advisors. 
Respondents representing employers and industry interests are especially keen to stress 
existing skills shortages and the pressing need to ease immigration restrictions on foreign 
professionals. 
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Second, even though existing domestic skills shortages are widely acknowledged, 
German policy makers unequivocally insist that the labour market prospects of domestic 
workers and their privileged access to the national labour market must under all 
circumstances be maintained. There is a cross party consensus that the employment 
prospects of domestic workers must not be negatively affected by the recruitment of 
skilled foreign professionals. Respondents representing employers and industry interests 
also acknowledge the necessity to first and foremost employ domestic workers.  
Third, in the context of the political debate over skilled labour migration, 
conservative policy makers are strongly opposed to migrants accessing the national 
social-welfare system in Germany. Further, liberal and conservative policy makers 
equally oppose unskilled labour migration to Germany because they perceive unskilled 
migrants as a potential welfare liability as well as potential labour market competition for 
unskilled domestic workers. 
Fourth, while the governing Social Democrats as well as opposition Liberals and 
Greens support lower income thresholds for skilled foreign professionals, Christian 
Democrat policy makers in the Bundestag strongly oppose lowering existing income 
thresholds. The reduction of the previous income threshold from 86.400 Euros to 63.600 
Euros as part of the 2009 Action Programme was only made possible through the support 
of the Christian Democrat representatives in the Bundesrat, which further confirms the 
political power and leverage held by the Christian Democrats within political negotiation 
over skilled labour migration legislation. Christian Democrat Policy makers 
conceptualize the minimum income threshold as the most effective policy measure to 
control skilled labour migration into Germany and ensure optimal policy outcomes.  
Fifth, German policy makers across the political spectrum conceptualize resident 
migrants whose professional credentials are not officially recognized as well as foreign 
graduates from domestic universities as an available domestic skilled labour potential. 
Improving labour market access for migrant professionals who already reside in Germany 
does not contradict earlier discussed policy preference towards domestic workers.    
Sixth, in light of the fact that the 2009 Action Programme grants full labour market 
access to EU-8+2 graduates, the Christian Democrat and Social Democrat insistence on 
another two-year extension of derogation of freedom of movement for EU-8+2 citizens 
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can only be interpreted as an attempt to temporarily restrict politically inconvenient 
labour market access to unskilled and semi-skilled workers from the new EU-member 
states in eastern Europe. There appears to be virtually no significant political opposition 
towards fully opening the German labour market for skilled graduates from the EU-8+2 
member states.  
Seventh, the analysis of parliamentary debate transcripts reveals that even though 
Points Based Immigration is subject to frequent debate and enjoys strong support among 
the Social Democrats, Greens, and especially the Liberals as well as among labour 
market stakeholders and policy advisors, the fundamental opposition of the Christian 
Democrats and the Christian Democrat run Federal Ministry of the Interior towards such 
a system effectively prevents meaningful political debate and subsequent establishment 
of PBIS in Germany.  
The thesis concludes that even though rising demand for skilled workers, existing 
skilled labour shortages, and projected demographic transition have triggered state action 
on skilled labour migration policy in Germany during the sampling period, the 
corresponding policy formation process was however predominately shaped and framed 
by underlying motives that demand territorial closure and labour market restrictions 
towards to unskilled migrant workers. The Critical Discourse Analysis reveals that 
German policy makers fail to articulate the parameters and objectives of successful 
skilled labour migration policy outcomes and instead place disproportionate emphasis on 
potential negative policy outcomes of skilled labour migration to Germany. While 
German policy makers lack a clear and comprehensive vision of desired policy outcomes, 
they have clear and articulate understanding of negative migration outcomes and policy 
failure, possibly due to experience of past labour migration to Germany. The underlying 
policy maker motives identified within political discourse are to prevent unskilled labour 
migration to Germany and restrict migrants’ access to welfare within Germany. At the 
same time, there is a strong motive to maintain, improve, and defend labour market 
privileges of domestic workers, particularly domestic unskilled workers.  Consequently 
political discourse on skilled labour migration during the sampling period is 
predominately shaped and framed by non-labour market related motives and completely 
lacks any vision of potential positive skilled labour migration outcomes and policy 
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success. According to Bauder (2006, p. 15) “migration flows regulate labour markets, 
and labour markets shape migration flows”, which implies that skilled labour migration 
legislation should theoretically be aligned alongside specific labour market 
considerations or target specific labour migration flows. Yet political discourse on skilled 
labour migration policy in Germany is shaped and framed by domestic non-economic 
political considerations and not by labour market considerations. Officially the 2009 
Action Programme aims to alleviate existing skills shortages in the German labour 
market by facilitating and promoting labour market access for skilled foreign 
professionals, yet underlying policy motives identified within political discourse 
emphasise closure and restrictions towards foreign workers, skilled and unskilled. 
Despite the strong restrictionist emphasis within political discourse, some of the 
policy measures of the 2009 Action Programme actively circumvent the restrictionist 
tendencies by conceptualizing migrant professionals and foreign graduates residing 
within Germany as de facto domestic labour potential. The policy measures aiming to 
improve foreign skills accreditation and enable post-study labour market access should be 
interpreted as an attempt by German policy makers to increase the catchment area for 
skilled labour recruitment while simultaneously not contradicting efforts to maintain 
labour market preference for domestic workers. The analysis of political discourse and 
stakeholder interviews supports this assessment. Similarly, removal of labour market 
barriers for EU8+2 graduates as part of the 2009 Action Programme increases the 
catchment area for skilled workers, as EU member states de facto share a common labour 
market. At the same time, the Action Programme also invokes the extension clause 
allowing German policy makers to postpone politically inconvenient unskilled and semi-
skilled labour migration from Eastern Europe for another two years, thus reaffirming the 
government’s commitment to maintain employment security of domestic workers.    
 
8.2 – The 2009 Action Programme and Internal EU Migration 
  
 The analysis of political discourse on skilled labour migration in Germany 
between 2005 and 2009 proves that state action on international skilled labour 
recruitment and associated state policy is predominantly shaped and framed by electoral, 
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economic, and social considerations that are firmly embedded within the national 
political sphere. Even though attempts have been made at the European scale to 
implement an EU wide legislative framework that would facilitate the recruitment of 
third country nationals, the results of this thesis suggest that policies on skilled labour 
migration will likely remain the prerogative of the national government in Germany 
(Parkes and Angenendt, 2010). In light of the fact that German policy makers, 
particularly those belonging to governing coalition parties, are keen to protect and 
maintain the labour market prospects of domestic workers while simultaneously 
maintaining strict control over migrant access to state welfare, it is highly unlikely that 
the German state will relinquish sovereignty over a sensitive policy area such as 
immigration to the European parliament. Notwithstanding the potential political and 
economic synergy that a common EU policy framework for the recruitment of skilled 
third country nationals would entail, such policy would by default not adequately reflect 
the vested interest of German policy makers and the German state. Thus German policy 
makers will undoubtedly resist any attempt to rescale skilled labour migration legislation 
from the national level to the post-national EU level. 
 While there is little political support for a common European policy framework 
on skilled labour migration, the analysis of political discourse suggests that internal EU 
labour migration is largely uncontested within political discourse. The 2009 Action 
Programme effectively enables full and unrestricted labour market access for EU8+2 
workers with post-secondary credentials. Third country nationals on the other hand are 
required to either earn an executive salary or be subject to the priority check system, 
which effectively bares them from the German labour market. Thus, the 2009 Action 
Programme strengthens the position of skilled workers from the EU8+2 countries within 
the German labour market while their non-EU counterparts are still subject to significant 
labour market restrictions. At the same time, the two-year extension of derogation of 
freedom of movement for the EU8+2 nationals without post-secondary credentials should 
not be interpreted as outright political opposition to internal EU labour migration but 
rather a short-term electoral necessity. German policy makers overwhelmingly 
acknowledge that freedom of movement constitutes one of the core principles of the 
European Common Market and policy makers across the political spectrum accept the 
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inevitable removal of all labour market barriers for citizens from the new EU member 
states. As such the 2009 Action Programme should not be interpreted as an attempt to 
divide unskilled and skilled EU-8+2 workers but rather as an attempt to facilitate skilled 
labour migration from within the EU and postpone labour market access of unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers from eastern Europe until a politically more convenient time.  
Although German policy makers strongly emphasize the need to utilize domestic 
labour resources to fill skills shortages, workers from other EU member states are not 
negatively affected by this clear and well-articulated policy maker preference. Unlike 
skilled labour migration from third countries outside the EU, internal EU skilled labour 
migration is uncontested within political discourse on skilled labour migration. This 
reaffirms the necessity to distinguish between EU citizens and third country nationals 
within the context of skilled labour migration and associated theory frameworks.  
 
8.3 – The Role of Labour Market Stakeholders  
 
While the research of this thesis highlights the significance of underlying policy 
maker motives within state action on skilled labour migration, the results also question 
the assigned position and power of trade unions, employers, and state institutions in 
political negotiations over skilled labour migration legislation within migration theory. 
The interviews with ministerial representatives reveal that the federal ministries 
responsible for drafting and implementing skilled labour migration legislation do not 
operate in an ideological vacuum but instead follow the party line of their respective 
federal minister. The respondent from the CDU run Federal Ministry of the Interior 
echoes similar restrictionist tendencies that characterizes the Christian Democrat policy 
makers within the relevant parliamentary debate while the respondent from the SPD run 
Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs supports liberal labour migration policies 
in principle but nevertheless follows the non-confrontational approach that characterizes 
the Social Democrats in the Bundestag. According to Massey (1999, p. 312), economic 
interest groups determine labour migration policies bureaucratically and Boswell (2007, 
p. 79) calls for a conceptual distinction between party politics and the state’s bureaucratic 
apparatus within migration scholarship. The results of the thesis suggest that the 
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bureaucratic apparatus in Germany, at least at the federal level, is an extension of the 
system of party politics. This should not be surprising, as the responsible federal 
ministers are elected officials as well as members of the political parties. At the 
individual state level, however, the respondents representing state institutions are 
seemingly more pragmatic and are keen to stress that labour migration policy should 
primarily orientate itself according to the prevailing labour market conditions and not 
party politics. However, the respondents from the individual federal states confirm that 
aside from the occasional consultation they had very little formal input into federal policy 
on immigration matters, including skilled labour migration.  
 The results of this thesis furthermore show that the role of labour market 
stakeholders within political negotiations on skilled labour migration policy is 
significantly less pronounced than the literature suggests. Even though Caviedes (2010) 
highlights the role of the labour markets stakeholders such as employers and trade unions 
in policy negotiations on sectoral labour migration, this thesis concludes that employer 
and trade union interest is not overly pronounced within political discourse on skilled 
labour migration during the sampling period and thus did not significantly influence state 
action on skilled labour migration policy. During parliamentary debate, it was primarily 
the opposition Liberals that represented the economic interest of German employers and 
industry. The conservative Christian Democrat policy makers on the other hand, despite 
frequently stressing their pro-economy and pro-employers stance, argue that demand for 
skilled workers has to first and foremost be met through utilizing and training available 
domestic workers. For the Christian Democrats, domestic political considerations 
outweigh the economic interest of their employer clientele.   
Freeman (2006), Meyers (2004), Castles (2004), and Money (1997) state that 
capitalists’ (employers and owners of industry) privileged access to state policy makers 
as well as their ability to organize their interest more effectively ensures that labour 
migration policies will inevitably reflect employers’ interests. Boswell (2007, p. 77) 
states that employers’ interests will by default be more pronounced within labour 
migration legislation because employers reap the benefits of especially skilled labour 
migration without being financially liable for the long-term social and economic costs of 
immigration (Hanson, 2010). According to Boswell, the fact that employers have much to 
 324 
gain from labour migration and little to lose allows them to organize their collective 
interest more effectively and thus exert significant influence on policy makers and by 
default on state action regarding labour migration legislation. The results of this thesis 
reveal that even though policy makers from the governing coalition consulted with 
employers and industry representatives, their influence of the 2009 Action Programme 
has been rather negligible as particularly conservative policy makers were more 
concerned about domestic political considerations, such as maintaining domestic 
workers’ employment prospects and protecting the national welfare system. This is not 
surprising since the state’s representatives secure their legitimacy as well as maintain the 
legitimacy of the nation-state by protecting the citizens’ exclusive access to the labour 
market and the social-welfare system (Boswell, 206, p. 80). Thus, in the context of 
skilled labour migration policy, employer and industry interest in Germany does not 
appear as pronounced as some authors suggest. 
The role of trade unions in the political negotiations over the 2009 Action 
Programme Furthermore also puts into question the static notion that migration literature 
assigns to organized labour. According to Meyers (2004) and Freeman (2006) trade 
unions are generally apprehensive about migrant workers. The interviews with trade 
union representatives suggest that German trade unions actually support skilled labour 
migration in principle, their representatives are however critical of employers’ motives in 
regards to international skilled labour recruitment. They interpret industry claims on 
skilled labour shortages in Germany as a strategy of German employers to renege on their 
social responsibilities towards the domestic working population and the domestic 
unemployed. Yet German trade unions do not fundamentally oppose skilled labour 
migration and instead insist on policy mechanisms that ensure a level playing field 
between migrant workers and domestic workers in regards to employment conditions and 
social-welfare entitlements. In effect German trade unions do not wish migrant labour, 
skilled and unskilled, to equal cheap and disposable labour and thus demand equal pay 
for equal work, thereby removing some of the economic incentives of migrant labour. 
The trade unions in Germany have a much more nuanced view on skilled labour 
migration than the literature credits them. Instead of outright opposition to foreign 
workers, German trade unions prefer to determine the employment conditions of migrant 
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workers and guarantee their social-security entitlements, thereby ensuring that foreign 
workers will not undermine the employment prospects and labour market outcomes of 
domestic workers.  
 
8.4 – Filling the Gap: Underlying Motives and the Gap Hypothesis 
 
The Critical Discourse Analysis and the stakeholder interviews indicate there is a 
significant discrepancy between the stated goals of the 2009 Action Programme and the 
underlying motives that shaped the policy formation process of the legislation. While 
Cornelius et al. (1994) have established with their Gap Hypothesis that there is a 
consistent discrepancy between immigration policy intent and immigration policy 
outcome in many industrialized democracies and, this study concludes that in the German 
context there is actually a significant discrepancy between stated migration policy intent 
and the underlying policy maker motives in regards to the legislation. The results of the 
thesis suggest that the policy gap in Germany is actually between stated aims of the 2009 
Action Programme and the underlying policy maker motives that determine state action 
on skilled labour migration policy. The 2009 Action Programme states that it is vital for 
Germany to make immigration regulations more attractive for foreign professionals in 
order to strengthen Germany’s position within the global competition over skilled 
workers, which German policy makers acknowledge during parliamentary debate and 
interview. Yet the Critical Discourse Analysis of parliamentary debate transcripts shows 
that especially conservative policy makers are significantly more concerned with 
restricting undesired labour migration and preventing undesired migration policy 
outcomes than with promoting skilled labour migration to Germany. This suggests that 
conservative German policy makers will likely measure the success of the 2009 Action 
programme in terms of its ability to restrict and limit undesired labour migration and 
prevent undesired policy outcomes. Whether or not the legislation actually increases 
skilled labour migration flows to Germany and improves labour market access for skilled 
foreign professionals appears to be less of a policy maker objective, at least from a 
Christian Democrat point of view. The insight provided by the Critical Discourse 
Analysis of German parliamentary debate transcripts and stakeholder interviews suggests 
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that underlying policy maker motives regarding skilled labour migration provide a more 
critical and nuanced perspective on the intent of labour migration legislation than the 
actual stated aims of the policy itself. Scholarly research on migration policy needs to 
account for the underlying motives within policy formation processes, which in turn will 
contribute to an improved scholarly understanding of the discrepancy or gap between 
immigration policy intent and immigration policy outcome.  
 
8.5 - The Liberal Paradox and Skilled Labour Migration in Germany  
 
The analysis of the political discourse on skilled labour migration in Germany 
between 2005 and 2009 concludes that German policy makers are caught in a conflict 
between domestic economic interest and domestic political opinion (Hix et al., 2007). As 
such, political debate over skilled labour migration in Germany between 2005 and 2009 
resembles Hollifield’s (2008) ‘liberal paradox’ whereby labour market demand for skilled 
foreign professionals has to be reconciled with domestic political pressure to restrict 
immigration. Freeman (2006, p. 241) claims that unlike unskilled labour migration and 
humanitarian immigration, skilled labour migration is rarely contested while Hollifield 
(2004, p. 902) believes that skilled labour migration policies are less likely to face 
significant domestic opposition due to their perceived economic benefits. White (1988) 
and Hanson (2010) also believe that skilled labour migration is significantly less 
contested than other form of international migration.   
  The analysis of relevant political debate and stakeholder interviews however 
does not support this assessment and instead identifies a strong protectionist and 
restrictionist emphasis within political debate on skilled labour migration. The data also 
shows that within political debate there is no clear conceptual distinction between skilled 
labour migration and unskilled labour migration. As a result, the restrictionist policy 
maker emphasis towards unskilled labour migration extends into political debate on 
skilled labour migration and effectively determines state action on policy.  
 Hollifield (2004, p. 900) asks the question“ have states found ways of escaping 
from the liberal paradox, or are they still caught between economic forces that propel 
them towards greater openness and political forces that seek a higher degree of 
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closure?”. The analysis of political discourse during the sampling period leads to the 
conclusion that German policy makers have not found a way out of the ‘liberal paradox’. 
Instead the research results suggest that German policy makers, especially those 
belonging to the parties representing the government between 2005 and 2009, were more 
inclined to heed to domestic political pressures that demand a more restrictive policy 
approach towards skilled labour recruitment from abroad. A critical majority of German 
policy makers maintains the view that the costs and benefits of labour migration are 
unevenly distributed. While industry and employers inevitably benefit from the 
availability of additional skilled workers, there is a widespread fear that large-scale 
skilled labour migration would take incentives away from German employers to hire and 
train available domestic workers and thus further marginalize unskilled, unemployed, 
older, and female domestic workers in the national labour market. Thus, there is a 
universal consensus within political discourse and among stakeholders interviewed that in 
order to ensure that German employers preferentially hire domestic workers, the German 
state has to maintain sufficient barriers against skilled foreign workers. Moreover, the 
Christian Democrat apprehension towards migrants’ access to national social-welfare as 
well as migrant workers moving into sectors of the economy where there is no demand 
for skilled workers further compels German policy makers towards restrictive skilled 
labour migration policies.   
Anderson (2010, p. 312) suggests conceptualizing immigration policies as a 
mould that aims to construct a certain type of immigrant worker. In light of the overall 
restrictionist emphasis within political discourse on skilled labour migration in Germany 
as a result of apprehensions regarding domestic workers employment prospects as well as 
undesired immigration outcomes, the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour 
Migration should be conceived as a mould that constructs migrant professionals 
irrespective of their professional qualifications and human capital. Instead, the Action 
Programme effectively utilizes the minimum income threshold to construct an elite 
worker whose salary ensures that he or she will not compete with unskilled and semi-
skilled domestic workers over jobs in the lower segments of the German economy and 
who will also not become a financial liability to the German state. By default, the income 
threshold also ensures that there will not be an overabundant supply of these elite 
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workers, which effectively forces German employers to utilize and train available 
domestic workers and not rely on the recruitment of foreign labour.   
The more peculiar aspect of the 2009 Action Programme relates to the fact that 
some of its policy measures effectively transform foreign workers into an available 
domestic skilled labour resource, thus circumventing restrictionist emphasis towards 
foreign workers and Hollifield’s ‘liberal paradox’. As mentioned beforehand, improving 
accreditation procedures for immigrant professionals already residing in Germany as well 
as liberalizing labour market access for foreign graduates from domestic universities can 
be interpreted as an attempt to utilize foreign skills potential without having to contradict 
the stated policy goal of maintaining privileged labour market access for domestic 
workers through territorial closure. Moreover, while the removal of labour market 
barriers for EU-8+2 graduates and the two-year extension of derogation of movement for 
EU-8+2 citizens can interpreted in terms of the skilled/unskilled policy dichotomy 
(Skeldon, 2008), granting unrestricted labour market access to EU-8+2 graduates 
technically utilizes domestic labour resources as EU citizens are, legally speaking, 
domestic workers. This suggests that German policy makers at least partially 
conceptualize skilled labour migration legislation as a means to increase the catchment 
area for available domestic skilled labour potential without having to grant territorial 
access to additional foreigners. By default this practice does not contradict the stated 
policy preference for domestic workers and effectively circumvents protectionist and 
restrictionist emphasis towards foreign labour.  
 
8.6 - Contributions to Migration Theory 
 
According to Stalker (2002) and Hanson (2010) national governments typically 
try to dissuade labour migration if it is perceived to create and exacerbate social and 
political problems with the domestic electorate. At the same time Freeman (2006), 
Hollifield (2004), and White (1988) presume that skilled labour migration does not face 
the same domestic political opposition within economically advanced nation-states that 
generally found with unskilled labour migration, humanitarian migration or 
undocumented immigration. However, the results from this thesis reveal that in Germany 
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skilled labour migration and associates policy frameworks also face significant domestic 
political opposition despite its acknowledged economic benefits and existing skills 
shortages within the German labour market. 
 German policy makers, particularly on the conservative political spectrum, do not 
exclusively conceptualize skilled labour migration in terms of economic utility and 
labour market demand. Instead they are keenly aware that the labour market mechanisms 
that are supposed to regulate skilled labour migration are far from perfect and can lead to 
undesired policy outcomes. For example, German policy makers acknowledge that 
skilled foreign professionals frequently experience deskilling and are relegated to the 
secondary labour market where they then compete with domestic workers. At the same 
time, policy makers are very much aware that employers and industry reap the economic 
benefits of skilled labour migration while the economic cost of failed migrant labour 
market integration falls to the German state. This demonstrates that German policy 
makers are all too aware of the fact that good policy intentions and subsequent policy 
outcome do not necessarily correspond and as a consequence they are actively aiming to 
reduce the risk of policy failure, which in turn puts a protectionist and restrictionist 
emphasis on state action regarding skilled labour migration policy. National immigration 
policy makers in Germany, at least in the context of skilled labour migration, appear to 
have a better understanding of policy failures and the long term social and economic 
impacts of labour migration than some migration scholarship credits them (Castles, 
2003).  
 Furthermore, the results of the Critical Discourse Analysis of parliamentary 
debate transcripts reveal that underlying policy maker motives in regards to skilled labour 
migration legislation differ significantly from the stated policy intent. Thus migration 
scholars should attempt to shift their research emphasis from analysing migration policy 
intent towards identifying the underlying policy maker motives that determine state 
action on migration legislation. Overall, within the literature there needs to be a stronger 
conceptual distinction between the politics of skilled labour migration (underlying 
motives) and policies on skilled labour migration (stated policy intent). In order to 
incorporate and adequately conceptualize the underlying motives that determine state 
action on skilled labour migration policies within migration theory, migration scholars 
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need to shift the research focus away from the post-policy outcomes towards the politics 
of skilled labour migration and the power negotiations that create and shape the 
legislation in the first place. The research approach utilized in this thesis will contribute 
towards a more nuanced and critical understanding of skilled labour migration policy 
formation processes and associated state action within economically advanced nation-
states. Accounting for policy maker motives within migration policy formation processes 
will contribute towards an improved scholarly understanding of the discrepancy between 
stated policy intent and subsequent policy failures, thus filling the gap in the Gap 
Hypothesis.  
The thesis also concludes that comprehensive evaluation and critical 
interpretation of skilled labour migration policies and associated state action need to 
move beyond the restrictionist/expansionist or pro-immigrant/against immigrant dualism 
prevalent in many scholarly studies on immigration policy. Even though the political 
debate and the power negotiations that preceded the implementation of the 2009 Action 
Programme had a strong protectionist and restrictionist emphasis, the Critical Discourse 
Analysis and the stakeholder interviews also revealed that policy makers actively 
circumvent popular and even their own party demands for restrictive immigration 
controls. By promoting foreign skills accreditation and enabling post-study labour market 
access as part of the 2009 Action Programme, German policy makers have reconciled 
political pressure for territorial closure with labour market and employers’ demand for 
skilled workers while simultaneously improving the labour market prospects of the 
resident migrant community. This shows that political pressure for territorial closure can 
be reconciled with labour market demand within skilled labour migration legislation. 
 
8.7 – Geography and the Nation-State 
 
The strong restrictionist and protectionist emphasis identified within political 
discourse on skilled labour migration during the policy formation process of the 2009 
Action Programme clearly illustrates that state action on skilled labour migration 
legislation is not exclusively determined by international market mechanisms and global 
economic forces but are instead predominantly determined and influenced by factors that 
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are firmly embedded within the national political scale. International migratory flows 
may be determined and shaped by global economic factors such as wage disparities 
between national labour markets as well as local factors such as trans-national economic 
networks and social relations but national immigration policy nevertheless remains a 
clear reflection of national political interest that demands territorial closure towards non-
nationals.  
Not only are migration policies implemented within the territorial jurisdiction of 
individual nation-states, the policy makers that create, shape, and frame migration policy 
formation processes are predominately motivated by factors that are linked to political 
and social considerations and interests firmly embedded within the national political 
scale. National political interest constitutes the foundation of skilled labour migration 
policy in Germany. In other countries this national interest may manifest itself differently 
but the German case study shows that among German policy makers, national interest is 
closely aligned alongside the interest of the domestic working population and 
considerations about the national welfare system. Freeman & Hill (2006, p. 7) observe 
that skilled labour migration policy in the United States is also a wholly self-contained 
national affair where national politics rather then global economic pressures determine 
state action towards skilled migration policy.  
Political discourse on skilled labour migration in Germany has a strong 
restrictionist and protectionist emphasis because the responsible German policy makers 
believe that controlling skilled labour migration is in the national interest. Whether or not 
these national interests are legitimate or a result of electoral pandering by national 
politicians remains irrelevant, what matters is that these national political interests and 
considerations dominate state action on skilled labour migration in Germany. Therefore 
the national scale remains an important scale of analysis for migration scholars wishing 
to research immigration policy and its impact of global migratory flows.  
The research approach of the thesis has also allowed to reconceptualise the 
position and role of the nation-state and national governments within empirical research 
on immigration policy and international labour migration. Instead of merely 
conceptualizing the nation-state as a monolithic singular political entity that distorts 
international migration flows, the thesis results show that migration scholars can account 
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for the nation-state and it policies on immigration by deconstructing policy formation 
processes and expose the underlying motives within political discourse. Identifying 
underlying policy maker motives within political discourse provides critical insight into 
the nature, purpose, and possibly the outcome of skilled labour migration policy and thus 
repositions state action on skilled labour migration and associated policy within 
migration theory. The results of the thesis show that skilled labour migration policy is not 
a singular legislative expression of national governments but rather the end result of 
complex and multilayered power-negotiations and compromises between different policy 
makers, institutional actors, and labour market stakeholders within the different political 
scales of national government. By default this effectively makes the nation-state a set of 
complex and multilayered power-negotiations and compromises between relevant state 
and non-state actors. In order to account for the nation-state as well as state action on 
migration policies within scholarly research on in international labour migration, 
migration scholars are well advised to abandon the one-dimensional, monolithic 
conceptualization commonly ascribed to the nation-state within migration theory. The 
thesis provides a research framework for improved scholarly understanding and 
conceptualization of the nation-state within immigration theory and migration 
scholarship.      
 
8.8 – Directions of Future Research 
 
 In light of the underlying restrictionist and protectionist emphasis within political 
discourse on skilled labour migration, it is very unlikely German policy makers will 
embark on a large-scale liberalization of the domestic labour market for foreign workers, 
skilled or unskilled. The thesis concludes that German policy makers did intent for the 
2009 Action Programme to widely open the German labour market to foreign 
professionals. In light of the fact that German policy maker are strongly motivated to 
restrict undesired immigration to Germany and instead prefer to promote the employment 
of domestic workers, the success of the 2009 Action Programme should not be 
exclusively measured by the number of skilled foreign professionals entering the German 
labour market after 2009. Instead, the employment rates of domestic workers should be 
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considered an important benchmark in respect of the Action Programme’s success. 
Moreover, the number of unskilled foreigners entering the German labour market after 
2009 as well as the social-welfare dependency of foreigners should also serve as factors 
in measuring the success of the 2009 Action Programme.  
The optimum policy outcome would be a slight to medium increase in skilled 
foreign professionals taking up employment in the German labour market as well as a 
significant decrease in domestic unemployment as well as a reduced number of unskilled 
migrants entering in Germany. This then would enable German policy makers to present 
reduced domestic unemployment to their constituents as a synergy effect from skilled 
labour migration and thus create the political consensus with the electorate for further 
liberalization of skilled labour migration policy frameworks.  
 The ultimate policy failure on the other hand would be increased or stagnating 
domestic unemployment and increased unskilled immigration to Germany. Whether or 
not skilled labour migration had increased or not in this scenario would be irrelevant 
because of policy makers’ failure to improve the employment prospects and labour 
outcomes of the domestic workers. German policy makers, particularly the Christian 
Democrats, would likely interpret increased skilled labour migration in conjunction with 
increased domestic unemployment as German employers reneging on their responsibility 
towards domestic workers in favour of foreign workers. In this hypothetical scenario, 
protectionist and restrictionist emphasis within political debate would increase 
significantly and most likely lead to increased restrictions on labour migration from third 
countries.    
At this point it is too early to determine the policy outcome of the 2009 Action 
Programme on Skilled Labour Migration. Heike Pethe’s (2005) study on the success the 
German Greencard was conducted four years after the initial implementation of the 
Greencard system and a similar time lapse would be prudent for a comprehensive study 
on the policy outcome of the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration.  
Another potential research opportunity relates to ongoing debate over points 
based immigration in Germany, which will most likely continue in the future. 
Considering that opposition to PBIS is strongest among CDU policy makers, a change in 
the federal government after the 2013 election, with the CDU going into opposition, 
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would potentially give the debate on PBIS new momentum. However, considering the 
ongoing European Debt Crisis following the 2008 global recession and reduced economic 
growth in Germany, labour market demand for skilled workers is not likely to increase 
significantly. Moreover, in light of prospective long-term sluggish economic growth and 
increased unemployment in the Mediterranean EU member states, German as well as 
European policy makers will most likely look at internal EU labour migration as a means 
to offset the economic fallout of the debt crisis and ongoing structural recession in 
southern Europe. German policy makers’ labour market preference for domestic workers 
will shift from national workers to EU workers, especially considering that internal EU 
labour migration already has an established legal framework as well as the fact that it is 
largely uncontested within domestic German politics. In this prospective scenario, 
national policy makers in Germany will be less inclined to facilitate labour migration of 
third country nationals, which in turn will make political debate over PBIS redundant.  
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Appendix A – 2009 Action Programme of Skilled Labour 
Migration 
 
Federal Ministry                 Federal Ministry 
of the Interior                of Labour and Social Affairs 
 
 
Berlin, 16 July 2008 
 
 
Action Programme of the Federal Government 
Labour migration's contribution to securing the skilled labour base in Germany 
 
 
Preliminary remarks 
 
In the context of current demographic trends, globalization and economic structural 
change in the direction of knowledge-intensive and research-intensive industries and 
services, current studies indicate that it will be increasingly difficult in the medium and 
long term to meet the growing need for skilled labour and highly qualified workers in 
Germany. It is forecast that the demand for skilled workers and greater qualification will 
increase as the supply of skilled labour diminishes. This trend will lead to the growing 
challenge that a shortage could develop, particularly on the labour market for university 
graduates, which could already start curbing economic growth by the mid-2010s. 
 
Competition over highly qualified skilled labour will continue to grow. For this reason, it 
is vital that Germany's immigration regulations also be made more attractive in order to 
strengthen the country's position in this area.  
 
When doing so, the Federal Government will advocate within the framework of national 
and European migration policies that targeted immigration be achieved in a way that does 
not hurt developing countries. The Federal Government will not deliberately recruit 
skilled workers from sectors in developing countries that have shortages of skilled labour. 
 
The Federal Employment Agency's Institute for Employment Research published a 
projection in December 2007 with the conclusion that "according to the latest long-term 
forecasts, the number of gainfully active persons will probably grow by a good 1.7 
million between 2005 and 2020 and then decline – due to demographic factors – by some 
500,000 in the following five years ....Underemployment in Germany could – just in 
terms of figures – fall by half by the year 2025. This however will be the case only when 
future manpower needs can be met not only in terms of quantity but also in terms of 
qualifications. Otherwise there is the danger of mass unemployment in combination with 
a shortage of skilled labour." The study "The Future of Education and Work" published 
in January 2007 by the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) comes to similar 
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conclusions. 
 
The Federal Government therefore aims to meet the growing demand for skilled labour 
first and foremost by stepping up the vocational and continuing training provided 
domestic skilled workers, by increasing the labour-force participation rate of women and 
older persons, and by training persons with an immigrant background who already live in 
Germany. For this, the German Government adopted the Advancement through 
Education qualification initiative on 9 January 2008 in order to improve the quality and 
effectiveness of vocational and continuing training on a long-term basis. The Federal 
Government and Länder governments are expected to reach agreement on a set of joint 
measures by autumn 2008 and subsequently adopt it at a meeting of the heads of the 
federal and Länder governments. 
 
Meseberg resolution 
Mindful of the expected increase in Germany's skilled labour requirements in the future, 
the federal cabinet decided at its closed meeting in Meseberg on 23/24 August 2007 that: 
 
"The Federal Government will make every effort to utilize Germany's own pool of skilled 
labour. Additional demand in the area of highly skilled workers could emerge in both the 
short and long term. In order to create a reliable basis for decisions on immigration, the 
relevant departments will swiftly draft a proposal for a monitoring system for 
ascertaining Germany's skilled labour requirements.  
 
"We want to provide for managing the immigration of highly qualified skilled workers in 
a way that reflects the needs of the labour market and strengthens our country's position 
when competing for the best workers. German schools abroad will play an important role 
in this connection. 
 
"For this purpose, the Federal Government will develop a blueprint for immigration that 
takes into account our country's interests in the coming decade. Quantitative and 
qualitative instruments and the experience that other countries have gathered in 
connection with managing immigration to meet the needs of their domestic labour 
markets are to be incorporated when drafting the blueprint."  
 
Therefore, in pursuance of the Meseberg resolution and with due regard to European 
consultations, the Federal Government proposes the following measures: 
 
Set of measures 
 
The following immigration policy measures are to take effect on 1 January 2009. 
 
1. Open the labour market for university graduates from the new EU Member 
States by waiving the priority check (screening to determine whether other job 
candidates with priority are available to fill the position) 
 
The labour market will be opened to university graduates (with a degree from a university 
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or a university of applied sciences) from the new EU Member States.  
 
This measure will be implemented at national level by ministerial ordinance without the 
approval of the Bundesrat. 
 
2. Extend the derogation from freedom of movement for the new acceding countries 
(EU-8 and for Bulgaria and Romania) 
 
The transitional provisions for the EU-8 (3rd phase: 1 May 2009 - 30 April 2011) and 
Bulgaria and Romania (2nd phase: 1 January 2009 - 31 December 2011) which contain a 
derogation from the principle of free movement for the new acceding countries will be 
extended. 
 
 Activation of the transitional provision for the EU-8 and for Bulgaria and Romania will  
be implemented at national level by means of a cabinet decision (and publication in the 
Federal Gazette) without the participation of the Bundesrat and at European level through 
a notification of the Commission by the Federal Government prior to 1 May 2009 for the 
EU-8 and prior to 1 January 2009 for Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
3. Lower the minimum income threshold for highly skilled workers 
 
In order to strengthen Germany in the international competition over highly qualified 
skilled workers, the minimum income threshold for issuing a settlement permit to highly 
skilled workers, which ensures a permanent right of residence right from the start, will be 
lowered from double the income ceiling for assessing contributions to a statutory health 
insurance fund (currently ! 86,400) to the income ceiling for assessing contributions to a 
general pension fund in the western Länder which is currently ! 63,600.  
 
This measure will be implemented by amending Section 19 of the Act on the Residence, 
Economic Activity and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory 
(Aufenthaltsgesetz). 
 
4. Open the labour market for university graduates from third countries (with 
priority check) and for their family members 
 
In addition, the labour market will be opened for all university graduates (with a degree 
from a university or a university of applied sciences) from third countries. However, in 
order to avoid adverse effects on the employment opportunities of domestic workers, the 
relevant authorities will continue to check whether other domestic job seekers who are 
entitled to preference are available to fill the particular position (priority check) and 
whether the particular foreign national will be hired under equally favourable terms as 
comparable German workers. The existing arrangement for university graduates from 
third countries who earned their degree in Germany will remain unchanged.  
 
This measure will be implemented by ministerial ordinance with the approval of the 
Bundesrat. 
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5. Preferential admission of graduates from German schools abroad 
 
Individuals who have graduated from a German school abroad have in-depth knowledge 
of the German language and culture. German universities and universities of applied 
sciences could make greater use of existing possibilities for admission to a university in 
Germany and  correspondingly promote them. In order to make Germany more attractive 
as a country of destination, the priority check will be waived 
 
• for every course of study or training that qualifies graduates to practice an 
occupation and for the individual's subsequent employment 
 
• in the case of individuals with a university degree, for every job that is 
commensurate with their training. 
 
This measure will be implemented by ministerial ordinance without the approval of the 
Bundesrat (with Bundesrat approval in the case of subsequent employment). These 
measures will be flanked by corresponding "promotional" activities to be sponsored by 
the Federal Foreign Office, which is also responsible for the German schools abroad. 
Additional activities on the part of the Länder would be desirable. 
 
6. Improve the status of (young) foreign students who have passed through the 
German education system and whose residence status is not secure 
 
Germany will make use, first and foremost, of the potential offered by those young 
foreign nationals who are familiar with the German culture as a result of their own 
integration and completion of their education in Germany (called "Bildungsinländer" in 
Germany = foreign students who have passed through the German education system). 
However due to their parents' residence status, many of these individuals have no 
prospects for long-term residence in Germany. For many, especially younger, foreign 
nationals whose deportation has been suspended, the provisions governing the right to 
stay adopted by the Standing Conference of the Interior Ministers of the Länder in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (IMK) on 17 November 2006 and the regulations 
governing old cases set forth in Sections 104a and 104b of the Act on the Residence, 
Economic Activity and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory (Residence Act) 
raise high hurdles in this regard. Vocationally well-qualified persons whose deportation 
has been suspended and who have completed their education in Germany or who have 
already proven themselves on the labour market as a result of qualifications they 
previously earned in their country of origin can also help meet the need for skilled labour 
on a long-term basis. The following improvements will be introduced for young 
"Bildungsinländer" whose deportation has been suspended and for vocationally well-
qualified persons whose deportation has been suspended and who have received a 
binding job offer or already have a job that is commensurate with their training: 
 
• Young foreigners whose deportation has been suspended, who have resided less 
than four years in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and therefore 
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do not have equal access to the labour market will receive facilitated access to 
education. This does not affect the individual's status as a foreign national whose 
deportation has been suspended. 
 
• Foreigners whose deportation has been suspended, who have integrated well 
into German society and have completed a vocational training programme or 
earned a university degree will receive a secure residence status (residence permit 
for the purpose of employment). 
 
• University graduates whose degree is recognized in Germany, whose 
deportation has been suspended and who have worked continually for two years 
in an occupation that corresponds to their qualifications and skilled workers 
whose deportation has been suspended and who have worked continually in an 
occupation that requires completion of at least three years of formal vocational 
training will receive a secure residence status (residence permit for the purpose of 
employment).  
 
The first measure will be implemented by ministerial ordinance without the approval of 
the Bundesrat. The other two measures will be realized by amendments to the Residence 
Act. This will entail adding a residence permit for the purpose of employment to Part 4 
"Residence for the purpose of economic activity" to enable the employment of qualified 
foreigners whose deportation has been suspended. The same exclusion criteria as those 
already provided for in the regulations governing old cases as set forth in Section 104a of 
the Residence Act shall fundamentally apply to qualified foreigners whose deportation 
has been suspended. 
 
 
 
7. Make the basic conditions more attractive for persons who are immigrating to 
Germany or have already immigrated to Germany 
 
Not only the form and content of immigration regulations but also the attractiveness of 
the general conditions for foreigners in Germany will play a decisive role in the further 
opening of the labour market for foreign university graduates. In this connection, 
Germany must compensate for disadvantages in the global competition over the best 
minds which it particularly has vis-à-vis Anglo-Saxon immigration countries. This would 
include, for instance, making better use of immigrants' potential and training (particularly 
through good profiling and targeted updating courses) as laid out in the Federal 
Government's qualification initiative and the National Integration Plan. In addition to the 
issue of granting access to the labour market to family members, the following areas for 
action will be tackled on a flanking basis: 
 
• The easing of requirements for the formal recognition of foreign degrees and 
certificates. 
 
• Making it clear that spouses of highly-qualified university graduates from third 
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countries or the EU do not have to prove they have a knowledge of the German 
language prior to entering Germany (Federal Ministry of the Interior, Federal 
Foreign Office and the Länder governments), 
 
• Measures against racism and discrimination. 
 
Monitoring 
 
A labour market monitoring system is to be used to better identify Germany's current, 
medium-term and longer-term manpower needs and to ascertain trends in the supply and 
demand of labour, in order to enable pragmatic decisions to be taken in individual cases 
on the basis of this information, while taking into consideration the longer-term factors. 
The aim here is to determine more precisely how demographic changes will manifest 
themselves in the German labour market in the future. The Federal Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs will, in conjunction with the other departments involved and 
coordinators, call into being an alliance to advise the Federal Government in decisions on 
immigration that reflects the needs of the German labour market. Furthermore, the 
Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs will design an early indicator system that 
will use an index to show what enterprises expect about future labour requirements. 
 
The Federal Government will conduct the monitoring activities under the lead 
management of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs on the basis of 
- external, scientific projections on medium-term and long-term skilled labour 
requirements and 
- the results of the alliance's consultations. 
 
Given the complexity of gathering and processing information for projections on medium 
term and long-term training and skilled labour requirements, external analyses in the 
form of advisory opinions will have to be obtained. These will have to make use of data 
from the Federal Statistical Office, the Institute for Employment Research of the Federal 
Employment Agency and, in particular, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 
(BAMF), the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB) and the 
Federal Institute for Population Research as well as the advisory services offered by these 
bodies. 
 
 This alliance will enable a transparent discourse on future labour requirements as well. 
Its composition and the assignment of tasks within it will reflect the actual distribution 
within society of responsibility for securing the labour base in Germany. In any event, 
labour and management, scientists and representatives of the Federal Government and 
Länder governments will be members of the alliance. 
 
The alliance will have the task of 
- advising on current and future developments in labour requirements and the labour 
supply 
by sector, region and qualification in Germany and 
- jointly assessing skilled labour shortages, based on indicators and bottleneck analyses. 
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The alliance will not have the task of developing an immigration point system or a 
blueprint for potential immigration. In order to make more precise projections and be 
better able to underpin our knowledge about how labour requirements will develop, the 
current and projected labour requirements of German businesses are to be recorded with 
the help of an index. Enterprises will be called upon to communicate their expectations 
regarding future labour requirements.  
 
The labour requirements index will be an early indicator for labour needs. It will show 
the findings of monthly, representative employer surveys in all sectors and company size 
classes. These surveys are to assess current and prospective labour requirements for the 
next six months.  
 
As part of its work, the alliance is to examine whether existing surveys could be refined 
and further developed for this or if it will be necessary to design a new survey. 
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Appendix B - Interview Guide 
 
 
Interview Questions 
 
1. 
 
G. Wer sind Sie und was ist der spezifische Auftrag ihrer Institution? 
E. How are you and what is the purpose of the institution you represent? 
 
2.  
 
G. Was ist der Standpunkt Ihrer Partei zur Migration von Fachkräften, speziell, wie sieht 
für Ihre Fraktion der ideale Arbeitsmigrant aus – unterscheiden Sie zwischen 
Arbeitsmigranten und anderen Migranten?  
 
E. What is the position of your Party/Institution/Group on skilled labour migration in 
Germany?  
 
3. 
 
S. Wo im AMSG hätten Sie gerne noch etwas verbessert oder Sachen hereingebracht, die 
die anderen Parteien nicht mitgetragen haben? 
 
E. What is your position on the 2009 Action Programme? Where do you see room for 
improvements? 
 
4. 
 
G. Welche Kriterien definieren Ihrer Meinung nach den optimalen Arbeitsmigranten in 
der Bundesrepublik, was sollten die oder der mitbringen um sich in den deutschen 
Arbeitsmarkt zu integrieren? 
 
E. What criteria define the optimal skilled foreign professional/ What is you definition of 
skilled foreign professional? What does he or she have to bring along?    
 
5. 
 
G. Inwieweit sollten wirtschaftliche überlegungen eine Rolle in the Migrationpolitik 
spielen 
 
E. To what degree should economic consideration influence immigration policy?   
 
 
 
6. 
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D. Glauben Sie, das auf Seiten der Politik ein gewisser Widerwille ist, sich von der 
Wirtschaft einspannen zu lassen, ohne die Kostenfrage vorher geklärt zu haben? Denn in 
den 70ger Jahren mussten von staatlicher Seite erhebliche Aufwendungen getätigt 
werden, die mit den Gastarbeitern entstanden waren. 
 
E. Do you believe that Germany’s politicians are apprehensive about liberalizing policy 
frameworks for skilled labour migration do to the social and economic costs of previous 
labour migration.  
  
7. 
 
E. Seit den 70ger Jahren, wo die Migrationspolitik fast ausschließlich aus humanitären 
Gründen geführt wurde, gab keine wirtschaftliche Migration mehr – jedenfalls nicht von 
staatlicher Seite. Sind da Möglichkeiten verpasst worden? 
 
G. Since the 1970s immigration to Germany has mainly been through asylum or family 
reuniom while labour migration has been more or less neglected. Do you think there were 
some missed opportunities in regards to skilled labour recruitment in the past?  
 
8. 
G. Asylpolitik und Zuwanderung von Fachkräften wird im selben politischen Forum, 
dem nnenausschuss, diskutiert. Es ist nicht ein Problem dass in Deutschland nicht genug 
differenziert werden kann zwischen Asyl- und Wirtschaftsmigration. 
 
E. Political debate on asylum and skilled labour migration tale place in the same political 
forum, the Innenausschuss. Do you think it appropriate that the humanitarian aspects of 
migration are discussed in the same political forum as labour immigration?  
 
9.  
 
G. Es gibt ja Überlegungen, ob wir nicht ein Punktesystem, wie in Australien, Kanada 
oder GB, um Fachkräfte einzuführen, was halten Sie von dieser Idee und  kann dies auch 
für den deutschen Arbeitsmarkt funktionieren? 
 
E. Where do you see the potential of a Canadian style Points Based Immigration in 
Germany?  
 
10. 
 
D: Wo sehen Sie das Arbeits- und Fachkräftepotential bei den „Neuen“  EU Staaten – 
Osteuropa-? Einige Sachen sind in dem Programm ja sehr spezifisch beschränkt auf die 
Akademiker. 
 
E. Where do you see the skilled labour potential of the new EU member states? The 2009 
Action Programme make specific reference of workers from the new EU member states.  
 366 
 
11. 
 
G. Bei diesem Aktionsprogramm dreht es sich ja auch um Hochschulabsolventen, die 
nach Deutschland kommen. Sehen Sie das als ein großes Arbeitskräftepotential? 
 
E. The Action Programme specifically references foreign graduates from German 
universities/ Where do you see the skilled labour potential of that group?  
 
12. 
  
G. Aber glauben Sie, dass die neuen Zuwanderung den Fachkräftemangel in Deutschland 
langfristig verhindern können?  
 
E. Do you think the immigration can reduce skilled labour demand in Germany in the 
long run? 
 
13. 
 
G. Wo sehen Sie das Arbeits- und Fachkräftepotential der hier in Deutschland 
gebundenen Migrantengeneration, die s.g. „Generation Rütli“? 
 
E. Where do you see the skilled labour potential of the migrant generation born in 
Germany?  
 
14. 
 
G. Warum, glauben Sie, sind die angelsächsischen Länder, wir USA, Kanada, Australien, 
GB , erfolgreicher als Deutschland, gerade Nichteuropäer im Arbeitsmarkt zu 
integrieren?  
 
E. Why are the English speaking countries more successful in integrating migrants into 
their labour markets? 
 
15. 
 
G. Stichwort : Rezession – glauben Sie dass die momentane globale Rezession die 
Migrationspolitik in Deutschland beeinflussen wird? Kann man mit weiteren 
Aktionsprogrammen rechnen, oder wird es eine Abschottung geben? 
 
E. What impact will the current recession have on the political debate on skilled labour 
migration in Germany? More liberal or more restrictive?  
 
16. 
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G. Deutschland ist ja der viel beschworene Exportweltmeister – da ist es dem Grunde 
nach widersprüchlich, wenn einerseits die Grenzöffnung für den Waren- und 
Güterverkehr gefordert wird und andererseits auf die strenge Reglementierung der 
Arbeitsmigranten zu beharren – dies ist ein Wirtschaftswiderspruch. 
 
E. Germany is an Export nation – isn’t it hypocrisy to promote free trade and open border 
but in turn insist on strict regulation for international labour mobility? 
 
17. 
 
G. Auf welcher politischen Ebene kann die Begrenzung der Fachkräfte am besten 
gesteuert werden: auf der lokalen Ebene, der Länderebene, Bundesebene oder auf der 
europäischen Ebene?  Wo sehen Sie Vor- und Nachteile? 
 
E.  What political scale is most appropriate for the management of the skilled labour 
migration? State, Federal or EU? Advantages / disadvantages? 
 
18. 
 
G. Warum, glauben Sie, dass diese die hier geführten Debatten sich häufig um Islam,& 
Kopftuch drehen, während die Liberalisierung der Arbeitsmärkte nicht so ein großes 
Thema darstellt? 
 
E. Why do you think topics like Islam and headscarfs are so emotionally debated in 
German politics while labour migration does not create that kind of response? 
 
19. 
 
S: Arbeitsmigration ist keine Einbahnstraße – 170.000 gingen in 2008 von Deutschland 
ins Ausland- ist dies ein Problem? 
 
E. Labour migration is not a one-way road? Do you think skilled labour emigration from 
Germany constitutes a problem? 
 
20. 
 
G. Was würden sie im Bezug auf die gesetzlichen Regelungen zur Zuwanderung 
Hoachqualifizierter verbessern?  
 
E. What aspect of skilled labour migration legislation would you improve?  
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Appendix C – Consent Form 
 
 
Insert Name of Research Proposal 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
(to be completed after Participant Information Sheet has been read) 
 
 
The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me.  I understand that this 
study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all procedures have been 
approved by the Loughborough University Ethical Advisory Committee. 
 
I have read and understood the information sheet and this consent form. 
 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation. 
 
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study. 
 
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage for any reason, 
and that I will not be required to explain my reasons for withdrawing. 
 
I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in strict confidence 
and will be kept anonymous and confidential to the researchers unless (under the 
statutory obligations of the agencies which the researchers are working with), it is 
judged that confidentiality will have to be breached for the safety of the 
participant or others.  
 
 
I agree to participate in this study. 
 
 
                    Your name 
 
 
 
              Your signature 
 
 
 
Signature of investigator 
 
 
 
                               Date 
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Appendix D – Manifest Codes 
 
X-narratives: Policy Specific Debate Items 
 
X 1: post-secondary/graduate narrative 
 
X 1.1 Waiving of priority check for graduates from new EU member states 
 
X 1.2 Open national labour market for graduates from non-EU countries but 
retaining priority check. 
 
X 1.3 Preferential access to labour market of graduates of oversees German 
language schools without priority check. 
 
X.  1.4 Allow German educated foreign students to retain residency & labour 
market access after graduation  
 
X 2: lower income threshold for highly skilled workers and entrepreneurs 
 
X.2.1 – income threshold remains too high 
 
X 2.2 – new income threshold is sufficient 
 
X3. Make Germany more attractive for skilled migrants workers 
  
 X3.H1 – recognition of foreign work credentials 
 
X4. Extend the limitation of freedom of movement of E8 + Rumania & Bulgaria migrants 
to 2011. 
 X4.1 – in support  
X 4.2 – opposed to it 
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A: Points based skilled immigration system 
 
 A1 – in favour 
 A2 – opposed 
 
B1 – international competition over best heads 
 
C: Purpose of skilled labour migration polices in Germany  
 
C1 – offsets effects of demographic transition 
C2 – alleviate immediate skilled labour shortage 
C3 – serve the interest of the national economy and employers 
 
 
F1: Skilled labour migration as part of wider policy initiative to mobilize and enable 
national labour force  
 
G1: Welfare Chauvinism 
 
Y1: Limit & restrict unskilled labour migration / control labour migration 
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Appendix E - Identified Manifest Codes in Bundesrat and Bundestag: 2005 
- 2009 
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Appendix F - Reflexivity of Research and Positionality of Researcher 
  
 This section discusses the way in which the research design and research process 
are conceptualized and critically evaluates the position of the researcher in relation to the 
research. The position of the researcher in relation to the research needs to be critically 
evaluated in order to determine its potential influence on aspects of the qualitative 
research, such as types of data collected and the way it is interpreted. The researcher's 
positionality, which according to Rose (1997, p. 308) can be defined in terms of race, 
nationality, age, gender, sexuality, social and economic status can influence the collection 
of data as well as its interpretation and by default the information that becomes coded as 
knowledge. According to Mansvelt et al. (2005, p. 254) knowledge does not exist 
independently of the people that created it. Instead all knowledge is partial, 
geographically, and temporally located because as researchers write and inscribe meaning 
into qualitative text, they are in fact constructing a partial and particular story. 
Consequently knowledge that is positioned or situated in a particular, geographical or 
temporary setting can no longer claim universality or neutrality of objectivity. Rose 
(1997) believes that researchers need to situate themselves and the interpretation of their 
data by reflexively examining their positionality. This reflexivity refers to a process of 
self-critique on the part of the researcher (Kobayashi, 1994). In other words, the 
researcher has to be aware of his or her positionality and consider its potential 
implication/how it impacts upon... during the data collection, data analysis, and data 
interpretation (Mansvelt et al., 2005). 
 In relation to this research project, appropriate measures have been taken to 
ensure that the researcher’s positionality is taken into consideration during the data 
collection and evaluation process. The researcher of the project speaks, reads, and writes 
German with native fluency and has a thorough understanding of the national German 
context of this study. At the same time the researcher’s Canadian nationality and 
association with a British university positions him outside the German national sphere in 
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the eyes of the interviewees. The researcher’s professional association with Canada and 
the United Kingdom has in a number of occasions facilitated access to interview 
candidates. Domestic German graduate researchers under the same circumstances would 
have had a more difficult time approaching the interview candidates, particularly in 
relation to the elected officials interviewed.54 
Even though the researcher was not affiliated with any political party in Germany, 
he was aware of his personal political leanings at all times during the analysis and 
interpretation of the collected qualitative data and ensured that all conclusions drawn 
from the data were made as impartial as possible. At the same time, the researcher kept 
his own ethnic background, citizenship, age, gender, as well as socio-economic status in 
mind while interpreting and writing-up the result of the qualitative data. Nevertheless, the 
researcher’s positionality in relation the data collection process could have been 
influenced by his ethnicity (white European), age (early thirties), and socio-economic 
status (university-educated). Even though half of the respondents were significantly older 
than the lead researcher, all interview respondents were also white European with post-
secondary qualifications including doctoral degrees. This created a level of familiarity 
and equality between the researcher and interview respondents during the interview and 
may have contributed to a more relaxed and open interview session. The researcher’s 
professional affiliation with a British University may have contributed to establishing a 
level of trust between respondents and researcher during the interviews.  
The issue of skilled labour migration and immigration in general was the subject 
of intense media, public, and political debate in Germany during the entire sampling 
period. The researcher was exposed to the public debate during his residence in Germany 
and the media debate through his regular consultation of the German news outlets. More 
significantly, every last interview respondent was very aware of the then current media, 
public, and political debate in Germany surrounding skilled labour migration and the 
overall situation of immigrants in the country. The data derived from the interviews and 
its associated knowledge is to a large degree temporally situated in the 2006 to 2010 
timeframe. However, since the 2009 Action Programme on Skilled Labour Migration was 
                                                
54 A number of the interviewed politicians stated that due to their busy schedules they normally do not do interviews 
with domestic graduate students.  
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debated and implemented during the 2005 to 2009 legislative period, the temporal 
situation of the qualitative data represents a vital aspect of the data. 
